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authorRasmus Dahlberg <rasmus@rgdd.se>2024-10-15 15:35:20 +0200
committerRasmus Dahlberg <rasmus@rgdd.se>2024-10-15 15:35:45 +0200
commit76bae02bcd7d6b3ec9eea428e5e95da184a8dbfb (patch)
tree410ab71c78c99d35aecd46733958a5699cdf5204 /slides/2021-surprise/src/body.tex
parent883a67439aff566962adafeb0385c6ae972073a3 (diff)
Rescue some slides from old private mono repos
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+\begin{frame}
+ %
+ % To explain the paper's contribution we can simply break down the title:
+ % privacy-preserving and incrementally deployable support for Certificate
+ % Transparency in Tor.
+ %
+ % To make a long story short, Tor Browser does not support Certificate
+ % Transparency. The reason why you want to do that is because it makes it
+ % possible to detect if visited websites are being impersonated or not.
+ %
+ % For example, an attacker may want to impersonate a website to steal a
+ % user's credit card number. It is also helpful to de-anonymize a Tor user.
+ %
+ % So, our work focus on adding support for Certificate Transparency in Tor
+ % Browser. We do that while focusing on two key properties.
+ %
+ % The proposed solution should be _privacy-preserving_. We achieve this
+ % because of and how we use Tor.
+ %
+ % The proposed solution should also be incrementally-deployable, and in the
+ % end have a stronger threat model than current Certificate Transparency
+ % deployments in Chrome and Safari that trust so-called CT logs blindly.
+ %
+ % In more detail, our incrementally-deployable design goes from:
+ % pairs of CT logs that are trusted blindly, to
+ % at least one CT log is trusted blindly, to
+ % no CT log that is trusted blindly.
+ %
+ % It is fair to say that we have a strong threat model where the attacker
+ % even has a zero-day exploit against Tor Browser. In spite of this very
+ % strong threat model, the involved performance overhead is modest.
+ %
+ % For more detail, please refer to our paper and/or watch the presentation.
+ %
+ \mktitle{Breaking down the title}
+ \begin{columns}
+ \begin{column}{0.55\textwidth}
+ \begin{itemize}
+ \item Support Certificate Transparency in Tor
+ \item Privacy-Preserving
+ \item Incrementally-deployable
+ \end{itemize}
+ \end{column}
+ \begin{column}{0.45\textwidth}
+ \centering\includegraphics[width=.5\columnwidth]{img/tb}
+ \end{column}
+ \end{columns}
+ \footnotetext[1]{\tiny{Paper: \url{https://petsymposium.org/2021/files/papers/issue2/popets-2021-0024.pdf}}}
+ \footnotetext[2]{\tiny{Presentation: \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f7yDJOd6g3U}}}
+\end{frame}