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authorRasmus Dahlberg <rasmus@rgdd.se>2024-10-15 16:08:16 +0200
committerRasmus Dahlberg <rasmus@rgdd.se>2024-10-15 16:08:16 +0200
commit385cc92bc91e1a6c3724085c060e76bf40c13ed3 (patch)
tree26d0a8f81f2caa472830fd40a51844bb202c1355 /summary/src/ctga/main.tex
Import PhD thesis
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+\begin{kaupaper}[
+ author={%
+ \textbf{Rasmus Dahlberg},
+ Tobias Pulls,
+ Jonathan Vestin,
+ Toke H{\o}iland-J{\o}rgensen, and
+ Andreas Kassler
+ },
+ title={%
+ Aggregation-Based Certificate Transparency Gossip
+ },
+ reference={%
+ SECURWARE (2019)
+ },
+ summary={%
+ Another often overlooked part of Certificate Transparency is that monitors
+ and end-users who browse websites must observe the same append-only
+ logs. For example, if the same append-only logs are not observed, an
+ end-user may connect to a website that serves a mis-issued certificate
+ that no monitor will discover. This would largely defeat the purpose of
+ public logging, which is why RFC~6962 specifies that multiple gossip
+ protocols should be defined separately in the future. We define one such
+ protocol that plugs into the (at the time current) idea of having
+ end-users interact with the logs through DNS. Our work is exploratory,
+ using recent advancements in programmable packet processors that allow
+ turning routers, switches, and network interface cards into
+ \emph{aggregators} of tree heads that the logs signed and transmitted in
+ plaintext via DNS. The aggregated tree heads are then used as a reference
+ while challenging the logs to prove consistency, thus protecting
+ entire vantage points from undetected split views. A different
+ network path (like Tor) can be used to break out of a local vantage point
+ to increase the likelihood of global consistency. If the security
+ definition for \emph{aggregation indistinguishability} is satisfied,
+ vantage points without an aggregator may also receive protection due to
+ herd immunity. Our P4 and XDP prototypes satisfy the notion of
+ aggregation indistinguishability at line-rate with regard to throughput.
+ Prevalent vantage points to roll out aggregation-based gossip include
+ autonomous systems and Internet exchange points that route the traffic of
+ many users. Our RIPE Atlas measurements show that 32 autonomous systems
+ could protect 30-50\% of the IPv4 space from undetected split views.
+ End-users merely need to use plaintext DNS for opt-in.
+ },
+ participation={\vspace{-.25cm}
+ Andreas and Tobias had the initial idea of exploring the intersection
+ between Certificate Transparency and programmable packet processors. I did most of the
+ design and writing with feedback from Tobias, our RIPE Atlas measurements,
+ and our performance benchmarks with Jonathan and Toke.
+ },
+ label={
+ paper:ctga
+ },
+]
+ \maketitle
+ \begin{abstract}
+ \input{src/ctga/src/abstract}
+ \end{abstract}
+
+ \input{src/ctga/src/introduction}
+ \input{src/ctga/src/background}
+ \input{src/ctga/src/design}
+ \input{src/ctga/src/implementation}
+ \input{src/ctga/src/measurements}
+ \input{src/ctga/src/related}
+ \input{src/ctga/src/discussion}
+ \input{src/ctga/src/conclusion}
+ \input{src/ctga/src/acknowledgments}
+
+ \bibliographystyle{plain}
+ \bibliography{src/ctga/src/ref}
+\end{kaupaper}