



# An Introduction to System Transparency Logging

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## Outline


1. Setting and problem
2. Design overview
3. How to get involved



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
## Our starting point

- Data publisher
- End-user
- Assumptions
  - ▶ Public key can be located
  - ▶ Signed data can be located
  - ▶ End-user can install extra tooling



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
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The attacker can compromise the data publisher


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
The attacker can compromise the data publisher  
The goal is to detect unwanted key-usage

## A quick step back—Transparency log crash course



- Tree head
- Consistency proof
- Inclusion proof

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The attacker can control the log

## Preparing a logging request


- Select a shard hint and checksum
- Sign using your private key

```
1  /*
2   * The logged Merkle tree leaf data
3   */
4  struct tree_leaf {
5      u64 shard_hint;
6      u8 checksum[32];
7      u8 signature[64];
8      u8 key_hash[32];
9  }
```

## Submitting a logging request


### Key-value pairs:

- Shard hint
- Checksum
- Signature
- Public key
- Domain hint




## Distributing proofs of public logging

- End-user will not talk to the log
- Proofs of logging
  - ▶ Inclusion proof
  - ▶ Tree head
- Witness cosigning



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The attacker can control a threshold of witnesses

## Summary and additional details

- Signed checksums
- Sharding
- Preserved data flows
- Anti-spam
- Global consistency
- Few simple parsers
- No cryptographic agility



## Get involved

- Feedback on our v0 design<sup>1</sup> and API<sup>2</sup>?
- Is this a service that you would use? Why (not)?
- Want to run an experimental log or witness?
- Implementation and tooling is still early-days
- Reach out via slack<sup>3</sup>, IRC<sup>4</sup>, GitHub, or DM



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<sup>1</sup><https://github.com/system-transparency/stfe/blob/design/doc/design.md>

<sup>2</sup><https://github.com/system-transparency/stfe/blob/design/doc/api.md>

<sup>3</sup><https://communityinviter.com/apps/system-transparency/join>

<sup>4</sup>`irc/oftc #siglog`