Import PhD thesis

author: Rasmus Dahlberg <rasmus@rgdd.se> 2024-10-15 16:08:16 +0200
committer: Rasmus Dahlberg <rasmus@rgdd.se> 2024-10-15 16:08:16 +0200
commit: 385cc92bc91e1a6c3724085c060e76bf40c13ed3 (patch)
tree: 26d0a8f81f2caa472830fd40a51844bb202c1355 /summary
178 files changed, 18568 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/summary/.gitignore b/summary/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..34841bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+*.aux
+*.fdb_latexmk
+*.fls
+*.log
+*.pap
+*.pcp
+*.sum
+*.toc
+*.bbl
+*.blg
+*.idx
+*.ilg
+*.ind
+*.log
+*.out
+*.run.xml
+main.pdf
diff --git a/summary/clean.sh b/summary/clean.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..0553bcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/clean.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+to_remove=$(cat .gitignore)
+
+rm -f $to_remove
+for subdir in $(ls -l src/ | grep '^d' | awk '{print $9}'); do
+	pushd src/$subdir >/dev/null
+	rm -f $to_remove
+	popd >/dev/null
+done
+
+clear
+ls -l
diff --git a/summary/kauclear.sty b/summary/kauclear.sty
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79f1705
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/kauclear.sty
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `kauclear.sty',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% kautools.dtx  (with options: `clear')
+%% 
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+%% 
+%% This file is part of the kauthesis bundle.
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3 or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `author-maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer and author of this work is Stefan Berthold.
+%% 
+%% This work consists of all files listed in manifest.txt.
+%% 
+%% kautools.dtx
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+\NeedsTeXFormat{LaTeX2e}[1999/12/01]
+\ProvidesPackage{kauclear}
+    [2014/10/22 v1.15 Karlstad University kautools bundle]
+\ProcessOptions\relax
+\newcommand\kuc@currentpagestyle{plain}
+\let\pagestyle@orig\pagestyle
+\renewcommand\pagestyle[1]{%
+  \renewcommand\kuc@currentpagestyle{#1}%
+  \pagestyle@orig{#1}%
+}
+\newcommand\kuc@restorepagestyle{%
+  \pagestyle@orig{\kuc@currentpagestyle}%
+}
+\let\cleardoubpage@orig\cleardoublepage
+\renewcommand\cleardoublepage{%
+  \clearpage%
+  \pagestyle@orig{empty}%
+  \cleardoubpage@orig%
+  \kuc@restorepagestyle%
+}
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `kauclear.sty'.
diff --git a/summary/kaucollection.cls b/summary/kaucollection.cls
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..000a356
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/kaucollection.cls
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `kaucollection.cls',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% kauthesis.dtx  (with options: `collection')
+%% 
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+%% 
+%% This file is part of the kauthesis bundle.
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3 or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `author-maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer and author of this work is Stefan Berthold.
+%% 
+%% This work consists of all files listed in manifest.txt.
+%% 
+%% kauthesis.dtx
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+\NeedsTeXFormat{LaTeX2e}[1999/12/01]
+\ProvidesClass{kaucollection}
+    [2014/12/04 v1.16 Karlstad University thesis layout]
+\LoadClass{article}
+\RequirePackage{kauclear}
+\RequirePackage{kaumeta}
+\RequirePackage{kaulist}
+\RequirePackage{kaulanguage}
+\RequirePackage{kaustudies}
+\RequirePackage{kauenvironments}
+\RequirePackage{tikz}
+\RequirePackage{kaupaper}
+\ProcessOptions\relax
+\AtBeginDocument{%
+  \setname{acknowledgementname}{Acknowledgements}{Tacks\"agelser}%
+}
+\AtBeginDocument{%
+  \setname{keywordname}{Keywords}{Nyckelord}%
+}
+\AtBeginDocument{%
+  \setname{introname}{Introductory Summary}{Inledande sammanfattning}%
+}
+\let\kauths@maketitle\maketitle
+\renewcommand\maketitle{%
+  \PackageWarning{maketitle does not serve any purpose in this class.
+    The abstract environment reproduces the title instead.}%
+}
+\let\kauths@abstract\abstract%
+\let\kauths@endabstract\endabstract%
+\newcommand*\frontmatter{%
+  \clearpage%
+  \setcounter{page}{3}%
+  \renewcommand\thepage{\roman{page}}%
+  \renewenvironment{abstract}{%
+    \newcommand\keywords{\paragraph{\keywordname:}}%
+    \newenvironment{english}{%
+      \renewcommand\keywords{\paragraph{Keywords:}}%
+      \section*{Abstract}%
+    }{%
+    }
+    \cleardoublepage%
+    \section*{\@title}%
+    \textsc{\prettylist{\@author}}\par%
+    \noindent\textit{\@institute}%
+    \section*{\abstractname}%
+  }{%
+    \cleardoublepage%
+  }%
+}
+\newenvironment{acknowledgements}{%
+  \cleardoublepage%
+  \section*{\acknowledgementname}%
+}{%
+  \par\bigskip\bigskip\bigskip\noindent\@place, \@date\hfill \prettylist{\@author}%
+  \cleardoublepage%
+}
+\let\kauths@tableofcontents\tableofcontents
+\renewcommand\tableofcontents{%
+  \cleardoublepage%
+  \kauths@tableofcontents%
+}
+\newcommand\mainmatter[1][]{%
+  \cleardoublepage%
+  \renewenvironment{abstract}{\kauths@abstract}{\kauths@endabstract}%
+  \setcounter{page}{1}%
+  \pagenumbering{arabic}%
+  \kaupart*[body={#1}]{\introname}%
+}
+\newcommand\vanityquote[2]{%
+  \begin{tikzpicture}[remember picture,overlay]%
+    \path (current page.south east) +(-3,3.5)%
+      node%
+        [ anchor=south east%
+        , font=\large%
+        , text width=28em%
+        ] {\raggedleft``#1\rlap{''}%
+           \normalfont\par\medskip\itshape #2\par};%
+  \end{tikzpicture}%
+}
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `kaucollection.cls'.
diff --git a/summary/kauenvironments.sty b/summary/kauenvironments.sty
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..15dd4c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/kauenvironments.sty
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `kauenvironments.sty',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% kautools.dtx  (with options: `environments')
+%% 
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+%% 
+%% This file is part of the kauthesis bundle.
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3 or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `author-maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer and author of this work is Stefan Berthold.
+%% 
+%% This work consists of all files listed in manifest.txt.
+%% 
+%% kautools.dtx
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+\NeedsTeXFormat{LaTeX2e}[1999/12/01]
+\ProvidesPackage{kauenvironments}
+    [2014/10/22 v1.15 Karlstad University kautools bundle]
+\ProcessOptions\relax
+\RequirePackage{xspace}
+\RequirePackage{xcolor}
+\newenvironment{researchquestions}%
+  {\begin{enumerate}%
+    \let\kue@item\item%
+    \renewcommand\item[1][Research question]%
+      {\kue@item\emph{##1}\nopagebreak\par}%
+  }%
+  {\end{enumerate}}%
+\newenvironment{contributions}%
+  {\begin{enumerate}%
+    \let\kue@item\item%
+    \renewcommand\item[1][%
+      \textcolor{red}{\emph{write your contribution between brackets
+        as optional argument of \texttt{\string\item}.}}]%
+      {\kue@item\emph{##1}\nopagebreak\par}%
+  }%
+  {\end{enumerate}}%
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `kauenvironments.sty'.
diff --git a/summary/kauhead.sty b/summary/kauhead.sty
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14f3a62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/kauhead.sty
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `kauhead.sty',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% kauprotocol.dtx  (with options: `head')
+%% 
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+%% 
+%% This file is part of the kauthesis bundle.
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3 or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `author-maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer and author of this work is Stefan Berthold.
+%% 
+%% This work consists of all files listed in manifest.txt.
+%% 
+%% kauprotocol.dtx
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+\NeedsTeXFormat{LaTeX2e}[1999/12/01]
+\ProvidesPackage{kauhead}
+    [2013/09/11 v1.11 Karlstad University protocol bundle]
+\ProcessOptions\relax
+\RequirePackage[urw-garamond]{mathdesign}
+\RequirePackage[paper=a4,pagesize]{typearea}
+\RequirePackage{xkeyval}
+\RequirePackage{graphicx}
+\RequirePackage{tikz}
+\RequirePackage{ragged2e}
+\define@cmdkeys[kauhed]{general}[kauhed@]%
+  { title, date%
+  , faculty, department%
+  , logofile%
+  }
+\newcommand\headdata[1]{\setkeys[kauhed]{general}{#1}}
+\setkeys[kauhed]{general}%
+  { title=, date=\today%
+  , faculty={Faculty of Health, Science and Technology}%
+  , department={Department of Mathematics and Computer Science}%
+  , logofile={kau_2012_cmyk_eps_14679}%
+  }
+\let\kauhed@maketitle\maketitle
+\renewcommand\maketitle{
+  \thispagestyle{empty}
+  \begin{tikzpicture}[overlay,remember picture]
+    \path (current page.north)
+      node[below=5mm, text centered, text width=\textwidth] (top)
+      {\includegraphics[width=33mm]{\kauhed@logofile}\\[3mm]%
+      \kauhed@faculty\\%
+      \kauhed@department}
+    ;
+  \end{tikzpicture}
+  \vspace{1.5cm}\\
+  \mbox{}\hfill\kauhed@date\\
+  \centering\Large\scshape\kauhed@title\\
+  \justifying\normalfont\bigskip\normalsize
+}
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `kauhead.sty'.
diff --git a/summary/kaulanguage.sty b/summary/kaulanguage.sty
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e87df75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/kaulanguage.sty
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `kaulanguage.sty',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% kautools.dtx  (with options: `language')
+%% 
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+%% 
+%% This file is part of the kauthesis bundle.
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3 or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `author-maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer and author of this work is Stefan Berthold.
+%% 
+%% This work consists of all files listed in manifest.txt.
+%% 
+%% kautools.dtx
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+\ProvidesPackage{kaulanguage}
+    [2014/10/22 v1.15 Karlstad University kautools bundle]
+\ProcessOptions\relax
+\newif\ifbabel
+\babelfalse
+\AtBeginDocument{%
+  \@ifpackageloaded{babel}%
+    {\babeltrue}%
+    {\babelfalse}%
+}
+\newcommand\setname[3]{%
+  \IfFileExists{swedish.ldf}{%
+    \ifbabel%
+      \expandafter\edef\csname #1\endcsname{\noexpand\iflanguage{swedish}{#3}{#2}}%
+    \else%
+      \expandafter\edef\csname #1\endcsname{#2}%
+    \fi%
+  }%
+  {\expandafter\edef\csname #1\endcsname{#2}}%
+}
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `kaulanguage.sty'.
diff --git a/summary/kaulist.sty b/summary/kaulist.sty
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..322ccb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/kaulist.sty
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `kaulist.sty',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% kautools.dtx  (with options: `list')
+%% 
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+%% 
+%% This file is part of the kauthesis bundle.
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3 or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `author-maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer and author of this work is Stefan Berthold.
+%% 
+%% This work consists of all files listed in manifest.txt.
+%% 
+%% kautools.dtx
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+\NeedsTeXFormat{LaTeX2e}[1999/12/01]
+\ProvidesPackage{kaulist}
+    [2014/10/22 v1.15 Karlstad University kautools bundle]
+\ProcessOptions\relax
+\RequirePackage{kaulanguage}
+\RequirePackage{tikz}
+\AtBeginDocument{%
+  \setname{commasign}{}{,}%
+}
+\AtBeginDocument{%
+  \setname{andname}{and}{och}%
+}
+\newcommand\prettylist[1]{%
+  \foreach[count=\xi] \x in #1 {}%
+  \let\num=\xi%
+  \foreach[count=\xi] \x in #1 {%
+    \ifnum \xi=1%
+      \x%
+    \else%
+      \ifnum \xi=\num%
+        \ifnum \num=2%
+          {} \andname{} \x%
+        \else%
+          \commasign{} \andname{} \x%
+        \fi%
+      \else%
+        , \x%
+      \fi%
+    \fi%
+  }%
+}%
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `kaulist.sty'.
diff --git a/summary/kaumasters.cls b/summary/kaumasters.cls
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e76504b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/kaumasters.cls
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `kaumasters.cls',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% kauthesis.dtx  (with options: `masters')
+%% 
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+%% 
+%% This file is part of the kauthesis bundle.
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3 or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `author-maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer and author of this work is Stefan Berthold.
+%% 
+%% This work consists of all files listed in manifest.txt.
+%% 
+%% kauthesis.dtx
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+\NeedsTeXFormat{LaTeX2e}[1999/12/01]
+\ProvidesClass{kaumasters}
+    [2014/12/04 v1.16 Karlstad University thesis layout]
+\LoadClass{article}
+\RequirePackage{kauclear}
+\RequirePackage{kaumeta}
+\RequirePackage{kaulist}
+\RequirePackage{kaulanguage}
+\newif\if@kaufont\@kaufontfalse
+\DeclareOption{garamond}{\@kaufonttrue}
+\ProcessOptions\relax
+\if@kaufont
+\RequirePackage{garamondx}
+\RequirePackage[garamondx,cmbraces]{newtxmath}
+\fi
+\RequirePackage[paper=a4,pagesize,twoside=semi]{typearea}
+\AtBeginDocument{%
+  \setname{acknowledgementname}{Acknowledgements}{Tacks\"agelser}%
+}
+\AtBeginDocument{%
+  \setname{keywordname}{Keywords}{Nyckelord}%
+}
+\AtBeginDocument{%
+  \setname{approvalname}{Approved}{Godk\"and}%
+}
+\AtBeginDocument{%
+  \setname{examinationname}{Master's degree}{magisterexamen}%
+}
+\AtBeginDocument{%
+  \setname{approvaltext}%
+    {This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the %
+      requirements for the \examinationname{} in Computer Science. %
+      All material in this thesis which is not my own work has been %
+      identified and no material is included for which a degree has %
+      previously been conferred.}%
+    {Denna uppsats \"ar skriven som en del av det arbete som kr\"avs %
+      f\"or att erh\aa lla en \examinationname{} i datavetenskap. Allt %
+      material i denna rapport, vilket inte \"ar mitt eget, har blivit %
+      tydligt identifierat och inget material \"ar inkluderat som %
+      tidigare anv\"ants f\"or erh\aa llande av annan examen.}%
+}
+\AtBeginDocument{%
+  \setname{supervisorname}{Supervisor}{Handledare}%
+}
+\AtBeginDocument{%
+  \setname{examinername}{Examiner}{Examinator}%
+}
+\let\kauths@maketitle\maketitle
+\renewcommand\maketitle{%
+  \PackageWarning{maketitle does not serve any purpose in this class.
+    The abstract environment reproduces the title instead.}%
+}
+\let\kauths@abstract\abstract%
+\let\kauths@endabstract\endabstract%
+\newcommand*\frontmatter{%
+  \clearpage%
+  \setcounter{page}{3}%
+  \renewcommand\thepage{\roman{page}}%
+  \renewenvironment{abstract}{%
+    \newcommand\keywords{\paragraph{\keywordname:}}%
+    \newenvironment{english}{%
+      \renewcommand\keywords{\paragraph{Keywords:}}%
+      \section*{Abstract}%
+    }{%
+    }
+    \cleardoublepage%
+    \section*{\@title}%
+    \textsc{\prettylist{\@author}}\par%
+    \noindent\textit{\@institute}%
+    \section*{\abstractname}%
+  }{%
+    \cleardoublepage%
+  }%
+}
+\newcommand\approvalpage{%
+  \cleardoublepage%
+  \newcommand\sig{\makebox[7cm]{\hrulefill}\\}%
+  \newcommand\signer[1]{\begin{quote}\sig ##1\end{quote}\mbox{}}%
+  \noindent\approvaltext\\\mbox{}\bigskip%
+  \foreach \x in \@author {\signer{\x}}%
+  \\\mbox{}\bigskip\\\mbox{}\bigskip%
+  \approvalname,\\\mbox{}\bigskip%
+  \begin{quote}%
+    \sig\supervisorname: \@supervisor\\\mbox{}\bigskip\\%
+    \sig\examinername: \@examiner
+  \end{quote}%
+}
+\newenvironment{acknowledgements}{%
+  \cleardoublepage%
+  \section*{\acknowledgementname}%
+}{%
+  \par\bigskip\bigskip\bigskip\noindent\@place, \@date\hfill \prettylist{\@author}%
+  \cleardoublepage%
+}
+\let\kauths@tableofcontents\tableofcontents
+\renewcommand\tableofcontents{%
+  \cleardoublepage%
+  \kauths@tableofcontents%
+}
+\newcommand\mainmatter[1][]{%
+  \cleardoublepage%
+  \renewenvironment{abstract}{\kauths@abstract}{\kauths@endabstract}%
+  \setcounter{page}{1}%
+  \pagenumbering{arabic}%
+}
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `kaumasters.cls'.
diff --git a/summary/kaumeeting.cls b/summary/kaumeeting.cls
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..638be63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/kaumeeting.cls
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `kaumeeting.cls',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% kauprotocol.dtx  (with options: `meeting')
+%% 
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+%% 
+%% This file is part of the kauthesis bundle.
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3 or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `author-maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer and author of this work is Stefan Berthold.
+%% 
+%% This work consists of all files listed in manifest.txt.
+%% 
+%% kauprotocol.dtx
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+\NeedsTeXFormat{LaTeX2e}[1999/12/01]
+\ProvidesClass{kaumeeting}
+    [2013/09/11 v1.11 Karlstad University protocol bundle]
+\ProcessOptions\relax
+\LoadClass{article}
+\RequirePackage{kauhead}
+\RequirePackage{tabularx}
+\define@cmdkeys[kaumet]{general}[kaumet@]%
+  { meeting, protocol, place%
+  , start, end%
+  , participants, excused, missing%
+  , distribution%
+  }
+\define@cmdkey[kaumet]{general}[kaumet@]{date}%
+  {\setkeys[kauhed]{general}{date={#1}}}
+\define@cmdkey[kaumet]{general}[kaumet@]{faculty}%
+  {\setkeys[kauhed]{general}{faculty={#1}}}
+\define@cmdkey[kaumet]{general}[kaumet@]{department}%
+  {\setkeys[kauhed]{general}{department={#1}}}
+\define@cmdkey[kaumet]{general}[kaumet@]{logofile}%
+  {\setkeys[kauhed]{general}{logofile={#1}}}
+\newcommand\metadata[1]{\setkeys[kaumet]{general}{#1}}
+\setkeys[kauhed]{general}{title=Meeting record}%
+\setkeys[kaumet]{general}%
+  { meeting=, protocol=, place=%
+  , date=\today, start=, end=%
+  , participants=, excused=, missing=%
+  , distribution=%
+  , faculty={Faculty of Health, Science and Technology}%
+  , department={Department of Mathematics and Computer Science}%
+  , logofile={kau_2012_cmyk_eps_14679}%
+  }
+\let\kaumet@maketitle\maketitle
+\renewcommand\maketitle{
+  \kaumet@maketitle%
+  \noindent\small%
+  \begin{tabularx}{\textwidth}{@{}>{\bfseries\vphantom{Xy}}rX}
+    subject & \kaumet@meeting\\
+    place & \kaumet@place\\
+    start & \kaumet@start\\
+    end & \kaumet@end\\
+    participants & \kaumet@participants\\
+    recording & \kaumet@protocol\\
+    excused & \kaumet@excused\\
+    missing & \kaumet@missing\\
+    distribution & \kaumet@distribution
+  \end{tabularx}\smallskip
+  \justifying\normalfont\normalsize
+}
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `kaumeeting.cls'.
diff --git a/summary/kaumeta.sty b/summary/kaumeta.sty
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d1758d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/kaumeta.sty
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `kaumeta.sty',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% kautools.dtx  (with options: `meta')
+%% 
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+%% 
+%% This file is part of the kauthesis bundle.
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3 or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `author-maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer and author of this work is Stefan Berthold.
+%% 
+%% This work consists of all files listed in manifest.txt.
+%% 
+%% kautools.dtx
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+\NeedsTeXFormat{LaTeX2e}[1999/12/01]
+\ProvidesPackage{kaumeta}
+    [2014/10/22 v1.15 Karlstad University kautools bundle]
+\ProcessOptions\relax
+\usepackage{ifthen}
+\newcommand*\@subject{}
+\newcommand\subject[1]{\renewcommand*\@subject{#1}}
+\newcommand*\@institute{}
+\newcommand*\@shortinstitute{}
+\newcommand\institute[2][]{%
+  \renewcommand*\@institute{#2}%
+  \ifthenelse{\equal{#1}{}}{%
+    \renewcommand*\@shortinstitute{#2}%
+  }{%
+    \renewcommand*\@shortinstitute{#1}%
+  }%
+}
+\newcommand*\@place{}
+\newcommand\place[1]{\renewcommand*\@place{#1}}
+\newcommand\@supervisor{}
+\newcommand\supervisor[1]{\renewcommand*\@supervisor{#1}}
+\newcommand\@examiner{}
+\newcommand\examiner[1]{\renewcommand*\@examiner{#1}}
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `kaumeta.sty'.
diff --git a/summary/kaunote.cls b/summary/kaunote.cls
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..13742af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/kaunote.cls
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `kaunote.cls',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% kauprotocol.dtx  (with options: `note')
+%% 
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+%% 
+%% This file is part of the kauthesis bundle.
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3 or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `author-maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer and author of this work is Stefan Berthold.
+%% 
+%% This work consists of all files listed in manifest.txt.
+%% 
+%% kauprotocol.dtx
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+\NeedsTeXFormat{LaTeX2e}[1999/12/01]
+\ProvidesClass{kaunote}
+    [2013/09/11 v1.11 Karlstad University protocol bundle]
+\ProcessOptions\relax
+\LoadClass{article}
+\RequirePackage{kauhead}
+\newcommand\metadata[1]{\setkeys[kauhed]{general}{#1}}
+\let\kaunot@title\title
+\renewcommand\title[1]{\setkeys[kauhed]{general}{title={#1}}}
+\let\kaunot@maketitle\maketitle
+\renewcommand\maketitle{%
+  \kaunot@maketitle\par\medskip\@afterindentfalse\@afterheading%
+}
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `kaunote.cls'.
diff --git a/summary/kaupaper.sty b/summary/kaupaper.sty
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..505072a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/kaupaper.sty
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `kaupaper.sty',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% kautools.dtx  (with options: `paper')
+%% 
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+%% 
+%% This file is part of the kauthesis bundle.
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3 or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `author-maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer and author of this work is Stefan Berthold.
+%% 
+%% This work consists of all files listed in manifest.txt.
+%% 
+%% kautools.dtx
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+\NeedsTeXFormat{LaTeX2e}[1999/12/01]
+\ProvidesPackage{kaupaper}
+    [2014/10/22 v1.15 Karlstad University kautools bundle]
+\RequirePackage{xkeyval}
+\PassOptionsToPackage{hypertexnames=false}{hyperref}
+
+\define@cmdkeys[kua]{paper}[kua@]{author,title,subtitle,refprefix,reference,refnote,email,refstr,vanity,subdelimiter,label,summary,limitations,participation}
+\define@cmdkeys[kua]{paperlist}[kua@]{printparticipation,tocline}
+\setkeys[kua]{paper}{refstr=\reprintedname}
+
+\ProcessOptionsX[kua]<paper>
+
+\RequirePackage{kauparts}
+\RequirePackage{ifthen}
+\RequirePackage{tikz}
+
+\RequirePackage{ragged2e}
+\RequirePackage{hyphenat}
+
+\RequirePackage{kaulanguage}
+
+\AtBeginDocument{%
+  \setname{reprintedname}{Reprinted from}{Ursprungligen publicertad i}%
+  \setname{appendedpapersname}{List of Appended Papers}{Bifogade publiceringar}%
+  \setname{participationname}{Comments on my Participation}{Kommentarer p\aa{} min medverka}%
+  \setname{papername}{Paper}{Publicering}%
+}
+
+\newcounter{kua@section}
+\newcounter{kua@equation}
+\newcounter{kua@figure}
+\newcounter{kua@table}
+
+\newcounter{kua@paper}
+
+\providecommand\thepaper{}
+\providecommand\thepapertitle{}
+
+\newcommand\kua@warning\relax
+\newcommand\kua@dowarn{\gdef\kua@warning{\@latex@warning@no@line{List data created from the kaupaper environment was outdated. Rerun to get the lists right}}}
+\AtEndDocument{\kua@warning}
+
+\newcommand\kua@listof[4]{%
+  \IfFileExists{\jobname.#1}%
+    {% check whether empty file
+      \newread\reader%
+      \openin\reader\jobname.#1%
+      \read\reader to \readmacro%
+      \ifeof\reader%
+        \textcolor{red}{\ldots{} will be available after the next \LaTeX{} run.}%
+        \@starttoc{#1}%
+        %\AtEndDocument{\@latex@warning@no@line{Rerun to get the list of #2 right}}%
+        \kua@dowarn%
+      \else% file not empty -> create list
+        #3\@starttoc{#1}#4%
+      \fi%
+    }%
+    {% file does not exist
+      \textcolor{red}{\ldots{} will be available after the next \LaTeX{} run.}%
+      \@starttoc{#1}%
+      %\AtEndDocument{\@latex@warning@no@line{Rerun to get the list of #2 right}}%
+      \kua@dowarn%
+    }%
+}
+\newcommand\listofpapers[1][]{%
+  \setkeys[kua]{paperlist}{printparticipation=yes,tocline=yes,#1}
+  \section*{\appendedpapersname}%
+  \ifthenelse{\equal{\kua@tocline}{yes}}{%
+    \addcontentsline{toc}{section}{\appendedpapersname}%
+  }{}%
+  \kua@listof{pap}{appended papers}{%
+    \begin{enumerate}%
+    \renewcommand\theenumi{\textbf{\Roman{enumi}}}%
+  }{\end{enumerate}}%
+  \ifthenelse{\equal{\kua@printparticipation}{yes}}{%
+    \subsection*{\participationname}%
+    \kua@listof{pcp}{participation in appended papers}{}{}%
+  }{}%
+}
+
+\newcommand\l@paper[2]{%
+  \item #1%
+}
+
+\newcommand\listofsummaries{%
+  \kua@listof{sum}{paper summaries}{}{}%
+}
+
+\newcommand\l@summary[2]{%
+  #1%
+}
+
+\newcommand\l@limit[2]{%
+  %\paragraph{Limitations.}
+  #1%
+}
+
+\newcommand\l@participation[2]{%
+  #1%
+}
+
+\newcommand\papercover{%
+  \begin{tikzpicture}[remember picture,overlay]%
+    \path (current page.center)%
+      node%
+        [ node distance=\baselineskip%
+        , text width=\textwidth%
+        , text centered%
+        ] (refstr) {\kua@refstr};%
+      \ifthenelse{\equal{\kua@subtitle}{}}{%
+        \node%
+          [ node distance=1.5\baselineskip%
+          , above=of refstr%
+          , text width=\textwidth%
+          , text centered%
+          , font=\LARGE\bfseries%
+          ] {\nohyphens{\kua@title}};%
+      }{%
+        \node%
+          [ node distance=1.5\baselineskip%
+          , above=of refstr%
+          , text width=\textwidth%
+          , text centered%
+          , font=\large\bfseries%
+          ] (sub) {\nohyphens{\kua@subtitle}};%
+        \node%
+          [ node distance=1pt%
+          , above=of sub%
+          , text width=\textwidth%
+          , text centered%
+          , font=\LARGE\bfseries%
+          ] {\nohyphens{\kua@title}};%
+      }%
+      \node%
+        [ node distance=\baselineskip%
+        , below=of refstr%
+        , text width=\textwidth%
+        , text centered%
+        , font=\large%
+        ] {\nohyphens{\kua@reference}\ifthenelse{\equal{\kua@refnote}{}}{}{\mbox{}\\\medskip\nohyphens{\kua@refnote}}}%
+    ;%
+  \end{tikzpicture}%
+}
+
+\newenvironment{kaupaper}[1][]{%
+  \setcounter{kua@section}{\value{section}}%
+  \setcounter{kua@equation}{\value{equation}}%
+  \setcounter{kua@figure}{\value{figure}}%
+  \setcounter{kua@table}{\value{table}}%
+  \setcounter{section}{0}%
+  \setcounter{equation}{0}%
+  \setcounter{figure}{0}%
+  \setcounter{table}{0}%
+  \setkeys[kua]{paper}{subtitle=,vanity=,subdelimiter={---},refprefix=,refnote=,label=,summary={\string\textcolor{red}{Use the \string\texttt{summary} key in the \string\texttt{kaupaper} environment to add a summary.}},participation={\string\textcolor{red}{Use the \string\texttt{participation} key in the \string\texttt{kaupaper} environment to add a comment.}},limitations={},#1}%
+  \setcounter{kua@paper}{\value{kup@part}}\stepcounter{kua@paper}%
+  \kaupart[tocentry=false,label=\kua@label,body=\papercover\kua@vanity]{\papername}%
+  \ifthenelse{\equal{\kua@subtitle}{}}%
+    {\ifthenelse{\equal{\kua@refnote}{}}%
+      {\addcontentsline{pap}{paper}{\kua@author. \kua@title. \kua@refprefix\kua@reference.}}%
+      {\addcontentsline{pap}{paper}{\kua@author. \kua@title. \kua@refprefix\kua@reference.\smallskip\\\kua@refnote}}%
+     \addcontentsline{toc}{part}{\textsc{\papername} \Roman{kua@paper}: \\\kua@title}}%
+    {\ifthenelse{\equal{\kua@refnote}{}}%
+      {\addcontentsline{pap}{paper}{\kua@author. \kua@title\kua@subdelimiter\kua@subtitle. \kua@refprefix\kua@reference.}}%
+      {\addcontentsline{pap}{paper}{\kua@author. \kua@title\kua@subdelimiter\kua@subtitle. \kua@refprefix\kua@reference.\smallskip\\\kua@refnote}}%
+     \addcontentsline{toc}{part}{\textsc{\papername} \Roman{kua@paper}: \\\kua@title\kua@subdelimiter\kua@subtitle}}%
+  \addcontentsline{sum}{summary}{\string\subsubsection*{\papername~\Roman{kua@paper} -- \kua@title}\kua@summary}%
+  \ifthenelse{\equal{\kua@limitations}{}}{}{%
+    \addcontentsline{sum}{limit}{\kua@limitations}}%
+  \addcontentsline{pcp}{participation}{\string\paragraph{\papername~\Roman{kua@paper}}\kua@participation}%
+  \renewcommand*\thepaper{\papername~\Roman{kua@paper}}%
+  \renewcommand*\thepapertitle{\kua@title}%
+  \renewcommand\maketitle{%
+    \thispagestyle{plain}%
+    \centering%
+      \Large\bfseries%
+      \vspace*{0.15\textheight}%
+      \kua@title\par%
+      \addvspace{1ex}%
+      \ifthenelse{\equal{\kua@subtitle}{}}{}{\large\kua@subtitle}%
+      \par\addvspace{\baselineskip}%
+      \normalsize%
+      \kua@author\\[0.25\baselineskip]%
+      \normalfont%
+    \par\addvspace{2\baselineskip}\justifying%
+  }%
+}{%
+  \setcounter{section}{\value{kua@section}}%
+  \setcounter{equation}{\value{kua@equation}}%
+  \setcounter{figure}{\value{kua@figure}}%
+  \setcounter{table}{\value{kua@table}}%
+  \clearpage%
+}
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `kaupaper.sty'.
diff --git a/summary/kauparts.sty b/summary/kauparts.sty
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5252ba6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/kauparts.sty
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `kauparts.sty',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% kautools.dtx  (with options: `parts')
+%% 
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+%% 
+%% This file is part of the kauthesis bundle.
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3 or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `author-maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer and author of this work is Stefan Berthold.
+%% 
+%% This work consists of all files listed in manifest.txt.
+%% 
+%% kautools.dtx
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+\NeedsTeXFormat{LaTeX2e}[1999/12/01]
+\ProvidesPackage{kauparts}
+    [2014/10/22 v1.15 Karlstad University kautools bundle]
+\RequirePackage{xkeyval}
+
+\define@cmdkeys[kup]{pkg}[kup@]{vshift,vstep}
+\setkeys[kup]{pkg}{vshift=2,vstep=0.8}
+
+\ProcessOptionsX[kup]<pkg>
+
+\RequirePackage{calc}
+\RequirePackage{ifthen}
+\RequirePackage{suffix}
+\RequirePackage{tikz}
+\usetikzlibrary{positioning}
+
+\define@cmdkeys[kup]{part}[kup@]{body,label}
+\define@boolkeys[kup]{part}[kup@]{tocentry}
+
+\newcounter{kup@part}
+\newcounter{kup@vertical}
+\setcounter{kup@vertical}{0}
+
+\newcommand*\@titlepagestyle{empty}
+\newcommand\titlepagestyle[1]{\renewcommand*\@titlepagestyle{#1}}
+
+\newcommand\kup@partheadline[2]{%
+  \path[node distance=1ex] (current page.north east) +(3pt,\kup@vshift+\kup@vstep*\arabic{kup@vertical}) %
+    node%
+      [ anchor=north east%
+      , minimum width=2cm+3pt%
+      %, minimum height=7mm%
+      %, draw=black%
+      %, fill=black%
+      , left color=white%
+      , right color=black%
+      , text=white%
+      , font=\LARGE\bfseries%
+      ] (bar) {#1}%
+    node[base left=of bar,font=\LARGE\bfseries] {#2};%
+}
+\newcommand\kaupart[2][]{%
+  \cleardoublepage%
+  \thispagestyle{\@titlepagestyle}%
+  \stepcounter{kup@part}%
+  \setkeys[kup]{part}{body=\relax,label=,tocentry=true,#1}%
+  \providecommand\phantomsection{}%
+  \phantomsection%
+  \ifkup@tocentry%
+    \addcontentsline{toc}{part}{\numberline{\Roman{kup@part}}\textsc{#2}}%
+  \fi%
+  \renewcommand\@currentlabel{\Roman{kup@part}}%
+  \ifthenelse{\equal{\kup@label}{}}{}{\label{\kup@label}}%
+  \begin{tikzpicture}[remember picture,overlay,yscale=-1]%
+    \kup@partheadline{\Roman{kup@part}}{#2}%
+  \end{tikzpicture}%
+  \kup@body
+  \stepcounter{kup@vertical}%
+  \cleardoublepage%
+}
+\WithSuffix\newcommand\kaupart*[2][]{%
+  \cleardoublepage%
+  \thispagestyle{\@titlepagestyle}%
+  \setkeys[kup]{part}{body=\relax,tocentry=true,#1}%
+  \providecommand\phantomsection{}%
+  \phantomsection%
+  \ifkup@tocentry%
+    \addcontentsline{toc}{part}{\textsc{#2}}%
+  \fi%
+  \begin{tikzpicture}[remember picture,overlay,yscale=-1]%
+    \kup@partheadline{\vphantom{X}}{#2}%
+  \end{tikzpicture}%
+  \kup@body
+  \stepcounter{kup@vertical}%
+  \cleardoublepage%
+}
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `kauparts.sty'.
diff --git a/summary/kaureport.cls b/summary/kaureport.cls
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8de211
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/kaureport.cls
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `kaureport.cls',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% kauthesis.dtx  (with options: `report')
+%% 
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+%% 
+%% This file is part of the kauthesis bundle.
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3 or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `author-maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer and author of this work is Stefan Berthold.
+%% 
+%% This work consists of all files listed in manifest.txt.
+%% 
+%% kauthesis.dtx
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+\NeedsTeXFormat{LaTeX2e}[1999/12/01]
+\ProvidesClass{kaureport}
+    [2014/12/04 v1.16 Karlstad University thesis layout]
+\LoadClass{article}
+\RequirePackage{kauclear}
+\RequirePackage{kaumeta}
+\RequirePackage{kaulist}
+\RequirePackage{kaulanguage}
+\RequirePackage{kaustudies}
+\RequirePackage{kauenvironments}
+\RequirePackage{tikz}
+\RequirePackage{kauparts}
+\ProcessOptions\relax
+\AtBeginDocument{%
+  \setname{acknowledgementname}{Acknowledgements}{Tacks\"agelser}%
+}
+\AtBeginDocument{%
+  \setname{keywordname}{Keywords}{Nyckelord}%
+}
+\let\kauths@maketitle\maketitle
+\renewcommand\maketitle{%
+  \PackageWarning{maketitle does not serve any purpose in this class.
+    The abstract environment reproduces the title instead.}%
+}
+\let\kauths@abstract\abstract%
+\let\kauths@endabstract\endabstract%
+\newcommand*\frontmatter{%
+  \clearpage%
+  \setcounter{page}{3}%
+  \renewcommand\thepage{\roman{page}}%
+  \renewenvironment{abstract}{%
+    \newcommand\keywords{\paragraph{\keywordname:}}%
+    \newenvironment{english}{%
+      \renewcommand\keywords{\paragraph{Keywords:}}%
+      \section*{Abstract}%
+    }{%
+    }
+    \cleardoublepage%
+    \section*{\@title}%
+    \textsc{\prettylist{\@author}}\par%
+    \noindent\textit{\@institute}%
+    \section*{\abstractname}%
+  }{%
+    \cleardoublepage%
+  }%
+}
+\newenvironment{acknowledgements}{%
+  \cleardoublepage%
+  \section*{\acknowledgementname}%
+}{%
+  \par\bigskip\bigskip\bigskip\noindent\@place, \@date\hfill \prettylist{\@author}%
+  \cleardoublepage%
+}
+\let\kauths@tableofcontents\tableofcontents
+\renewcommand\tableofcontents{%
+  \cleardoublepage%
+  \kauths@tableofcontents%
+}
+\newcommand\mainmatter[1][]{%
+  \cleardoublepage%
+  \renewenvironment{abstract}{\kauths@abstract}{\kauths@endabstract}%
+  \setcounter{page}{1}%
+  \pagenumbering{arabic}%
+}
+\newcommand\vanityquote[2]{%
+  \begin{tikzpicture}[remember picture,overlay]%
+    \path (current page.south east) +(-3,3.5)%
+      node%
+        [ anchor=south east%
+        , font=\large%
+        , text width=28em%
+        ] {\raggedleft``#1\rlap{''}%
+           \normalfont\par\medskip\itshape #2\par};%
+  \end{tikzpicture}%
+}
+\let\part\kaupart
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `kaureport.cls'.
diff --git a/summary/kaustudies.sty b/summary/kaustudies.sty
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..83a7eb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/kaustudies.sty
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `kaustudies.sty',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% kautools.dtx  (with options: `studies')
+%% 
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+%% 
+%% This file is part of the kauthesis bundle.
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3 or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `author-maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer and author of this work is Stefan Berthold.
+%% 
+%% This work consists of all files listed in manifest.txt.
+%% 
+%% kautools.dtx
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+\NeedsTeXFormat{LaTeX2e}[1999/12/01]
+\ProvidesPackage{kaustudies}
+    [2014/10/22 v1.15 Karlstad University kautools bundle]
+\RequirePackage{xkeyval}
+
+\define@boolkey[kus]{pkg}[kus@]{tinyfontswitch}[true]{}
+
+\presetkeys[kus]{pkg}{tinyfontswitch}{}
+\ProcessOptionsX[kus]<pkg>
+
+\RequirePackage[twoside]{geometry}
+\RequirePackage{garamondx}
+\RequirePackage[garamondx,cmbraces]{newtxmath}
+
+\geometry
+  { paperwidth=165mm
+  , paperheight=242mm
+  , inner=27mm
+  , outer=27mm
+  , top=24mm
+  , bottom=22mm
+  }
+
+\ifkus@tinyfontswitch
+  \let\kus@tiny@orig\tiny
+  \renewcommand*\tiny{\sffamily\kus@tiny@orig}
+\fi
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `kaustudies.sty'.
diff --git a/summary/kautitle.sty b/summary/kautitle.sty
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..824b531
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/kautitle.sty
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `kautitle.sty',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% kautools.dtx  (with options: `title')
+%% 
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+%% 
+%% This file is part of the kauthesis bundle.
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3 or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `author-maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer and author of this work is Stefan Berthold.
+%% 
+%% This work consists of all files listed in manifest.txt.
+%% 
+%% kautools.dtx
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+\NeedsTeXFormat{LaTeX2e}[1999/12/01]
+\ProvidesPackage{kautitle}
+    [2014/10/22 v1.15 Karlstad University kautools bundle]
+\ProcessOptions\relax
+\RequirePackage{xkeyval}
+\RequirePackage{tikz}
+\RequirePackage{hyphenat}
+\RequirePackage{kaumeta}
+\define@cmdkeys[kut]{pkg}[kut@]{normalfont,titlefont}
+\setkeys[kut]{pkg}%
+  { normalfont=\fontfamily{aun}\fontsize{18}{21.6}\selectfont\bfseries
+  , titlefont=\fontfamily{aub}\fontsize{28}{33.6}\selectfont }
+\newcommand\setkautitlefont[1]{\setkeys[kut]{pkg}{#1}}
+\let\kut@maketitle\maketitle
+\renewcommand\maketitle{%
+  \thispagestyle{empty}
+  \begin{tikzpicture}[remember picture, overlay]%
+    \path (current page.north west) +(-4pt,4pt) node (NW) {};
+    \path (current page.south east) +(4pt,-4pt) node (SE) {};
+    \path (current page.north west) +(-3pt,3pt) node (NWC) {};
+    \path (current page.south east) +(3pt,-3pt) node (SEC) {};
+    \path[clip] (NWC) rectangle (SEC);
+    \path (current page.south west) node[rotate=243.5] {\pgfimage{kau-logo-tryck}};%
+    \path (current page.north east) node[rotate=175] {\pgfimage{kau-logo-tryck}};%
+    \path (current page.north west) node
+      [shift={(10pt,-12pt)},anchor=south west,rotate=270
+      ,font=\kut@normalfont\vphantom{Xy}]
+      {\@subject};
+    \path (current page.south east) node
+      [shift={(-8pt,6pt)},anchor=north east,rotate=270
+      ,rounded corners,fill=black,text=white,inner sep=8pt
+      ,font=\kut@normalfont\vphantom{Xy}]
+      {\@shortinstitute};
+    \path
+      (current page.east) node[shift={(-10,0)}] (A) {}
+      (current page.east) node[shift={(0,-2.5)}] (B) {}
+      [shading=axis,left color=white,right color=black] (A) rectangle (B.south east)
+    ;
+    \path (B) node
+      [anchor=north east
+      ,inner sep=8pt
+      ,text=black
+      ,font=\kut@normalfont\vphantom{Xy}
+      ,text width=14cm,text ragged left]
+      {\@author};
+    \path[fill=white,opacity=0.90,transparency group] (NW) rectangle (SE);
+    \path (B) node
+      [anchor=south east,shift={(-3pt,0)}
+      ,text=yellow!75!red
+      ,font=\kut@titlefont\vphantom{Xy}
+      ,text width=14cm,text ragged left]
+      {\nohyphens{\@title}};
+  \end{tikzpicture}%
+  \clearpage%
+}
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `kautitle.sty'.
diff --git a/summary/main.tex b/summary/main.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..23e50d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/main.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `kaucollectiontemplate.tex',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% kauthesis.dtx  (with options: `collectiontemplate')
+%% 
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+%% 
+%% This file is part of the kauthesis bundle.
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3 or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `author-maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer and author of this work is Stefan Berthold.
+%% 
+%% This work consists of all files listed in manifest.txt.
+%% 
+%% kauthesis.dtx
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+\documentclass{kaucollection}
+
+%%%
+% Template preamble
+%%%
+\usepackage{xstring}
+\usepackage{scrlayer-scrpage}
+\pagestyle{scrheadings}
+\renewcommand*\headfont{\normalfont\small}
+\rehead{\thepaper}
+\lohead{\thepapertitle}
+\lohead{%
+  \IfStrEq{\thepapertitle}{Privacy-Preserving \& Incrementally-Deployable Support for Certificate Transparency in Tor}%
+    {Privacy-Preserving \& Incrementally-Deployable Support for Certificate Transpa...}%
+    {\IfStrEq{\thepapertitle}{Sauteed Onions: Transparent Associations from Domain Names to Onion Addresses}%
+      {Sauteed Onions: Transparent Associations from Domain Names to Onion Add...}%
+      {\thepapertitle}%
+    }%
+}
+
+%%%
+% Template metadata
+%%%
+\title{%
+  On Certificate Transparency Verification and\\
+  Unlinkability of Websites Visited by Tor Users
+}
+
+\author{%
+  Rasmus Dahlberg
+}
+\institute{%
+  Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
+}
+\place{%
+  Karlstad University
+}
+
+%%%
+% Thesis preamble
+%%%
+\usepackage[sectionbib]{natbib}
+\usepackage{chapterbib}
+
+% Better line breaks
+\usepackage{microtype}
+
+% Appendix that starts from A for each paper
+\usepackage{appendix}
+\renewcommand{\restoreapp}{}
+
+% Crypto notation
+\usepackage[
+    lambda, advantage, operators, sets, adversary, landau, probability, notions,
+    logic, ff, mm, primitives, events, complexity, asymptotics, keys
+]{cryptocode}
+
+% Tables
+\usepackage{booktabs}
+
+% Figures
+\usepackage{graphicx}
+\usepackage{subcaption}
+\usepackage{tikz}
+\usepackage{tikz-qtree}
+\usetikzlibrary{shapes.misc,positioning,arrows,snakes}
+
+\usepackage{rotating}
+
+% Colors
+\usepackage{color}
+\usepackage{colortbl}
+\definecolor{rgddTeal}{HTML}{009999}
+\definecolor{rgddLime}{HTML}{809933}
+\definecolor{rgddPurple}{HTML}{993380}
+\definecolor{rgddRed}{HTML}{E04644}
+\definecolor{rgddGreen}{HTML}{008000}
+\definecolor{rgddBlue}{HTML}{2809B2}
+\definecolor{rgddBlack}{HTML}{000000}
+
+% Links
+\usepackage{hyperref}
+\hypersetup{
+  colorlinks = true,                              % Color links instead of boxes
+  urlcolor   = rgddBlue,                            % Color external hyper links
+  linkcolor  = rgddBlue,                                  % Color internal links
+  citecolor  = rgddGreen,                                      % Color citations
+}
+\def\UrlBreaks{\do\/\do-}                       % More flexible line-break rules
+
+% Code listings
+\usepackage{listings}
+
+% Theorems with s/openbox/rgddopenbox in rgddamsthm.sty to avoid package class
+\usepackage{rgddamsthm}
+\theoremstyle{definition}
+\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}
+
+% Command to underscore
+\usepackage{stackengine}
+\newcommand\barbelow[1]{\stackunder[1.2pt]{#1}{\rule{.8ex}{.075ex}}}
+
+%%%
+% Document start
+%%%
+\begin{document}
+  \frontmatter
+
+  \begin{abstract}
+    \input{src/abstract}
+  \end{abstract}
+
+  \section*{Kring verifiering av Certificate Transparency samt länkbarhet av Tor-användare och besökta webbplatser}
+  \textsc{Rasmus Dahlberg}\\
+  \noindent\textit{Institutionen för matematik och datavetenskap}
+  \section*{Sammanfattning}
+  \input{src/sammanfattning}
+  \cleardoublepage
+
+  \begin{acknowledgements}
+    \input{src/acknowledgements}
+  \end{acknowledgements}
+
+  \input{src/abbr}\addcontentsline{toc}{section}{List of Acronyms}%
+  \cleardoublepage
+
+  {
+    \hypersetup{linkcolor=black}
+    \listofpapers
+  }
+  \cleardoublepage
+
+  \input{src/other}\addcontentsline{toc}{section}{List of Other Contributions}%
+  \cleardoublepage
+
+  {
+    \hypersetup{linkcolor=black}
+    \tableofcontents
+  }
+
+  \mainmatter
+  \include{src/introduction/main}\setcounter{footnote}{0}
+  \include{src/lwm/main}\setcounter{footnote}{0}
+  \include{src/ctga/main}\setcounter{footnote}{0}
+  \include{src/ctor/main}\setcounter{footnote}{0}
+  \include{src/sauteed/main}\setcounter{footnote}{0}
+  \include{src/cat/main}\setcounter{footnote}{0}
+  \include{src/tlwo/main}\setcounter{footnote}{0}
+  
+\end{document}
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `kaucollectiontemplate.tex'.
diff --git a/summary/pgfcropmarks.sty b/summary/pgfcropmarks.sty
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f23adcb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/pgfcropmarks.sty
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `pgfcropmarks.sty',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% kautools.dtx  (with options: `crop')
+%% 
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+%% 
+%% This file is part of the kauthesis bundle.
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3 or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `author-maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer and author of this work is Stefan Berthold.
+%% 
+%% This work consists of all files listed in manifest.txt.
+%% 
+%% kautools.dtx
+%% Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Stefan Berthold <stefan.berthold@kau.se>
+\NeedsTeXFormat{LaTeX2e}[1999/12/01]
+\ProvidesPackage{pgfcropmarks}
+    [2014/10/22 v1.15 Karlstad University kautools bundle]
+\ProcessOptions\relax
+\RequirePackage{pgfpages}%
+\nofiles%
+\newif\if@kus@isodd%
+\@kus@isoddtrue%
+\newlength{\cropmarklen}\setlength{\cropmarklen}{40pt}%
+\newlength{\cropmarksep}\setlength{\cropmarksep}{15pt}%
+\pgfpagesdeclarelayout{cropmarks}%
+{%
+}%
+{%
+  \pgfpagesphysicalpageoptions%
+  {%
+    logical pages=1,%
+    physical height=297mm,%
+    physical width=210mm%
+  }%
+  \pgfpageslogicalpageoptions{1}%
+  {%
+    border code=%
+      \if@kus@isodd
+        \global\@kus@isoddfalse
+        \pgfsetlinewidth{0.6pt}%
+        \pgfusepath{discard}%
+        \pgfmoveto{\pgfpoint{-\cropmarksep}{0pt}}%
+          \pgflineto{\pgfpoint{-\cropmarklen}{0pt}}%
+        \pgfmoveto{\pgfpoint{0pt}{-\cropmarksep}}%
+          \pgflineto{\pgfpoint{0pt}{-\cropmarklen}}%
+        \pgfmoveto{\pgfpoint{\paperwidth+\cropmarksep}{0pt}}%
+          \pgflineto{\pgfpoint{\paperwidth+\cropmarklen}{0pt}}%
+        \pgfmoveto{\pgfpoint{\paperwidth}{-\cropmarksep}}%
+          \pgflineto{\pgfpoint{\paperwidth}{-\cropmarklen}}%
+        \pgfmoveto{\pgfpoint{-\cropmarksep}{\paperheight}}%
+          \pgflineto{\pgfpoint{-\cropmarklen}{\paperheight}}%
+        \pgfmoveto{\pgfpoint{0pt}{\paperheight+\cropmarksep}}%
+          \pgflineto{\pgfpoint{0pt}{\paperheight+\cropmarklen}}%
+        \pgfmoveto{\pgfpoint{\paperwidth}{\paperheight+\cropmarksep}}%
+          \pgflineto{\pgfpoint{\paperwidth}{\paperheight+\cropmarklen}}%
+        \pgfmoveto{\pgfpoint{\paperwidth+\cropmarksep}{\paperheight}}%
+          \pgflineto{\pgfpoint{\paperwidth+\cropmarklen}{\paperheight}}%
+        \pgfusepath{stroke}%
+      \else
+        \global\@kus@isoddtrue
+      \fi,%
+    center=\pgfpoint{.5\pgfphysicalwidth}{.5\pgfphysicalheight}%
+  }%
+}%
+\pgfpagesuselayout{cropmarks}%
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `pgfcropmarks.sty'.
diff --git a/summary/preprint/thesis-preprint.pdf b/summary/preprint/thesis-preprint.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97f63c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/preprint/thesis-preprint.pdf
diff --git a/summary/rgddamsthm.sty b/summary/rgddamsthm.sty
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85aadce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/rgddamsthm.sty
@@ -0,0 +1,444 @@
+%%
+%% This is file `amsthm.sty',
+%% generated with the docstrip utility.
+%%
+%% The original source files were:
+%%
+%% amsclass.dtx  (with options: `amsthm')
+%% This is a generated file.
+%% 
+%% Copyright 1995, 1999, 2004, 2009-2020 American Mathematical Society.
+%% 
+%% American Mathematical Society
+%% Technical Support
+%% Publications Technical Group
+%% 201 Charles Street
+%% Providence, RI 02904
+%% USA
+%% tel: (401) 455-4080
+%%      (800) 321-4267 (USA and Canada only)
+%% fax: (401) 331-3842
+%% email: tech-support@ams.org
+%% 
+%% This work may be distributed and/or modified under the
+%% conditions of the LaTeX Project Public License, either version 1.3c
+%% of this license or (at your option) any later version.
+%% The latest version of this license is in
+%%   http://www.latex-project.org/lppl.txt
+%% and version 1.3c or later is part of all distributions of LaTeX
+%% version 2005/12/01 or later.
+%% 
+%% This work has the LPPL maintenance status `maintained'.
+%% 
+%% The Current Maintainer of this work is the American Mathematical
+%% Society.
+%% 
+%% ========================================================================
+%% 
+\NeedsTeXFormat{LaTeX2e}% LaTeX 2.09 can't be used (nor non-LaTeX)
+[1995/06/01]% LaTeX date must be June 1995 or later
+\ProvidesPackage{amsthm}[2020/05/29 v2.20.6]
+\let\@xp=\expandafter
+\let\@nx=\noexpand
+\def\@oparg#1[#2]{\@ifnextchar[{#1}{#1[#2]}}
+\long\def\@ifempty#1{\@xifempty#1@@..\@nil}
+\long\def\@xifempty#1#2@#3#4#5\@nil{%
+  \ifx#3#4\@xp\@firstoftwo\else\@xp\@secondoftwo\fi}
+\long\def\@ifnotempty#1{\@ifempty{#1}{}}
+\def\setboxz@h{\setbox\z@\hbox}
+\def\@addpunct#1{%
+  \relax\ifhmode
+    \ifnum\spacefactor>\@m \else#1\fi
+  \fi}
+\def\nopunct{\spacefactor 1007 }
+\def\frenchspacing{\sfcode`\.1006\sfcode`\?1005\sfcode`\!1004%
+  \sfcode`\:1003\sfcode`\;1002\sfcode`\,1001 }
+\DeclareOption*{\input{\CurrentOption .thm}}
+\ProcessOptions
+
+\newcommand{\theoremstyle}[1]{%
+  \@ifundefined{th@#1}{%
+    \PackageWarning{amsthm}{Unknown theoremstyle `#1'}%
+    \thm@style{plain}%
+  }{%
+    \thm@style{#1}%
+  }%
+}
+\newtoks\thm@style
+\thm@style{plain}
+\newtoks\thm@bodyfont  \thm@bodyfont{\itshape}
+\newtoks\thm@headfont  \thm@headfont{\bfseries}
+\newtoks\thm@notefont  \thm@notefont{}
+\newtoks\thm@headpunct \thm@headpunct{.}
+\newskip\thm@preskip \newskip\thm@postskip
+\def\thm@space@setup{%
+  \thm@preskip=\topsep \thm@postskip=\thm@preskip
+}
+\renewcommand{\newtheorem}{\@ifstar{\@xnthm *}{\@xnthm \relax}}
+\def\@xnthm#1#2{%
+  \let\@tempa\relax
+  \@xp\@ifdefinable\csname #2\endcsname{%
+    \global\@xp\let\csname end#2\endcsname\@endtheorem
+    \ifx *#1% unnumbered, need to get one more mandatory arg
+      \edef\@tempa##1{%
+        \gdef\@xp\@nx\csname#2\endcsname{%
+          \@nx\@thm{\@xp\@nx\csname th@\the\thm@style\endcsname}%
+            {}{##1}}}%
+    \else % numbered theorem, need to check for optional arg
+      \def\@tempa{\@oparg{\@ynthm{#2}}[]}%
+    \fi
+  }%
+  \@tempa
+}
+\def\@ynthm#1[#2]#3{%
+  \ifx\relax#2\relax
+    \def\@tempa{\@oparg{\@xthm{#1}{#3}}[]}%
+  \else
+    \@ifundefined{c@#2}{%
+      \def\@tempa{\@nocounterr{#2}}%
+    }{%
+      \@xp\xdef\csname the#1\endcsname{\@xp\@nx\csname the#2\endcsname}%
+      \toks@{#3}%
+      \@xp\xdef\csname#1\endcsname{%
+        \@nx\@thm{%
+          \let\@nx\thm@swap
+            \if S\thm@swap\@nx\@firstoftwo\else\@nx\@gobble\fi
+          \@xp\@nx\csname th@\the\thm@style\endcsname}%
+            {#2}{\the\toks@}}%
+      \let\@tempa\relax
+    }%
+  \fi
+  \@tempa
+}
+\def\@xthm#1#2[#3]{%
+  \ifx\relax#3\relax
+    \newcounter{#1}%
+  \else
+    \newcounter{#1}[#3]%
+    \@xp\xdef\csname the#1\endcsname{\@xp\@nx\csname the#3\endcsname
+      \@thmcountersep\@thmcounter{#1}}%
+  \fi
+  \toks@{#2}%
+  \@xp\xdef\csname#1\endcsname{%
+    \@nx\@thm{%
+      \let\@nx\thm@swap
+        \if S\thm@swap\@nx\@firstoftwo\else\@nx\@gobble\fi
+      \@xp\@nx\csname th@\the\thm@style\endcsname}%
+      {#1}{\the\toks@}}%
+}
+\def\@thm#1#2#3{%
+  \ifhmode\unskip\unskip\par\fi
+  \normalfont
+  \trivlist
+  \let\thmheadnl\relax
+  \let\thm@swap\@gobble
+  \thm@notefont{\fontseries\mddefault\upshape}%
+  \thm@headpunct{.}% add period after heading
+  \thm@headsep 5\p@ plus\p@ minus\p@\relax
+  \thm@space@setup
+  #1% style overrides
+  \@topsep \thm@preskip               % used by thm head
+  \@topsepadd \thm@postskip           % used by \@endparenv
+  \def\@tempa{#2}\ifx\@empty\@tempa
+    \def\@tempa{\@oparg{\@begintheorem{#3}{}}[]}%
+  \else
+    \refstepcounter{#2}%
+    \def\@tempa{\@oparg{\@begintheorem{#3}{\csname the#2\endcsname}}[]}%
+  \fi
+  \@tempa
+}
+\def\@restorelabelsep{\relax}
+\let\@ythm\relax
+\let\thmname\@iden \let\thmnote\@iden \let\thmnumber\@iden
+\providecommand\@upn{\textup}
+\def\thmhead@plain#1#2#3{%
+  \thmname{#1}\thmnumber{\@ifnotempty{#1}{ }\@upn{#2}}%
+  \thmnote{ {\the\thm@notefont(#3)}}}
+\let\thmhead\thmhead@plain
+\def\swappedhead#1#2#3{%
+  \thmnumber{#2}%
+  \thmname{\@ifnotempty{#2}{~}#1}%
+  \thmnote{ {\the\thm@notefont(#3)}}}
+\let\swappedhead@plain=\swappedhead
+\let\thmheadnl\relax
+\let\thm@indent\noindent
+\let\thm@swap\@gobble
+\def\@begintheorem#1#2[#3]{%
+  \deferred@thm@head{\the\thm@headfont \thm@indent
+    \@ifempty{#1}{\let\thmname\@gobble}{\let\thmname\@iden}%
+    \@ifempty{#2}{\let\thmnumber\@gobble}{\let\thmnumber\@iden}%
+    \@ifempty{#3}{\let\thmnote\@gobble}{\let\thmnote\@iden}%
+    \thm@swap\swappedhead\thmhead{#1}{#2}{#3}%
+    \the\thm@headpunct
+    \thmheadnl % possibly a newline.
+    \hskip\thm@headsep
+  }%
+  \ignorespaces}
+\newskip\thm@headsep
+\thm@headsep=5pt plus1pt minus1pt\relax
+\let\adjust@parskip@nobreak=\@nbitem
+\newtoks\dth@everypar
+\dth@everypar={%
+  \@minipagefalse \global\@newlistfalse
+  \@noparitemfalse
+  \if@inlabel
+    \global\@inlabelfalse
+    \begingroup \setbox\z@\lastbox
+     \ifvoid\z@ \kern-\itemindent \fi
+    \endgroup
+    \unhbox\@labels
+  \fi
+  \if@nobreak \@nobreakfalse \clubpenalty\@M
+  \else \clubpenalty\@clubpenalty \everypar{}%
+  \fi
+}%
+\def\deferred@thm@head#1{%
+  \if@inlabel \indent \par \fi % eject a section head if one is pending
+  \if@nobreak
+    \adjust@parskip@nobreak
+  \else
+    \addpenalty\@beginparpenalty
+    \addvspace\@topsep
+    \addvspace{-\parskip}%
+  \fi
+  \global\@inlabeltrue
+  \everypar\dth@everypar
+  \sbox\@labels{\normalfont#1}%
+  \ignorespaces
+}
+\def\nonslanted{\relax
+  \@xp\let\@xp\@tempa\csname\f@shape shape\endcsname
+  \ifx\@tempa\itshape\upshape
+  \else\ifx\@tempa\slshape\upshape\fi\fi}
+\def\swapnumbers{\edef\thm@swap{\if S\thm@swap N\else S\fi}}
+\def\thm@swap{N}%
+\let\@opargbegintheorem\relax
+\def\th@plain{%
+%%  \let\thm@indent\noindent % no indent
+%%  \thm@headfont{\bfseries}% heading font is bold
+%%  \thm@notefont{}% same as heading font
+%%  \thm@headpunct{.}% add period after heading
+%%  \let\thm@swap\@gobble
+%%  \thm@preskip\topsep
+%%  \thm@postskip\theorempreskipamount
+  \itshape % body font
+}
+\def\th@definition{%
+  \normalfont % body font
+}
+\def\th@remark{%
+  \thm@headfont{\itshape}%
+  \normalfont % body font
+  \thm@preskip\topsep \divide\thm@preskip\tw@
+  \thm@postskip\thm@preskip
+}
+\def\@endtheorem{\endtrivlist\@endpefalse }
+\newcommand{\newtheoremstyle}[9]{%
+  \@ifempty{#5}{\dimen@\z@skip}{\dimen@#5\relax}%
+  \ifdim\dimen@=\z@
+    \toks@{#4\let\thm@indent\noindent}%
+  \else
+    \toks@{#4\def\thm@indent{\noindent\hbox to#5{}}}%
+  \fi
+  \def\@tempa{#8}\ifx\space\@tempa
+    \toks@\@xp{\the\toks@ \thm@headsep\fontdimen\tw@\font\relax}%
+  \else
+    \def\@tempb{\newline}%
+    \ifx\@tempb\@tempa
+      \toks@\@xp{\the\toks@ \thm@headsep\z@skip
+        \def\thmheadnl{\newline}}%
+    \else
+      \toks@\@xp{\the\toks@ \thm@headsep#8\relax}%
+    \fi
+  \fi
+  \begingroup
+  \thm@space@setup
+  \@defaultunits\@tempskipa#2\thm@preskip\relax\@nnil
+  \@defaultunits\@tempskipb#3\thm@postskip\relax\@nnil
+  \xdef\@gtempa{\thm@preskip\the\@tempskipa
+    \thm@postskip\the\@tempskipb\relax}%
+  \endgroup
+  \@temptokena\@xp{\@gtempa
+    \thm@headfont{#6}\thm@headpunct{#7}%
+  }%
+  \@ifempty{#9}{%
+    \let\thmhead\thmhead@plain
+  }{%
+    \@namedef{thmhead@#1}##1##2##3{#9}%
+    \@temptokena\@xp{\the\@temptokena
+      \@xp\let\@xp\thmhead\csname thmhead@#1\endcsname}%
+  }%
+  \@xp\xdef\csname th@#1\endcsname{\the\toks@ \the\@temptokena}%
+}
+\DeclareRobustCommand{\qed}{%
+  \ifmmode \mathqed
+  \else
+    \leavevmode\unskip\penalty9999 \hbox{}\nobreak\hfill
+    \quad\hbox{\qedsymbol}%
+  \fi
+}
+\let\QED@stack\@empty
+\let\qed@elt\relax
+\newcommand{\pushQED}[1]{%
+  \toks@{\qed@elt{#1}}\@temptokena\expandafter{\QED@stack}%
+  \xdef\QED@stack{\the\toks@\the\@temptokena}%
+}
+\newcommand{\popQED}{%
+  \begingroup\let\qed@elt\popQED@elt \QED@stack\relax\relax\endgroup
+}
+\def\popQED@elt#1#2\relax{#1\gdef\QED@stack{#2}}
+\newcommand{\qedhere}{%
+  \begingroup \let\mathqed\math@qedhere
+    \let\qed@elt\setQED@elt \QED@stack\relax\relax \endgroup
+}
+\newif\ifmeasuring@
+\newif\iffirstchoice@ \firstchoice@true
+\def\setQED@elt#1#2\relax{%
+  \ifmeasuring@
+  \else \iffirstchoice@ \gdef\QED@stack{\qed@elt{}#2}\fi
+  \fi
+  #1%
+}
+\def\qed@warning{%
+  \PackageWarning{amsthm}{The \@nx\qedhere command may not work
+    correctly here}%
+}
+\newcommand{\mathqed}{\quad\hbox{\qedsymbol}}
+\def\linebox@qed{\hfil\hbox{\qedsymbol}\hfilneg}
+\@ifpackageloaded{amsmath}{%
+  \def\math@qedhere{%
+    \@ifundefined{\@currenvir @qed}{%
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+  }
+  \def\displaymath@qed{%
+    \relax
+    \ifmmode
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+      \else
+        \eqno
+        \let\eqno\relax \let\leqno\relax \let\veqno\relax
+        \hbox{\qedsymbol}%
+      \fi
+    \else
+       \aftergroup\linebox@qed
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+  \@xp\let\csname equation*@qed\endcsname\displaymath@qed
+  \def\equation@qed{%
+    \iftagsleft@
+      \hbox{\phantom{\quad\qedsymbol}}%
+      \gdef\alt@tag{%
+        \rlap{\hbox to\displaywidth{\hfil\qedsymbol}}%
+        \global\let\alt@tag\@empty
+      }%
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+        \vtop{\ialign{\hfil####\cr
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+                \qedsymbol\cr}}%
+        \setbox\z@
+      }%
+    \fi
+  }
+  \def\qed@tag{%
+    \global\tag@true \nonumber
+    &\omit\setboxz@h {\strut@ \qedsymbol}\tagsleft@false
+    \place@tag@gather
+    \kern-\tabskip
+    \ifst@rred \else \global\@eqnswtrue \fi \global\advance\row@\@ne \cr
+  }
+  \def\split@qed{%
+    \def\endsplit{\crcr\egroup \egroup \ctagsplit@false \rendsplit@
+      \aftergroup\align@qed
+    }%
+  }
+  \def\align@qed{%
+    \ifmeasuring@ \tag*{\qedsymbol}%
+    \else \let\math@cr@@@\qed@tag
+    \fi
+  }
+  \@xp\let\csname align*@qed\endcsname\align@qed
+  \@xp\let\csname gather*@qed\endcsname\align@qed
+%% Needs some patching up for amsmath 1.2
+}{% end of amsmath branch, start plain LaTeX branch
+  \def\math@qedhere{%
+    \@ifundefined{\@currenvir @qed}{%
+      \qed@warning \aftergroup\displaymath@qed
+    }{%
+      \@xp\aftergroup\csname\@currenvir @qed\endcsname
+    }%
+  }
+  \def\displaymath@qed{%
+    \relax
+    \ifmmode
+      \ifinner \aftergroup\aftergroup\aftergroup\linebox@qed
+      \else
+        \eqno \def\@badmath{$$}%
+        \let\eqno\relax \let\leqno\relax \let\veqno\relax
+        \hbox{\qedsymbol}%
+      \fi
+    \else
+       \aftergroup\linebox@qed
+    \fi
+  }
+  \@ifundefined{ver@leqno.clo}{%
+    \def\equation@qed{\displaymath@qed \quad}%
+  }{%
+    \def\equation@qed{\displaymath@qed}%
+  }
+    \def\@tempa#1$#2#3\@nil#4{%
+        \def#4{#1$#2\def\@currenvir{displaymath}#3}%
+    }%
+    \expandafter\ifx\csname[ \endcsname\relax
+        \expandafter\@tempa\[\@nil\[%
+    \else
+        \expandafter\expandafter\expandafter\@tempa\csname[
+        \expandafter\endcsname\expandafter\@nil
+        \csname[ \endcsname
+    \fi
+}
+\@ifpackageloaded{amstex}{%
+  \def\@tempa{TT}%
+}{%
+  \@ifpackageloaded{amsmath}{%
+    \def\@tempb#1 v#2.#3\@nil{#2}%
+    \ifnum\@xp\@xp\@xp\@tempb\csname ver@amsmath.sty\endcsname v0.0\@nil
+       <\tw@
+      \def\@tempa{TT}%
+    \else
+      \def\@tempa{TF}%
+    \fi
+  }{%
+    \def\@tempa{TF}
+  }%
+}
+\if\@tempa
+  \renewcommand{\math@qedhere}{\quad\hbox{\qedsymbol}}%
+\fi
+\newcommand{\rgddopenbox}{\leavevmode
+  \hbox to.77778em{%
+  \hfil\vrule
+  \vbox to.675em{\hrule width.6em\vfil\hrule}%
+  \vrule\hfil}}
+\DeclareRobustCommand{\textsquare}{%
+  \begingroup \usefont{U}{msa}{m}{n}\thr@@\endgroup
+}
+\providecommand{\qedsymbol}{\rgddopenbox}
+\newenvironment{proof}[1][\proofname]{\par
+  \pushQED{\qed}%
+  \normalfont \topsep6\p@\@plus6\p@\relax
+  \trivlist
+  \item[\hskip\labelsep
+        \itshape
+    #1\@addpunct{.}]\ignorespaces
+}{%
+  \popQED\endtrivlist\@endpefalse
+}
+\providecommand{\proofname}{Proof}
+\endinput
+%%
+%% End of file `amsthm.sty'.
diff --git a/summary/src/abbr.tex b/summary/src/abbr.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea8bdcd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/abbr.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+\section*{List of Acronyms}
+The introductory summary refrains from using acronyms to make it easily
+digested.  However, a few acronyms are used without definition because their
+full versions are likely less familiar to most readers.  These acronyms are:
+
+\begin{description}
+  \item[DNS] Domain Name System
+  \item[HTML] Hyper Text Markup Language
+  \item[HTTP] Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
+  \item[HTTPS] Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure
+  \item[IP] Internet Protocol
+  \item[P4] Programming Protocol-independent Packet Processors
+  \item[RFC] Request For Comments
+  \item[RIPE] R\'{e}seaux IP Europ\'{e}ens
+  \item[RSA] Rivest Shamir Adleman
+  \item[TCP] Transmission Control Protocol
+  \item[TLS] Transport Layer Security
+  \item[XDP] eXpress Data Path
+\end{description}
diff --git a/summary/src/abstract.tex b/summary/src/abstract.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a43c0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/abstract.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+Certificate Transparency is an ecosystem of logs, monitors, and auditors that
+hold certificate authorities accountable while issuing certificates.  We show
+how the amount of trust that TLS clients and domain owners need to place in
+Certificate Transparency can be reduced, both in the context of existing gradual
+deployments and the largely unexplored area of Tor.  Our contributions include
+  improved third-party monitoring,
+  a gossip protocol plugging into Certificate Transparency over DNS,
+  an incrementally deployable gossip-audit model tailored for Tor Browser, and
+  using certificates with onion addresses.
+The methods used range from proof sketches to Internet measurements and
+prototype evaluations.  An essential part of our evaluation in Tor is to assess
+how the protocols used during website visits---such as requesting an inclusion
+proof from a Certificate Transparency log---affect unlinkability between senders
+and receivers.  We find that most false positives in website fingerprinting
+attacks can be eliminated for all but the most frequently visited sites.  This
+is because the destination anonymity set can be reduced due to how Internet
+protocols work: communication is observable and often involves third-party
+interactions.  Some of the used protocols can further be subject to side-channel
+analysis.  For example, we show that remote (timeless) timing attacks against
+Tor's DNS cache reliably reveal the timing of past exit traffic.  The severity
+and practicality of our extension to website fingerprinting pose threats to the
+anonymity provided by Tor.  We conclude that access to a so-called website
+oracle should be an assumed attacker capability when evaluating website
+fingerprinting~defenses.
+
+\keywords
+  Auditing,
+  Certificate Transparency,
+  DNS,
+  Gossip,
+  Side-Channels,
+  Timing Attacks,
+  Tor,
+  Tor Browser,
+  Website Fingerprinting,
+  Website Oracles
diff --git a/summary/src/acknowledgements.tex b/summary/src/acknowledgements.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c585150
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/acknowledgements.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+I am fortunate to be surrounded by people that helped me reach this milestone in
+one piece.
+First,
+  I want to acknowledge that my brother, Victor, provided me with unlimited
+  tutoring before my PhD studies.  I would not be on my current path without
+  him.
+Second,
+  Sarah and Andreas, thank you for challenging and supporting me.  You have been
+  a determinantal part of my personal growth and well-being.
+Finally,
+  Mom, thank you for being around whenever I need it.
+
+Several doors were opened for me at Karlstad University.  Stefan Alfredsson and
+Stefan Lindskog kick-started my undergraduate studies with programming feedback,
+increased-pace study plans, and the opportunity to be involved in the
+department.  Tobias Pulls introduced me to computer security research.  We have
+worked closely ever since, and \emph{I strongly recommend him as an advisor and
+collaborator}.  Simone Fischer-H\"{u}bner, Stefan Lindskog, Leonardo Martucci,
+and Tobias Pulls all provided sincere advice during my PhD studies.  Many other
+individuals selflessly helped me forward.  Some of them include
+  Ala Sarah Alaqra,
+  Linus Nordberg,
+  Jenni Reuben,
+  Fredrik Str\"{o}mberg, and
+  Paul Syverson.
+
+I am further grateful for my
+collaborators:
+  Matthew Finkel,
+  Toke H{\o}iland-J{\o}rgensen,
+  Andreas Kassler,
+  Linus Nordberg,
+  Tobias Pulls,
+  Tom Ritter,
+  Paul Syverson, and
+  Jonathan Vestin.
+They are all driven individuals that I learned a lot from.
+I also appreciate the generous funding received from
+  the Swedish Knowledge Foundation and
+  the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research.
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/.gitignore b/summary/src/cat/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bb88c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+main.pdf
+*.blg
+*.bbl
+*.fls
+*.fdb_latexmk
+*.log
+*.out
+*.aux
+*.swp
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/aws.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/aws.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c3161e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/aws.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/bt10.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/bt10.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..23fbd5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/bt10.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/bt100.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/bt100.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b37c523
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/bt100.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/bt1000.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/bt1000.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..65e51f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/bt1000.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/df_nodef.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/df_nodef.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f72a9d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/df_nodef.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/df_wt.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/df_wt.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14a18b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/df_wt.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/df_wtfpad.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/df_wtfpad.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e425ae8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/df_wtfpad.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/dns__classifier-idea.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/dns__classifier-idea.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf68fff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/dns__classifier-idea.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/dns__timing-dist.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/dns__timing-dist.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eca8a0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/dns__timing-dist.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/dynaflow_config1.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/dynaflow_config1.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de82dc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/dynaflow_config1.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/dynaflow_config2.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/dynaflow_config2.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e995173
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/dynaflow_config2.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/dynaflow_nodef.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/dynaflow_nodef.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c481a3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/dynaflow_nodef.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/factor-fnp.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/factor-fnp.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..933d1ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/factor-fnp.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/factor-recall.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/factor-recall.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e017db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/factor-recall.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/probfp.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/probfp.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..81e8de8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/probfp.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/setting-oracle.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/setting-oracle.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4620d67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/setting-oracle.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/setting.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/setting.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1004bf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/setting.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/timeuntilvisited.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/timeuntilvisited.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..188746b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/timeuntilvisited.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/wang_csbuflo.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/wang_csbuflo.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ec042b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/wang_csbuflo.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/wang_nodef.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/wang_nodef.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7dd0023
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/wang_nodef.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/img/wang_tamaraw.pdf b/summary/src/cat/img/wang_tamaraw.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f902ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/img/wang_tamaraw.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/main.tex b/summary/src/cat/main.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5dd9d84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/main.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+\begin{kaupaper}[
+    author={%
+      Tobias Pulls and \textbf{Rasmus Dahlberg}
+    },
+    title={%
+      Website Fingerprinting with Website Oracles
+    },
+    reference={%
+      PETS (2020)
+    },
+    summary={%
+      One of the properties Tor aims to provide against local network attackers
+      is unlinkability between end-users (sender anonymity set) and their
+      destinations on the Internet (receiver anonymity set).  A website
+      fingerprinting attack aims to break anonymity in this model by inferring
+      which website an identifiable end-user is visiting based only on the
+      traffic entering the Tor network.  We extend the attacker model for
+      website fingerprinting attacks by introducing the notion of \emph{website
+      oracles}.  A website oracle answers the following question: was website $w$
+      visited during time frame $t$?  In other words, the attacker can query the
+      receiver anonymity set for websites that were (not) visited.  Our
+      simulations show that augmenting past website fingerprinting attacks to
+      include website oracles significantly reduces false positives for all but
+      the most popular websites, e.g., to the order of $10^{-6}$ for
+      classifications around Alexa top-10k and much less for the long tail of
+      sites.  Further, some earlier website fingerprinting defenses are largely
+      ineffective in the (stronger) attacker model that includes website
+      oracles.  We discuss a dozen real-world website oracles ranging from
+      centralized access logs to widely accessible real-time bidding platforms
+      and DNS caches, arguing that they are inherent parts of the protocols used
+      to perform website visits.  Therefore, access to a website oracle should
+      be an assumed attacker capability when evaluating which website
+      fingerprinting defenses are effective.
+    },
+    participation={\vspace{-.25cm}
+      Tobias is the main author and conducted most of the work.  I mainly
+      contributed by coining the name \emph{website oracle}, evaluating
+      sources of real-world website oracles, and performing our non-simulated
+      network experiments.
+    },
+    label={
+      paper:cat
+    },
+]
+  \maketitle
+  \begin{abstract}
+    \input{src/cat/src/abstract}
+  \end{abstract}
+
+  \input{src/cat/src/intro}
+  \input{src/cat/src/background}
+  \input{src/cat/src/oracles}
+  \input{src/cat/src/sources}
+  \input{src/cat/src/sim}
+  \input{src/cat/src/wf}
+  \input{src/cat/src/discussion}
+  \input{src/cat/src/related}
+  \input{src/cat/src/conclusions}
+  \input{src/cat/src/ack}
+
+  \bibliographystyle{plain}
+  \bibliography{src/cat/src/ref-min}
+  
+  \begin{appendices}
+    \input{src/cat/src/bayes}
+    \input{src/cat/src/lessons}
+    \input{src/cat/src/othersources}
+  \end{appendices}
+
+\end{kaupaper}
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/src/abstract.tex b/summary/src/cat/src/abstract.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da09599
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/src/abstract.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+\noindent
+Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks are a subset of traffic analysis attacks
+where a local passive attacker attempts to infer which websites a target victim
+is visiting over an encrypted tunnel, such as the anonymity network Tor. We
+introduce the security notion of a \emph{Website Oracle} (WO) that gives a WF
+attacker the capability to determine whether a particular monitored website was
+among the websites visited by Tor clients at the time of a victim's trace. Our
+simulations show that combining a WO with a WF attack---which we refer to as a
+WF+WO attack---significantly reduces false positives for about half of all
+website visits and for the vast majority of websites visited over Tor. The
+measured false positive rate is on the order one false positive per million
+classified website trace for websites around Alexa rank 10,000. Less popular
+monitored websites show orders of magnitude lower false positive rates.
+
+{\setlength{\parindent}{6mm} We argue that WOs are inherent to the setting of
+anonymity networks and should be an assumed capability of attackers when
+assessing WF attacks and defenses. Sources of WOs are abundant and available to
+a wide range of realistic attackers, e.g., due to the use of DNS, OCSP, and
+real-time bidding for online advertisement on the Internet, as well as the
+abundance of middleboxes and access logs. Access to a WO indicates that the
+evaluation of WF defenses in the open world should focus on the highest possible
+recall an attacker can achieve. Our simulations show that augmenting the Deep
+Fingerprinting WF attack by Sirinam \emph{et~al.}~\cite{DF} with access to a WO
+significantly improves the attack against five state-of-the-art WF defenses,
+rendering some of them largely ineffective in this new WF+WO setting.}
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/src/ack.tex b/summary/src/cat/src/ack.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4008faf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/src/ack.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+\section*{Acknowledgements}
+We would like to thank Jari Appelgren, Roger Dingledine, Nicholas Hopper, Marc
+Juarez, George Kadianakis, Linus Nordberg, Mike Perry, Erik Wästlund, and the
+PETS reviewers for their valuable feedback. Simulations were performed using the
+Swedish National Infrastructure for Computing (SNIC) at
+High Performance Computing Center North (HPC2N)
+This research was funded by the
+Swedish Internet Foundation and the
+Knowledge Foundation of Sweden.
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/src/background.tex b/summary/src/cat/src/background.tex
new file mode 100644
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+\section{Background} \label{cat:sec:back}
+Here we present background on terminology, the anonymity network Tor,
+and WF attacks and defenses. 
+
+\subsection{Anonymity and Unobservability}
+Anonymity is the state of a subject not being identifiable from an attackers
+perspective within the \emph{anonymity set} of possible subjects that performed
+an action such as sending or receiving a message~\cite{anonterm}. For an
+anonymity network, an attacker may not be able to determine who sent a message
+into the network---providing a sender anonymity set of all possible
+senders---and conversely, not be able to determine the recipient of a message
+from the network out of all possible recipients in the recipient anonymity set.
+Inherent for anonymity is that the subjects in an anonymity set change based on
+what the attacker observes, e.g., when some subjects send or receive
+messages~\cite{KedoganAP02,Raymond00}. In gist, anonymity is concerned with
+hiding the \emph{relationship} between a sender and recipient, not its
+existence. 
+
+Unobservability is a strictly stronger notion than
+anonymity~\cite{KedoganAP02,anonterm,Raymond00}. In addition to anonymity of the
+relationship between a sender and recipient, unobservability also requires that
+an attacker (not acting as either the sender or recipient) cannot sufficiently
+distinguish if there is a sender or recipient or not~\cite{anonterm}. Perfect
+unobservability is therefore the state of an attacker being unable to determine
+if a sender/recipient should be part of the anonymity set or not.
+
+\subsection{Tor}
+Tor is a low-latency anonymity network for anonymising TCP streams with about
+eight million daily users, primarily used for anonymous browsing, censorship
+circumvention, and providing anonymous (onion) services~\cite{tor,torusage}.
+Because Tor is designed to be usable for low-latency tasks such as web browsing,
+its threat model and design does not consider powerful attackers, e.g., global
+passive adversaries that can observe all network traffic on the
+Internet~\cite{trilemma,tor}. However, less powerful attackers such as ISPs and
+ASes that observe a fraction of network traffic on the Internet are in scope. 
+
+Users typically use Tor Browser---a customised version of Mozilla Firefox
+(bundled with a local relay)---as a client that sends traffic through three
+\emph{relays} when browsing a website on the regular Internet: a guard, middle,
+and exit relay. Traffic from the client to the exit is encrypted in multiple
+layers as part of fixed-size cells such that only the guard relay knows the
+IP-address of the client and only the exit relay knows the destination website.
+There are about 7000 public relays at the time of writing, all available in the
+\emph{consensus} generated periodically by the network. The consensus is public
+and therefore anyone can trivially determine if traffic is coming from the Tor
+network by checking if the IP-address is in the consensus. Note that the
+encrypted network traffic in Tor is exposed to network adversaries as well as
+relays as it traverses the Internet. Figure~\ref{cat:fig:setting} depicts the
+setting just described, highlighting the anonymity sets of users of Tor Browser
+and the possible destination websites. 
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\includegraphics[width=.85\columnwidth]{src/cat/img/setting}
+	\caption{Using Tor to browse to a website, where an attacker observes the encrypted traffic into the Tor network for a target user, attempting to determine the website the user is visiting.}
+	\label{cat:fig:setting}
+\end{figure}
+
+\subsection{Website Fingerprinting}
+\label{cat:sec:back:wf}
+As mentioned in the introduction, attacks that analyse the encrypted network
+traffic (a trace) between a Tor client and a guard relay with the goal to detect
+the website a client is visiting are referred to as \emph{website
+fingerprinting} (WF) attacks. Figure~\ref{cat:fig:setting} shows the typical
+location of the attacker, who can also be the guard itself. WF attacks are
+evaluated in either the \emph{closed} or the \emph{open} world. In the closed
+world, an attacker \emph{monitors} a number of websites and it is the goal of
+the attacker to determine which website out of all the possible monitored
+websites a target is visiting. The open world is like the closed world with one
+significant change: the target user may also visit \emph{unmonitored} websites.
+This means that in the open world the attacker may also classify a trace as
+unmonitored in addition to monitored, posing a significantly greater challenge
+for the attacker in a more realistic setting than the closed world. The ratio
+between monitored and unmonitored traces in a dataset is further a significant
+challenge for WF attacks when assessing their real-world significance for
+Tor~\cite{DBLP:conf/ccs/JuarezAADG14}. Typically, WF attacks are evaluated on
+the frontpages of web\emph{sites}: web\emph{page} fingerprinting is presumably
+much more challenging due to the orders of magnitude of more webpages than
+websites. Unless otherwise stated, we only consider the frontpages of websites
+in this paper. 
+
+\subsubsection{Website Fingerprinting Attacks}
+Prior to WF attacks being considered for use on Tor, they were used against
+HTTPS~\cite{cheng1998traffic}, web
+proxies~\cite{Hintz02,DBLP:conf/sp/SunSWRPQ02}, SSH
+tunnels~\cite{DBLP:conf/ccs/LiberatoreL06}, and VPNs~\cite{HerrmannWF09}. For Tor, WF attacks are typically based on machine learning and can be
+categorized based on if they use deep learning or not. 
+
+Traditional WF attacks in the literature use manually engineered features
+extracted from both the size and timing of packets (and/or cells) sent by Tor.
+State of the art attacks with manually engineered features are
+Wang-kNN~\cite{Wang}, CUMUL~\cite{cumul}, and k-FP~\cite{kfp}. For reference,
+Wang-kNN has 1225 features, CUMUL 104 features, and k-FP 125 features. In terms
+of accuracy, k-FP appears to have a slight edge over the other two, but all
+three report over 90\% accuracy against significantly sized datasets. As
+traditional WF attacks progressed, the features more than the type of machine
+learning method have shown to be vital for the success of attacks, with an
+emerging consensus on what are important features (e.g., coarse features like
+number of incoming and outgoing packets)~\cite{Cherubin17,kfp,cumul}.
+
+Deep learning was first used for WF attacks by Abe and Goto in
+2016~\cite{abe2016fingerprinting}. Relatively quickly, Rimmer \emph{et~al.}
+reached parity with traditional WF attacks, lending credence to the emerging
+consensus that the research community had found the most important features for
+WF~\cite{DBLP:conf/ndss/RimmerPJGJ18}. However, recently Sirinam et
+al.~\cite{DF} with Deep Fingerprinting (DF) significantly improved on other WF
+attacks, also on the WTF-PAD and Walkie-Talkie defenses, and is at the time of
+writing considered state-of-the-art. DF is based on a Convolutional Neural
+Network (CNN) with a customized architecture for WF. Each packet trace as input
+to DF is simply a constant size (5000) list of cells (or packets) and their
+direction (positive for outgoing, negative for incoming), ignoring size and
+timings. Based on the input, the CNN learns features on its own: we do not know
+what they are, other than preliminary work indicating that the CNN gives more
+weight to input early in the trace~\cite{mathews2018understanding}. 
+
+The last layer of the CNN-based architecture of DF is a \emph{softmax} function:
+it assigns (relative) probabilities to each class as the output of
+classification. These probabilities allow a threshold to be defined for the
+final classification in the open world, requiring that the probability of the
+most likely class is above the threshold to classify as a monitored website. 
+
+\subsubsection{Website Fingerprinting Defenses}
+WF defenses for Tor modify the timing and number of (fixed-size) cells sent over
+Tor when a website is visited. The modifications are done by injecting dummy
+traffic and introducing artificial delays. Defenses can typically be classified
+as either based on constant-rate traffic or not, where constant rate defenses
+force all traffic to fit a pre-determined structure, forming \emph{collision
+sets} for websites where their traffic traces appear identical to an attacker.
+Non-constant rate defenses simply more-or-less randomly inject dummy traffic
+and/or artificial delays with the hope of obfuscating the resulting network
+traces. WF defenses are typically compared in terms of their induced
+\emph{bandwidth} (BOH) and \emph{time} (TOH) overheads compared to no defense.
+Further, different WF defenses make more or less realistic and/or practical
+assumptions, making comparing overheads necessary but not nearly sufficient for
+reaching conclusions. 
+
+We briefly describe WF defenses that we later use to evaluate the impact of
+attackers performing enhanced WF attacks with access to WOs:
+\begin{description}
+    \item[Walkie-Talkie] by Wang and Goldberg~\cite{WT} puts Tor Browser into
+    half duplex mode and pads traffic such that different websites result in the
+    same cell sequences. This creates a collision set between a visited website
+    and  a target \emph{decoy website} which results in the same cell sequence
+    with the defense. Their evaluation shows 31\% BOH and 34\% TOH. Collision
+    sets grow beyond size two at the cost of BOH.
+    \item[WTF-PAD] by Juarez \emph{et~al.}~\cite{wtf-pad} is based on the idea
+    of \emph{adaptive padding} \cite{DBLP:conf/esorics/ShmatikovW06} where fake
+    padding is injected only when there is no real traffic to send. The defense
+    is simulated on collected packet traces and its design is the foundation of
+    the circuit padding framework recently implemented in Tor. The simulations
+    report  50-60\% BOH and 0\% TOH.
+    \item[CS-BuFLO] by Cai \emph{et~al.}~\cite{csbuflo} is a \emph{constant rate}
+    defense where traffic is always sent at a constant rate between a sender and
+    receiver, improving on prior work by Dyer~et
+    al.~\cite{DBLP:conf/sp/DyerCRS12}. Their evaluation shows 220-270\% BOH and
+    270-340\% TOH.
+    \item[Tamaraw] by Cai \emph{et~al.}~\cite{Tamaraw} is another constant rate defense
+    that further improves on CS-BuFLO. In the evaluation by Wang and Goldberg,
+    they report  103\% BOH and 140\% TOH for Tamaraw~\cite{WT}.
+    \item[DynaFlow] by Lu \emph{et~al.}~\cite{DynaFlow} is a \emph{dynamic}
+    constant-rate defense that allows for the defense to adjust its parameters
+    (notably the ``inter-packet interval'') based on configuration and on the
+    observed traffic. The evaluation shows an overall improvement over Tamaraw
+    when configured to use similar overheads. 
+\end{description}
+The primary downside of defenses like Walkie-Talkie that depend on creating
+collision sets for websites is that they require up-to-date knowledge of the
+target website(s) to create collisions with (to know how to morph the traffic
+traces): this is a significant practical issue for
+deployment~\cite{DBLP:conf/wpes/NithyanandCJ14,Wang,WT}. Constant rate defenses
+like CS-BuFLO and Tamaraw are easier to deploy but suffer from significant
+overheads~\cite{csbuflo,Tamaraw}. WTF-PAD is hard to implement both efficiently
+and effectively in practice due to only being simulated on packet traces as-is
+and also being vulnerable to attacks like Deep Fingerprinting~\cite{wtf-pad,DF}.
+While DynaFlow shows great promise, but requires changes at the client (Tor
+Browser, local relay, or both) and at exit relays to \emph{combine} packets with
+payloads smaller than Tor's cell size~\cite{DynaFlow}. Without combined packets
+its advantage in terms of overhead compared to Tamaraw likely shrinks. 
+
+\subsection{Challenges for WF Attacks in Practice}
+A number of practical challenges for an attacker performing WF attacks have been
+highlighted over the years, notably comprehensively so by Mike Perry of the Tor
+Project~\cite{perryCrit} and Juarez et
+al.~\cite{DBLP:conf/ccs/JuarezAADG14}. Wang and Goldberg have showed that
+several of the highlighted challenges---such as maintaining a fresh data set and
+determining when websites are visited---are practical to overcome~\cite{DBLP:journals/popets/WangG16}. What remains are two notably
+significant challenges: distinguishing between different goals of the attacker
+and addressing false positives.
+
+
+For attacker goals when performing WF attacks, an attacker may want to detect
+website visits with the goal of censoring access to it, to identify all users
+that visit particular websites, or to identify every single website visited by
+a target~\cite{perryCrit}. Clearly, these goals put different
+constraints on the attacker. For censorship, classification must happen before
+content is actually allowed to be completely transferred to the victim. For
+monitoring only a select number of websites the attacker has the most freedom,
+while detecting all website visits by a victim requires the attacker to have
+knowledge of all possible websites on the web. 
+
+For addressing false positives there are a number of aspects to take into
+account. First, the web has millions of websites that could be visited by a
+victim (not the case for onion services~\cite{JansenJGED18}), and each website
+has a significant number of webpages that are often dynamically generated and
+frequently changed~\cite{DBLP:conf/ccs/JuarezAADG14,perryCrit}. Secondly, how
+often victims potentially visit websites that are monitored by an attacker is
+unknown to the attacker, i.e., the \emph{base rate} of victims are unknown. The
+base rate leads to even a small false positive rate of a WF attack overwhelming
+an attacker with orders of magnitude more false positives than true positives,
+leaving WF attacks impractical for most attacker goals in practice. 
+
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/src/bayes.tex b/summary/src/cat/src/bayes.tex
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+\section{Bayes' Law for Estimating Utility of Website Oracles} \label{cat:app:bayes}
+
+To reason about the advantage to an attacker of having access to a WO, we
+estimate the conditional probability of a target user visiting a monitored
+website. For conditional probability we know that:
+\begin{equation}
+	P(C_0 \cap C_1) = P(C_0|C_1)P(C_1)
+\end{equation}
+
+For a hypothesis $H$ given conditional evidence $E$, Bayes' theorem states
+that:
+\begin{equation}
+	P(H|E) = \frac{P(E|H) P(H)}{P(E)}
+\end{equation}
+
+Assume that E = $E_0 \cap E_1$, then:
+\begin{equation}
+	P(H|E_0 \cap E_1) = \frac{P(E_0 \cap E_1|H) P(H)}{P(E_0 \cap E_1)}
+\end{equation}
+
+Substituting $P(E_0 \cap E_1)$ with (1) we get:
+\begin{equation}
+	P(H|E_0 \cap E_1) = \frac{P(E_0 \cap E_1|H) P(H)}{P(E_0|E_1)P(E_1)}
+\end{equation}
+
+For a timeframe $t$, we define
+\begin{description}
+	\item[$H$] the probability that target user(s) visited website $w$ over Tor in $t$
+	\item[$E_0$] the probability that target user(s) visited a website over Tor in $t$
+	\item[$E_1$] the probability that someone visited website $w$ over Tor in $t$
+\end{description}
+
+We see that $P(E_0 \cap E_1|H) = 1$ by definition and get:
+\begin{equation}
+	P(H|E_0 \cap E_1) = \frac{P(H)}{P(E_0|E_1)P(E_1)}
+\end{equation}
+
+Consider $P(E_0|E_1)$: while the conditional $E_1$ may have some minor affect on
+user behaviour (in particular for overall popular websites), we assume that the
+popularity of using Tor to visit a particular website (by any of the users of
+Tor) has negligible impact on $E_0$ and treat $E_0$ and $E_1$ as independent:
+
+\begin{equation}
+	P(H|E_0 \cap E_1) = \frac{P(H)}{P(E_0)P(E_1)}
+\end{equation}
+
+We can further refine $P(H)$ as being composed of at least:
+
+\begin{equation}
+	P(H) = P(E_0) \cap P(B_w) = P(E_0|B_w)P(B_w)
+\end{equation}
+
+Where $P(B_w)$ is the base rate (prior) of the user(s) visiting website $w$ out
+of all possible websites they visit ($P(E_0)$). We again assume (perhaps
+naively) that $E_0$ is also independent of $B_w$, which gives us:
+
+\begin{equation}
+	P(H|E_0 \cap E_1) = \frac{P(E_0)P(B_w)}{P(E_0)P(E_1)} = \frac{P(B_w)}{P(E_1)}
+\end{equation}
+
+In other words, if an attacker learns that target user(s) visited a website
+($E_0$) over Tor and that website $w$ was also visited over Tor by some user
+($E_1$), then we can estimate the probability that it was target user(s) that
+visited website $w$ ($H$) as the ratio between the base rate (prior) for
+visiting $w$ of target user(s) ($B_w$) and the probability that someone visited
+the website over Tor ($E_1$), all within a timeframe $t$.
+
+Figure~\ref{cat:fig:bt} shows the results for simulating the probability $P(H|E_0
+\cap E_1)$ for different website popularities of $w$, base rates, and
+timeframes. We see that with a realistic timeframe of $100$ ms, for all
+base-rates but $10^{-6}$ there is non-zero conditional probability (and
+therefore utility of WO access) for Alexa top 100k or less popular websites,
+which covers about half of all website visits over Tor (excluding
+\url{torproject.org}).
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\begin{subfigure}{.495\columnwidth}
+	\includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{src/cat/img/bt10}
+	\caption{10 ms}
+	\label{cat:fig:bt:10ms}
+	\end{subfigure}
+	\begin{subfigure}[b]{.495\columnwidth}
+	\includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{src/cat/img/bt100}
+	\caption{100 ms}
+	\label{cat:fig:bt:100ms}
+	\end{subfigure}
+	\begin{subfigure}[b]{.495\columnwidth}
+	\includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{src/cat/img/bt1000}
+	\caption{1000 ms}
+	\label{cat:fig:bt:1000ms}
+	\end{subfigure}
+	\caption{The conditional probability as a function of user base rate and
+	website popularity (Alexa) for three different timeframes.}
+	\label{cat:fig:bt}
+\end{figure}
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/src/conclusions.tex b/summary/src/cat/src/conclusions.tex
new file mode 100644
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+\section{Conclusions} \label{cat:sec:conc}
+WF+WO attacks use the base rate of all users of the network against victims,
+significantly reducing false positives in the case of all but the most popular
+websites visited over Tor. This is troubling in many ways, in part because
+presumably many sensitive website visits are to unpopular websites used only by
+local communities in regions of the world where the potential consequences of
+identification are the worst. 
+
+The threat model of Tor explicitly states that Tor does not consider attackers
+that can observe both incoming and outgoing traffic~\cite{tor}. Clearly, a WO
+gives the capability to infer what the outgoing traffic of the network encodes
+on the application layer (the website visits). This is in a sense a violation of
+Tor's threat model when combined with a WF attacker that also observes incoming
+traffic. However, we argue that because of the plethora of possible ways for an
+attacker to infer membership in the anonymity sets of Tor, WOs should be
+considered within scope simply because Tor asserts that it is an anonymity
+network. 
+
+While the real-world impact of WF attacks on Tor users remains an open question,
+our simulations show that false positives can be signficantly reduced by many
+attackers with little extra effort for some WO sources. Depending on WO source,
+this comes at a trade-off of less recall. For many attackers and attacker goals,
+however, this is a worthwhile trade. To us, the threat of WF attacks appears
+more real than ever, especially when also considering recent advances by deep
+learning based attacks like DF~\cite{DF} and DeepCorr~\cite{deepcorr}.
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/src/discussion.tex b/summary/src/cat/src/discussion.tex
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/summary/src/cat/src/discussion.tex
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+\section{Discussion} \label{cat:sec:disc}
+For defenses that are based on the idea of creating collision sets between
+packet traces generated by websites, oracle access is equivalent to being able
+to perform set intersection between the set of websites in a collision set and
+monitored websites visited at the time of fingerprinting. As the results show
+from Section~\ref{cat:sec:wf}, some defenses can significantly reduce the recall of
+WF attacks with WOs, but not the precision for the majority of websites and
+website visits in Tor. 
+
+Next, in Section~\ref{cat:sec:disc:unmon} we further cement that our simulations
+show that WOs significantly reduces false positives, highlighting that a WF+WO
+attacker surprisingly infrequently have to query a WO when classifying
+unmonitored traces. Section~\ref{cat:sec:disc:flawed} discusses the impact of
+imperfect WO sources with limited observability and false positives on the joint
+WF+WO attack. Finally, Section~\ref{cat:sec:disc:limits} covers limitations of our
+work, and Section~\ref{cat:sec:disc:miti} discusses possible mitigations.
+
+\subsection{A Large Unmonitored Dataset}
+\label{cat:sec:disc:unmon}
+We look at the number of false positives for a large test dataset consisting of
+only unmonitored websites (representing a target user(s) with base rate 0, i.e.,
+that never visits any monitored website). Using the dataset of Greschbach et
+al.~\cite{DBLP:conf/ndss/GreschbachPRWF17}, we trained DF on 100x100 monitored
+and 10k unmonitored websites (8:2 stratified split for validation), resulting in
+about 80\% validation accuracy after 30 epochs (so DF is clearly successful also
+on this dataset). We then tested the trained classifier on \emph{only} 100k
+\emph{unmonitored} traces, with and without oracle access (100ms resolution) for
+different assumptions of the popularity of the \emph{monitored} websites. With
+ten repetitions of the above experiment, we observed a false positive rate in
+the order of $10^{-6}$ for monitored websites with Alexa popularity 10k.
+Excluding \url{torproject.org}, this indicates that an attacker would have close
+to no false positives for about half of all website visits in Tor, according to
+the distribution of Mani \emph{et~al.}~\cite{torusage} (see
+Section~\ref{cat:sec:sim:dist}). Without access to a WO, DF had a false positive
+rate in the order of $10^{-3}$ to $10^{-4}$, depending on the threshold used by
+the attacker. 
+
+Recall how WOs are used as part of WF+WO attacks in
+Section~\ref{cat:sec:oracles:generic}: the WO is only used if the WF attack
+classifies a trace as monitored.\footnote{For WF attacks like DF that produces a
+list of probabilities (Definition~\ref{cat:def:oracleprob}), just assume that the
+attacker picks the threshold and checks if the probability is above as part of
+the if-statement before using the WO.} This means that, in the example above,
+the WO is used on average every $10^3$ to $10^4$ trace, to (potentially) rule
+out a false positive. Clearly, this means that WO sources that can only be used
+infrequently, e.g., due to caching as in DNS, are still valuable for an
+attacker.
+
+\subsection{Imperfect Website Oracle Sources}
+\label{cat:sec:disc:flawed}
+Our analysis considered an ideal source of a WO that observes all visits to
+targeted \emph{monitored} websites of the attacker and that produces no false
+positives. Next, using the same dataset and setup as for
+Figure~\ref{cat:fig:df:nodef} with an Alexa starting rank of $10^4$, we simulate the
+impact on recall and the False-Negative-to-Positive-rate\footnote{For a
+classifier with multiple monitored classes and an unmonitored class (as for our
+modified DF, see Section~\ref{cat:sec:wf:aug}), FNP captures the case when the
+classifier classifies an unmonitored testing trace as any monitored class. In
+addition to FNP, such a classifier can also confuse one monitored website for
+another. Both these cases are false positives~\cite{Wang2015a}.} (FNP) of the
+\emph{joint} WF+WO attack for five false positive rates \emph{of the WO} and a
+fraction of observed website visits.
+
+Figure~\ref{cat:fig:factor-recall} shows the impact on the joint recall in the above
+setting. We see that recall is directly proportional to the fraction of observed
+visits, as per the results of Greschbach
+\emph{et~al.}~\cite{DBLP:conf/ndss/GreschbachPRWF17}. Further, false positives
+for the WO have a positive impact on the fraction of recall, counteracting
+visits missed due to limited observability. For the same reason, a larger
+timeframe or monitoring more popular websites would also improve recall.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+  \includegraphics[width=.67\columnwidth]{src/cat/img/factor-recall}
+	\caption{How limited WO observability effects the final recall of a WF+WO attack for five different WO false positive rates.}
+	\label{cat:fig:factor-recall}
+\end{figure}
+
+Figure~\ref{cat:fig:factor-fnp} shows the impact on the joint FNP. Note that lower
+FNP is better for an attacker. We see that limited observability has no impact
+on FNP. This makes sense, because a WO cannot confirm anything it does not
+observe. The FNP fraction for the joint FNP is roughly proportional to the FP of
+the WO. We also see that the FNP fraction consistently is above the FP of the
+WO: this is because---beyond the simulated FP---there is a slight probability
+that someone else (in our simulation of the Tor network) visited the website for
+each classified trace. A larger timeframe or monitoring more popular websites
+would also increase FNP. 
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+  \includegraphics[width=.67\columnwidth]{src/cat/img/factor-fnp}
+	\caption{How limited WO observability effects the final False-Negative-to-Positive-rate (FNP) of a WF+WO attack for five different WO false positive rates. Lower is better.}
+	\label{cat:fig:factor-fnp}
+\end{figure}
+
+From above results, our simulations indicate that even with a deeply imperfect
+WO source an attacker can get significant advantage in terms of reduced false
+positives at a comparatively small cost of recall. For example, given a WO with
+50\% observability and false positives, the resulting WF+WO attack has about
+75\% of the recall of the WF attack and slightly more than half the false
+positives. 
+
+\subsection{Limitations}
+\label{cat:sec:disc:limits}
+As discussed in Section~\ref{cat:sec:back:wf}, there are a number of practical
+limitations in general for WF attacks. Regarding attacker goals, WOs are likely
+less useful for the purpose of censorship than for other goals. Many sources of
+WOs cannot be accessed in real-time, giving little utility for an attacker that
+needs to make a near real-time censorship decision. An attacker that only wants
+to detect visits to a few selected monitored websites gains significant utility
+from WOs, as long as the detection does not have to be in real-time. It is also
+noteworthy that an attacker that wants to detect all possible website visits by
+a victim can use the WO to in essence ``close the world'' from all possible
+websites to only those visited over Tor while the victim is actively browsing.
+Granted, this requires a source for the WO that is slightly different from our
+definition, but some do offer this: e.g., an attacker that gains comprehensive
+control over the DNS resolvers used by Tor
+exits~\cite{DBLP:conf/ndss/GreschbachPRWF17}. 
+
+When it comes to false positives a significant limitation of our simulations is
+that we consider fingerprinting the frontpages of websites and not specific
+webpages. Several sources or WOs are not able to detect webpage visits. This is
+also true for subsequent webpage visits on the same website after first visiting
+the frontpage of a website (e.g., DNS and OCSP will be cached). An attacker with
+the goal of detecting each such page visit will thus suffer more false positives
+or fail at detecting them for some sources of WOs.
+
+\subsection{Mitigations}
+\label{cat:sec:disc:miti}
+The best defense against WOs is WF defenses that significantly reduce the recall
+of WF attacks. In particular, if an attacker can significantly reduce the
+website anonymity set \emph{after} accounting for information from the WO, then
+attacks are likelier to succeed. This implies that most websites need to (at
+least have the potential to) result in the same network traces, as we see with
+DynaFlow, Tamaraw, and CS-BuFLO. 
+
+For onion websites we note that the DHT source of a WO from
+Section~\ref{cat:sec:sources} is inherent to the design of onion services in Tor.
+Defenses that try to make it harder to distinguish between regular website
+visits and visits to onion websites should also consider this WO source as part
+of their analysis, in particular for v2 onion services.
+
+Finally, some sources of WOs could be minimized. If you run a potentially
+sensitive website: do not use RTB ads, staple OCSP, have as few DNS entries as
+possible\footnote{As noted by
+Greschbach~\emph{et~al.}~\cite{DBLP:conf/ndss/GreschbachPRWF17}, websites may
+have several unique domain names. Each of those could be used independently to
+query several sources (e.g., DNS) of WOs.} with a high TTL, do not use CDNs, do
+not retain any access logs, and consider if your website, web server, or
+operating system have any information leaks that can be used as an oracle. If
+you run a Tor exit, consider not using Google or Cloudflare for your DNS but
+instead use your ISP's resolver if
+possible~\cite{DBLP:conf/ndss/GreschbachPRWF17}.
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/src/intro.tex b/summary/src/cat/src/intro.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b65baa9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/src/intro.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+\section{Introduction} \label{cat:sec:intro}
+A Website Fingerprinting (WF) attack is a type of traffic analysis attack where
+an attacker attempts to learn which websites are visited through encrypted
+network tunnels---such as the low-latency anonymity network Tor~\cite{tor} or
+Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)---by analysing the encrypted network
+traffic~\cite{cheng1998traffic,HerrmannWF09,Hintz02,DBLP:conf/ccs/LiberatoreL06,PanchenkoNZE11,DBLP:conf/sp/SunSWRPQ02}.
+The analysis considers only the size and timing of encrypted packets sent over
+the network to and from a target client. This makes it possible for attackers
+that only have the limited \emph{capability} of observing the encrypted network
+traffic (sometimes referred to as a \emph{local eavesdropper}) to perform WF
+attacks. Sources of such capabilities include ISPs, routers, network interface
+cards, WiFi hotspots, and guard relays in the Tor network, among others. Access
+to encrypted network traffic is typically not well-protected over the Internet
+because it is already in a form that is considered safe to expose to attackers
+due to the use of encryption. 
+
+The last decade has seen significant work on improved WF attacks (e.g.,
+\cite{CaiZJJ12,kfp,DF,Wang}) and defenses (e.g,
+\cite{csbuflo,Tamaraw,wtf-pad,DynaFlow}) accompanied by an ongoing debate on the
+real-world impact of these attacks justifying the deployment of defenses or not,
+in particular surrounding Tor (e.g.,
+\cite{DBLP:conf/ccs/JuarezAADG14,perryCrit,DBLP:journals/popets/WangG16}).
+There are significant real-world challenges for an attacker to successfully
+perform WF attacks, such as the sheer size of the web (about 200 million active
+websites~\cite{netcraft-survey}),
+detecting the beginning of website loads in encrypted network traces, background
+traffic, maintaining a realistic and fresh training data set, and dealing with
+false positives. 
+
+Compared to most VPN implementations, Tor has some basic but rather ineffective
+defenses in place against WF attacks, such as padding packets to a constant size
+and randomized HTTP request pipelining~\cite{CaiZJJ12,tor,Wang}. Furthermore,
+Tor recently started implementing a framework for circuit padding machines to
+make it easier to implement traffic analysis defenses~\cite{tor-0401}
+based on adaptive padding~\cite{wtf-pad,DBLP:conf/esorics/ShmatikovW06}.
+However, the unclear real-world impact of WF attacks makes deployment of
+proposed effective (and often prohibitively costly in terms of bandwidth and/or
+latency overheads) WF defenses a complicated topic for researchers to reach
+consensus on and the Tor Project to decide upon.
+
+\subsection{Introducing Website Oracles}
+In this paper, we introduce the security notion of a \emph{Website Oracle} (WO)
+that can be used by attackers to augment any WF attack. A WO answers ``yes'' or
+``no'' to the question ``was a particular website visited over Tor at this point
+in time?''. We show through simulation that such a \emph{capability}---access to
+a WO---greatly reduces the false positive rate for an attacker attempting to
+fingerprint the majority of websites and website visits through the Tor network.
+The reduction is to such a great extent that our simulations suggest that false
+positives are no longer a significant reason for why WF attacks lack real-world
+impact. This is in particular the case for onion services where the estimated
+number of websites is a fraction compared to the ``regular''
+web~\cite{JansenJGED18}.
+
+Our simulations are based on the privacy-preserving network measurement results
+of the live Tor network in early 2018 by Mani \emph{et~al.}~\cite{torusage}.
+Besides simulating WOs we also identify a significant number of potential
+sources of WOs that are available to a wide range of attackers, such as nation
+state actors, advertisement networks (including their customers), and operators
+of Tor relays. Some particularly practical sources---due to DNS
+and how onion services are accessed---can be used by anyone with modest
+computing resources. 
+
+We argue that sources of WOs are inherent in Tor due to its design goal of
+providing \emph{anonymous} and not \emph{unobservable} communication: observable
+anonymity sets are inherent for anonymity~\cite{KedoganAP02,anonterm,Raymond00},
+and a WO can be viewed as simply being able to query for membership in the
+destination/recipient anonymity set (the potential websites visited by a Tor
+client). The solution to the effectiveness of WF+WO attacks is therefore not to
+eliminate all sources---that would be impossible without unobservable
+communication~\cite{KedoganAP02,anonterm,Raymond00}---but to assume that an
+attacker has WO access when evaluating the effectiveness of WF attacks and
+defenses, even for weak attackers like local (passive) eavesdroppers. 
+
+The introduction of a WO in the setting of WF attacks is similar to how
+encryption schemes are constructed to be secure in the presence of an attacker
+with access to \emph{encryption} and \emph{decryption} oracles (chosen plaintext
+and ciphertext attacks, respectively) \cite{GoldwasserM84,NaorY90,RackoffS91}.
+This is motivated by the real-world prevalence of such oracles, and the high
+impact on security when paired with other weaknesses of the encryption schemes:
+e.g., Bleichenbacher~\cite{Bleichenbacher98} padding oracle attacks remain an
+issue in modern cryptosystems today despite being discovered about twenty years
+ago~\cite{Merget19,RonenGGSWY18}. 
+
+\subsection{Contributions and Structure}
+Further background on anonymity, Tor, and WF are presented in
+Section~\ref{cat:sec:back}. Section~\ref{cat:sec:oracles} defines a WO and describes two
+generic constructions for combining a WO with \emph{any} WF attack. Our generic
+constructions are a type of Classify-Verify method by Stolerman
+\emph{et~al.}~\cite{stolerman2013classify}, first used in the context of WF
+attacks by Juarez \emph{et~al.}~\cite{DBLP:conf/ccs/JuarezAADG14} and later by
+Greschbach \emph{et~al.} \cite{DBLP:conf/ndss/GreschbachPRWF17}.
+Section~\ref{cat:sec:sources} presents a number of sources of WOs that can be used
+by a wide range of attackers. We focus on practical sources based on DNS and
+onion service directories in Tor, offering \emph{probabilistic} WOs that anyone
+can use with modest resources. We describe how we simulate access to a WO
+throughout the rest of the paper in Section~\ref{cat:sec:sim}, based on Tor network
+measurement data from Mani \emph{et~al.}~\cite{torusage}.
+
+Section~\ref{cat:sec:wf} experimentally evaluates the performance of augmenting the
+state-of-the-art WF attack Deep Fingerprinting (DF) by Sirinam
+\emph{et~al.}~\cite{DF} with WO access using one of our generic constructions.
+We show significantly improved classification performance against unprotected
+Tor as well as against traces defended with the WF defenses WTF-PAD by Juarez
+\emph{et~al.}~\cite{wtf-pad} and Walkie-Talkie by Wang and Goldberg~\cite{WT},
+concluding that the defenses are ineffective in this new setting where an
+attacker has access to a WO. Further, we also evaluate DF with WO access against
+Wang \emph{et~al.}'s dataset~\cite{Wang} with simulated traces for the
+constant-rate WF defenses CS-BuFLO and Tamaraw by Cai et
+al.~\cite{csbuflo,Tamaraw}. Our results show that constant-rate defenses are
+overall effective defenses but not efficient due to the significant induced
+overheads. We then evaluate two configurations of the WF defense DynaFlow by Lu
+\emph{et~al.}~\cite{DynaFlow}, observing similar effectiveness as CS-BuFLO but
+at lower overheads approaching that of WTF-PAD and Walkie-Talkie.
+
+In Section~\ref{cat:sec:disc} we discuss our results, focusing on the impact on
+false positives with WO access, how imperfect sources for WOs impact WF+WO
+attacks, limitations of our work, and possible mitigations. Our simulations
+indicate that WF defenses should be evaluated against WF attacks based on how
+they minimise \emph{recall}. We present related work in
+Section~\ref{cat:sec:related}, including how WF+WO attacks relate to traffic
+correlation and confirmation attacks. Section~\ref{cat:sec:conc} briefly concludes
+this paper. 
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/src/lessons.tex b/summary/src/cat/src/lessons.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..70f49f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/src/lessons.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+\section{Lessons from Simulation} \label{cat:app:lessons}
+With the ability to simulate access to WOs we can now simulate the entire
+website anonymity set for Tor. To get a better understanding of why WOs are so
+useful for an attacker performing WF attacks, we look at two results from the
+simulation below. 
+
+\subsection{Time Until Website Visited over Tor}
+\label{cat:sec:sim:timeuntil}
+
+Figure~\ref{cat:fig:timeuntil} shows the time until there is a 50\% probability that
+a website has been visited over Tor depending on website popularity (Alexa, as
+discussed in Section~\ref{cat:sec:sim:dist}). Within ten seconds, we expect that
+most of Alexa top 1k has been visited. Recall that this represents about one
+third of all website visits over Tor. The less popular websites on Alexa top
+one-million represent another third of all visits, quickly approaching hundreds
+of seconds between visits. For the remaining third of all website visits we
+expect them to be even less frequent.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+  \includegraphics[width=.67\columnwidth]{src/cat/img/timeuntilvisited}
+	\caption{The simulated time until there is a 50\% probability that a website for different Alexa ranks has been visited over Tor.}
+	\label{cat:fig:timeuntil}
+\end{figure}
+
+\subsection{Visits Until First False Positive}
+\label{cat:sec:sim:fp}
+Assume that target user(s) have a base rate of $0$, i.e., they never visit the
+attacker's monitored websites. With WO access, we can determine how many
+(naively assumed independent) website visits it \emph{at least} takes until
+there is a 50\% chance that the attacker's classifier gets a false positive.
+This is because if the attacker's website classifier without oracle access
+always returns a false positive, then the false positive rate by the WF+WO
+attack will be determined by when the WO says that the---incorrectly classified
+as monitored---website has been visited. Figure~\ref{cat:fig:probfp} shows the
+expected number of visits \emph{by the victim(s)} for different timeframes based
+on the popularity of the monitored websites. Note that the attacker per
+definition chooses which websites are monitored and can therefore take the
+probability of false positives into account. 
+
+\begin{figure}[t]
+	\centering
+  \includegraphics[width=.67\columnwidth]{src/cat/img/probfp}
+	\caption{The number of website visits until there is a 50\% probability
+	that a website oracle would contribute to a false positive.}
+	\label{cat:fig:probfp}
+\end{figure}
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/src/main.tex b/summary/src/cat/src/main.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f12287b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/src/main.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+\documentclass[USenglish,oneside,twocolumn]{article}
+
+\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}%(only for the pdftex engine)
+%\RequirePackage[no-math]{fontspec}%(only for the luatex or the xetex engine)
+\usepackage[big]{dgruyter_NEW}
+\usepackage{subcaption}
+\usepackage[dvipsnames]{xcolor}
+\usepackage{mathtools}
+\usepackage{amsthm, amssymb}
+\usepackage[]{cryptocode}
+\usepackage{footmisc}
+\hypersetup{
+  colorlinks,
+  citecolor=RedViolet,
+  linkcolor=RedViolet,
+  urlcolor=MidnightBlue}
+
+\theoremstyle{definition}
+\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}
+
+\DOI{foobar}
+
+\newcommand{\TODO}[1]{\textcolor{red}{TODO:} #1}
+
+\cclogo{\includegraphics{by-nc-nd.pdf}}
+
+\begin{document}
+
+  \author*[1]{Tobias Pulls}
+  \author[2]{Rasmus Dahlberg}
+  \affil[1]{Karlstad University, E-mail: tobias.pulls@kau.se}
+  \affil[2]{Karlstad University, E-mail: rasmus.dahlberg@kau.se}
+
+  \title{\huge Website Fingerprinting with Website Oracles}
+
+  \runningtitle{Website Fingerprinting with Website Oracles}
+
+  \begin{abstract}
+    {\input{src/abstract}}
+  \end{abstract}
+  \keywords{website fingerprinting, website oracles, traffic analysis, security model, design}
+% \classification[PACS]{}
+% \communicated{...}
+% \dedication{...}
+
+\journalname{Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies}
+\DOI{Editor to enter DOI}
+\startpage{1}
+\received{..}
+\revised{..}
+\accepted{..}
+
+\journalyear{..}
+\journalvolume{..}
+\journalissue{..}
+
+\maketitle
+\eject
+\section{Introduction}
+\label{cat:sec:intro}
+\input{src/intro}
+
+\section{Background}
+\label{cat:sec:back}
+\input{src/background}
+
+\section{Website Oracles}
+\label{cat:sec:oracles}
+\input{src/oracles}
+
+\section{Sources of Website Oracles}
+\label{cat:sec:sources}
+\input{src/sources}
+
+\section{Simulating Website Oracles}
+\label{cat:sec:sim}
+\input{src/sim}
+
+\section{Deep Fingerprinting with Website Oracles}
+\label{cat:sec:wf}
+\input{src/wf}
+
+\section{Discussion}
+\label{cat:sec:disc}
+\input{src/discussion}
+
+\section{Related Work}
+\label{cat:sec:related}
+\input{src/related}
+
+\section{Conclusions}
+\label{cat:sec:conc}
+\input{src/conclusions}
+
+\section*{Acknowledgements}
+We would like to thank Jari Appelgren, Roger Dingledine, Nicholas Hopper, Marc
+Juarez, George Kadianakis, Linus Nordberg, Mike Perry, Erik Wästlund, and the
+PETS reviewers for their valuable feedback. Simulations were performed using the
+\href{http://snic.se/}{Swedish National Infrastructure for Computing} (SNIC) at
+\href{https://www.hpc2n.umu.se/}{High Performance Computing Center North}
+(HPC2N). This research was funded by the
+\href{https://internetstiftelsen.se/en/}{Swedish Internet Foundation} and the
+\href{www.kks.se}{Knowledge Foundation of Sweden}. 
+
+\bibliographystyle{abbrv}
+\bibliography{ref-min}
+
+\appendix
+\section{Bayes' Law for Estimating Utility of Website Oracles}
+\label{cat:app:bayes}
+\input{src/bayes}
+
+\section{Lessons from Simulation}
+\label{cat:app:lessons}
+\input{src/lessons}
+
+\section{Sources of Website Oracles}
+\label{cat:app:sources}
+\input{src/othersources}
+
+\end{document}
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/src/oracles.tex b/summary/src/cat/src/oracles.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01f1d99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/src/oracles.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+\section{Website Oracles} \label{cat:sec:oracles}
+We first define a WO and then present two generic constructions for use with WF
+attacks based on the kind of output the WF attack supports. 
+
+\subsection{Defining Website Oracles}
+\begin{definition}
+	\label{cat:def:oracle}
+	A website oracle answers true or false to the question ``was a particular
+	monitored website $w$ visited over the Tor network at time $t$?''. 
+\end{definition}
+
+A WO considers only web\emph{sites} and not web\emph{pages} for $w$, but note
+that even for webpage fingerprinting being able to narrow down the possible
+websites that webpages belong to through WO access is a significant advantage to
+an attacker. The time $t$ refers to a \emph{period of time} or \emph{timeframe}
+during which a visit should have taken place. Notably, different sources of WOs
+may provide different \emph{resolutions} for time, forcing an attacker to
+consider a timeframe in which a visit could have taken place. For example,
+timestamps in Apache or nginx access logs use regular Unix timestamps as default
+(i.e., seconds), while CDNs like Cloudflare maintain logs with Unix nanosecond
+precision. Further, there are inherent limitations in approximating $t$ for the
+query when the attacker in addition to WO access can only directly observe
+traffic from the victim into Tor. We explore this later in
+Section~\ref{cat:sec:sim:timeframe}.
+
+One important limitation we place on the use of a WO with WF is that the
+attacker can only query the WO for \emph{monitored} websites. The open world
+setting is intended to capture a more realistic setting for evaluating attacks,
+and inherent in this is that the attacker cannot train (or even enumerate) all
+possible websites on the web. Given the ability to enumerate and query all
+possible websites gives the adversary a capability in line with a global passive
+adversary performing correlation attacks, which is clearly outside of the threat
+model of Tor~\cite{tor}. We further relate correlation and confirmation attacks
+to WF+WO attacks in Section~\ref{cat:sec:related}.
+
+Definition~\ref{cat:def:oracle} defines the ideal WO: it never fails to observe a
+\emph{monitored} website visit, it has no false positives, and it can answer for
+an arbitrary $t$. This is similar to how encryption and decryption oracles
+always encrypt and decrypt when modelling security for encryption
+schemes~\cite{GoldwasserM84,NaorY90,RackoffS91}. In practice, sources of all of
+these oracles may be more or less ideal and challenging for an attacker to use.
+Nevertheless, the prevalence of sources of these imperfect oracles motivate the
+assumption of an attacker with access to an ideal oracle. Similarly, for WOs, we
+motivate this assumption in Sections~\ref{cat:sec:sources}~and~\ref{cat:sec:sim}, in
+particular wrt.\ a timeframe on the order of (milli)seconds.
+Section~\ref{cat:sec:disc} further considers non-ideal sources of WOs and the effect
+on WF+WO attacks, both when the WO can produce false positives and when the
+source only observes a fraction of visits to monitored websites.
+
+\subsection{Generic Website Fingerprinting Attacks with Website Oracles}
+\label{cat:sec:oracles:generic}
+As mentioned in Section~\ref{cat:sec:back:wf}, a WF attack is a classifier that is
+given as input a packet trace and provides as output a classification. The
+classification is either a monitored site or a class representing unmonitored
+(in the open world). Figure~\ref{cat:fig:setting-oracle} shows the setting where an
+attacker capable of performing WF attacks also has access to a WO. We define a
+generic construction for WF+WO attacks that works with \emph{any} WF attack in
+the open world in Definition~\ref{cat:def:oraclewf}: 
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\includegraphics[width=\columnwidth]{src/cat/img/setting-oracle}
+	\caption{WF+WO attacks, where the WO infers membership of a particular website $w$ in the website anonymity set of all possible websites visited over Tor during a particular timeframe $t$.}
+	\label{cat:fig:setting-oracle}
+\end{figure}
+
+\begin{definition}[Binary verifier]
+	\label{cat:def:oraclewf}
+	Given a website oracle $o$ and WF classification $c$ of a trace collected at
+	time $t$, if $c$ is a monitored class, query the oracle $o(c,t)$. Return $c$
+	if the oracle returns true, otherwise return the unmonitored class. 
+\end{definition}
+
+Note that the WO is only queried when the WF \emph{classification} is for a
+monitored website and that Definition~\ref{cat:def:oraclewf} is a generalisation of
+the ``high precision'' DefecTor attack by Greschbach
+\emph{et~al.}~\cite{DBLP:conf/ndss/GreschbachPRWF17}. In terms of
+\emph{precision} and \emph{false positives}, the above generic WF+WO
+construction is strictly superior to a WF attack without a WO. Assume that the
+WF classification incorrectly classified an unmonitored trace as monitored, then
+there is \emph{only a probability} that a WO also returns true, depending on the
+probability that someone else visited the website in the same timeframe over
+Tor. If it does not, then a false positive is prevented. That is, a WF attack
+without WO access is identical to a WF attack with access to a useless WO that
+always returns true; any improvements beyond that will only help the attacker in
+ruling out false positives. We consider the impact on \emph{recall} later.
+
+We can further refine the use of WOs for the subset of WF attacks that support
+providing as output an ordered list of predictions in decreasing likelihood,
+optionally with probabilities, as shown in Definition~\ref{cat:def:oracleprob}:
+
+\begin{definition}[List verifier]
+	Given an ordered list of predictions in the open world and a website oracle:
+
+	{\centering
+	\pseudocode[syntaxhighlight=auto]{%
+	\t\pcfor \text{top prediction $p$ in list} \pcdo \\
+	\t\pcind \pcif p \text{ is unmonitored or oracle says $p$ visited } \t\pcthen\\
+	\t\pcind[2] return \text{list}\\
+	\t\pcind \text{move $p$ to last in list and optionally update probabilities}}
+	}
+	\label{cat:def:oracleprob}
+\end{definition}
+
+First, we observe that if the WF attack thinks that it is most likely an
+unmonitored website, then we accept that because a WO can only teach us
+something new about monitored websites. Secondly, if the most likely prediction
+has been visited according to the WO then we also accept that classification
+result. Finally, all that is left to do is to consider this while repeatedly
+iterating over the top predictions: if the top classification is a monitored
+website that has not been visited according to the WO, then move it from the top
+of the list and optionally update probabilities (if applicable, then also set
+$p=0.0$ before updating) and try again. Per definition, we will either hit the
+case of a monitored website that has been visited according to the WO or an
+unmonitored prediction. As mentioned in Section~\ref{cat:sec:back:wf}, WF output
+that has some sort of probability or threshold associated with classifications
+are useful for attackers with different requirements wrt. false positives and
+negatives.
+
+One could consider a third approach based on repeatedly querying a WO to first
+determine if any monitored websites have been visited and then train an
+optimised classifier (discarding monitored websites that we know have not been
+visited). While this may give a minor improvement, our results later in this
+paper as well as earlier work show that confusing monitored websites is a minor
+issue compared to confusing an unmonitored website as
+monitored~\cite{DBLP:conf/ndss/GreschbachPRWF17,DBLP:conf/ccs/JuarezAADG14,Wang}. 
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/src/othersources.tex b/summary/src/cat/src/othersources.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..35d3c71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/src/othersources.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+\section{Sources of Website Oracles} \label{cat:app:sources}
+There are a wide number of possible sources to instantiate WOs. Here we present
+some details on a selection of sources, far from exhaustive.
+
+\subsection{Surveillance Programmes}
+Intelligence agencies operate surveillance programmes that perform bulk
+collection and retention of communications metadata, including
+web-browsing~\cite{lyon2014surveillance}. For example, the Snowden revelations
+included \emph{Marina}:
+\begin{quote}
+	Of the more distinguishing features, Marina has the ability to look back on
+	the last 365 days' worth of DNI (Digital Network Intelligence) metadata seen
+	by the Sigint collection system, \emph{regardless} whether or not it was
+	tasked for collection~\cite{guardian}.
+\end{quote}
+
+Another example is the prevalence of nation states to monitor Internet traffic
+that crosses geographic borders. For example, China operates the Great Firewall
+of China that is also used for censorship purposes. Due to the nature of Tor and
+how exits are selected, visits to websites that are not operated by world-wide
+reaching hosting providers are highly likely to cross multiple nation borders as
+traffic goes from an exit to the website. It is also worth to highlight that any
+sensitive website hosted from within a country where a state actor is interested
+in identifying visitors are likely to capture traffic to that website due to the
+Tor traffic crossing its borders more often than not. 
+
+\subsection{Content Delivery Networks}
+Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), such as Akamai, Google, and Amazon host
+different types of content for a significant fraction of all websites on the
+Internet~\cite{ScheitleHGJZSV18}. Inherently, all requests for these resources
+are easily identified as coming from Tor exits, and depending on content, things
+like unique identifiers and HTTP referrer headers enable the CDN provider to
+infer the website the content is hosted on. 
+
+\subsection{Internet Giants}
+Internet giants like Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, and Cloudflare
+make up a large fraction the web as we know it. For example the use of Google
+Analytics is wide-spread, so is hosting in clouds provided by several of these
+giants, and Cloudflare with its ``cloud network platform'' hosts over 13 million
+domains~\cite{cf-size}.
+While some of them may do what is in their power to protect the valuable data
+they process and retain, they are still subject to many legal frameworks across
+the world that might not offer the best of protections for, say, access logs
+pertaining to ``anonymous'' users of Tor when requested by authorities of nation
+states. As another example, Cloudflare offers a nice API for their customers to
+get their access logs with Unix nanosecond precision. The logs are retained for
+up to seven
+days~\cite{cf-retention},
+giving ample time for legal requests. 
+
+\subsection{Access Logs of Web Servers}
+The vast majority of web servers retain access logs by default. Typically, they
+provide unix timestamps with seconds as the resolution (the case for Apache and
+nginx). Further, the access logs may be shipped to centralised security
+information and event management (SIEM) systems for analysis, with varying
+retention times and rigour in storage. For example, it is common to
+``anonymize'' logs by removing parts of the IP-addresses and then retaining them
+indefinitely, as is the case for Google who removes part of IP addresses in logs
+after nine
+months~\cite{google-retention}.
+
+
+\subsection{Middleboxes}
+Network middleboxes that observe, analyse, and potentially retain network
+traffic abound. Especially in more oppressive countries, middleboxes are often
+used for censorship or dragnet surveillance, e.g., as seen with Blue Coat in
+Syria~\cite{bluecoat}. 
+
+\subsection{OCSP Responders}
+Chung \emph{et~al.}~\cite{ocsp-chung} found in a recent study that 95.4\% of all
+certificates support the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), which allows
+a client to query the responsible CA in real-time for a certificate's revocation
+status via HTTP. As such, the browsed website will be exposed to the CA in
+question. From a privacy-standpoint this could be solved if the server
+\emph{stapled} a recently fetched OCSP response with the served certificate.
+Unfortunately, only 35\% of Alexa's top-one-million uses OCSP
+stapling~\cite{ocsp-chung}.
+
+Unless an OCSP response is stapled while visiting a website in a default
+configuration of the Tor browser, the status of a certificate is checked in
+real-time using OCSP. As such, any CA that issued a certificate for a website
+without OCSP stapling could instantiate a WO with an RTT-based resolution.
+Similarly, any actor that observes most OCSP traffic (which is in plaintext due
+to HTTP) gets the same capability. To better understand who could instantiate a
+WO based on OCSP we performed preliminary traceroute measurements\footnote{%
+	Every RIPE Atlas probe used its configured DNS resolver(s). In total we
+	requested 2048 WW-probes for one-off measurements.
+} on the RIPE Atlas network towards four OCSP
+responders that are hosted by particularly large CAs: Let's Encrypt, Sectigo,
+DigiCert, and GoDaddy. Let's Encrypt and Sectigo are fronted by a variety of
+actors (mainly due to CDN caching), while DigiCert is fronted by a single CDN.
+Requests towards GoDaddy's OCSP responder always end-up in an AS hosted by
+GoDaddy.
+
+\subsection{Tor Exit Relays}
+Anyone can run a Tor exit relay and have it be used by all Tor users. Obviously,
+the operator of the exit relay can observe when its relay is used and the
+destination websites. At the time of writing, the consumed exit bandwidth of the
+entire Tor network is around 50~Gbit/s. This makes the necessary investment for
+an attacker that wishes to get a decent chunk of exit bandwidth more a question
+of stealthily deploying new exit relays than prohibitively large monetary costs.
+
+\subsection{Information Leaks}
+More sophisticated attackers can look for information leaks at the application,
+network, and operating system levels that allow them to infer that websites have
+been visited. Application level information leaks are particularly of concern
+for onion services: any observable state that can be tied to a new visitor is a
+WO for an onion visit (this is not the case for ``regular'' websites). Such
+state can include online status or the number of online users of a service, any
+observable activity with timestamps, a predictable caching structure, and so on.
+Similar information leaks can also occur on the network and operating system
+level~\cite{DBLP:journals/ton/CaoQWDKM18,DBLP:conf/uss/EnsafiPKC10,DBLP:conf/ccs/QianMX12}.
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/src/ref-min.bib b/summary/src/cat/src/ref-min.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe12c0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/src/ref-min.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,837 @@
+@misc{google-retention,
+	author = {Google LLC.},
+	title = {How {Google} retains data we collect},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://web.archive.org/web/20190227170903/https://policies.google.com/technologies/retention}},
+}
+
+@misc{cf-retention,
+	author = {Cloudflare Inc.},
+	title = {{FAQs}},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://web.archive.org/web/20190227165850/https://developers.cloudflare.com/logs/faq/}},
+}
+
+@misc{cf-size,
+	author = {Cloudflare Inc.},
+	title = {Helping Build a Better Internet},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://web.archive.org/web/20190227165133/https://www.cloudflare.com/}},
+}
+
+@misc{guardian,
+	author = {The Guardian},
+	title = {{NSA} stores metadata of millions of web users for up to a year, secret files show},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/30/nsa-americans-metadata-year-documents}, accessed 2019-02-27},
+}
+
+@misc{wiki,
+	author = {Wikipedia contributors},
+	title = {Softmax function---{Wikipedia}{,} the free encyclopedia.},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Softmax_function&oldid=883834589}, accessed 2019-02-17},
+}
+
+@misc{alexa,
+	author = {Amazon},
+	title = {The top 500 sites on the web},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://www.alexa.com/topsites}, accessed 2019-02-13}}
+}
+
+@misc{tor-safety-board,
+	author = {Tor Project},
+	title = {Tor Research Safety Board},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://research.torproject.org/safetyboard.html}, accessed 2019-02-13},
+}
+
+@misc{google-bid-anon,
+	author = {Google LLC.},
+	title = {Set your desktop and mobile web inventory to Anonymous, Branded, or Semi-transparent in {AdX}},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://web.archive.org/web/20190228123602/https://support.google.com/admanager/answer/2913411?hl=en&ref_topic=2912022}},
+}
+
+@misc{google-bid,
+	author = {Google LLC.},
+	title = {Real-Time Bidding Protocol Buffer v.161 },
+	howpublished = {\url{https://web.archive.org/web/20190228122615/https://developers.google.com/authorized-buyers/rtb/downloads/realtime-bidding-proto}},
+}
+
+@misc{google-dn,
+	author = {Google LLC.},
+	title = {About targeting for Display Network campaigns},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://web.archive.org/web/20190228122431/https://support.google.com/google-ads/answer/2404191?hl=en&ref\_topic=3121944\%5C}},
+}
+
+@misc{google-purge,
+	author = {Google LLC.},
+	title = {Flush Cache},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://web.archive.org/web/20190228150306/https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/cache}},
+}
+
+@misc{cf-purge,
+	author = {Cloudflare Inc.},
+	title = {Purge Cache},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://web.archive.org/web/20190228150344/https://1.1.1.1/purge-cache/}},
+}
+
+@misc{bug-report,
+  author = {Tobias Pulls and Rasmus Dahlberg},
+  title = {{OOM} manger wipes entire {DNS} cache},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29617}},
+  year = {2020},
+}
+
+@misc{tor-0401,
+  author = {Nick Mathewson},
+  title = {New Release: {Tor} 0.4.0.1-alpha },
+  howpublished = {\url{https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-0401-alpha}, accessed 2019-02-08},
+}
+
+@misc{netcraft-survey,
+  author = {Netcraft},
+  title = {January 2019 Web Server Survey},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://web.archive.org/web/20190208081915/https://news.netcraft.com/archives/category/web-server-survey/}}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/ccs/JuarezAADG14,
+  author    = {Marc Ju{\'{a}}rez and
+               Sadia Afroz and
+               Gunes Acar and
+               Claudia D{\'{\i}}az and
+               Rachel Greenstadt},
+  title     = {A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2014}
+}
+
+@article{chow1970optimum,
+  title={On optimum recognition error and reject tradeoff},
+  author={Chow, C},
+  journal={IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory},
+  volume={16},
+  number={1},
+  year={1970},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{stolerman2013classify,
+  title={Classify, but verify: Breaking the closed-world assumption in stylometric authorship attribution},
+  author={Stolerman, Ariel and Overdorf, Rebekah and Afroz, Sadia and Greenstadt, Rachel},
+  booktitle={IFIP Working Group},
+  volume={11},
+  year={2013}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/ndss/GreschbachPRWF17,
+  author    = {Benjamin Greschbach and
+               Tobias Pulls and
+               Laura M. Roberts and
+               Phillip Winter and
+               Nick Feamster},
+  title     = {The Effect of {DNS} on {Tor}'s Anonymity},
+  booktitle = {{NDSS}},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@article{DBLP:journals/popets/WangG16,
+  author    = {Tao Wang and
+               Ian Goldberg},
+  title     = {On Realistically Attacking {Tor} with Website Fingerprinting},
+  journal   = {PETS},
+  volume    = {2016},
+  number    = {4},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/uss/KwonALDD15,
+  author    = {Albert Kwon and
+               Mashael AlSabah and
+               David Lazar and
+               Marc Dacier and
+               Srinivas Devadas},
+  title     = {Circuit Fingerprinting Attacks: Passive Deanonymization of {Tor} Hidden
+               Services},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year      = {2015},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/wpes/PanchenkoMHLWE17,
+  author    = {Andriy Panchenko and
+               Asya Mitseva and
+               Martin Henze and
+               Fabian Lanze and
+               Klaus Wehrle and
+               Thomas Engel},
+  title     = {Analysis of Fingerprinting Techniques for {Tor} Hidden Services},
+  booktitle = {{WPES}},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{jansenccs18,
+  author    = {Rob Jansen and Matthew Traudt and Nick Hopper},
+  title     = {Privacy-Preserving Dynamic Learning of {Tor} Network Traffic},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2018}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/ccs/JansenJ16,
+  author    = {Rob Jansen and
+               Aaron Johnson},
+  title     = {Safely Measuring {Tor}},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/wpes/VinesRK17,
+  author    = {Paul Vines and
+               Franziska Roesner and
+               Tadayoshi Kohno},
+  title     = {Exploring {ADINT:} Using Ad Targeting for Surveillance on a Budget
+               - or - How Alice Can Buy Ads to Track Bob},
+  booktitle = {{WPES}},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@article{riggingranking,
+  author    = {Victor Le Pochat and
+               Tom van Goethem and
+               Wouter Joosen},
+  title     = {Rigging Research Results by Manipulating Top Websites Rankings},
+  journal   = {CoRR},
+  volume    = {abs/1806.01156},
+  year      = {2018},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{torusage,
+  author    = {Akshaya Mani and
+               T. Wilson{-}Brown and
+               Rob Jansen and
+               Aaron Johnson and
+               Micah Sherr},
+  title     = {Understanding {Tor} Usage with Privacy-Preserving Measurement},
+  booktitle = {{IMC}},
+  year      = {2018}
+}
+
+@article{lyon2014surveillance,
+  title={Surveillance, {Snowden}, and big data: Capacities, consequences, critique},
+  author={Lyon, David},
+  journal={Big Data \& Society},
+  volume={1},
+  number={2},
+  year={2014},
+  publisher={SAGE Publications Sage UK: London, England}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{Wang,
+  author    = {Tao Wang and
+               Xiang Cai and
+               Rishab Nithyanand and
+               Rob Johnson and
+               Ian Goldberg},
+  title     = {Effective Attacks and Provable Defenses for Website Fingerprinting},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year      = {2014},
+}
+
+@article{Cherubin17,
+  author    = {Giovanni Cherubin},
+  title     = {Bayes, not Na{\"{\i}}ve: Security Bounds on Website Fingerprinting Defenses},
+  journal   = {PETS},
+  volume    = {2017},
+  number    = {4},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{Tamaraw,
+  author    = {Xiang Cai and
+               Rishab Nithyanand and
+               Tao Wang and
+               Rob Johnson and
+               Ian Goldberg},
+  title     = {A Systematic Approach to Developing and Evaluating Website Fingerprinting
+               Defenses},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2014},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{csbuflo,
+  author    = {Xiang Cai and
+               Rishab Nithyanand and
+               Rob Johnson},
+  title     = {{CS-BuFLO}: {A} Congestion Sensitive Website Fingerprinting Defense},
+  booktitle = {{WPES}},
+  year      = {2014},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DF,
+  author    = {Payap Sirinam and
+               Mohsen Imani and
+               Marc Ju{\'{a}}rez and
+               Matthew Wright},
+  title     = {Deep Fingerprinting: Undermining Website Fingerprinting Defenses with
+               Deep Learning},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2018}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{wtf-pad,
+  author    = {Marc Ju{\'{a}}rez and
+               Mohsen Imani and
+               Mike Perry and
+               Claudia D{\'{\i}}az and
+               Matthew Wright},
+  title     = {Toward an Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defense},
+  booktitle = {{ESORICS}},
+  year      = {2016}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{WT,
+  author    = {Tao Wang and
+               Ian Goldberg},
+  title     = {Walkie-Talkie: An Efficient Defense Against Passive Website Fingerprinting
+               Attacks},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year      = {2017}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DynaFlow,
+  author    = {David Lu and
+               Sanjit Bhat and
+               Albert Kwon and
+               Srinivas Devadas},
+  title     = {DynaFlow: An Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defense Based on Dynamically-Adjusting
+               Flows},
+  booktitle = {{WPES}},
+  year      = {2018}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{tor,
+  author    = {Roger Dingledine and
+               Nick Mathewson and
+               Paul F. Syverson},
+  title     = {Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year      = {2004}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{trilemma,
+  author    = {Debajyoti Das and
+               Sebastian Meiser and
+               Esfandiar Mohammadi and
+               Aniket Kate},
+  title     = {Anonymity Trilemma: Strong Anonymity, Low Bandwidth Overhead, Low
+               Latency - Choose Two},
+  booktitle = {{IEEE} {S\&P}},
+  year      = {2018},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{SunSWRPQ02,
+  author    = {Qixiang Sun and
+               Daniel R. Simon and
+               Yi{-}Min Wang and
+               Wilf Russell and
+               Venkata N. Padmanabhan and
+               Lili Qiu},
+  title     = {Statistical Identification of Encrypted Web Browsing Traffic},
+  booktitle = {{IEEE S\&P}},
+  year      = {2002}
+}
+
+@article{rtb,
+  author    = {Jun Wang and
+               Weinan Zhang and
+               Shuai Yuan},
+  title     = {Display Advertising with Real-Time Bidding {(RTB)} and Behavioural
+               Targeting},
+  journal   = {Foundations and Trends in Information Retrieval},
+  year      = {2017}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{ocsp-chung,
+  author    = {Taejoong Chung and
+               Jay Lok and
+               Balakrishnan Chandrasekaran and
+               David R. Choffnes and
+               Dave Levin and
+               Bruce M. Maggs and
+               Alan Mislove and
+               John P. Rula and
+               Nick Sullivan and
+               Christo Wilson},
+  title     = {Is the Web Ready for {OCSP} Must-Staple?},
+  booktitle = {{IMC}},
+  year      = {2018}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{bluecoat,
+  author    = {Chaabane Abdelberi and
+               Terence Chen and
+               Mathieu Cunche and
+               Emiliano De Cristofaro and
+               Arik Friedman and
+               Mohamed Ali K{\^{a}}afar},
+  title     = {Censorship in the Wild: Analyzing Internet Filtering in {Syria}},
+  booktitle = {{IMC}},
+  year      = {2014}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{PanchenkoNZE11,
+  author    = {Andriy Panchenko and
+               Lukas Niessen and
+               Andreas Zinnen and
+               Thomas Engel},
+  title     = {Website fingerprinting in onion routing based anonymization networks},
+  booktitle = {{WPES}},
+  year      = {2011}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{Hintz02,
+  author    = {Andrew Hintz},
+  title     = {Fingerprinting Websites Using Traffic Analysis},
+  booktitle = {{PETS}},
+  year      = {2002}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{HerrmannWF09,
+  author    = {Dominik Herrmann and
+               Rolf Wendolsky and
+               Hannes Federrath},
+  title     = {Website fingerprinting: attacking popular privacy enhancing technologies
+               with the multinomial na{\"{\i}}ve-bayes classifier},
+  booktitle = {{CCSW}},
+  year      = {2009},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{kfp,
+  author    = {Jamie Hayes and
+               George Danezis},
+  title     = {k-fingerprinting: {A} Robust Scalable Website Fingerprinting Technique},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{CaiZJJ12,
+  author    = {Xiang Cai and
+               Xin Cheng Zhang and
+               Brijesh Joshi and
+               Rob Johnson},
+  title     = {Touching from a distance: website fingerprinting attacks and defenses},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2012},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/esorics/ShmatikovW06,
+  author    = {Vitaly Shmatikov and
+               Ming{-}Hsiu Wang},
+  title     = {Timing Analysis in Low-Latency Mix Networks: Attacks and Defenses},
+  booktitle = {{ESORICS}},
+  year      = {2006},
+}
+
+@misc{anonterm,
+  title={A terminology for talking about privacy by data minimization: Anonymity, unlinkability, undetectability, unobservability, pseudonymity, and identity management},
+  author={Pfitzmann, Andreas and Hansen, Marit},
+  publisher={Dresden, Germany},
+  year={2010},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{JansenJGED18,
+  author    = {Rob Jansen and
+               Marc Ju{\'{a}}rez and
+               Rafa Galvez and
+               Tariq Elahi and
+               Claudia D{\'{\i}}az},
+  title     = {Inside Job: Applying Traffic Analysis to Measure {Tor} from Within},
+  booktitle = {{NDSS}},
+  year      = {2018}
+}
+
+@article{GoldwasserM84,
+  author    = {Shafi Goldwasser and
+               Silvio Micali},
+  title     = {Probabilistic Encryption},
+  journal   = {JCSS},
+  volume    = {28},
+  number    = {2},
+  year      = {1984},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{NaorY90,
+  author    = {Moni Naor and
+               Moti Yung},
+  title     = {Public-key Cryptosystems Provably Secure against Chosen Ciphertext
+               Attacks},
+  booktitle = {Proc. Annu. ACM Symp. Theory Comput.},
+  year      = {1990}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{RackoffS91,
+  author    = {Charles Rackoff and
+               Daniel R. Simon},
+  title     = {Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext
+               Attack},
+  booktitle = {{CRYPTO}},
+  year      = {1991}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{Bleichenbacher98,
+  author    = {Daniel Bleichenbacher},
+  title     = {Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the {RSA} Encryption
+               Standard {PKCS} {\#}1},
+  booktitle = {{CRYPTO}},
+  year      = {1998}
+}
+
+@article{RonenGGSWY18,
+  author    = {Eyal Ronen and
+               Robert Gillham and
+               Daniel Genkin and
+               Adi Shamir and
+               David Wong and
+               Yuval Yarom},
+  title     = {The 9 Lives of {Bleichenbacher's} {CAT:} New Cache ATtacks on {TLS}
+               Implementations},
+  journal   = {{IACR} Cryptology ePrint Archive},
+  year      = {2018},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/sp/DyerCRS12,
+  author    = {Kevin P. Dyer and
+               Scott E. Coull and
+               Thomas Ristenpart and
+               Thomas Shrimpton},
+  title     = {Peek-a-Boo, {I} Still See You: Why Efficient Traffic Analysis Countermeasures
+               Fail},
+  booktitle = {{IEEE} {S\&P}},
+  year      = {2012}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/wpes/NithyanandCJ14,
+  author    = {Rishab Nithyanand and
+               Xiang Cai and
+               Rob Johnson},
+  title     = {Glove: {A} Bespoke Website Fingerprinting Defense},
+  booktitle = {{WPES}},
+  year      = {2014}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{mathews2018understanding,
+  title={UNDERSTANDING FEATURE DISCOVERY IN WEBSITE FINGERPRINTING ATTACKS},
+  author={Mathews, Nate and Sirinam, Payap and Wright, Matthew},
+  booktitle={{WNYISPW}},
+  year={2018},
+}
+
+@article{abe2016fingerprinting,
+  title={Fingerprinting attack on {Tor} anonymity using deep learning},
+  author={Abe, Kota and Goto, Shigeki},
+  journal={Proceedings of the Asia-Pacific Advanced Network},
+  volume={42},
+  year={2016}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/ndss/RimmerPJGJ18,
+  author    = {Vera Rimmer and
+               Davy Preuveneers and
+               Marc Ju{\'{a}}rez and
+               Tom van Goethem and
+               Wouter Joosen},
+  title     = {Automated Website Fingerprinting through Deep Learning},
+  booktitle = {{NDSS}},
+  year      = {2018}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{cumul,
+  author    = {Andriy Panchenko and
+               Fabian Lanze and
+               Jan Pennekamp and
+               Thomas Engel and
+               Andreas Zinnen and
+               Martin Henze and
+               Klaus Wehrle},
+  title     = {Website Fingerprinting at Internet Scale},
+  booktitle = {{NDSS}},
+  year      = {2016}
+}
+
+@article{cheng1998traffic,
+  title={Traffic analysis of {SSL} encrypted web browsing},
+  author={Cheng, Heyning and Avnur, Ron},
+  journal={Project paper, University of Berkeley},
+  year={1998}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/sp/SunSWRPQ02,
+  author    = {Qixiang Sun and
+               Daniel R. Simon and
+               Yi{-}Min Wang and
+               Wilf Russell and
+               Venkata N. Padmanabhan and
+               Lili Qiu},
+  title     = {Statistical Identification of Encrypted Web Browsing Traffic},
+  booktitle = {{IEEE S\&P}},
+  year      = {2002}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/ccs/LiberatoreL06,
+  author    = {Marc Liberatore and
+               Brian Neil Levine},
+  title     = {Inferring the source of encrypted {HTTP} connections},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2006}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{KedoganAP02,
+  author    = {Dogan Kesdogan and
+               Dakshi Agrawal and
+               Stefan Penz},
+  title     = {Limits of Anonymity in Open Environments},
+  booktitle = {{IH}},
+  year      = {2002}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/pet/Danezis04,
+  author    = {George Danezis},
+  title     = {The Traffic Analysis of Continuous-Time Mixes},
+  booktitle = {{PETS}},
+  year      = {2004}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/ih/DanezisS04,
+  author    = {George Danezis and
+               Andrei Serjantov},
+  title     = {Statistical Disclosure or Intersection Attacks on Anonymity Systems},
+  booktitle = {{IH}},
+  year      = {2004}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/diau/BertholdPS00,
+  author    = {Oliver Berthold and
+               Andreas Pfitzmann and
+               Ronny Standtke},
+  title     = {The Disadvantages of Free {MIX} Routes and how to Overcome Them},
+  booktitle = {International Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability},
+  year      = {2000},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{KesdoganP04,
+  author    = {Dogan Kesdogan and
+               Lexi Pimenidis},
+  title     = {The Hitting Set Attack on Anonymity Protocols},
+  booktitle = {{IH}},
+  year      = {2004}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{TroncosoGPV08,
+  author    = {Carmela Troncoso and
+               Benedikt Gierlichs and
+               Bart Preneel and
+               Ingrid Verbauwhede},
+  title     = {Perfect Matching Disclosure Attacks},
+  booktitle = {{PETS}},
+  year      = {2008}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DiazSCP02,
+  author    = {Claudia D{\'{\i}}az and
+               Stefaan Seys and
+               Joris Claessens and
+               Bart Preneel},
+  title     = {Towards Measuring Anonymity},
+  booktitle = {{PETS}},
+  year      = {2002}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{SerjantovD02,
+  author    = {Andrei Serjantov and
+               George Danezis},
+  title     = {Towards an Information Theoretic Metric for Anonymity},
+  booktitle = {{PETS}},
+  year      = {2002}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{Raymond00,
+  author    = {Jean{-}Fran{\c{c}}ois Raymond},
+  title     = {Traffic Analysis: Protocols, Attacks, Design Issues, and Open Problems},
+  booktitle = {International Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability},
+  year      = {2000}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{Danezis03,
+  author    = {George Danezis},
+  title     = {Statistical Disclosure Attacks},
+  booktitle = {{IFIP SEC}},
+  year      = {2003}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{MurdochD05,
+  author    = {Steven J. Murdoch and
+               George Danezis},
+  title     = {Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of {Tor}},
+  booktitle = {{IEEE} {S\&P}},
+  year      = {2005}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{ChakravartySK10,
+  author    = {Sambuddho Chakravarty and
+               Angelos Stavrou and
+               Angelos D. Keromytis},
+  title     = {Traffic Analysis against Low-Latency Anonymity Networks Using Available
+               Bandwidth Estimation},
+  booktitle = {{ESORICS}},
+  year      = {2010}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{MittalKJCB11,
+  author    = {Prateek Mittal and
+               Ahmed Khurshid and
+               Joshua Juen and
+               Matthew Caesar and
+               Nikita Borisov},
+  title     = {Stealthy traffic analysis of low-latency anonymous communication using
+               throughput fingerprinting},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2011}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{deepcorr,
+  author    = {Milad Nasr and
+               Alireza Bahramali and
+               Amir Houmansadr},
+  title     = {DeepCorr: Strong Flow Correlation Attacks on {Tor} Using Deep Learning},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2018}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{JohnsonWJSS13,
+  author    = {Aaron Johnson and
+               Chris Wacek and
+               Rob Jansen and
+               Micah Sherr and
+               Paul F. Syverson},
+  title     = {Users get routed: traffic correlation on {Tor} by realistic adversaries},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2013}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{BorisovDMT07,
+  author    = {Nikita Borisov and
+               George Danezis and
+               Prateek Mittal and
+               Parisa Tabriz},
+  title     = {Denial of service or denial of security?},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2007}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{SunEVLRCM15,
+  author    = {Yixin Sun and
+               Anne Edmundson and
+               Laurent Vanbever and
+               Oscar Li and
+               Jennifer Rexford and
+               Mung Chiang and
+               Prateek Mittal},
+  title     = {{RAPTOR:} Routing Attacks on Privacy in {Tor}},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year      = {2015}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{ScheitleHGJZSV18,
+  author    = {Quirin Scheitle and
+               Oliver Hohlfeld and
+               Julien Gamba and
+               Jonas Jelten and
+               Torsten Zimmermann and
+               Stephen D. Strowes and
+               Narseo Vallina{-}Rodriguez},
+  title     = {A Long Way to the Top: Significance, Structure, and Stability of Internet
+               Top Lists},
+  booktitle = {{IMC}},
+  year      = {2018}
+}
+
+@article{DBLP:journals/ton/CaoQWDKM18,
+  author    = {Yue Cao and
+               Zhiyun Qian and
+               Zhongjie Wang and
+               Tuan Dao and
+               Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy and
+               Lisa M. Marvel},
+  title     = {Off-Path {TCP} Exploits of the Challenge {ACK} Global Rate Limit},
+  journal   = {{IEEE/ACM} Trans. Netw.},
+  volume    = {26},
+  number    = {2},
+  year      = {2018}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/ccs/QianMX12,
+  author    = {Zhiyun Qian and
+               Zhuoqing Morley Mao and
+               Yinglian Xie},
+  title     = {Collaborative {TCP} sequence number inference attack: how to crack
+               sequence number under a second},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2012}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/uss/EnsafiPKC10,
+  author    = {Roya Ensafi and
+               Jong Chun Park and
+               Deepak Kapur and
+               Jedidiah R. Crandall},
+  title     = {Idle Port Scanning and Non-interference Analysis of Network Protocol
+               Stacks Using Model Checking},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year      = {2010}
+}
+
+@misc{onionv2,
+  author = {{Tor Project}},
+  title = {{Tor} Rendezvous Specification - Version 2},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/rend-spec-v2.txt}, accessed 2019-02-13},
+}
+
+@misc{onionv3,
+  author = {{Tor Project}},
+  title = {{Tor} Rendezvous Specification - Version 3},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/rend-spec-v3.txt}, accessed 2019-02-13},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{Merget19,
+  author    = {Robert Merget and Juraj Somorovsky and Nimrod Aviram and Craig Young and Janis Fliegenschmidt and Jörg Schwenk and Yuval Shavitt},
+  title     = {Scalable Scanning and Automatic Classification of {TLS} Padding Oracle Vulnerabilities},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year      = {2019},
+  note      = {to appear}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/pet/WinterKMHSLW14,
+  author    = {Philipp Winter and
+               Richard K{\"{o}}wer and
+               Martin Mulazzani and
+               Markus Huber and
+               Sebastian Schrittwieser and
+               Stefan Lindskog and
+               Edgar R. Weippl},
+  title     = {Spoiled Onions: Exposing Malicious {Tor} Exit Relays},
+  booktitle = {{PETS}},
+  year      = {2014}
+}
+
+@phdthesis{Wang2015a,
+  author = {Tao Wang},
+  title = {Website Fingerprinting: Attacks and Defenses},
+  school = {University of Waterloo},
+  year = {2015},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://nymity.ch/tor-dns/pdf/Wang2015a.pdf}},
+}
+
+@misc{perryCrit,
+  author = {Mike Perry},
+  title = {A Critique of Website Traffic Fingerprinting Attacks},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://blog.torproject.org/critique-website-traffic-fingerprinting-attacks}, accessed 2019-02-08},
+}
+
+@article{DBLP:journals/jsac/ReedSG98,
+  author    = {Michael G. Reed and Paul F. Syverson and David M. Goldschlag},
+  title     = {Anonymous connections and onion routing},
+  journal   = {{JSAC}},
+  volume    = {16},
+  number    = {4},
+  year      = {1998},
+}
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/src/related.tex b/summary/src/cat/src/related.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c36654
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/src/related.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+\section{Related Work} \label{cat:sec:related}
+The combination of a WF attack with a WO is a type of Classify-Verify method as
+proposed by Stolerman et al.~\cite{stolerman2013classify}, which in turn is a
+type of rejection function as described by Chow~\cite{chow1970optimum}. Such a
+method was first used in the context of WF by Juarez
+\emph{et~al.}~\cite{DBLP:conf/ccs/JuarezAADG14} and later by Greschbach
+\emph{et~al.} \cite{DBLP:conf/ndss/GreschbachPRWF17} to augment WF attacks with
+inferences from observed DNS traffic. Note that the attack by Greschbach et al.
+can be seen as a probabilistic WO due to the attacker under their threat model
+only observing a fraction of DNS traffic from the Tor network. Our work builds
+upon and generalises their work where DNS traffic is just one of many possible
+sources to infer website visits from. Further, our DNS-based sources are usable
+by anyone instead of relatively strong network attackers (or Google or
+Cloudflare).
+
+All anonymity networks produce anonymity sets (per definition) that change with
+observations by an attacker over time~\cite{Raymond00}. Modelling the behaviour
+of an anonymity system (as a mix), what the attacker observes, and how the
+anonymity sets change over time allows us to reason about how the attacker can
+perform traffic analysis and break the anonymity provided by the
+system~\cite{DiazSCP02,KedoganAP02,SerjantovD02}. Attacks along these lines are
+many with more-or-less consistent terminology, including intersection attacks,
+(statistical) disclosure attacks, and traffic confirmation
+attacks~\cite{DBLP:conf/diau/BertholdPS00,Danezis03,
+DBLP:conf/pet/Danezis04,DBLP:conf/ih/DanezisS04,KesdoganP04,Raymond00,
+DBLP:journals/jsac/ReedSG98,TroncosoGPV08}. 
+
+WOs are nothing more than applying the notion of anonymity sets to the potential
+destination websites visited over an anonymity network like Tor and giving an
+attacker the ability to query this anonymity set for membership for a limited
+number of monitored websites. The way we use WOs in our generic attacks is
+\emph{not to learn long-term statistically unlikely relationships} between
+senders and recipients in a network. Rather, the WO is only used to learn
+\emph{part of the anonymity set at the time of the attack}. That an attacker can
+observe anonymity sets is not novel, what is novel in our work is how we apply
+it to the WF domain and argue for its inclusion as a core attacker capability
+when modelling WF attacks and defenses. 
+
+Murdoch and Danezis showed how to use observed latency in Tor as an oracle to
+perform traffic analysis attacks \cite{MurdochD05}. Chakravarty \emph{et~al.}
+detailed similar attacks but based on bandwidth estimation
+\cite{ChakravartySK10} and Mittal \emph{et~al.} using throughput
+estimation~\cite{MittalKJCB11}. Attackers in these cases do not need to be
+directly in control of significant fractions Tor, but rather use network
+measurements to infer the state of the network and create an oracle that an
+attacker can utilize, similar to WOs. 
+
+Correlation of input and output flows is at the core of many attacks on
+anonymity networks like Tor~\cite{BorisovDMT07,JohnsonWJSS13,SunEVLRCM15}. Flow
+correlation attacks correlate traffic on the network layer, considering packet
+sizes and timing of sent traffic. The RAPTOR attack by Sun et
+al.~\cite{SunEVLRCM15} needs about 100MB of data sent over five minutes to
+correlate flows with high accuracy. The recent state-of-the-art attack DeepCorr
+by Nasr \emph{et~al.} \cite{deepcorr}---based on deep learning like Deep
+Fingerprinting by Sirinam \emph{et~al.}~\cite{DF}---needs only about 900KB of
+data (900 packets) for comparable accuracy to RAPTOR. While flow correlation
+attacks like RAPTOR and DeepCorr operate on the network layer, WF+WO attacks can
+be viewed as \emph{application layer} correlation attacks. WF attacks extract
+the application-layer data (the website) while WOs reconstruct parts of the
+anonymity set of possible monitored websites visited. WF attacks need to observe
+most of the traffic generated when visiting a website that goes into the
+anonymity network. While a WO does not have to directly view any of the output
+flows of the network, it needs to be able to infer if a particular website was
+visited during a period of time, as shown in Section~\ref{cat:sec:sources}.
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/src/sim.tex b/summary/src/cat/src/sim.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4077b89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/src/sim.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+\section{Simulating Website Oracles} \label{cat:sec:sim}
+To be able to \emph{simulate} access to a WO for \emph{arbitrary monitored
+websites} we need to simulate the entire website anonymity set of Tor, because
+the anonymity set is what a WO queries for membership. We opt for simulation for
+ethical reasons. The simulation has three key parts: how those visits are
+distributed, the number of visits to websites over Tor, and the timeframe
+(resolution) of the oracle source. Note that the first two parts are easy for an
+attacker to estimate by simply observing traffic from live Tor exit relays,
+something we cannot trivially do as researchers adhering to Tor's research
+safety
+guidelines~\cite{tor-safety-board}.
+Another option available to an attacker is to repeatedly query a WO to learn
+about the popularity of its monitored websites and based on those figures infer
+the utility of the WO. We opted to not perform such measurements ourselves,
+despite access to several WOs, due to fears of inadvertently harming Tor users.
+Instead we base our simulations on results from the privacy-preserving
+measurements of the Tor network in early 2018 by Mani
+\emph{et~al.}~\cite{torusage}.
+
+\subsection{How Website Visits are Distributed}
+\label{cat:sec:sim:dist}
+Table~\ref{cat:table:visits} shows the average inferred website popularity from Mani
+\emph{et~al.}~\cite{torusage}. The average percentage does not add up to 100\%,
+presumably due to the privacy-preserving measurement technique or rounding
+errors. Their results show that \texttt{torproject.org} is very popular (perhaps
+due to a bug in software using Tor), and beyond that focus on
+Alexa's~\cite{alexa} top one million most
+popular websites as bins. The ``other'' category is for websites identified not
+part of Alexa's top one million websites ranking. For the rest of the analysis
+(not simulation) in this paper we \emph{exclude} \texttt{torproject.org}: for one,
+that Tor users visit that website is unlikely to be an interesting fact for an
+attacker to monitor, and its over-representation (perhaps due to a bug) will
+skew our analysis. Excluding \texttt{torproject.org}, about one third of all
+website visits go to Alexa (0,1k], one third to Alexa (1k,1m], and one third to
+other websites. The third column of Table~\ref{cat:table:visits} contains adjusted
+average percentages.
+
+\begin{table}[!t]
+\caption{Inferred average website popularity for the entire Tor network early 2018, from Mani \emph{et~al.}~\cite[Figure 2]{torusage}.}
+\centering
+\begin{tabular}{lcc}
+Website &  Average & Without\\
+ & primary domain (\%) & torproject.org\\
+\midrule
+torproject.org  & 40.1 & \\
+Alexa (0,10]  & 8.4 & 13.9 \\
+Alexa (10,100]  & 5.1 & 8.4 \\
+Alexa (100,1k]  & 6.2 & 10.3 \\
+Alexa (1k,10k]  & 4.3 & 7.1 \\
+Alexa (10k,100k]  & 7.7 &  12.7\\
+Alexa (100k,1m]  & 7.0 & 11.6 \\
+other  & 21.7 & 35.9 \\
+\end{tabular}
+\label{cat:table:visits}
+\end{table}
+
+In our simulations for website visits we treat the entries in column two of
+Table~\ref{cat:table:visits} as bins of a histogram with the relative size indicated
+by the average website popularity. After randomly selecting a bin (weighted by
+popularity), in the case of an Alexa range we uniformly select a website within
+the range, and for the other category we uniformly select from one million other
+websites. This is a conservative choice given that there are hundreds of
+millions of active websites on the Internet. Uniformly selecting within a bin
+will make the more popular websites in the bin likely underrepresented while
+less popular websites in the bin get overrepresented. However, we typically
+simulate an attacker that monitors $\approx$100 websites and use the website
+popularity as the starting rank of the first monitored website. For the most
+popular websites, monitoring 100 websites covers the entire or significant
+portions of the bins (Alexa $\leq$1k), and for less popular websites (Alexa
+$>$1k), as our results later show, this does not matter. 
+
+\subsection{The Number of Website Visits}
+Mani \emph{et~al.} also inferred with a 95\% confidence interval that
+$(104\pm36)*10^6$ \emph{initial} streams are created during a 24 hour period in
+the entire Tor network \cite{torusage}. Based on this, in our simulation we
+assume 140 million website visits per day that are distributed as described
+above and occur uniformly throughout the day. While assuming uniformity is
+naive, we selected the upper limit of the confidence interval to somewhat negate
+any unreasonable advantage to the attacker. 
+
+\subsection{A Reasonable Timeframe}
+\label{cat:sec:sim:timeframe}
+Wang and Goldberg show that it is realistic to assume that an attacker can
+determine the start of a webpage load even in the presence of background noise
+and multiple concurrent website visits~\cite{DBLP:journals/popets/WangG16}. An
+attacker can further determine if a circuit is used for onion services or
+not~\cite{DBLP:conf/uss/KwonALDD15,DBLP:conf/wpes/PanchenkoMHLWE17}. Now,
+consider an attacker that observes traffic between a Tor client and its guard.
+The initial stream contains the first HTTP GET request for a typical website
+visit. The request will be the first outgoing packet as part of a website visit
+once a connection has been established. When the request arrives at the
+destination is the point in time when an oracle, e.g., instantiated by access
+logs would record this time as the time of visit. Clearly, the exact time is
+between the request and the response packets and the attacker observes the
+timing of those packets. So what is a realistic timeframe for the attacker to
+use when it queries a WO?
+
+Between January 22--30 (2019) we performed Round-Trip Time (RTT) measurements
+using four Amazon EC2 instances that ran \emph{their own} nginx HTTP(S) servers
+to visit \emph{themselves} over Tor (with \texttt{torify curl}) using a fresh
+circuit for each visit. This allowed us easy access to start and stop times for
+the RTT measurement, as well as the time a request appeared in the nginx access
+log (without any clock-drift). In total we collected 21,497 HTTP traces and
+21,492 HTTPS traces, where each trace contains start, log, and stop timestamps.
+Our results are shown in Figure~\ref{cat:fig:aws}. It is clear that that log-to-stop
+times are independent of HTTP(S). More than half of all log-to-stop times
+($54.5$\%) are within a 100~ms window (see 40--140~ms), and nearly all
+log-to-stop times are less than 1000~ms.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\includegraphics[width=0.7\textwidth]{src/cat/img/aws}
+	\caption{%
+		Time differences between start, log, and stop events when visiting a website over HTTP(S) using Tor.
+	}
+	\label{cat:fig:aws}
+\end{figure}
+
+Based on our experiment results we consider three timeframes relevant: 10 ms,
+100 ms, and 1000 ms. First, 10 ms is relevant as close to optimal for any
+attacker. On average, there are only 17 website visits during a 10 ms window in
+the entire Tor network. 100 ms is our default for the WF experiments we perform:
+we consider it realistic for many sources of WOs (e.g., Cloudflare logs and
+real-time bidding). We also consider a 1000 ms timeframe relevant due to the
+prevalence of sources of WOs with a resolution in seconds (e.g., due to Unix
+timestamps or TTLs for DNS). Based on our simulations and the different
+timeframes, Appendix~\ref{cat:app:bayes} contains an analysis of the utility of WOs
+using Bayes' law. Appendix~\ref{cat:app:lessons} presents some key lessons from the
+simulation, in particular that while the resolution and resulting timeframe is
+an important metric in our simulation, it is minor in comparison to the overall
+website popularity in Tor of the monitored websites.
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/src/sources.tex b/summary/src/cat/src/sources.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..89616ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/src/sources.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+\section{Sources of Website Oracles} \label{cat:sec:sources}
+There are a wide range of potential sources of WOs. Table~\ref{cat:table:sources}
+summarizes a selection of sources that are more thoroughly detailed in
+Appendix~\ref{cat:app:sources}. The table shows the availability of the source,
+i.e., if the attacker needs to query the source in near real-time as a website
+visit occurs or if it can be accessed retroactively, e.g., through a legal
+request. We also estimate qualitatively the false positive rate of the source,
+its coverage of websites it can monitor (or fraction of Tor network traffic,
+depending on source), as well as the estimated effort to access the source.
+Finally, the table gives an example of an actor with access to the source. 
+
+Next we focus on a number of sources of WOs that we find particularly relevant:
+several due to DNS in Section~\ref{cat:sec:sources:dns}, the DHT of Tor onion
+directory services in Section~\ref{cat:sec:sources:dht}, and real-time bidding
+platforms in Section~\ref{cat:sec:sources:rtb}. 
+
+\begin{sidewaystable}
+	\caption{Comparison of a number of WO sources based on their \emph{estimated} time of availability (when attacker likely has to collect data, i.e., retroactively or real-time), False Positive Rate (FPR), coverage of website/network visits, and primary entities with access.}
+	\centering
+	\label{cat:table:sources}
+	\begin{tabular}{l c c c c r}
+	Source &  Availability & FPR & Coverage & Effort & Access \\ \midrule
+	Dragnet surveillance programmes  & retroactive & negl. & high & high & intelligence agencies \\
+	Content Delivery Networks & retroactive & negl. & high & high & operators\\
+	Real-time bidding & real-time (retroactive) & negl. & high & modest & customers (operator)\\
+	Webserver access logs & retroactive & negl. & high & medium & operators\\
+	Middleboxes & retroactive~\cite{bluecoat} & negl. & medium & medium & operators \\
+	OCSP & retroactive & low & high & medium & few CAs, plaintext\\
+	8.8.8.8 operator & retroactive & low~\cite{DBLP:conf/ndss/GreschbachPRWF17} & 16.8\% of visits & high & Google, plaintext \\
+	1.1.1.1 operator & retroactive & low~\cite{DBLP:conf/ndss/GreschbachPRWF17} & 7.4\% of visits & high & Cloudflare, plaintext \\
+	Exit relays & real-time & negl. & low & low & operators \\
+	Exit relays DNS cache & real-time & medium & high & medium & anyone\\
+	Query DNS resolvers & real-time & high & low & low & anyone \\
+	Onion v2 (v3) & real-time & negl. & high (low) & low (high) & anyone \\
+	% &  &  &  &  & \\
+	\end{tabular}
+\end{sidewaystable}
+
+\subsection{DNS}
+\label{cat:sec:sources:dns}
+Before a website visit the corresponding domain name must be resolved to an IP
+address. For a user that uses Tor browser, the exit relay of the
+current circuit resolves the domain name. If the DNS record of the domain
+name is already cached in the DNS cache of the exit relay, then the exit relay
+uses that record. Otherwise the domain name is resolved and subsequently cached
+using whichever DNS resolution mechanism that the exit relay has configured.
+Based on this process we present three sources of WOs that work for unpopular
+websites.
+
+\subsubsection{Shared Pending DNS Resolutions}
+If an exit relay is asked to resolve a domain name that is uncached it will
+create a list of pending connections waiting for the domain resolution to
+finish. If another connection asks that the same domain name be resolved, it is
+added to the list of pending connections.  When a result is available all
+pending connections are informed.  This is the basis of a WO: if a request to
+resolve a domain name returns a record \emph{more quickly than previously
+measured by the attacker for uncached entries}, the entry was either pending
+resolution at the time of the request or already cached. Notably this works
+regardless of if exit relays have DNS caches or not. However, the timing
+constraints of shared pending connections are significant and thus a practical
+hurdle to overcome.
+
+\subsubsection{Tor's DNS Cache at Exit Relays}
+If an unpopular website is visited by a user, the resolved domain name will
+likely be cached by a \emph{single} relay.  We
+performed 411 \texttt{exitmap}~\cite{DBLP:conf/pet/WinterKMHSLW14}
+measurements between April 1--10 (2019), collecting on average 3544
+(un)cached data points for each exit using a domain under our control
+that is not used by anyone else.
+
+Given a labelled data set of (un)cached times for each exit relay, we can
+construct distinct \emph{per-relay} classifiers that predict whether a measured
+time corresponds to an (un)cached domain name. While there are many different
+approaches that could be used to build such a classifier, we decided to use a
+simple heuristic that should result in little or no false positives: output
+`cached' iff no uncached query has \emph{ever} been this fast before.
+Figure~\ref{cat:fig:dns:classifier-idea} shows the idea of this classifier in
+greater detail, namely create a \emph{threshold} that is the minimum of the
+largest cached time and the smallest uncached time and then say cached iff the
+measured time is smaller than the threshold. Regardless of how well this
+heuristic performs (see below), it should be possible to construct other
+classifiers that exploit the trend of smaller resolve times and less standard
+deviation for cached queries (Figure~\ref{cat:fig:dns:dist}). For example, 69.1\% of
+all exit relays take at least 50~ms more time to resolve an uncached domain on
+average.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\includegraphics[width=.7\columnwidth]{src/cat/img/dns__classifier-idea}
+	\caption{The two cases when deciding on a classifier's threshold.}
+	\label{cat:fig:dns:classifier-idea}
+\end{figure}
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\includegraphics[width=.7\columnwidth]{src/cat/img/dns__timing-dist}
+	\caption{%
+		The difference between (un)cached standard deviation and mean times
+		without any absolute values, i.e., a negative value implies
+		that the uncached time is smaller than the cached time.
+	}
+	\label{cat:fig:dns:dist}
+\end{figure}
+
+
+To estimate an \emph{upper bound} on how effective the composite classifier of
+all per-relay classifiers could be \emph{without any false positives} using
+our heuristic, we applied ten-fold cross-validation to simply exclude every
+exit relay that had false positives during any fold and then weighted the
+observed bandwidth for the remaining classifiers by the individual true positive
+rates.  This gives us an
+estimate of how much bandwidth we could predict true positives for without
+having any false positives. By comparing it to the total exit bandwidth of the
+Tor network, we obtain an estimated upper bound true positive rate for the
+composite classifier of $17.3$\%.
+
+When an attacker measures if a domain is cached or not the domain will, after
+the measurement, be cached for up to an hour (current highest caching duration
+in Tor, independent of TTL) at every exit. However, if a an attacker can cause
+an exit to run low on memory, the entire DNS cache will be removed (instead of
+only parts of it) due to a bug in the out-of-memory manager of Tor. We have
+reported this to the Tor
+Project~\cite{bug-report}.
+We further discuss in Section~\ref{cat:sec:disc} how frequently an attacker on
+average can be expected to query a WO.
+
+\subsubsection{Caching at Recursive DNS Resolvers}
+For a website that is unpopular enough, there is a high chance that nobody on
+the web visited the website within a given timeframe.  This is the basis of
+our next idea for a WO which is \emph{not mutually exclusive} to the Tor
+network: wait a couple of seconds after observing a connection, then probe all
+recursive DNS resolvers of Tor exits that can be accessed to determine whether
+any monitored website was cached approximately at the time of observing the
+connection by inspecting TTLs. %the TTL of returned DNS records.
+
+In 2016 Greschbach~\emph{et~al.}~\cite{DBLP:conf/ndss/GreschbachPRWF17} showed
+that remote DNS resolvers like Google's \texttt{8.8.8.8} receive a large
+portion of all DNS traffic that exit relays generate. To better understand how
+the DNS resolver landscape looks today, we repeated their RIPE Atlas experiment
+setup for 35 hours in February 17--18 (2019), measuring every 30 minutes. Our
+results show that Google (16.8\%) and Cloudflare (7.4\%) are both popular. Many
+exits use a same-AS resolver which is presumably the ISP (42.3\%), while other
+exits resolve themselves (15.2\%) or use a remote DNS resolver that we did not
+identify (18.2\%). Further, we note that there are at least one RIPE Atlas
+network measurement probe in the same AS as 53.3\% of all exits, providing
+access to many of the same DNS resolvers as used by exits from a similar network
+vantage point. 
+
+Instead of using RIPE Atlas nodes we opted for a different approach which is
+\emph{strictly worse}: query Google's and Cloudflare's DNS resolvers from VMs in
+16 Amazon EC2 regions.  With a simple experiment of first visiting a unique
+domain (once again under our control and only used by us) using \texttt{torify
+curl} and then querying the DNS resolvers from each Amazon VM to observe TTLs,
+we got true positive rates of 2.9\% and 0.9\% for Google and Cloudflare with
+1000 repetitions. While this may seem low, the cost for an attacker is at the
+time of writing about 2 USD per day using on-demand pricing. Using an identical
+setup we were also able to find a subset of monitored websites that yield
+alarmingly high true positive rates: 61.4\% (Google) and 8.0\% (Cloudflare).
+Presumably this was due to the cached entries being shared over a wider
+geographical area for some reason (however, not globally). Regardless, coupled
+with the fact that anyone can \emph{globally purge} the DNS caches of
+Google~\cite{google-purge} and Cloudflare~\cite{cf-purge} for arbitrary domain
+names, this is a noteworthy WO source.
+
+\subsection{Onion Service Directories in Tor}
+\label{cat:sec:sources:dht}
+To access an onion service a user first obtains the service's \emph{descriptor}
+from a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) maintained by \emph{onion service
+directories}. From the descriptor the user learns of \emph{introduction points}
+selected by the host of the onion service in the Tor network that are used to
+establish a connection to the onion service in a couple of more
+steps~\cite{onionv2,onionv3} that are irrelevant here. Observing a request for
+the descriptor of a monitored onion service is a source for a WO. To observe
+visits for a target (known) onion service in the DHT, a relay first has to be
+selected as one out of six or eight (depending on version) relays to host the
+descriptor in the DHT, and then the victim has to select that relay to retrieve
+the descriptor. For v2 of onion services, the location in the DHT is
+deterministic~\cite{onionv2} and an attacker can position its relays in such a
+way to always be selected for hosting target descriptors. Version 3 of onion
+services addresses this issue by randomising the process every 24
+hours~\cite{onionv3}, forcing an attacker to host a significant number of relays
+to get a WO for onion services with high coverage. At the time of writing, there
+are about 3,500 relays operating as onion service directories.
+
+\subsection{Real-Time Bidding}
+\label{cat:sec:sources:rtb}
+Real-Time Bidding (RTB) is an approach towards online advertisement that allows
+a publisher to auction ad space to advertisers on a \emph{per-visit} basis in
+real time~\cite{rtb}. Google's Display Network includes more than two million
+websites that reach 90\% of all Internet users~\cite{google-dn}, and an
+advertiser that uses RTB must respond to submitted bid
+requests containing information such as the three first network bytes of an IPv4
+address, the second-level domain name of the visited website, and the user agent
+string within $\approx$100~ms~\cite{google-bid}. While the exact information
+available to the bidder depends on the ad platform and the publisher's
+advertisement settings, anonymous modes provide less
+revenue~\cite{google-bid-anon}.
+Combined with many flavours of pre-targeting such as IP and location
+filtering~\cite{DBLP:conf/wpes/VinesRK17}, it is likely that the bidder knows
+whether a user used Tor while accessing a monitored website. Vines et
+al.~\cite{DBLP:conf/wpes/VinesRK17} further note that ``35\% of the DSPs also
+allow arbitrary IP white-and blacklisting (Admedo, AdWords, Bing, BluAgile,
+Criteo, Centro, Choozle, Go2Mobi, Simpli.fi)''. Finally, observe that an
+attacker need not win a bid to use RTB as a WO.
diff --git a/summary/src/cat/src/wf.tex b/summary/src/cat/src/wf.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b2dedb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/cat/src/wf.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+\section{Deep Fingerprinting with Website Oracles} \label{cat:sec:wf}
+We first describe how we augment the Deep Fingerprinting (DF) attack by Sirinam
+\emph{et~al.}~\cite{DF} with WO access. Next we evaluate the augmented
+classifier on three different datasets with five different WF defenses. Source
+code and datasets for simulating WF+WO attacks as well as steps to reproduce all
+of the following results using DF are available at
+\href{https://github.com/pylls/wfwo}{https://github.com/pylls/wfwo}.
+
+\subsection{The Augmented Classifier}
+\label{cat:sec:wf:aug}
+As covered in the background (Section~\ref{cat:sec:back:wf}), DF is a CNN where the
+last layer is a softmax. The output is an array of probabilities for each
+possible class. Compared to the implementation of DF used by Sirinam
+\emph{et~al.}, we changed DF to not first use binary classification in the open
+world to determine if it is an unmonitored trace or not, but rather such that
+there is one class for each monitored website and one for unmonitored.
+Conceptually, this slightly lowers the performance of DF in our analysis, but
+our metrics show that mistaking one monitored website for another is
+insignificant for the datasets used in the analysis of this paper. The principal
+source of false positives is mistaking an unmonitored website for a monitored. 
+
+Given the probability of each possible class as output of DF, we used the second
+generic construction (Definition~\ref{cat:def:oracleprob}) from
+Section~\ref{cat:sec:oracles:generic} to combine DF with a WO. To update the
+remaining probabilities after removing a (monitored) prediction with the help of
+the WO, we use a softmax again. However, due to how the softmax function is
+defined, it emphasizes differences in values above one and actually
+de-emphasizes values between zero and
+one~\cite{wiki}.
+This is problematic for us because all values we send through the softmax are
+probabilities that per definition are between zero and one. To account for this,
+we first divide each probability with the maximum probability and multiply with
+a constant before performing the softmax. Through trial-and-error, a constant of
+five gave us a reasonable threshold in probabilities. Note that this does not in
+any way affect the order of likely classes from DF, it simply puts the
+probabilities in a span that makes it easier for us to retain a threshold value
+between zero and one after multiple calls to the softmax function. 
+
+\subsection{WTF-PAD and Walkie-Talkie}
+We use the original dataset of Sirinam \emph{et~al.}~\cite{DF} that consists of
+95 monitored websites with 1,000 instances each as well as 20,000 unmonitored
+websites (95x1k+20k). The dataset is split 8:1:1 for training, validation, and
+testing, respectively. Given the dataset and our changes to DF to not do binary
+classification means that our testing dataset is unbalanced in terms of
+instances per class. Therefore we show precision-recall curves generated by
+alternating the threshold for DF with and without WO access. 
+
+Figure~\ref{cat:fig:df} shows the results of DF and DF+WO with a simulated WO on
+Sirinam \emph{et~al.}'s dataset with no defense (Figure~\ref{cat:fig:df:nodef}),
+Walkie-Talkie (Figure~\ref{cat:fig:df:wt}), and WTF-PAD
+(Figure~\ref{cat:fig:df:wtfpad}). For the WO we use a 100 ms timeframe and plot the
+results for different starting Alexa ranks of the 95 monitored websites.
+Regardless of defense or not, we observe that for Alexa ranks 1k and less
+popular websites the precision is perfect (1.0) regardless of threshold. This
+indicates that---for an attacker monitoring frontpages of websites---a 100 ms WO
+significantly reduces false positives for two-thirds of all website visits made
+over Tor, for the vast majority of potentially monitored frontpages of websites.
+Recall is also slightly improved. 
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+		\begin{subfigure}{.495\columnwidth}
+		\includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{src/cat/img/df_nodef}
+		\caption{No defense.}
+		\label{cat:fig:df:nodef}
+		\end{subfigure}
+		\begin{subfigure}{.495\columnwidth}
+		\includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{src/cat/img/df_wt}
+		\caption{Walkie-Talkie~\cite{WT}.}
+		\label{cat:fig:df:wt}
+		\end{subfigure}
+		\begin{subfigure}{.495\columnwidth}
+		\includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{src/cat/img/df_wtfpad}
+		\caption{WTF-PAD~\cite{wtf-pad}.}
+		\label{cat:fig:df:wtfpad}
+		\end{subfigure}
+		\caption{Attack simulation for Deep Fingerprinting (DF) with website oracles (100 ms timeframe) on Sirinam \emph{et~al.}'s dataset~\cite{DF}. The lines in each sub-figure show DF with and without website oracle access for different starting Alexa ranks for monitored websites.}
+		\label{cat:fig:df}
+\end{figure}
+
+For Walkie-Talkie we observe a significant improvement in precision due to WO
+access. Wang and Goldberg note that the use of popular websites as decoy
+(non-sensitive) websites protects less-popular sensitive websites due to the
+base rate: an attacker claiming that the user visited the less-popular website
+is (per definition) likely wrong, given that the attacker is able to detect both
+potential website visits~\cite{WT}. Access to a WO flips this observation on its
+head: if a WO detects the sensitive less-popular website, the base rate works in
+reverse. The probability of an unpopular website being both miss-classified and
+visited in the timeframe is small for all but the most popular websites. The key
+question becomes one of belief in the base rate of the network and that of the
+target user, as analysed in Appendix~\ref{cat:app:bayes}. 
+
+Further, WO access improves both recall and precision for all monitored websites
+against WTF-PAD. WTF-PAD only provides a three percentage points decrease in
+recall compared to no defense for monitored websites with Alexa ranks 1k and
+above. 
+
+\subsection{CS-BuFLO and Tamaraw}
+To evaluate the constant-rate defenses CS-BuFLO and Tamaraw by Cai et
+al.~\cite{csbuflo,Tamaraw} we use Wang \emph{et~al.}'s dataset in the open world
+\cite{Wang}. The dataset consists of 100 monitored websites with 90 instances
+each and 9000 unmonitored sites (100x90+9k), that we randomly split (stratified)
+into 8:1:1 for training, validation, and testing. We had to increase the length
+of the input to DF for this dataset, from 5000 to 25000, to ensure that we
+capture most of the dataset. To get defended traces for CS-BuFLO and Tamaraw we
+use the slightly modified implementations as part of Cherubin's
+framework~\cite{Cherubin17}. 
+
+Figure~\ref{cat:fig:wang} shows the results of our simulations. DF alone is also
+highly effective against the original Wang dataset---as expected---and our
+attack simulation shows that we can further improve it with access to website
+oracles. Most importantly, both CS-BuFLO and Tamaraw offer protection against DF
+with and without oracle access by \emph{significantly lowering recall}. Tamaraw
+offers an order of magnitude better defense in terms of recall. As implemented
+in the framework by Cherubin, CS-BuFLO and Tamaraw reportedly has BOH 67.2\% and
+256.7\%, and TOH 575.6\% and 341.4\%, respectively. This kind of overhead is
+likely prohibitively large for real-world deployment in
+Tor~\cite{csbuflo,Tamaraw,wtf-pad,DF,WT}.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+		\begin{subfigure}{.495\columnwidth}
+		\includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{src/cat/img/wang_nodef}
+		\caption{No defense.\\\,}
+		\label{cat:fig:wang:nodef}
+		\end{subfigure}
+		\begin{subfigure}{.495\columnwidth}
+		\includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{src/cat/img/wang_csbuflo}
+		\caption{CS-BuFLO~\cite{csbuflo}, with reported 67.2\% BOW and 575.6\% TOH~\cite{Cherubin17}.}
+		\label{cat:fig:wang:csbuflo}
+		\end{subfigure}
+		\begin{subfigure}{.495\columnwidth}
+		\includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{src/cat/img/wang_tamaraw}
+		\caption{Tamaraw~\cite{Tamaraw}, with reported 256.7\% BOW and 341.4\% TOH~\cite{Cherubin17}.}
+		\label{cat:fig:wang:tamaraw}
+		\end{subfigure}
+		\caption{Attack simulation for Deep Fingerprinting (DF)~\cite{DF} with website oracles (100 ms timeframe) on Wang \emph{et~al.}'s dataset~\cite{Wang}. The lines in each sub-figure show DF with and without website oracle access for different starting Alexa ranks for monitored websites.}
+		\label{cat:fig:wang}
+\end{figure}
+
+
+\subsection{DynaFlow}
+DynaFlow is a \emph{dynamic} constant-rate defense by Lu
+\emph{et~al.}~\cite{DynaFlow} with two configurations that result in different
+overheads and levels of protection. Lu \emph{et~al.} gathered their own dataset
+of 100 monitored websites with 90 instances each and 9000 unmonitored websites
+(100x90+9k, same as Wang \emph{et~al.}'s \cite{Wang}) to be able to combine
+smaller packets, as discussed briefly in Section~\ref{cat:sec:back:wf}. As for
+CS-BuFLO and Tamaraw, we had to increase the length of the input to DF for this
+dataset to 25000 to ensure that we capture most of the dataset. 
+
+Figure~\ref{cat:fig:dynaflow} shows the results of our simulations for no defense as
+well as the two configurations of DynaFlow. As for Wang \emph{et~al.}'s
+dataset~\cite{Wang}, we see as expected that DF is highly effective and WO
+access further improves the attack. Further, both configurations of DynaFlow are
+effective defenses, comparable to CS-BuFLO with significantly lower overheads at
+first glance. However, note that the comparison is problematic due to DynaFlow
+combining smaller packets. The extra overhead for config 2 over 1 is not wasted:
+recall is significantly reduced, more than halved for regular DF and slightly
+less than half with a WO. 
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+		\begin{subfigure}{.495\columnwidth}
+		\includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{src/cat/img/dynaflow_nodef}
+		\caption{No defense.\\\,}
+		\label{cat:fig:dynaflow:nodef}
+		\end{subfigure}
+		\begin{subfigure}{.495\columnwidth}
+		\includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{src/cat/img/dynaflow_config1}
+		\caption{DynaFlow~\cite{DynaFlow} config 1, with measured 59\% BOH and 24\% TOH.}
+		\label{cat:fig:dynaflow:config1}
+		\end{subfigure}
+		\begin{subfigure}{.495\columnwidth}
+			\includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{src/cat/img/dynaflow_config2}
+			\caption{DynaFlow~\cite{DynaFlow} config 2, with measured 109\% BOH and 30\% TOH.}
+			\label{cat:fig:dynaflow:config2}
+		\end{subfigure}
+		\caption{Attack simulation for Deep Fingerprinting (DF)~\cite{DF} with website oracles (100 ms timeframe) on Lu \emph{et~al.}'s dataset~\cite{DynaFlow}. The lines in each sub-figure show DF with and without website oracle access for different starting Alexa ranks for monitored websites.}
+		\label{cat:fig:dynaflow}
+\end{figure}
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/.gitignore b/summary/src/ctga/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bb88c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+main.pdf
+*.blg
+*.bbl
+*.fls
+*.fdb_latexmk
+*.log
+*.out
+*.aux
+*.swp
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/img/design.pdf b/summary/src/ctga/img/design.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a9aba1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/img/design.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/img/parser.tex b/summary/src/ctga/img/parser.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dba221b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/img/parser.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+\resizebox{\columnwidth}{!}{%
+\begin{tikzpicture}[%
+  -latex,
+  sibling distance=10em,
+  level distance=22pt,
+  parser/.style = {%
+    draw,
+    shape=rectangle,
+    rounded corners,
+    align=center,
+    top color=white,
+    bottom color=mydblue!20,
+  },
+  label/.style = {%
+    draw=none,
+    align=center,
+    text=mydblue,
+    font=\scriptsize,
+  },
+  arrow/.style = {%
+	  draw,
+	  -latex,
+	  rounded corners,
+  },
+]
+	
+	\node[parser](eth){Ethernet};
+	\node[parser,right=of eth](udp){UDP};
+	\coordinate(ip) at ($ (eth) !.5! (udp) $);
+	\node[parser,above=of ip](ipv4){IPv4};
+	\node[parser,below=of ip](ipv6){IPv6};
+
+	\node[parser,right=of udp](dns){DNS};
+	\node[parser](dnsp) at ($ (dns) + (1,1.1) $){preamble};
+	\node[parser](dnsq) at ($ (dns) + (2.25,.45) $){domain name};
+	\node[parser](dnst) at ($ (dns) + (2.25,-.45) $){query type};
+	\node[parser](dnsc) at ($ (dns) + (1,-1.1) $){query class};
+
+	\path[arrow] ($ (eth) + (-1.25,0) $) -- node[left,pos=0]{\texttt{pkt\_in}} (eth);
+
+	\path[arrow] (eth) |- node[label,above left,pos=1]{\texttt{type=0x0800}} (ipv4);
+	\path[arrow] (eth) |- node[label,below left,pos=1]{\texttt{type=0x86DD}} (ipv6);
+	\path[arrow] (ipv4) -| node[label,above right, pos=0]{\texttt{proto=0x17}} (udp);
+	\path[arrow] (ipv6) -| node[label,below right, pos=0]{\texttt{proto=0x17}} (udp);
+	\path[arrow] (udp) -- node[label,above]{\texttt{sport=53}} (dns);
+
+	\path[arrow,dashed] (dns) |- (dnsp);
+	\path[arrow,dashed] (dnsp) -| node[label,above right,pos=0]{\texttt{qd=an=1}} (dnsq);
+	\path[arrow,dashed] (dnsq) -- node[label,right]{\texttt{known log}} (dnst);
+	\path[arrow,dashed] (dnst) |- node[label,below right,pos=1]{\texttt{TXT}} (dnsc);
+	\path[arrow,dashed]
+		(dnsq) edge[out=5, in=355, looseness=8]
+			node[label,right]{
+				\begin{tabular}{c}
+					variable \\
+					length
+				  \end{tabular}
+				}
+		(dnsq);
+	\path[arrow,dashed]
+		(dnsc) --
+			node[label,below right,pos=.8]{\texttt{IN}}
+			node[pos=1.2,rotate=90]{\texttt{clone}}
+		($ (dnsc) + (-1.5,0) $);
+\end{tikzpicture}
+}
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/img/perf-netfpga.pdf b/summary/src/ctga/img/perf-netfpga.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..309a689
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/img/perf-netfpga.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/img/perf-xdp.pdf b/summary/src/ctga/img/perf-xdp.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..041cbdd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/img/perf-xdp.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/img/pl.pdf b/summary/src/ctga/img/pl.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b39f91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/img/pl.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/img/ps.pdf b/summary/src/ctga/img/ps.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf3db16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/img/ps.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/img/related.tex b/summary/src/ctga/img/related.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..31a86e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/img/related.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+\resizebox{1\columnwidth}{!}{%
+  \begin{tikzpicture}[%
+    ns/.style = {
+      draw=none,
+    },
+    ps/.style = {
+      draw,
+      -latex,
+    },
+  ]
+    \node[ns](gossip){};
+    \node[ns,right=0pt of gossip](retroactive){\textbf{Retroactive}};
+    \node[ns,left=0pt of gossip](proactive){\textbf{Proactive}};
+
+    % proactive
+    \node[ns,left=12pt of proactive](cross){STH cross-logging~\cite{minimal-gossip,ietf-cross-logging,hof-cross-logging,catena}};
+    \node[ns,above=0pt of cross](push){STH pushing~\cite{google-gossip}};
+    \node[ns,below=0pt of cross](cosi){STH cosigning~\cite{cosi}};
+
+    \path[ps] (proactive) -- (push.east);
+    \path[ps] (proactive) -- (cross);
+    \path[ps] (proactive) -- (cosi.east);
+
+    % retroactive
+    \node[ns,right=12pt of retroactive](implicit){Implicit via multipath~\cite{mpaudit}};
+    \node[ns,above=0pt of implicit](pool){STH pooling~\cite{chuat-gossip,ietf-gossip}};
+    \node[ns,below=0pt of implicit](trust){Trusted auditing~\cite{ietf-gossip}};
+    \node[ns,above=14pt of retroactive.north east](feedback){SCT feedback~\cite{ietf-gossip}};
+    \node[ns,below=14pt of retroactive.south east](bee){CT honey bee~\cite{ct-honey-bee}};
+
+    \path[ps] (retroactive) -- (feedback);
+    \path[ps] (retroactive) -- (pool.west);
+    \path[ps] (retroactive) -- (implicit);
+    \path[ps] (retroactive) -- (trust.west);
+    \path[ps] (retroactive) -- (bee);
+  \end{tikzpicture}
+}
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/img/wcov-goo.pdf b/summary/src/ctga/img/wcov-goo.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..976e5bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/img/wcov-goo.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/img/wcov-nor.pdf b/summary/src/ctga/img/wcov-nor.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..110cf88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/img/wcov-nor.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/main.tex b/summary/src/ctga/main.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc5ff45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/main.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+\begin{kaupaper}[
+    author={%
+      \textbf{Rasmus Dahlberg},
+      Tobias Pulls,
+      Jonathan Vestin,
+      Toke H{\o}iland-J{\o}rgensen, and
+      Andreas Kassler
+    },
+    title={%
+      Aggregation-Based Certificate Transparency Gossip
+    },
+    reference={%
+      SECURWARE (2019)
+    },
+    summary={%
+      Another often overlooked part of Certificate Transparency is that monitors
+      and end-users who browse websites must observe the same append-only
+      logs.  For example, if the same append-only logs are not observed, an
+      end-user may connect to a website that serves a mis-issued certificate
+      that no monitor will discover.  This would largely defeat the purpose of
+      public logging, which is why RFC~6962 specifies that multiple gossip
+      protocols should be defined separately in the future.  We define one such
+      protocol that plugs into the (at the time current) idea of having
+      end-users interact with the logs through DNS.  Our work is exploratory,
+      using recent advancements in programmable packet processors that allow
+      turning routers, switches, and network interface cards into
+      \emph{aggregators} of tree heads that the logs signed and transmitted in
+      plaintext via DNS.  The aggregated tree heads are then used as a reference
+      while challenging the logs to prove consistency, thus protecting
+      entire vantage points from undetected split views.  A different
+      network path (like Tor) can be used to break out of a local vantage point
+      to increase the likelihood of global consistency.  If the security
+      definition for \emph{aggregation indistinguishability} is satisfied,
+      vantage points without an aggregator may also receive protection due to
+      herd immunity.  Our P4 and XDP prototypes satisfy the notion of
+      aggregation indistinguishability at line-rate with regard to throughput.
+      Prevalent vantage points to roll out aggregation-based gossip include
+      autonomous systems and Internet exchange points that route the traffic of
+      many users.  Our RIPE Atlas measurements show that 32 autonomous systems
+      could protect 30-50\% of the IPv4 space from undetected split views.
+      End-users merely need to use plaintext DNS for opt-in.
+    },
+    participation={\vspace{-.25cm}
+      Andreas and Tobias had the initial idea of exploring the intersection
+      between Certificate Transparency and programmable packet processors.  I did most of the
+      design and writing with feedback from Tobias, our RIPE Atlas measurements,
+      and our performance benchmarks with Jonathan and Toke.
+    },
+    label={
+      paper:ctga
+    },
+]
+  \maketitle
+  \begin{abstract}
+    \input{src/ctga/src/abstract}
+  \end{abstract}
+  
+  \input{src/ctga/src/introduction}
+  \input{src/ctga/src/background}
+  \input{src/ctga/src/design}
+  \input{src/ctga/src/implementation}
+  \input{src/ctga/src/measurements}
+  \input{src/ctga/src/related}
+  \input{src/ctga/src/discussion}
+  \input{src/ctga/src/conclusion} 
+  \input{src/ctga/src/acknowledgments}
+  
+  \bibliographystyle{plain}
+  \bibliography{src/ctga/src/ref}
+\end{kaupaper}
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/src/abstract.tex b/summary/src/ctga/src/abstract.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5483f7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/src/abstract.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+\noindent
+Certificate Transparency (CT) requires that every certificate which is issued by
+a certificate authority must be publicly logged.  While a CT log can be
+untrusted in theory, it relies on the assumption that every client observes and
+cryptographically verifies the same log. As such, some form of gossip mechanism
+is needed in practice. Despite CT being adopted by several major browser
+vendors, no gossip mechanism is widely deployed.
+We suggest an aggregation-based gossip mechanism that passively observes
+cryptographic material that CT logs emit in plaintext, aggregating at packet
+processors (such as routers and switches) to periodically verify log consistency
+off-path. In other words, gossip is provided as-a-service by the network.  Our
+proposal can be implemented for a variety of programmable packet processors at
+line-speed without aggregation distinguishers (throughput), and based on
+20 days of RIPE Atlas measurements that represent clients from 3500 autonomous
+systems we show that significant protection against split-viewing CT logs can be
+achieved with a realistic threat model and an incremental deployment scenario.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/src/acknowledgments.tex b/summary/src/ctga/src/acknowledgments.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a35331b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/src/acknowledgments.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+\section*{Acknowledgements}
+We would like to thank Stefan Alfredsson and Philipp Winter for their RIPE Atlas
+credits, as well as Jonas Karlsson and Ricardo Santos for helping with the
+NetFPGA setup. We also received funding from the HITS research profile which is
+funded by the Swedish Knowledge Foundation.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/src/background.tex b/summary/src/ctga/src/background.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e924d57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/src/background.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+\section{Background} \label{ctga:sec:background}
+First additional prerequisites are provided on CT and the status quo,
+then the techniques which allow us to program custom packet processors are
+introduced.
+
+\subsection{Certificate Transparency} \label{ctga:sec:background:ct}
+The main motivation of CT is that the CA ecosystem is error-prone~\cite{laurie}:
+	a CA can normally issue certificates for \emph{any} domain name, and
+	given that there are hundreds of trusted CAs an attacker only needs to
+	target the weakest link~\cite{ca-ecosystem}. 
+While the requirement of CT logging all certificates cannot prevent mis-issuance
+proactively, it allows anyone to detect it retroactively by monitoring the
+logs~\cite{ct}.  After a log promises to include a certificate by issuing a
+Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT), a new STH including the appended certificate
+must be issued within a Maximum Merge Delay (MMD). Typically, logs use 24~hour
+MMDs. Should non-included SCTs and/or inconsistent STHs be found,
+binding evidence of misbehaviour exists because these statements are
+digitally signed by the logs.  Other than MMD a log's policy defines parameters
+such as STH frequency:
+	the number of STHs that can be issued during an MMD, making it harder to
+	track clients~\cite{ietf-gossip}.
+
+CT is being deployed across Apple's platform~\cite{apple-ct} and Google's
+Chrome~\cite{google-ct}. The status quo is to trust a CA-signed certificate if
+it is accompanied by two or more SCTs, thereby relying on at least one log to
+append each certificate so that mis-issuance can be detected by monitors that
+inspect the logs. The next step of this incremental deployment is to
+\emph{verify} that these certificates are logged by querying for
+inclusion~\cite{google-gossip}, and that the log's append-only property is
+respected by challenging the log to prove STH consistency. Finally, to fully
+distrust CT logs we need mechanisms that detect split-views.  One such mechanism
+which is based on programmable packet processors (introduced next) is presented
+in Section~\ref{ctga:sec:design}, and it is compared to related work on CT gossip in
+Section~\ref{ctga:sec:related}.
+
+\subsection{Programmable Data Planes} \label{ctga:sec:background:pdp}
+Packet processors such as switches, routers, and network interface cards
+are typically integrated tightly using customized hardware and application-%
+specific integrated circuits. This inflexible design limits the
+potential for innovation and leads to long product upgrade cycles, where it
+takes \emph{years} to introduce new processing capabilities and support for
+different protocols and header fields (mostly following lengthy
+standardization cycles).
+The recent shift towards flexible \emph{match+action} packet-processing
+pipelines---including
+  RMT~\cite{rmt},
+  Intel Flexpipe~\cite{flexpipe},
+  Cavium XPA~\cite{cavium}, and
+  Barefoot Tofino~\cite{barefoot}---%
+now have the potential to change the way in which packet processing hardware is
+implemented:
+  it enables programmability using high-level languages, such as P4,
+  while at the same time maintaining performance comparable to fixed-function
+  chips.
+
+\subsubsection{P4}
+The main goal of P4 is to simplify
+  \barbelow{p}rogramming of
+  \barbelow{p}rotocol-independent
+  \barbelow{p}acket
+  \barbelow{p}rocessors
+by providing an abstract programming model for the network data plane~\cite{p4}.
+In this setting, the functionality of a packet processing device is specified
+without assuming any hardwired protocols and headers. Consequently, a P4 program
+must parse headers and connect the values of those protocol fields to the
+actions that should be executed based on a pipeline of reconfigurable
+match+action tables.
+Based on the specified P4 code, a front-end compiler generates a high-level
+intermediate representation that a back-end compiler uses to create a target-%
+dependent program representation. Compilers are available for several platforms,
+including
+  the software-based simple switch architecture~\cite{p4bm},
+  SDNet for Xilinx NetFPGA boards~\cite{p4netfpga}, and
+  Netronome's smart network interfaces~\cite{p4netronome}.
+It is also possible to compile basic P4 programs into eBPF byte
+code~\cite{p42ebpf}.
+
+\subsubsection{XDP}
+The Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) is a Linux-based packet filtering
+mechanism~\cite{bpf}. Verified bytecode is injected from user space, and
+executed for each received packet in kernel space by a just-in-time compiler.
+Extended BPF (eBPF)
+enhances the original BPF concept, enabling faster runtime and many new
+features.  For example, an eBPF program can be attached to the Linux traffic
+control tool \texttt{tc}, and additional hooks were defined for a faster eXpress
+Data Path (XDP)~\cite{xdp}. In contrast to the Intel Data Plane Development Kit
+(DPDK), which runs in user space and completely controls a given network
+interface that supports a DPDK driver, XDP cooperates with the Linux stack to
+achieve fast, programmable, and reconfigurable packet processing using C-like
+programs.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/src/conclusion.tex b/summary/src/ctga/src/conclusion.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f001ace
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/src/conclusion.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+\section{Conclusion and Future Work} \label{ctga:sec:conclusion}
+Wide spread modifications of TLS clients are inevitable to support CT gossip.
+We propose that these modifications include challenging the logs to
+prove certificate inclusion based on STHs \emph{fetched in plaintext}, thereby
+enabling the traversed packet processors to assist in split view detection
+retroactively by aggregating STHs for periodic off-path verification.  Our
+results show that the aggregation-step can be implemented without throughput-%
+based distinguishers for a distant attacker, and that our approach offers rapid
+incremental deployment with high impact on a significant fraction of Internet
+users.  Beyond being an application neutral approach that is complementary to
+proactive gossip, a compelling aspect is that core packet processors are used
+(rather than clients) as a key building block:
+	should a consistency issue arise, it is already in the hands of an actor
+	that is better equipped to investigate the cause manually.
+Further, considering that far from all TLS clients are backed by big browser
+vendors (not to mention other use-cases of transparency logs in general) it is
+likely a long-term win to avoid pushing complex retroactive gossip logic into
+all the different types of clients when there are orders of magnitudes fewer
+packet processors that could aggregate to their own off-path challengers.
+Future work includes different instantiations of the aggregation step and
+evaluating whether aggregation indistinguishability is provided based on
+throughput and/or latency.  The setting may also change in some scenarios,
+e.g., if DNS caches are aggregated the transport need not be plaintext.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/src/design.tex b/summary/src/ctga/src/design.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a04e36b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/src/design.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+\section{Design} \label{ctga:sec:design}
+An overview of aggregation-based gossip is shown in Figure~\ref{ctga:fig:agg}. The
+setting consists of logs that send plaintext STHs to clients over a network, and
+as part of the network inline \emph{packet processors} passively aggregate
+observed STHs to their own off-path \emph{challengers} which challenge the logs
+to prove consistency. A log cannot present split views to different clients that
+share an aggregating vantage point because it would trivially be detected by
+that vantage point's challenger. A log also cannot present a persistent split
+view to different challengers because they are off-path in the sense that they
+are indistinguishable from one another. This means that every client that is
+covered by an aggregator must be on the same view because at least one
+challenger will otherwise detect an inconsistency and report it. A client that
+is not directly covered by an aggregator may receive indirect protection in the
+form of herd immunity. This is discussed in Section~\ref{ctga:sec:discussion:herd}.
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+  \centering
+  \includegraphics[width=\columnwidth]{src/ctga/img/design.pdf}
+  \caption[ ]{%
+    Packet processor that aggregates plaintext STHs for off-path verification.
+  }
+  \label{ctga:fig:agg}
+\end{figure}
+
+\subsection{Threat Model and Security Notion} \label{ctga:sec:agg:thr}
+The overarching threat is undetectable domain impersonation (ex-post) by an
+attacker that is capable of compromising at least one CA and a sufficient number
+of CT logs to convince a client into accepting a forged certificate.
+We assume that any illegitimately issued certificate
+would be detected by the legitimate domain owner through self or delegated
+third-party monitoring.
+This means that an attacker must either provide a split view towards the victim
+or the monitoring entity.
+We also assume that clients query the logs for certificate inclusion based on
+STHs that they acquire from the logs via plaintext mechanisms that packet
+processors can observe, and that some other entities than challengers process
+STHs using the chosen off-paths (Section~\ref{ctga:sec:discussion:limitations}).
+We do not account for the fact that CA compromises may be detected by other
+means, focusing solely on split-viewing CT logs.
+
+\subsubsection{Limitations}
+Our gossip mechanism is limited to STHs that packet processors can observe.
+As such, a client isolated by an attacker is not protected. We limit ourselves
+to attackers that act over a network some distance
+(in the sense of network path length) from a client in plaintext so that
+aggregation can take place. Our limitations and assumptions are further
+discussed in Section~\ref{ctga:sec:discussion:limitations}.
+
+\subsubsection{Attackers}
+Exceptionally powerful attackers can isolate clients, \emph{but clients are not
+necessarily easy to isolate} for a significant number of relevant attackers.
+Isolation may require physical control over a device~\cite{fbi-apple},
+clients may be using anonymity networks like Tor where path selection is
+inherently unpredictable~\cite{tor}, or sufficiently large parts of the network
+cannot be controlled to ensure that no aggregation takes place.
+This may be the case if we consider
+  a nation state actor attacking another nation state actor,
+  the prevalence of edge security middleboxes, and
+  that home routers or NICs nearby the clients could aggregate.
+Any attacker that cannot account for these considerations is within our
+threat model.
+
+\subsubsection{Security Notion}
+To bypass our approach towards gossip an adaptive attacker may attempt to
+actively probe the network for aggregating packet processors. This leads us to
+the key security notion:
+  \emph{aggregation indistinguishability}.
+An attacker should not be able to determine if a packet processor is aggregating
+STHs. The importance of aggregation indistinguishability motivates the design of
+our gossip mechanism into two distinct components:
+  aggregation that takes place inline at packet processors, and
+  periodic off\mbox{-}path log challenging that checks whether the observed STHs
+    are consistent.
+
+\subsection{Packet Processor Aggregation} \label{ctga:sec:aggregator}
+An aggregating packet-processor determines for each packet if it is STH-related.
+If so, the packet is cloned and sent to a challenging component for off-path
+verification.
+The exact definition of \emph{STH-related} depends on the plaintext source, but it
+is ultimately the process of inspecting multiple packet headers such as
+transport protocol and port number. It should be noted that the original packet
+must not be dropped or modified. For example, an aggregator would have a
+trivial aggregation distinguisher if it dropped any malformed STH.
+
+For each aggregating packet processor we have to take IP fragmentation into
+consideration. Recall that IP fragmentation usually occurs when a packet is
+larger than the MTU, splitting it into multiple smaller IP packets that are
+reassembled at the destination host. Normally, an STH should not be fragmented
+because it is much smaller than the de-facto minimum MTU of (at least) 576~%
+bytes~\cite{min-mtu,ipv6}, but an attacker could use fragmentation to
+\emph{intentionally} spread expected headers across multiple packets.
+Assuming stateless packet processing, an aggregator cannot identify
+such fragmented packets as STH-related because some header would be absent
+  (cf.\ stateless firewalls).
+All tiny fragments should therefore be aggregated to account for intentional IP
+fragmentation, which appears to have little or no impact on normal traffic
+because tiny fragments are anomalies~\cite{frag-study-02}. The threat of 
+multi-path fragmentation is discussed in Section~\ref{ctga:sec:discussion:limitations}.
+
+Large traffic loads must also be taken into account. If an aggregating
+packet processor degrades in performance as the portion of STH-related traffic
+increases, a distant attacker may probe for such behaviour to determine if a
+path contains an aggregator. Each \emph{implementation} must therefore be
+evaluated individually for such behaviour, and if trivial aggregation
+distinguishers exist this needs to be solved. For example, STH-related traffic
+could be aggregated probabilistically to reduce the amount of work.
+Another option is to load-balance the traffic before aggregation, i.e., avoid
+worst-case loads that cannot be handled.
+
+\subsection{Off-Path Log Challenging} \label{ctga:sec:challenger}
+A challenger is setup to listen for aggregated traffic, reassembling IP
+fragments and storing the aggregated STHs for periodic off-path verification.
+Periodic off\mbox{-}path verification means that the challenger challenges the log
+based on its own (off-path fetched) STHs and the observed (aggregated) STHs to
+verify log consistency periodically, e.g., every day.
+The definition of \emph{off-path} is that the challenger must not be linkable to
+its aggregating packet processor(s) or any other challenger (including itself).
+Without an off-path there is no gossip step amongst aggregator-challenger
+instances that are operated by different actors, and our approach towards gossip
+would only assert that clients behind the same vantage point observe the same
+logs. If a log cannot distinguish between different challengers due to the
+use of off-paths, however, it is non-trivial to maintain a targeted split-view
+towards an unknown location. Therefore, we get a form of \emph{implicit
+gossip}~\cite{mpaudit} because at least one challenger would detect an
+inconsistency unless everybody observes the same log. If every challenger
+observes the same log, so does every client that is covered by an aggregating
+packet processor.  Notably the challenger component \emph{does not run inline}
+to avoid timing distinguishers.  Note that there are other important
+considerations when implementing a challenger, as discussed in
+Section~\ref{ctga:sec:discussion:limitations}.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/src/discussion.tex b/summary/src/ctga/src/discussion.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a542d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/src/discussion.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+\section{Discussion} \label{ctga:sec:discussion}
+Next we discuss assumptions, limitations and deployment, showing that
+our approach towards retroactive gossip can be deployed to detect
+split-views by many relevant attackers with relatively little effort.  The
+main drawback is reliance on clients fetching STHs in plaintext, e.g., using
+CT-over-DNS~\cite{ct-over-dns}.
+
+\subsection{Assumptions and Limitations} \label{ctga:sec:discussion:limitations}
+Aggregation-based gossip is limited to network traffic that packet processors
+can observe. The strongest type of attacker in this setting---who can completely
+isolate a client---trivially defeats our gossip mechanism and other retroactive
+approaches in the literature (see Section~\ref{ctga:sec:related}).
+A weaker attacker cannot isolate a client, but is located nearby in a network
+path length sense. This limits the opportunity for packet processor aggregation,
+but an attacker cannot rule it out given aggregation indistinguishability.
+Section~\ref{ctga:sec:implementation} showed based on performance that it is non-%
+trivial to distinguish between (non\mbox{-})aggregating packet processors on two
+different targets using P4 and XDP. Off-path challengers must also be
+indistinguishable from one another to achieve \emph{implicit gossip}.
+While we suggested the use of anonymity networks like Tor, a prerequisite is
+that this is in and of itself not an aggregation distinguisher.
+Therefore, we assume that other entities also use off-paths to fetch and verify
+STHs. The fact that a unique STH \emph{is not audited} from an off-path could
+also be an aggregation distinguisher. To avoid this we could rely on a
+verifiable STH history~\cite{ver-sth}
+and wait until the next MMD to audit or simply monitor the full log so that
+consistency proofs are unnecessary.
+
+The existence of multiple network paths are fundamental to the structure and
+functioning of the Internet. A weak attacker may use IP fragmentation such that
+each individual STH fragment is injected from a different location to make
+aggregation harder, approaching the capabilities of a stronger attacker that
+is located closer to the client. This is further exacerbated by the deployment
+of multi-path transport protocols like MPTCP (which can also be fragmented).
+Looking back at our RIPE Atlas measurements in Section~\ref{ctga:sec:measurements}, the
+results towards Google's world-wide infrastructure better represent an active
+attacker that takes \emph{some} measures to circumvent aggregation by
+approaching a client nearby the edge. Given that the likelihood of aggregation
+is high if \emph{any} IXP is present (Figure~\ref{ctga:fig:wcov}), aggregation at
+well-connected IXPs are most likely to be circumvented.
+
+\subsection{Deployment} \label{ctga:sec:disussion:deployment}
+Besides aggregating at strategic locations in the Internet's backbone,
+ISPs and enterprise networks have the opportunity to protect all of their
+clients with relatively little effort. Deployment of special-purpose middleboxes
+are already prevalent in these environments, and then the inconvenience of
+fragmentation tends to go away due to features such as packet reassembly.
+Further, an attacker cannot trivially circumvent the edge of a network topology%
+---especially not if aggregation takes place on an end-system:
+  all fragments are needed to reassemble a packet, which means that multi-path
+  fragmentation is no longer a threat.
+If aggregation-based gossip is deployed on an end-system, STHs could be
+hooked using other approaches than P4/XDP. For example, shim-layers that
+intercept TLS certificates higher up in the networking stack were already
+proposed by Bates~\emph{et~al.}~\cite{h1} and O'Neill~\emph{et~al.}~\cite{h2}.
+In this setting, an end-system is viewed as the aggregating packet processor,
+and it reports back to an off-path challenger that may be a local process
+running on the same system or a remote entity, e.g., a TelCo could host
+challengers that collect aggregated STHs from smartphones.
+
+While we looked at programming physical packet processors like routers,
+STH aggregation could be approached in hypervisors and software
+switches~\cite{pisces} to protect many virtual hosts. If CT-over-DNS is used to
+fetch STHs, it would be promising to output DNS server caches to implement the
+aggregation step. Similar to DNS servers, so called Tor exist relays also
+operate DNS caches. In other words, P4 and XDP are only examples of how to
+\emph{instantiate} the aggregation step. Depending on the used plaintext source,
+packet processor, and network topology other approaches may be more suitable,
+e.g., C for vendor-specific middleboxes.
+
+\subsection{Retroactive Gossip Benefits From Plaintext}
+As opposed to an Internet core that only forwards IP packets, extra
+functionality is often embedded which causes complex processing dependencies and
+protocol ossification~\cite{TCPoss}. Many security and protocol issues were
+found for middleboxes that provides extra
+functionality~\cite{HTTPSintercept,langely-quic}, resulting in the mindset
+that \emph{everything} should be encrypted~\cite{langely-quic}.
+Our work is controversial because it goes against this mindset and advocates
+that STHs should be communicated in plaintext.
+We argue that this makes sense in the context of STHs due to the absence of
+privacy concerns and because the entire point of gossip is to make STHs
+\emph{available} (rather than end-to-end).
+The idea of intentionally exposing information to the network is not new, e.g.,
+MPQUIC is designed to support traffic shaping~\cite{mpquic}.
+
+While we used CT-over-DNS as a plaintext source, there is a push towards
+DNS-over-TLS~\cite{dot} and DNS-over-HTTPS~\cite{doh}.
+Wide use of these approaches could undermine our gossip mechanism, but
+ironically the security of TLS could be jeopardized unless gossip is deployed.
+In other words, long term gossip is an essential component of CT and other
+transparency logs to avoid becoming yet another class of trusted third-parties.
+If proactive approaches such as witness cosigning are rejected in favour of
+retroactive mechanisms, then ensuring that STHs are widely spread and easily
+accessible is vital. An STH needs no secrecy if the appropriate measures are
+taken to make it privacy-insensitive~\cite{ietf-gossip}.
+While secure channels also provide integrity and replay protection, an STH is
+already signed by logs and freshness is covered by MMDs, as well as issue
+frequency to protect privacy.
+A valid argument against exposing any plaintext to the network is protocol
+ossification. We emphasize that our design motivates why packet processors
+should fail open:
+  otherwise there is no aggregation indistinguishability.
+Note that there are other plaintext sources than CT-over-DNS that could be
+aggregated.  However, if these sources require stream-reassembly it is
+generally hard to process in languages such as P4 and XDP~\cite{ctga-thesis}.
+
+\subsection{Indistinguishability and Herd Immunity} \label{ctga:sec:discussion:herd}
+An attacker that gains control over a CT log is bound to be more risk averse
+than an attacker that compromises a CA. There is an order of magnitude fewer
+logs than CAs, and client vendors are likely going to be exceptionally picky
+when it comes to accepted and rejected logs.
+We have already seen examples of this, including Google Chrome disqualifying
+logs that made mistakes:
+  Izenpe used the same key for production and testing~\cite{izenpe}, and
+  Venafi suffered from an unfortunate power outage~\cite{venafi}.
+Risk averse attackers combined with packet processors that are aggregation
+indistinguishable may lead to \emph{herd immunity}: despite a significant
+fraction of clients that lack aggregators, indirect protection may be provided
+because the risk of eventual detection is unacceptable to many attackers. Hof
+and Carle~\cite{hof-cross-logging} and Nordberg \emph{et~al.}~\cite{ietf-gossip}
+discussed herd immunity~briefly~before~us.
+While herd immunity is promising, it should be noted that aggregation
+distinguishable packet processors at \emph{the edge of a network topology} may
+be acceptable for some.  In other words, if an aggregator cannot be circumvented
+but it is detectable split-views would still be deterred against covered
+clients if the challenger is off-path.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/src/implementation.tex b/summary/src/ctga/src/implementation.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a35cfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/src/implementation.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+\section{Distinguishability Experiments} \label{ctga:sec:implementation}
+There are many different ways to implement the aggregation step. We decided to
+use P4 and XDP because a large variety of programmable
+packet processors support these languages (Section~\ref{ctga:sec:background:pdp}).
+The aggregated plaintext source is assumed to be CT-over-DNS~\cite{ct-over-dns},
+which means that a client obtains STHs by fetching IN TXT resource records.
+Since languages for programmable packet processors are somewhat restricted,
+we facilitated packet processing by requiring that at most one STH is sent per
+UDP packet.
+This is reasonable because logs should only have one \emph{most recent} STH.
+A DNS STH is roughly 170~bytes without any packet headers and
+should normally not be fragmented, but to ensure that we do not miss any
+intentionally fragmented STHs we aggregate every tiny fragment. We did not
+implement the challenging component because it is relatively easy given
+an existing off-path. Should any scalability issue arise for the challenger
+there is nothing that prevents a distributed front-end that processes the
+aggregated material before storage. Storage is not an issue because there are
+only a limited amount of unique STHs per day and log
+  (one new STH per hour is a common policy, and browsers recognize $\approx 40$
+  logs).
+Further implementation details can be found
+online~\cite{github,full-version}.
+
+\subsection{Setup}
+We used a test-bed consisting of
+  a traffic generator,
+  a traffic receiver, and
+  an aggregating target in between.
+The first target is a P4-enabled NetFPGA SUME board that runs an adapted version
+of our P4 reference implementation.
+The second target is a net-next kernel v4.17.0-rc6 Linux machine that runs XDP
+on one core with
+  a 10~Gb SFP+ X520 82599ES Intel card,
+  a $3.6$~GHz Intel Core i7-4790 CPU, and
+  16~GB of RAM at 1600~MHz (Hynix/Hyundai).
+We would like to determine whether there are any aggregation distinguishers as
+the fraction of STHs (experiment 1) and tiny fragments (experiment 2) in the
+traffic is increased from 0--100\%, i.e., does performance degrade as a
+function of STH-related rate? Non-fragmented STH packets are
+411~bytes
+	(we used excessively large DNS headers to maximize the packet parsing
+	overhead),
+and tiny fragments are 64~bytes. All background traffic have the same packet
+sizes but is not deemed STH-related.
+
+\subsection{Results}
+Figure~\ref{ctga:fig:perf-p4} shows throughput as a function of STH-related rate for
+the P4-enabled NetFPGA. While we were unable to observe any distinguisher between
+normal routing and the edge case of 100\% aggregation for
+non-fragmented STH packets, there is a small constant throughput difference for
+tiny fragments ($7.5$~Kbps). This is a non-negligible \emph{program
+distinguisher} if a packet processor is physically isolated as in our benchmark,
+i.e., something other than a routing program is running but it is not
+necessarily an aggregator because performance does not degrade as a function
+of increased STH-related rate. However, we found such degradation behaviour for the
+single-core XDP case (Figure~\ref{ctga:fig:perf-xdp}). If line-speed is higher than
+2~Gbps, STHs could be aggregated probabilistically or traffic could be load-%
+balanced to \emph{overcome} this issue.
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+  \centering
+  \begin{subfigure}[b]{.8\textwidth}
+	  \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{src/ctga/img/perf-netfpga}
+    \caption{P4 NetFPGA}
+    \label{ctga:fig:perf-p4}
+  \end{subfigure}
+
+  \begin{subfigure}[b]{.8\textwidth}
+    \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{src/ctga/img/perf-xdp}
+    \caption{XDP on a single core}
+    \label{ctga:fig:perf-xdp}
+  \end{subfigure}
+  \caption{%
+    Throughput as a function of STH-related traffic that is aggregated.
+  }
+  \label{ctga:fig:perf}
+\end{figure}
+
+\subsection{Lessons Learned}
+P4-NetFPGA provides aggregation indistinguishability regardless of STH load.
+For XDP, it depends on the scenario: what is the line-rate criteria and how many
+cores are available. For example, five cores support 10~Gbps aggregation
+indistinguishability without probabilistic filtering or load balancing.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/src/introduction.tex b/summary/src/ctga/src/introduction.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..248785e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/src/introduction.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+\section{Introduction} \label{ctga:sec:introduction}
+The HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) ecosystem is going through a paradigm shift. As opposed to blindly
+trusting that Certificate Authorities (CAs) only issue certificates to the
+rightful domain owners%
+  ---a model known for its weakest-link security~\cite{ca-ecosystem}---%
+transparency into the set of issued certificates is incrementally being
+required by major browser vendors~\cite{apple-ct,google-ct}.  This transparency
+is forced and takes the form of Certificate Transparency (CT) logs:
+  the idea is to reject any TLS certificate that have yet to be publicly logged,
+  such that domain owners can monitor the logs for client\mbox{-}accepted certificates
+	to \emph{detect} certificate mis-issuance \emph{after the fact}~\cite{ct}.
+While the requirement of certificate logging is a significant improvement to the
+HTTPS ecosystem, the underlying problem of trusting CAs cannot be solved by the
+status quo of trusted CT logs (described further in
+Section~\ref{ctga:sec:background:ct}). Therefore, it is paramount that nobody
+needs to trust these logs once incremental deployments are matured.
+
+CT is formalized and cryptographically verifiable~\cite{ct-formal}, supporting
+inclusion and consistency proofs.
+This means that a client can verify whether a log is
+operated correctly:
+  said certificates are included in the log, and
+  nothing is being removed or modified.
+Despite the ability to cryptographically verify these two properties, there are
+no assurances that everybody observes \emph{the same
+log}~\cite{chuat-gossip,ct}.  For example, certificate mis-issuance would
+not be detected by a domain owner that monitors the logs if fraudulently issued
+certificates are shown to the clients selectively.  A log that serves different
+versions of itself is said to present a \emph{split view}~\cite{ietf-gossip}.
+Unless such log misbehaviour can be detected, we must trust it not to happen.
+
+The solution to the split viewing problem is a gossip mechanism which ensures
+that everybody observes \emph{the same} consistent log~\cite{ct}.  This
+assumption is simple in theory but remarkably hard in practice due to
+	client privacy,
+	varying threat models, and
+	deployment challenges~\cite{ietf-gossip,cosi}.
+While Google started on a package that supports
+	minimal gossip~\cite{minimal-gossip} and
+	the mechanisms of Nordberg \emph{et~al.}~\cite{ietf-gossip},
+there is ``next to no deployment in the wild''~\cite{little-or-no-gossip}.
+To this end, we propose a gossip mechanism that helps detecting split-view
+attacks retroactively based on the idea of packet processors, such as routers
+and middleboxes, that \emph{aggregate} Signed Tree Heads (STHs)---succinct
+representations of the logs' states---that are exposed to the network \emph{in
+plaintext}.
+The aggregated STHs are then used to challenge the logs to prove consistency
+via an off-path, such that the logs cannot distinguish between challenges that
+come from different aggregators.  Given this indistinguishability assumption, it
+is non-trivial to serve a consistent split-view to an unknown
+location~\cite{mpaudit}.  Thus, all aggregators must be on the same view, and
+accordingly all clients that are covered by these aggregators must also be on
+the same view \emph{despite not doing any explicit gossip themselves} because
+gossip is provided as-a-service by the network.  An isolated client (i.e.,
+untrusted network path to the aggregator) is notably beyond reach of any
+retroactive gossip~\cite{cosi}.
+
+The premise of having STHs in plaintext is controversial given current trends to
+encrypt transport protocols, which is otherwise an approach that combats
+inspection of network traffic and protocol
+ossification~\cite{HTTPSintercept,TCPoss}.  We argue that keeping gossip
+related material in plaintext to support aggregation-based gossip comes with few
+downsides though:
+  it is easy to implement,
+  there are no major negative privacy impacts, and
+  it would offer significant protection for a large portion of the Internet
+    with a realistic threat model \emph{despite relatively small deployment
+    efforts}.
+The three main limitations are
+  no protection against isolated clients,
+  reliance on clients that fetch STHs from the logs in plaintext, and
+  possible concerns surrounding protocol ossification~\cite{TCPoss}.
+Our contributions are:
+\begin{itemize}
+  \item Design and security considerations for a network-based gossip mechanism
+    that passively aggregates STHs to verify log consistency off-path
+    (Section~\ref{ctga:sec:design}).
+  \item Generic implementations of the aggregation step using P4~\cite{p4} and
+    XDP~\cite{xdp} for plaintext STHs, supporting line-speed packet
+    processing on systems that range from switches, routers, network interface
+    cards, and Linux (Section~\ref{ctga:sec:implementation}).
+  \item A simulation based on RIPE Atlas measurements that evaluate the impact
+    of deploying aggregation-based gossip at ASes and IXPs. Our evaluation shows
+    that incremental roll-out at well-connected locations would protect a
+    significant portion of all Internet clients from undetected split views
+    (Section~\ref{ctga:sec:measurements}).
+\end{itemize}
+
+Besides the sections referenced above, the paper introduces necessary
+background in Section~\ref{ctga:sec:background} and provides discussion, conclusion,
+and future work in Sections~\ref{ctga:sec:related}--\ref{ctga:sec:conclusion}.
+A full version with additional implementation details is available
+online~\cite{full-version}.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/src/measurements.tex b/summary/src/ctga/src/measurements.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee0ea89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/src/measurements.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+\section{Estimated Impact of Deployment} \label{ctga:sec:measurements}
+We conducted 20 daily traceroute measurements during spring 2018 on the RIPE
+Atlas platform to evaluate the effectiveness of aggregation-based gossip. The
+basic idea is to look at client coverage as central ASes and IXPs aggregate
+STHs. If any significant client coverage can be achieved, the likelihood of
+pulling off an undetected split-view will be small.
+
+\subsection{Setup}
+We scheduled RIPE Atlas measurements from roughly 3500 unique ASes that
+represent 40\% of the IPv4 space, trace-routing Google's authoritative
+CT-over-DNS server and NORDUnet's CT log to simulate clients that fetch DNS STHs
+in plaintext. Each traceroute result is a list of
+traversed IPs, and it can be translated into the corresponding ASes and IXPs
+using public data sets~\cite{pub-routeviews,pub-caida}.
+In other words, traversed ASes and IXPs can be determined for each probe. Since
+we are interested in client coverage as ASes and IXPs aggregate, each
+probe is weighted by the IPv4 space of its AS. While an IP address is an
+imperfect representation of a client, e.g., an IP may be unused or reused, it
+gives a decent idea of how significant it is to cover a given probe.
+
+\subsection{Results}
+Figure~\ref{ctga:fig:pl} shows AS/IXP path length and stability from the probes to
+the targets.
+If the AS path length is one, a single AS is traversed \emph{before reaching the
+target}. It is evident that an AS path tends to be one hop longer
+towards NORDUnet than Google because there is a rough off-by-one offset on the
+x-axis.
+A similar trend of greater path length towards NORDUnet can be observed for
+IXPs. For example,
+  74.0\% of all paths traversed no IXP towards Google, but
+  58.5\% of all paths traversed a single IXP towards NORDUnet.
+These results can be explained by infrastructural differences of our targets:
+  since Google is a worldwide actor an average path should be shorter than
+  compared to a region-restricted actor like NORDUnet.
+We also observed that AS and IXP paths tend to be quite stable over 20~days
+	(the duration of our measurements).
+I.e., if AS $a$ and $b$ are traversed it is unlikely to suddenly be
+routed via AS~$c$.
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+  \centering
+  \includegraphics[width=0.5\columnwidth]{src/ctga/img/pl}%
+  \includegraphics[width=0.5\columnwidth]{src/ctga/img/ps}
+  \caption{%
+    Path length and stability towards Google and NORDUnet.
+  }
+  \label{ctga:fig:pl}
+\end{figure}
+
+Figure~\ref{ctga:fig:wcov} shows coverage of the RIPE Atlas network as $1...n$ actors
+aggregate STHs. For example, 100\% and 50\% coverage means that at least 40\%
+and 20\% of the full IPv4 space is covered. The aggregating ASes and IXPs were
+selected based on the most commonly traversed vantage points in
+our measurements (Pop), as well as CAIDA's largest AS ranking~\cite{caida}.
+We found that more coverage is achieved when targeting
+NORDUnet than Google. This is expected given that the paths tend to be longer.
+If CAIDA's top-32 enabled aggregation, the coverage would be significant
+towards Google (31.6\%)~and~NORDUnet~(58.1\%).
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+  \centering
+  \includegraphics[width=0.5\columnwidth]{src/ctga/img/wcov-goo}%
+  \includegraphics[width=0.5\columnwidth]{src/ctga/img/wcov-nor}
+  \caption{%
+    Coverage as a function of aggregation opt-in.
+  }
+  \label{ctga:fig:wcov}
+\end{figure}
+
+\subsection{Lessons Learned}
+A vast majority of all clients traverse \emph{at least} one AS that could
+aggregate. It is relatively rare to traverse IXPs towards Google but not
+NORDUnet. We also learned that paths tends to be stable, which means that the
+time until split view detection would be at least 20 days \emph{if} it is
+possible to find an unprotected client. This increases the importance of
+aggregation indistinguishability.
+Finally, we identified vantage points that are commonly traversed using Pop, and
+these vantage points are represented well by CAIDA's independent AS ranking.
+Little opt-in from ASes and IXPs provides significant coverage against an
+attacker that is relatively close to a client
+  (cf.\ world-wide infrastructure of Google).
+Although we got better coverage for NORDUnet, any weak attacker would approach
+Google's coverage by renting infrastructure nearby.
+Any weak attacker could also circumvent IXP aggregation by detecting the IXP
+itself~\cite{ixp-detect}.  As such, top-ranked AS aggregation should give
+the best split-view protection.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/src/ref.bib b/summary/src/ctga/src/ref.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5aa2314
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/src/ref.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,573 @@
+@inproceedings{ixp-detect,
+  author    = {George Nomikos and Xenofontas A. Dimitropoulos},
+  title     = {{traIXroute}: Detecting {IXPs} in traceroute paths},
+  booktitle = {PAM},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@mastersthesis{ctga-thesis,
+  author = {Rasmus Dahlberg},
+  title  = {Aggregating {Certificate Transparency} Gossip Using Programmable Packet Processors},
+  school = {Karlstad University},
+  year   = {2018},
+  type   = {Master Thesis},
+}
+
+@article{laurie,
+  author    = {Ben Laurie},
+  title     = {{Certificate Transparency}},
+  journal   = {{ACM} Queue},
+  volume    = {12},
+  number    = {8},
+  year      = {2014},
+}
+
+@misc{minimal-gossip,
+  author = {David Drysdale},
+  title = {Minimal Gossip},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-go/blob/master/gossip/minimal}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+@misc{google-ct,
+  author = {Devon O'Brien},
+  title = {{Certificate Transparency} Enforcement in {Google Chrome}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!msg/ct-policy/wHILiYf31DE/iMFmpMEkAQAJ}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+@misc{apple-ct,
+  author = {Apple Inc.},
+  title = {Apple's {Certificate Transparency} Policy},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT205280}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{h2,
+  author    = {Mark O'Neill and
+               Scott Heidbrink and
+               Scott Ruoti and
+               Jordan Whitehead and
+               Dan Bunker and
+               Luke Dickinson and
+               Travis Hendershot and
+               Joshua Reynolds and
+               Kent E. Seamons and
+               Daniel Zappala},
+  title     = {{TrustBase}: An Architecture to Repair and Strengthen Certificate-Based Authentication},
+  booktitle = {USENIX Security},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{h1,
+  author    = {Adam Bates and
+               Joe Pletcher and
+               Tyler Nichols and
+               Braden Hollembaek and
+               Dave Tian and
+               Kevin R. B. Butler and
+               Abdulrahman Alkhelaifi},
+  title     = {Securing {SSL} Certificate Verification through Dynamic Linking},
+  booktitle = {CCS},
+  year      = {2014},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{catena,
+  author    = {Alin Tomescu and Srinivas Devadas},
+  title     = {Catena: Efficient Non-equivocation via {Bitcoin}},
+  booktitle = {IEEE S\&P},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{ct-pir,
+  author    = {Wouter Lueks and Ian Goldberg},
+  title     = {Sublinear Scaling for Multi-Client Private Information Retrieval},
+  booktitle = {FC},
+  year      = {2015},
+}
+
+@techreport{ct,
+  author      = {Ben Laurie and Adam Langley and Emilia Kasper},
+  title       = {{Certificate Transparency}},
+  type        = {RFC},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  number      = {6962},
+  year        = {2013},
+}
+
+@misc{vds,
+  author        = {Adam Eijdenberg and Ben Laurie and Al Cutter},
+  title         = {Verifiable Data Structures},
+  howpublished  = {\url{https://github.com/google/trillian/blob/master/docs/VerifiableDataStructures.pdf}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{transparency-overlays,
+  author    = {Melissa Chase and Sarah Meiklejohn},
+  title     = {Transparency Overlays and Applications},
+  booktitle = {CCS},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{coniks,
+  author    = {Marcela S. Melara and
+    Aaron Blankstein and
+    Joseph Bonneau and
+    Edward W. Felten and
+    Michael J. Freedman},
+  title     = {{CONIKS}: Bringing Key Transparency to End Users},
+  booktitle = {USENIX Security},
+  year      = {2015},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{ca-ecosystem,
+  author    = {Zakir Durumeric and
+    James Kasten and
+    Michael Bailey and
+    J. Alex Halderman},
+  title     = {Analysis of the {HTTPS} Certificate Ecosystem},
+  booktitle = {IMC},
+  year      = {2013},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{little-or-no-gossip,
+  author    = {Oliver Gasser and
+    Benjamin Hof and
+    Max Helm and
+    Maciej Korczynski and
+    Ralph Holz and
+    Georg Carle},
+  title     = {In Log We Trust: Revealing Poor Security Practices with {Certificate Transparency} Logs and Internet Measurements},
+  booktitle = {PAM},
+  year      = {2018},
+}
+
+@techreport{ietf-gossip,
+  author      = {Linus Nordberg and Daniel Kahn Gillmor and Tom Ritter},
+  title       = {Gossiping in {CT}},
+  number      = {draft-ietf-trans-gossip-05},
+  type        = {Internet-draft},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  year        = {2018},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{chuat-gossip,
+  author    = {Laurent Chuat and
+   Pawel Szalachowski and
+   Adrian Perrig and
+   Ben Laurie and
+   Eran Messeri},
+  title     = {Efficient Gossip Protocols for Verifying the Consistency of
+    Certificate Logs},
+  booktitle = {CNS},
+  year      = {2015},
+}
+
+@misc{ct-honey-bee,
+  author    = {Andrew Ayer},
+  title     = {Lightweight Program that Pollinates {STHs} Between {Certificte
+    Transparency} Logs and Auditors},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/SSLMate/ct-honeybee}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+@article{hof-cross-logging,
+  author    = {Benjamin Hof and Georg Carle},
+  title     = {Software Distribution Transparency and Auditability},
+  journal   = {CoRR},
+  volume    = {abs/1711.07278},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@techreport{ietf-cross-logging,
+  author      = {Benjamin Hof},
+  title       = {{STH} Cross Logging},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  number      = {draft-hof-trans-cross-00},
+  type        = {Internet-draft},
+  year        = {2017},
+}
+
+@misc{google-gossip,
+  author      = {Ryan Sleevi and Eran Messeri},
+  title       = {{Certificate Transparency} in {Chrome}: Monitoring {CT} Logs consistency},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FP5J5Sfsg0OR9P4YT0q1dM02iavhi8ix1mZlZe_z-ls/edit?pref=2&pli=1}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{cosi,
+  author    = {Ewa Syta and
+               Iulia Tamas and
+               Dylan Visher and
+               David Isaac Wolinsky and
+               Philipp Jovanovic and
+               Linus Gasser and
+               Nicolas Gailly and
+               Ismail Khoffi and
+               Bryan Ford},
+  title     = {Keeping Authorities ``Honest or Bust'' with Decentralized Witness Cosigning},
+  booktitle = {IEEE S\&P},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{mpaudit,
+  author    = {Lachlan J. Gunn and Andrew Allison and Derek Abbott},
+  title     = {Safety in Numbers: Anonymization Makes Keyservers Trustworthy},
+  booktitle = {HotPETs},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{doublecheck,
+  author    = {Mansoor Alicherry and Angelos D. Keromytis},
+  title     = {{DoubleCheck}: Multi-path Verification Against Man-in-the-Middle
+    Attacks},
+  booktitle = {ISCC},
+  year      = {2009},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{perspectives,
+  author    = {Dan Wendlandt and David G. Andersen and Adrian Perrig},
+  title     = {Perspectives: Improving {SSH}-Style Host Authentication with
+    Multi-Path Probing},
+  booktitle = {USENIX ATC},
+  year      = {2008},
+}
+
+@misc{ct-over-dns,
+  author      = {Ben Laurie},
+  title       = {{Certificate Transparency} Over {DNS}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/blob/master/dns}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+%%% Results: Characteristics of fragment traffic (§4c)
+% Figures 12--13 show real-world measurements that __very__ few correct
+% fragmentation series are less than 576 bytes.
+%
+% 93 series less than 256 bytes were observed, and all but two appeared to be
+% errors.
+%
+% ``MTUs lower than 576 bytes are generally evidence of mistaken or misguided
+% configuration''.
+%%%
+@article{frag-study-02,
+  author    = {Colleen Shannon and David Moore and Kimberly C. Claffy},
+  title     = {Beyond Folklore: Observations on Fragmented Traffic},
+  journal   = {IEEE/ACM Trans.\ Netw.},
+  volume    = {10},
+  number    = {6},
+  year      = {2002},
+}
+
+%%% page 60
+% ``Since nearly all networks in the Internet currently support an MTU of 576
+% or greater, we strongly recommend the use of 576 for datagrams sent to
+% non-local networks''
+%%%
+@techreport{min-mtu,
+  author      = {Robert Braden},
+  title       = {Requirements for {Internet} hosts---Communication Layers},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  type        = {RFC},
+  number      = {1122},
+  year        = {1989},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{xdp,
+  author    = {Toke H{\o}iland{-}J{\o}rgensen and
+               Jesper Dangaard Brouer and
+               Daniel Borkmann and
+               John Fastabend and
+               Tom Herbert and
+               David Ahern and
+               David Miller},
+  title     = {The eXpress data path: fast programmable packet processing in the operating system kernel},
+  booktitle = {CoNEXT},
+  year      = {2018},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{TCPoss,
+  author    = {Michio Honda and
+               Yoshifumi Nishida and
+               Costin Raiciu and
+               Adam Greenhalgh and
+               Mark Handley and
+               Hideyuki Tokuda},
+  title     = {Is it Still Possible to Extend {TCP}?},
+  booktitle = {IMC},
+  year      = {2011},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{HTTPSintercept,
+  author    = {Zakir Durumeric and
+               Zane Ma and
+               Drew Springall and
+               Richard Barnes and
+               Nick Sullivan and
+               Elie Bursztein and
+               Michael Bailey and
+               J. Alex Halderman and
+               Vern Paxson},
+  title     = {The Security Impact of {HTTPS} Interception},
+  booktitle = {NDSS},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{mpquic,
+  author    = {Quentin De Coninck and Olivier Bonaventure},
+  title     = {Multipath {QUIC}: Design and Evaluation},
+  booktitle = {CoNEXT},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{tor,
+  author    = {Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson and Paul F. Syverson},
+  title     = {Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router},
+  booktitle = {USENIX Security},
+  year      = {2004},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{androidlibs,
+  author    = {Michael Backes and Sven Bugiel and Erik Derr},
+  title     = {Reliable Third-Party Library Detection in {Android} and its Security Applications},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{androidlibs2,
+  author    = {Erik Derr and
+    Sven Bugiel and
+    Sascha Fahl and
+    Yasemin Acar and
+    Michael Backes},
+  title     = {Keep me Updated: An Empirical Study of Third-Party Library
+    Updatability on {Android}},
+  booktitle = {CCS},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{langely-quic,
+  author    = {Adam Langley and
+               Alistair Riddoch and
+               Alyssa Wilk and
+               Antonio Vicente and
+               Charles Krasic and
+               Dan Zhang and
+               Fan Yang and
+               Fedor Kouranov and
+               Ian Swett and
+               Janardhan R. Iyengar and
+               Jeff Bailey and
+               Jeremy Dorfman and
+               Jim Roskind and
+               Joanna Kulik and
+               Patrik Westin and
+               Raman Tenneti and
+               Robbie Shade and
+               Ryan Hamilton and
+               Victor Vasiliev and
+               Wan{-}Teh Chang and
+               Zhongyi Shi},
+  title     = {The {QUIC} Transport Protocol: Design and Internet-Scale Deployment},
+  booktitle = {{SIGCOMM}},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+
+@article{sdn,
+  author    = {Nick Feamster and
+    Jennifer Rexford and
+    Ellen W. Zegura},
+  title     = {The road to {SDN:} An intellectual history of programmable networks},
+  journal   = {CCR},
+  volume    = {44},
+  number    = {2},
+  year      = {2014},
+}
+
+@techreport{ipv6,
+  author        = {Steve Deering and Robert Hinden},
+  title         = {Internet Protocol Version 6 ({IPv6}) specification},
+  type          = {RFC},
+  institution   = {IETF},
+  number        = {8200},
+  year          = {2017},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{ct-formal,
+  author    = {Benjamin Dowling and
+    Felix G{\"{u}}nther and
+    Udyani Herath and
+    Douglas Stebila},
+  title     = {Secure Logging Schemes and {Certificate Transparency}},
+  booktitle = {ESORICS},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{bpf,
+  author    = {Steven McCanne and Van Jacobson},
+  title     = {The {BSD} Packet Filter: A New Architecture for User-level
+    Packet Capture},
+  booktitle = {Usenix Winter Technical Conference},
+  year      = {1993},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{pisces,
+  author    = {Muhammad Shahbaz and
+               Sean Choi and
+               Ben Pfaff and
+               Changhoon Kim and
+               Nick Feamster and
+               Nick McKeown and
+               Jennifer Rexford},
+  title     = {{PISCES:} A Programmable, Protocol-Independent Software Switch},
+  booktitle = {{ACM} {SIGCOMM}},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@article{p4,
+  author    = {Pat Bosshart and
+               Dan Daly and
+               Glen Gibb and
+               Martin Izzard and
+               Nick McKeown and
+               Jennifer Rexford and
+               Cole Schlesinger and
+               Dan Talayco and
+               Amin Vahdat and
+               George Varghese and
+               David Walker},
+  title     = {{P4}: Programming Protocol-independent Packet Processors},
+  journal   = {CCR},
+  volume    = {44},
+  number    = {3},
+  year      = {2014},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{rmt,
+ author    = {Pat Bosshart and
+               Glen Gibb and
+               Hun{-}Seok Kim and
+               George Varghese and
+               Nick McKeown and
+               Martin Izzard and
+               Fernando A. Mujica and
+               Mark Horowitz},
+ title      = {Forwarding Metamorphosis: Fast Programmable Match-action Processing in
+  Hardware for {SDN}},
+ booktitle  = {ACM SIGCOMM},
+ year       = {2013},
+} 
+      
+@conference{p4netfpga,
+  author       = {Gordon Brebner},
+  title        = {{P4} for an {FPGA} Target},
+  booktitle    = {P4 Workshop},
+  year         = {2015},
+  note         = {\url{https://p4workshop2015.sched.com/event/3ZQA/p4-for-an-fpga-target}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+@misc{p4netronome,
+  title        = {Programming {NFP} with {P4} and {C}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.netronome.com/media/redactor_files/WP_Programming_with_P4_and_C.pdf}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+@misc{flexpipe,
+  title        = {Intel Ethernet Switch {FM600} Series: 10/40 {GbE} Low Latency Switching Silicon},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/product-briefs/ethernet-switch-fm6000-series-brief.pdf}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+@misc{cavium,
+  title = {Cavium and {XPliant} Introduce a Fully Programmable Switch Silicon Family Scaling to 3.2 Terabits per Second},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://cavium.com/newsevents-cavium-and-xpliant-introduce-a-fully-programmable-switch-silicon-family.html}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+@misc{barefoot,
+  title = {Tofino: World's fastest {P4}-programmable Ethernet switch {ASICs}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://barefootnetworks.com/products/brief-tofino/}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+@misc{p4bm,
+	title = {BEHAVIORAL MODEL REPOSITORY},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/p4lang/behavioral-model}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+@misc{p42ebpf,
+  author = {Mihai Budiu},
+  title = {Compiling {P4} to {eBPF}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/tree/master/src/cc/frontends/p4}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+@misc{fbi-apple,
+  author = {EFF},
+  title = {Apple Challenges {FBI}: All Writs Act Order ({CA})},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.eff.org/cases/apple-challenges-fbi-all-writs-act-order}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+@misc{ver-sth,
+  author = {Linus Nordberg},
+  title = {{Re: [Trans] Providing} the history of {STHs} a log has issued (in 6962-bis)},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/trans/JbFiwO90PjcYzXrEgh-Y7bFG5Fw}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+} 
+
+@techreport{dot,
+  author      = {Sara Dickinson and Dan Gillmor and Tirumaleswar Reddy},
+  title       = {Usage Profiles for {DNS} over {TLS} and {DNS} over {DTLS}},
+  type        = {RFC},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  number      = {8310},
+  year        = {2016},
+}
+
+@techreport{doh,
+  author      = {Paul Hoffman and Patrick McManus},
+  title       = {{DNS} Queries over {HTTPS (DoH)}},
+  type        = {RFC},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  number      = {8484},
+  year        = {2018},
+}
+
+@misc{izenpe,
+  author = {Ryan Sleevi},
+  title = {Upcoming {CT} Log Removal: {Izenpe}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-policy/qOorKuhL1vA}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+@misc{venafi,
+  author = {Ryan Sleevi},
+  title = {Upcoming Log Removal: {Venafi CT} Log Server},
+  note = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-policy/KMAcNT3asTQ}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+@misc{caida,
+  author = {CAIDA},
+  title = {{ARank}},
+  note = {\url{http://as-rank.caida.org/}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+}
+
+@article{full-version,
+  author    = {Rasmus Dahlberg and
+               Tobias Pulls and
+               Jonathan Vestin and
+               Toke H{\o}iland{-}J{\o}rgensen and
+               Andreas Kassler},
+  title     = {Aggregation-Based Gossip for Certificate Transparency},
+  journal   = {CoRR},
+  volume    = {abs/1806.08817},
+  year      = {2019},
+}
+
+@misc{pub-caida,
+  author = {CAIDA},
+  title = {The {CAIDA UCSD IXPs} Dataset},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.caida.org/data/ixps/}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+  month = {February},
+  year = {2018},
+}
+
+@misc{pub-routeviews,
+  title = {The {Routeviews MRT format RIBs and UPDATEs} Dataset},
+  howpublished = {\url{http://archive.routeviews.org/bgpdata/2018.03/RIBS/}, accessed 2019-09-04},
+  month = {March},
+  year = {2018},
+}
+
+@misc{github,
+  title = {Paper artifact},
+  year = {2018},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/rgdd/ctga}},
+}
diff --git a/summary/src/ctga/src/related.tex b/summary/src/ctga/src/related.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..15d7fad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctga/src/related.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+\section{Related Work} \label{ctga:sec:related}
+Earlier approaches towards CT gossip are categorized as \emph{proactive} or
+\emph{retroactive} in Figure~\ref{ctga:fig:related}. We consider an approach proactive
+if gossip takes place \emph{before} SCTs and/or STHs reach the broader audience
+of clients.
+Syta \emph{et~al.} proposed proactive witness cosigning, in which an STH is
+collectively signed by a \emph{large} number of witnesses and at most a fraction
+of those can be faulty to ensure that a benevolent witness observed an
+STH~\cite{cosi}.  STH
+cross-logging~\cite{minimal-gossip,ietf-cross-logging,hof-cross-logging}
+is similar in that an STH must be proactively disclosed in
+another transparency log to be trusted, avoiding any additional cosigning
+infrastructure at the cost of reducing the size and diversity of the witnessing
+group.
+Tomescu and Devadas~\cite{catena} suggested a similar cross-logging scheme,
+but split-view detection is instead reduced to the difficulty of forking the
+Bitcoin blockchain
+  (big-O cost of downloading all block headers as a TLS client).
+The final proactive approach is STH pushing, where a trusted third-party
+pushes the same verified STH history to a base of clients~\cite{google-gossip}.
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+  \centering
+  \input{src/ctga/img/related.tex}
+  \caption{%
+    A categorization of approaches towards CT gossip.
+  }
+  \label{ctga:fig:related}
+\end{figure}
+
+We consider a gossip mechanism retroactive if gossip takes place \emph{after}
+SCTs and/or STHs reach the broader audience of clients.
+Chuat \emph{et~al.} proposed that TLS clients and TLS servers be modified to
+pool exchanged STHs and relevant consistency proofs~\cite{chuat-gossip}.
+Nordberg \emph{et~al.} continued this line of work, suggesting privacy-%
+preserving client-server pollination of fresh STHs~\cite{ietf-gossip}. Nordberg
+\emph{et~al.} also proposed that clients feedback SCTs and certificate chains on
+every server revisit, and that trusted auditor relationships could be engaged if
+privacy need not be protected.
+The latter is somewhat similar to the formalized client-monitor gossip of
+Chase and Meiklejohn~\cite{transparency-overlays}, as well as the CT honey bee
+project where a client process fetches and submits STHs to a pre-%
+compiled list of auditors~\cite{ct-honey-bee}.
+Laurie suggested that a client can resolve privacy-sensitive SCTs to privacy-%
+insensitive STHs via DNS (which are easier to gossip)~\cite{ct-over-dns}.
+Private information retrievals could likely achieve something similar~\cite{ct-pir}.
+Assuming that TLS clients are indistinguishable from one another, split-view
+detection could also be implicit as proposed by Gunn \emph{et~al.} for the
+verifiable key-value store CONIKS~\cite{mpaudit,coniks}.
+
+Given that aggregation-based gossip takes place after an STH is issued, it is a
+retroactive approach. As such, we cannot protect an isolated client from split-%
+views~\cite{cosi}. Similar to STH pooling and STH pollination, we rely on
+client-driven communication and an existing infrastructure of packet processors
+to aggregate.
+Our off-path verification is
+based on the same multi-path probing and indistinguishability assumptions as
+Gunn \emph{et~al.}~\cite{doublecheck,mpaudit,perspectives}. Further, given that
+aggregation is application neutral and deployable on hosts, it could provide
+gossip \emph{for} the CT honey bee project (assuming plaintext STHs) and any
+other transparency application like Trillian~\cite{vds}. Another benefit when
+compared to browsing-centric and vendor-specific approaches is that a plethora
+of HTTPS clients are covered, ranging from niche web browsers to command line
+tools and embedded libraries that are vital to protect but yet lack the
+resources of major browser vendors~\cite{androidlibs,androidlibs2}.
+Our approach coexists well with witness cosigning and cross-logging due to
+different threat models, but not necessarily STH pushing if the secure
+channel is encrypted (no need to fetch what a trusted party provides).
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/.gitignore b/summary/src/ctor/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bb88c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+main.pdf
+*.blg
+*.bbl
+*.fls
+*.fdb_latexmk
+*.log
+*.out
+*.aux
+*.swp
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/img/design-full.pdf b/summary/src/ctor/img/design-full.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5602116
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/img/design-full.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/img/design-incremental.pdf b/summary/src/ctor/img/design-incremental.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c7160d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/img/design-incremental.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/main.tex b/summary/src/ctor/main.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac4b505
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/main.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+\begin{kaupaper}[
+    author={%
+      \textbf{Rasmus Dahlberg},
+      Tobias Pulls,
+      Tom Ritter, and
+      Paul Syverson
+    },
+    title={%
+      Privacy-Preserving \& Incrementally-Deployable Support for Certificate Transparency in Tor
+    },
+    reference={%
+      PETS (2021)
+    },
+    summary={%
+      One deployment challenge of Certificate Transparency is to ensure that
+      monitors and end-users are engaged in gossip-audit protocols.  This is
+      particularly difficult for end-users because such engagement can harm
+      privacy.  For example, verifying that a certificate is included by
+      fetching an inclusion proof from a log reveals which website was visited.
+      We propose a gradual roll-out of Certificate Transparency in Tor Browser
+      that preserves privacy \emph{due to} and \emph{how we use} the anonymity
+      network Tor.  The complete design holds log operators accountable for
+      certificates they promise to append by having Tor relays fetch inclusion
+      proofs against the same view agreed upon by directory authorities in Tor's
+      consensus.  Found issues (if any) are reported to trusted auditors.  The
+      incremental design side-steps much of the practical deployment effort by
+      replacing the audit-report pattern with cross-logging of certificates in
+      independent logs, thus assuming that at least one log is honest as opposed
+      to no log in the complete design.  All Tor Browser needs to do is verify
+      log signatures and then submit the encountered certificates to randomly
+      selected Tor relays.  Such submissions are probabilistic to balance
+      performance against the risk of eventual detection of log misbehavior.
+      Processing of the submitted certificates is also randomized to reduce
+      leakage of real-time browsing patterns, something Tor Browser cannot do on
+      its own due to criteria like disk avoidance and the threat model for
+      wanting Certificate Transparency in the first place.  We provide a
+      security sketch and estimate performance overhead based on Internet
+      measurements.
+    },
+    participation={\vspace{-.25cm}
+      I had the initial idea and was the main driver to move the work forward,
+      first in discussion with Tobias and then together with Tom and Paul.
+    },
+    label={
+      paper:ctor
+    },
+]
+  \maketitle
+  \begin{abstract}
+    \input{src/ctor/src/abstract}
+  \end{abstract}
+  
+  \input{src/ctor/src/introduction}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/background}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/adversary}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/design}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/analysis}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/cross-logging}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/performance}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/privacy}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/related}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/conclusion}
+
+  \input{src/ctor/src/acknowledgements}
+  
+  \bibliographystyle{plain}
+  \bibliography{src/ctor/src/ref}
+
+  \begin{appendices}
+    \input{src/ctor/src/appendix}
+  \end{appendices}
+\end{kaupaper}
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/src/abstract.tex b/summary/src/ctor/src/abstract.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..718c939
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/src/abstract.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+\noindent
+The security of the web improved greatly throughout the last couple of years.
+A large majority of the web is now served encrypted as part of HTTPS, and
+web browsers accordingly moved from positive to negative security indicators
+that warn the user if a connection is insecure.  A secure connection requires
+that the server presents a valid certificate that binds the domain name in
+question to a public key.  A certificate used to be valid if signed by a trusted
+Certificate Authority (CA), but web browsers like Google Chrome and
+Apple's Safari have additionally started to mandate Certificate Transparency (CT)
+logging to overcome the weakest-link security of the CA ecosystem.  Tor and the
+Firefox-based Tor Browser have yet to enforce CT.
+
+We present privacy-preserving and incrementally-deployable
+designs that add support for CT in Tor. Our designs go beyond the currently
+deployed CT enforcements that are based on blind trust:
+	if a user that uses Tor Browser is man-in-the-middled over HTTPS,
+	we probabilistically detect and disclose cryptographic evidence of CA and/or
+	CT log misbehavior.
+The first design increment allows Tor to play a vital role in the overall goal
+of CT:
+	detect mis-issued certificates and hold CAs accountable.
+We achieve this by randomly cross-logging a subset of certificates into other CT
+logs.  The final increments hold misbehaving CT logs accountable, initially
+assuming that some logs are benign and then without any such assumption.
+Given that the current CT deployment lacks strong mechanisms to verify if log
+operators play by the rules, exposing misbehavior is important for the web in
+general and not just Tor.  The full design turns Tor into a system for
+maintaining a probabilistically-verified view of the CT log ecosystem available
+from Tor's consensus.  Each increment leading up to it preserves privacy due to
+and how we use Tor.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/src/acknowledgements.tex b/summary/src/ctor/src/acknowledgements.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3bd9f48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/src/acknowledgements.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+\section*{Acknowledgements}
+We would like to thank our anonymous reviewers as well as Linus Nordberg and
+Eric Rescorla for their valuable feedback.
+Rasmus Dahlberg was supported by the Knowledge Foundation of Sweden and the
+Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research,
+Tobias Pulls by the Swedish Internet Foundation, and
+Paul Syverson by the U.S.\ Office of Naval Research (ONR).
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/src/adversary.tex b/summary/src/ctor/src/adversary.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a17fd31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/src/adversary.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+\section{Threat Model} \label{ctor:sec:adversary}
+We consider a strong attacker who is targeting all or a subset of users visiting
+a particular website over Tor. It is generally difficult to perform a targeted
+attack on a single particular Tor user because one needs to identify the user's
+connection before performing the attack---something that Tor's
+anonymity properties frustrate.
+However, it is not difficult to perform an attack on all or a subset of unknown
+users of a particular service. A network vantage point to perform such an attack
+is easily obtained by operating an exit relay (for a subset of Tor users) or by
+compromising the network path of multiple exit relays or the final destination.
+Once so positioned, the encrypted network traffic can be intercepted using a
+fraudulent certificate and associated SCTs.  The subsequent attack on decrypted
+network traffic
+may be passive (to gather user credentials or other information) or active.
+Typical examples of active attacks are to change cryptocurrency addresses to
+redirect funds to the attacker or to serve an exploit to the user's browser for
+\emph{user deanonymization}. Without the ability to intercept encrypted traffic,
+these attacks become more difficult as the web moves towards deprecating
+plaintext HTTP.
+
+All of the components of such an attack have been seen in-the-wild
+numerous times. Untargeted attacks on visitors of a particular website
+include Syria's interception of Facebook traffic using a self-signed
+512-bit RSA key in ~2011~\cite{syria-facebook-mitm}, Iran's
+interception of Bing and Google traffic using the DigiNotar
+CA~\cite{ct/a,diginotar}, and the 2018 MyEtherWallet
+self-signed certificate that was used as part of a BGP
+hijack~\cite{ethereum-hijack-isoc}.  The latter is also an example of
+redirecting routing as part of an attack (either suspected or
+confirmed). Other examples of this are Iran hijacking prefixes of
+Telegram (an encrypted messaging application) in
+2018~\cite{iran-telegram-bgp}, another attack on cryptocurrency in
+2014 this time targeting unencrypted mining
+traffic~\cite{bgp-hijacking-for-crypto},
+and hijacks that may have been intelligence-gathering (or honest
+mistakes) including hijacks by Russian ISPs in 2017 and China Telecom
+in 2018 and 2019~\cite{wiki-bgp}.  Finally, there are several examples of 
+law enforcement serving exploits to Tor Browser users to de-anonymize and
+subsequently arrest individuals~\cite{forbes-fbi-tor,doj-fbi-tor}.
+
+With
+the attacker's profile in mind, we consider someone that controls
+	a CA,
+	enough CT logs to pass Tor Browser's SCT-centric CT policy, 
+	some Tor clients, and
+	a fraction of Tor relays.
+For example, it is possible to
+	issue certificates and SCTs,
+	dishonor promises of public logging,
+	present split-views at will,
+	intercept and delay traffic from controlled exit relays as well as CT logs,
+		and
+	be partially present in the network.
+This includes a weaker attacker that does not \emph{control} CAs and CT logs,
+but who \emph{gained access} to the relevant signing keys~\cite{turktrust,%
+gdca1-omission}.  A modest fraction of CTor entities can be subject to DoS, but
+not everyone at once and all the time.  In other words, we consider the threat
+model of Tor and Tor Browser as a starting point~\cite{tor,tor-browser}.  Any
+attacker that can reliably disrupt CT and/or Tor well beyond Tor's threat
+model is therefore not within ours.
+
+Given that we are in the business of enforcing CT, the attacker needs to hide
+mis-issued certificates and SCTs from entities that audit the CT log ecosystem.
+As described in Section~\ref{ctor:sec:background:ct}, this can either be achieved by
+omission or split-view attacks.  Our intended attacker is clearly powerful and
+may successfully issue a certificate chain and associated SCTs without detection
+some of the time, but a CA caught in mis-issuance or a CT log that violated an
+MMD promise will no longer be regarded as trusted.  Therefore, we assume a
+\emph{risk-averse} attacker that above a relatively low probability of detection
+would be deterred from engaging in such activities. Note that the goal of
+\emph{detection} is inherited from CT's threat model, which aims to remedy
+certificate mis-issuance \emph{after the fact}; not prevent it~\cite{ct/a}.
+
+We identify and analyze specific attack vectors that follow from our threat
+model and design as part of the security analysis in Section~\ref{ctor:sec:analysis},
+namely, attack vectors related to timing as well as relay flooding and tagging.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/src/analysis.tex b/summary/src/ctor/src/analysis.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4bbc4c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/src/analysis.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+\section{Security Analysis} \label{ctor:sec:analysis}
+We consider four types of impact for an attacker that conducted
+HTTPS-based man-in-the-middle attacks on Tor Browser.  Other than \emph{none},
+these impact types are:
+\begin{description}
+	\item[Minor] the attack was detected due to some cover-up that involved
+		network-wide actions against CTor.  This is likely hard to attribute to
+		the actual attacker, but nevertheless it draws much unwanted attention.
+	\item[Significant] the attack generated public cryptographic evidence
+		that proves CA misbehavior.
+	\item[Catastrophic] the attack generated public cryptographic evidence
+		that proves CT log misbehavior.
+\end{description}
+
+Our design leads to significant and catastrophic impact events, but does
+unfortunately not preclude minor ones.  It is possible to overcome this
+shortcoming at different trade-offs, e.g., by tuning CTor parameters reactively
+(phase~2 below) or relying on different trust assumptions as in the
+incremental cross-logging designs (Section~\ref{ctor:sec:incremental}).
+
+\textbf{Probability of Detection.}
+Suppose the attacker mis-issued a certificate that Tor Browser trusts, and that
+it is considered valid because it is accompanied by enough SCTs from CT logs
+that the attacker controls.  The resulting SFO is then used to man-in-the-middle
+a single Tor Browser user, i.e., for the purpose of our analysis we consider
+\emph{the most risk-averse scenario possible}.  Clearly, none of the attacker's
+CT logs plan to keep any promise of public logging:
+	that would trivially imply significant impact events.
+The risk of exposure is instead bound by the probability that \emph{any} of the
+four phases in our design fail to propagate the mis-issued SFO to a pinned CT
+auditor that is benign.
+
+\textbf{Phase~1: Submission.}
+The probability of detection cannot exceed the probability of submission
+(\texttt{ct-submit-pr}). We analyze the outcome of submitting the mis-issued
+SFO from Tor Browser to a CTR\@.  There are two cases to consider, namely, the
+mis-issued SFO is either larger than \texttt{ct-large-sfo-size} or it is not.
+
+If the SFO is larger than \texttt{ct-large-sfo-size}, Tor Browser blocks until
+the SFO is submitted and its CT circuit is closed.  As such, it is impossible to
+serve a Tor Browser exploit reactively over the man-in-the-middled connection
+that shuts-down the submission procedure before it occurs.  Assuming that
+forensic traces in tor and Tor Browser are unreliable,\footnote{%
+	``tor'' (aka ``little-t tor'') is the tor process Tor Browser uses to
+	interact with the Tor network.  On marking a circuit as closed in tor, tor
+	immediately schedules the associated data structures to be freed as soon as
+	possible.
+} the sampled CTR identity also cannot be revealed with high certainty
+afterwards by compromising Tor Browser.  The attacker may know that the SFO is
+buffered by \emph{some CTR} based on timing, i.e., blocking-behavior could be 
+measurable and distinct.  The important part is not to reveal \emph{which CTR}
+received a submission:  a single Tor relay may be subject to DoS.
+
+If the SFO is smaller or equal to \texttt{ct-large-sfo-size} there is a
+race between (i) the time it takes for Tor Browser to submit the SFO and close
+its CT circuit against (ii) the time it takes for the attacker to compromise Tor
+Browser and identify the CTR in question.  It is more advantageous to try and
+win this race rather than being in the unfruitful scenario above.  Therefore,
+the attacker would maximize the time it takes to perform (i) by sending an SFO
+that is \texttt{ct-large-sfo-size}.  Our design reduced the threat of an
+attacker that wins this race by using pre-built CT circuits that are closed
+immediately after use.  This makes the attack surface \emph{narrow}, limiting
+the number of reliable exploits (if any).
+
+Note that the attack surface could, in theory, be eliminated by setting
+\texttt{ct-large-sfo-size} to zero.  However, that is likely  too costly in
+terms of latency~\cite{no-hard-fail}.
+
+\textbf{Phase~2: Buffering.}
+The probability of detection cannot exceed $1-(f_{\mathsf{ctr}} +
+f_{\mathsf{dos}})$, where $f_{\mathsf{ctr}}$ is the fraction of
+malicious CTRs and $f_{\mathsf{dos}}$ the fraction of CTRs that suffer from
+DoS.  We analyze the outcome of SFO reception at a genuine CTR\@.
+
+The time that an SFO is buffered depends on if the log's MMD elapsed or not.
+The earliest point in time that a newly issued SCT can be audited (and the log
+is expected to respond) is an MMD later, whereas the normal buffer time is
+otherwise only governed by smaller randomness in the \texttt{audit\_after}
+timestamp (minutes).  A rational attacker would therefore maximize the buffer
+time by using a newly issued SCT, resulting in an attack window that is \emph{at
+least} 24~hours for today's CT logs~\cite{google-log-policy}.
+
+Following from Tor's threat model, the mis-issued SFO must be stored in volatile
+memory and not to disk.  Two risks emerge due to large buffer times:
+	the CTR in question might be restarted by the operator independently of the
+		attacker's mis-issued SFO being buffered,
+	and given enough time the attacker might find a way to cause the evidence to
+		be deleted.
+While a risk-averse attacker cannot rely on the former to avoid detection, we
+emphasize that the CTR criteria must include the \texttt{stable} flag to reduce
+the probability of this occurring.
+
+The latter is more difficult to evaluate.  It depends on the attacker's
+knowledge as well as capabilities.  Phase~1 ensured that the attacker \emph{does
+not know which CTR to target}.  As such, any attempt to intervene needs to
+target all CTRs.  While a network-wide DoS against Tor would be effective, it is
+not within our threat model.  A less intrusive type of DoS would be to
+\emph{flood} CTRs by submitting massive amounts of SFOs: just enough to make
+memory a scarce resource, but without making Tor unavailable. This could
+potentially \emph{flush} a target SFO from the CTR's finite memory, following
+from the delete-at-random strategy in Section~\ref{ctor:sec:base:phase2}. Assuming
+that a CTR has at most 1~GiB of memory available for SFOs (conservative and in
+favour of the attacker), Appendix~\ref{ctor:app:flush} shows that the attacker's
+flood must involve at least $2.3$~GiB per CTR to accomplish a 90\% success
+certainty.  This means that it takes $7.9$--$39.3$~minutes if the relay
+bandwidth is between 8--40~Mbps.  So it is impractical to flush all CTRs within
+a few minutes, and hours are needed not to make everyone unavailable at once.
+
+The CTR criteria set in Section~\ref{ctor:sec:base:consensus} matches over
+4000 Tor relays~\cite{relay-by-flag}.  A network-wide flush that succeeds with
+90\% certainty therefore involves 8.99~TiB.  It might sound daunting at first,
+but distributed throughout an entire day it only requires 0.91~Gbps. Such an
+attack is within our threat model because it does not make Tor unavailable.
+Notably the ballpark of these numbers do not change to any significant degree by
+assuming larger success probabilities, e.g., a 99\% probability only doubles the
+overhead. Further, the needed bandwidth scales linearly with the assumed memory
+of CTRs.  This makes it difficult to rely on the finite volatile memory of CTRs
+to mitigate network-wide flushes.  As described in
+Section~\ref{ctor:sec:base:phase2}, we ensure that flushes are \emph{detected} by
+publishing the number of received and deleted SFO bytes throughout different
+time intervals as extra-info.
+
+Once detected, there are several possible \emph{reactions} that decrease the
+likelihood of a minor impact scenario.  For example, Tor's directory
+authorities could lower MMDs to, say, 30~minutes, so that the SFO is reported to
+an auditor before it is flushed with high probability.  This has the benefit of
+implying significant impact because the mis-issued certificate is detected, but
+also the drawback of allowing the logs to merge the certificate before there is
+any MMD violation to speak of.  The most appropriate response depends on the
+exact attack scenario and which trade-offs one is willing to accept.
+
+\textbf{Phase~3: Auditing.}
+By the time an SFO enters the audit phase, the log in question is expected to
+respond with a valid inclusion proof.  There is no such proof if the log
+violated its MMD, and it is too late to create a split-view that merged the
+certificate in time because the CTR's view is already fixed by an STH in the
+Tor consensus that captured the log's misbehavior.  In fact, creating any
+split-view within Tor is impractical because it requires that the consensus is
+forged or that nobody ever checks whether the trusted STHs are consistent.
+This leaves two options:
+	the attacker either responds to the query with an invalid inclusion proof or
+	not at all.
+The former is immediately detected and starts phase~4, whereas the latter forces
+the CTR to wait for \texttt{ct-watchdog-timeout} to trigger (which is a
+few seconds to avoid premature auditor reports).  A rational attacker prefers
+the second option to gain time.
+
+Clearly, the attacker knows that \emph{some} CTR holds evidence of log
+misbehavior as it is being audited.  The relevant question is whether the
+\emph{exact CTR identity} can be inferred, in which case the attacker could
+knock it offline (DoS).  Motivated by the threat of \emph{tagging}, where the
+attacker sends unique SFOs to all CTRs so that their identities are revealed
+once queried for, we erred on the safe side and built watchdogs into our design:
+it is already too late to DoS the querying CTR because the evidence is already
+replicated somewhere else, ready to be reported unless there is a timely
+acknowledgement. The attacker would have to \emph{break into an arbitrary CTR
+within seconds} to cancel the watchdog, which cannot be identified later on
+(same premise as the sampled CTR in phase~1).  Such an attacker is not in Tor's
+threat model.
+
+\textbf{Phase~4: Reporting.}
+At this stage the process of reporting the mis-issued SFO to a random CT auditor
+is initiated.  Clearly, the probability of detection cannot exceed
+$1-f_{\mathsf{auditor}}$, where $f_{\mathsf{auditor}}$ is the fraction of
+malicious CT auditors.  Fixating the sampled CT auditor is important to avoid
+the threat of an eventually successful report only if it is destined to the
+attacker's auditor because our attacker is partially present in the network.
+Gaining time at this stage is of limited help because the CTR identity is
+unknown as noted above, and it remains the
+case throughout phase~4 due to reporting on independent Tor circuits (and
+independently of if other SFO reports succeeded or not).  Without an
+identifiable watchdog, the attacker needs a network-wide attack that is already
+more likely to succeed in the buffer phase.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/src/appendix.tex b/summary/src/ctor/src/appendix.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..23e285f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/src/appendix.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+\section{Detailed Consensus Parameters} \label{ctor:app:consensus-params} 
+
+Below, the value of an item is computed as the median of all votes.
+\begin{description}
+    \item[ct-submit-pr:] A floating-point in $[0,1]$ that determines Tor
+        Browser's submission probability.  For example, $0$ disables submissions
+        while $0.10$ means that every 10$^{\mathsf{th}}$ SFO is sent to a random
+        CTR on average.
+    \item[ct-large-sfo-size:] A natural number that determines how many
+        wire-bytes a normal SFO should not exceed.  As outlined in
+        Section~\ref{ctor:sec:base:phase1}, excessively large SFOs are subject to
+        stricter verification criteria.
+    \item[ct-log-timeout:] A natural number that determines how long a CTR waits
+        before concluding that a CT log is unresponsive, e.g., 5~seconds. As
+        outlined in Section~\ref{ctor:sec:base:phase3}, a timeout causes the watchdog
+        to send an SFO to the auditor.
+    \item[ct-delay-dist:] A distribution that determines how long a CTR should
+        wait at minimum before auditing a submitted SFO.  As outlined in
+        Section~\ref{ctor:sec:base:phase2}, random noise is added, e.g., on the order
+        of minutes to an hour.
+    \item[ct-backoff-dist:]
+        A distribution that determines how long a CTR should wait between two
+        auditing instances, e.g., a few minutes on average.  As outlined in
+        Section~\ref{ctor:sec:base:phase3}, CTRs audit pending SFOs in batches at
+        random time intervals to spread out log overhead.
+    \item[ct-watchdog-timeout:] A natural number that determines how long time
+    at most a watchdog waits before considering an SFO for reporting. Prevents
+    the watchdog from having to wait for a circuit timeout caused by an
+    unresponsive CTR. Should be set with \texttt{ct-backoff-dist} in mind.
+    \item[ct-auditor-timeout] A natural number that determines how long time at
+    most a watchdog waits for an auditor to acknowledge the submission of an SFO.
+\end{description}
+
+\section{Log Operators \& Trust Anchors} \label{ctor:app:ct-trust-anchors}
+The standardized CT protocol suggests that a log's trust anchors should
+``usefully be the union of root certificates trusted by major browser
+vendors''~\cite{ct,ct/bis}.  Apple further claims that a log in their CT program
+``must trust all root CA certificates included in Apple's trust
+store''~\cite{apple-log-policy}.  This bodes well for the incremental CTor
+designs:
+	we assumed that the existence of independent log operators implies the
+	ability to at least add certificate chains and possibly complete SFOs
+	into logs that the attacker does not control.
+Google's CT policy currently qualifies 36 logs that are hosted by
+	Cloudflare,
+	DigiCert,
+	Google,
+	Let's Encrypt,
+	Sectigo, and
+	TrustAsia~\cite{google-log-policy}.
+No log accepts all roots, but the overlap between root certificates that are
+trusted by major browser vendors and CT logs increased over
+time~\cite{ct-root-landscape}.  This trend would likely continue if there are
+user agents that benefit from it, e.g., Tor Browser.  Despite relatively few
+log operators and an incomplete root coverage, the basic and extended
+cross-logging in CTor still provide significant value as is:
+\begin{itemize}
+	\item Even if there are no independent logs available for a certificate
+		issued by some CA, adding it again \emph{to the same logs} would come
+		with practical security gains.  For example, if the attacker gained
+		access to the secret signing keys but not the logs' infrastructures
+		the mis-issued certificate trivially makes it into the public.  If the
+		full SFO is added, the log operators could also notice that they were
+		compromised.
+	\item Most log operators only exclude a small fraction of widely accepted
+		root certificates: 1--5\%~\cite{ct-root-landscape}.  This narrows down
+		the possible CAs that the attacker must control by 1--2 orders of
+		magnitude.  In other words, to be entirely sure that CTor would (re)add
+		a mis-issued SFO to the attacker-controlled CT logs, this smaller group
+		of CAs must issue the underlying certificate.  It is likely harder to
+		take control of Let's Encrypt which some logs and operators exclude due
+		to the sheer volume of issued certificates than, say, a smaller CA that
+		law enforcement may coerce.
+\end{itemize}
+
+Browser-qualified or not, the availability of independent logs that accept the
+commonly accepted root certificates provides significant ecosystem value.
+Log misbehavior is mostly reported through the CT policy mailing list.  Thus, it
+requires manual intervention.  Wide support of certificate chain and SCT
+cross-logging allows anyone to \emph{casually} disclose suspected log
+misbehavior on-the-fly.
+
+\section{Flushing a Single CTR} \label{ctor:app:flush}
+Let $n$ be the number of SFOs that a CTR can store in its buffer.  The
+probability to sample a target SFO is thus $\frac{1}{n}$, and the probability to
+not sample a target SFO is $q = 1 - \frac{1}{n}$.  The probability to not sample
+a target SFO after $k$ submissions is $q^k$.  Thus, the probability to sample
+the relevant buffer index at least once is $p = 1 - q^k$.  Solving for $k$ we
+get: $k = \frac{\log(1 - p)}{\log(q)}$.  Substituting $q$ for $1 - \frac{1}{n}$
+yields Equation~\ref{ctor:eq:flush}, which can be used to compute the number of
+SFO submissions that the attacker needs to flush a buffer of $n>2$
+entries with some probability~$p\in[0,1)$.
+
+\begin{equation} \label{ctor:eq:flush}
+	k = \frac{\log(1-p)}{\log(1 - \frac{1}{n})}
+\end{equation}
+
+It is recommended that a non-exit relay should have at least 512MB of memory.
+If the available bandwidth exceeds 40Mbps, it should have at least
+1GB~\cite{relay-config}.  Given that these recommendations are lower bounds,
+suppose the average memory available to store SFOs is 1GiB.
+Section~\ref{ctor:sec:performance} further showed that the average SFO size is
+roughly 6KiB.  This means that the buffer capacity is $n \gets 174763$ SFOs.
+Plugging it into Equation~\ref{ctor:eq:flush} for $p \gets \frac{9}{10}$, the
+attacker's flood must involve $k \gets 402406$ submissions.  In other words,
+2.3GiB must be transmitted to flush a single CTR with 90\% success probability.
+
+As a corner case and implementation detail it is important that Tor Browser and
+CTRs \emph{reject} SFOs that are bogus in terms of size: it is a trivial DoS
+vector to load data indefinitely.  If such a threshold is added the required
+flushing bandwidth is still 2.3GiB (e.g., use 1MiB SFOs in the above
+computations).  What can be said about bandwidth and potential adversarial
+advantages is that a submitted SFO yields amplification:
+	twofold for cross-logging, and
+	slightly more for proof-fetching as the SFO is pushed up-front to a
+		watchdog.
+Note that such amplification is smaller than a typical website visit.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/src/background.tex b/summary/src/ctor/src/background.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85d972f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/src/background.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+\section{Background} \label{ctor:sec:background}
+The theory and current practise of CT is introduced first, then Tor
+and its privacy-preserving Tor Browser.
+
+\subsection{Certificate Transparency} \label{ctor:sec:background:ct}
+The idea to transparently log TLS certificates emerged at Google in response to
+a lack of proposals that could be deployed without drastic ecosystem changes
+and/or significant downsides~\cite{ct/a}.  By making the set of issued
+certificate chains\footnote{%
+	A domain owner's certificate is signed by an intermediate CA, whose
+	certificate is in turned signed by a root CA that acts as a trust
+	anchor~\cite{ca-ecosystem}.  Such a \emph{certificate chain} is valid if it
+	ends in a trusted anchor that is shipped in the user's system software.
+} transparent, anyone that inspect the logs can detect certificate
+mis-issuance \emph{after the fact}.  It would be somewhat circular to solve
+issues in the CA ecosystem by adding trusted CT logs.  Therefore, the
+cryptographic foundation of CT is engineered to avoid any such reliance.
+Google's \emph{gradual} CT roll-out started in 2015, and evolved from 
+downgrading user-interface indicators in Chrome to the current state of hard
+failures unless a certificate is accompanied by a signed \emph{promise} that it
+will appear in two CT logs~\cite{does-ct-break-the-web}.  Unlike Apple's
+Safari~\cite{apple-log-policy}, these two logs must additionally be operated by
+Google and not-Google to ensure independence~\cite{google-log-policy}.
+
+The lack of mainstream verification, i.e., beyond checking signatures, allows an
+attacker to side-step the current CT enforcement with minimal risk of exposure
+\emph{if the required logs are controlled by the attacker}.  
+CTor integrates into the gradual CT roll-out by starting on the
+premise of pairwise-independently trusted CT logs, which
+avoids the risk of bad user experience~\cite{does-ct-break-the-web}
+and significant system complexity.  For example, web pages are unlikely to
+break, TLS handshake latency stays about the same, and no robust management of
+suspected log misbehavior is needed.  Retaining the latter property as part of
+our incremental designs simplifies deployment.
+
+\subsubsection{Cryptographic Foundation}
+The operator of a CT log maintains a tamper-evident append-only Merkle
+tree~\cite{ct,ct/bis}.  At any time, a Signed Tree Head (STH) can be produced
+which fixes the log's structure and content.  Important attributes of an STH
+include
+	the tree head (a cryptographic hash),
+	the tree size (a number of entries), and
+	the current time.
+Given two tree sizes, a log can produce a \emph{consistency proof} that proves
+the newer tree head entails everything that the older tree head does.  As such,
+anyone can verify that the log is append-only without downloading all entries
+and recomputing the tree head.  Membership of an entry can also be proven
+by producing an \emph{inclusion proof} for an STH.  These proof techniques are
+formally verified~\cite{secure-logging-and-ct}.
+
+Upon a valid request, a log must add an entry and produce a new STH that covers
+it within a time known as the Maximum Merge Delay (MMD), e.g., 24~hours.  This
+policy aspect can be verified because in response, a Signed Certificate
+Timestamp (SCT) is returned.  An SCT is a signed promise that an entry will
+appear in the log within an MMD.  A log that violates its MMD is said to perform
+an \emph{omission attack}.  It can be detected by challenging the log to prove
+inclusion.  A log that forks, presenting one append-only version
+to some entities and another to others, is said to perform a \emph{split-view
+attack}.  Split-views can be detected by STH
+gossip~\cite{chuat,dahlberg,nordberg,syta}.
+
+\subsubsection{Standardization and Verification}
+The standardized CT protocol defines public HTTP(S) endpoints that allow anyone
+to check the log's accepted trust anchors and added certificates, as well as
+to obtain the most recent STH and to fetch proofs~\cite{ct,ct/bis}.  For
+example, the \texttt{add-chain} endpoint returns an SCT if the added certificate
+chain ends in a trust anchor returned by the \texttt{get-roots} endpoint.  We
+use \texttt{add-chain} in Section~\ref{ctor:sec:incremental}, as well as several
+other endpoints in Section~\ref{ctor:sec:base} to fetch proofs and STHs.  It might be
+helpful to know that an inclusion proof is fetched based on two parameters: a
+certificate hash and the tree size of an STH.  The former specifies the log entry
+of interest, and the latter with regards to which view inclusion should be
+proven.  The returned proof is valid if it can be used in combination with the
+certificate to reconstruct the STH's tree head.
+
+The CT landscape provides a limited value unless it is verified that the logs
+play by the rules.  What the rules are changed over time, but they are largely
+influenced by the major browser vendors that define \emph{CT policies}.  For
+example, what is required to become a recognized CT log in terms of uptime and
+trust anchors, and which criteria should pass to consider a certificate CT
+compliant~\cite{apple-log-policy,google-log-policy}.  While there are several ways that
+a log can misbehave with regards to these policy aspects, the most fundamental
+forms of cheating are omission and split-view attacks.  A party that follows-up
+on inclusion and consistency proofs is said to \emph{audit} the logs.
+
+Widespread client-side auditing is a premise for CT logs to be untrusted, but
+none of the web browsers that enforce CT engage in such activities yet.  For
+example, requesting an inclusion proof is privacy-invasive because it leaks
+browsing patterns to the logs, and reporting suspected log misbehavior comes
+with privacy~\cite{ct-with-privacy} as well as operational challenges.
+Found log incidents are mostly reported manually to the CT policy
+list~\cite{ct-policy-mailing-list}.  This is in contrast to automated
+\emph{CT monitors}, which notify domain owners
+of newly issued certificates based on what actually appeared in the public
+logs~\cite{lwm,ct-monitors}.
+
+\subsection{Tor} \label{ctor:sec:background:tor}
+
+Most of the activity of Tor's millions of daily users starts with Tor Browser
+and connects to some ordinary website via a circuit comprised of three
+randomly-selected Tor relays. In this way no identifying information from
+Internet protocols (such as IP address) are automatically provided to the
+destination, and no single entity can observe both the source and destination of
+a connection. Tor Browser is also configured and performs some filtering to resist
+browser fingerprinting, and first party isolation to resist sharing state or
+linking of identifiers across origins. More generally it avoids storing
+identifying configuration and behavioral information to disk.
+
+Tor relays in a circuit are selected at random, but not uniformly. A typical
+circuit is comprised of a \emph{guard}, a \emph{middle}, and an \emph{exit}. A
+guard is selected by a client and used for several months as the entrance to all
+Tor circuits. If the guard is not controlled by an adversary, that adversary
+will not find itself selected to be on a Tor circuit adjacent to (thus
+identifying) the client. And because some relay operators do not wish to act as
+the apparent Internet source for connections to arbitrary destinations, relay
+operators can configure the ports (if any) on which they will permit connections
+besides to other Tor relays. Finally, to facilitate load balancing, relays are
+assigned a weight based on their apparent capacity to carry traffic. In keeping
+with avoiding storing of linkable state, even circuits that share an origin will
+only permit new connections over that circuit for ten minutes. After that, if
+all connections are closed, all state associated with the circuit is cleared.
+
+Tor clients use this information when choosing relays with which to build a
+circuit. They receive the information via an hourly updated \emph{consensus}.
+The consensus assigns weights as well as flags such as \texttt{guard} or
+\texttt{exit}. It also assigns auxiliary flags such as
+\texttt{stable}, which, e.g.,
+is necessary to obtain the \texttt{guard} flag since guards must have good
+availability. Self-reported information by relays in their \emph{extra-info
+document}, such as statistics on their read and written bytes, are also part of
+the consensus and uploaded to \emph{directory authorities}. Directory
+authorities determine the consensus by voting on various components making up
+the shared view of the state of the Tor network. Making sure that all clients
+have a consistent view of the network prevents epistemic attacks wherein clients
+can be separated based on the routes that are consistent with their
+understanding~\cite{danezis:pets2008}. This is only a very rough sketch of Tor's
+design and operation.  More details can be found by following links at Tor's
+documentation site~\cite{tor-documentation}.
+
+Tor does not aim to prevent end-to-end correlation attacks. An adversary
+controlling the guard and exit, or controlling the destination and observing the
+client ISP, etc., is assumed able to confirm who is connected to whom on that
+particular circuit. The Tor threat model assumes an adversary able to control
+and/or observe a small to moderate fraction of Tor relays measured by both
+number of relays and by consensus weight, and it assumes a large
+number of Tor clients
+able to, for example, flood individual relays to detect traffic signatures of
+honest traffic on a given circuit~\cite{long-paths}. Also, the adversary can
+knock any small number of relays offline via either attacks from clients or
+direct Internet DDoS. 
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/src/conclusion.tex b/summary/src/ctor/src/conclusion.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c7f5508
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/src/conclusion.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+\section{Conclusion} \label{ctor:sec:conclusion} 
+We proposed CTor, a privacy-preserving and incrementally-deployable design that
+brings CT to Tor.  Tor Browser should start by taking the same proactive
+security measures as Google Chrome and Apple's Safari:
+	require that a certificate is only valid if accompanied by at least two
+	SCTs.
+Such CT enforcement narrows down the attack surface from the weakest-link
+security of the CA ecosystem to a relatively small number of trusted log
+operators \emph{without negatively impacting the user experience to an
+unacceptable degree}.  The problem is that a powerful attacker may gain control
+of the required logs, trivially circumventing enforcement without significant
+risk of exposure.  If deployed incrementally, CTor relaxes the currently
+deployed trust assumption by distributing it across all CT logs.  If the full
+design is put into operation, such trust is completely eliminated.
+
+CTor repurposes Tor relays to ensure that today's trust in CT logs is not
+misplaced:
+	Tor Browser probabilistically submits the encountered certificates and SCTs
+	to Tor relays, which
+		cross-log them into independent CT logs (incremental design)
+		or request inclusion proofs with regards to a single fixed view
+			(full design).
+It turns out that delegating verification to a party that can defer it
+is paramount in our setting, both for privacy and security.  Tor and the wider
+web would greatly benefit from each design increment.  The full design turns Tor
+into a
+system for maintaining a probabilistically-verified view of the entire CT log
+ecosystem, provided in Tor's consensus for anyone to use as a basis of trust.
+The idea to cross-log certificates and SCTs further showcase how certificate
+mis-issuance and suspected log misbehavior could be disclosed casually without
+any manual intervention by using the log ecosystem against the attacker.
+
+The attacker's best bet to break CTor involves any of the following:
+	operating significant parts of the CTor infrastructure,
+	spending a reliable Tor Browser zero-day that escalates privileges within a
+		tiny time window, or
+	targeting all Tor relays in an attempt to delete any evidence of certificate
+		mis-issuance and log misbehavior.
+The latter---a so-called network-wide flush---brings us to the border of our
+threat model, but it cannot be ignored due to the powerful attacker that we
+consider.  Therefore, CTor is designed so that Tor can \emph{adapt} in response
+to interference.  For example, in Tor Browser the \texttt{ct-large-sfo-size}
+could be set reactively such that all SFOs must be sent to a CTR before
+accepting any HTTPS application-layer data to counter zero-days, and the submit
+probability \texttt{ct-submit-pr} could be increased if ongoing attacks are
+suspected.  When it comes to the storage phase, the consensus can minimize or
+maximize the storage time by tuning a log's MMD in the \texttt{ct-log-info}
+item.  The distribution that adds random buffering delays could also be updated,
+as well as log operator relationships during the auditing phase.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/src/cross-logging.tex b/summary/src/ctor/src/cross-logging.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec6807d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/src/cross-logging.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+\section{Incremental Deployment} \label{ctor:sec:incremental} 
+Section~\ref{ctor:sec:base} covered the full design that places zero-trust in the CT
+landscape by challenging the logs to prove certificate inclusion with regards to
+trusted STHs in the Tor consensus.  If no such proof can be provided, the
+suspected evidence of log misbehavior is reported to a trusted CT auditor that
+follows-up on the incident, which involves human intervention if an issue
+persists.  The proposed design modifies the Tor consensus, Tor relays, and Tor
+Browser.  It also requires development and operation of a trusted auditor
+infrastructure.  The current lack of the latter makes it unlikely that we will
+see adoption of CTor in its full potential anytime soon, and begs the question
+of increments that help us get there in the future. Therefore, we additionally
+propose two incremental designs in this section.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+    \centering
+	\includegraphics[width=\columnwidth]{src/ctor/img/design-incremental}
+	\caption{%
+		Incremental design that can be deployed without any
+		trusted CT auditors.  Tor Browser still submits SFOs to CTRs on
+		independent Tor circuits for the sake of privacy and security.  After
+		CTR buffering, the submitted certificates are \emph{cross-logged} by
+		adding them to independent CT logs (selected at random) that the
+		attacker does not control (inferred from accompanied SCTs).
+	}
+	\label{ctor:fig:cross-log}
+\end{figure}
+
+Without the ability to rely on CT auditors, trust needs to be shifted elsewhere
+because we cannot expect relay operators to take on the role.  At the same time,
+an incremental proposal needs to improve upon the status quo of
+pairwise-independently trusted CT logs. These observations lead us towards the
+trust assumption that \emph{at least some} of the CT logs are trustworthy. Such
+an assumption is suboptimal, but it does provide a real-world security
+improvement by significantly raising the bar from weakest-link(s) to quite the
+opposite.
+
+The smallest change of the full design would be for watchdogs to report
+suspected certificate mis-issuance to all CT logs, simply by using the public
+\texttt{add-chain} API to make the SFO's certificate chain transparent.  This
+has the benefit of holding the CA accountable if \emph{some} log operator is
+benign.  Given that our attacker is risk-averse, reporting to a single
+independent log\footnote{The independent log need not be trusted by the browser,
+i.e., it could be specified separately in the Tor consensus.  An operator that
+runs such a log would help distribute trust and facilitate auditing.
+Appendix~\ref{ctor:app:ct-trust-anchors} provides details on today's log ecosystem.}
+that issued none of the accompanied SCTs would likely be sufficient.  There is
+also room for further simplification: there is no point in challenging the logs
+to prove inclusion if the fallback behavior of no response only makes the issued
+certificate public, not the associated SCTs. Thus, CTRs could opt to cross-log
+immediately \emph{without ever distinguishing between certificates that are
+benign and possibly fraudulent}.  This results in the incremental design shown
+in Figure~\ref{ctor:fig:cross-log}, which initially removes several system
+complexities such as extra-info metrics, auditor infrastructure, watchdog
+collaborations, and inclusion proof fetching against trusted STHs in Tor's
+consensus.
+
+The drawback of certificate cross-logging is that the misbehaving CT logs cannot
+be exposed.  There is also a discrepancy between cross-logging and encouraging
+the CT landscape to deploy reliable CT auditors.  We therefore suggest a
+minimal change to the basic cross-logging design that addresses both of these
+concerns.  This change is unfortunately to the API of CT logs and not Tor.  The
+proposed change is to allow cross-logging of a certificate's issued SCTs, e.g.,
+in the form of an \texttt{add-sfo} API that would replace \texttt{add-chain}
+in Figure~\ref{ctor:fig:cross-log}.
+This means that CTRs could expose both the mis-issued certificate and the logs
+that violated their promises of public logging.  At the same time, the
+infrastructural part of a CT auditor is built directly into existing
+CT logs:
+	accepting SFOs that need further investigation.
+Such an API would be an ecosystem improvement in itself, providing a
+well-defined place to report suspected log misbehavior on-the-fly
+\emph{casually}, i.e., without first trying to resolve an SFO for an extended
+time period from many different vantage points and then ultimately reporting it
+manually on the CT policy mailing list.
+
+\textbf{Security Sketch.} 
+There are no changes to phase~1 because cross-logging is instantiated at CTRs.
+Phases~3--4 are now merged, such that the encountered certificates are added to
+independent CT logs that the attacker does/may not control.  Watchdogs are no
+longer needed since either the certificates are added to a log that the attacker
+controls, or they are not (which makes them public).  The other main difference takes place in phase~2,
+during which CTRs buffer SFOs.  The buffer time used to be lengthy due to taking
+early signals and MMDs into account, but it is now irrelevant as no inclusion
+proofs are fetched.  The expected buffer time can therefore be shortened down
+to \emph{minutes} that follow only from the randomness in the
+\texttt{audit\_after} timestamp (for the sake of privacy), making network-wide
+flushes impractical while at the same time reducing the time that a mis-issued
+certificate stays unnoticed:
+	a benign log is likely to add an entry before all MMDs elapsed.
+
+The extended cross-logging also aims to expose log misbehavior.  As such, it is
+paramount that no cross-logged SFO becomes public before the issuing CT logs can
+merge the mis-issued certificate reactively to avoid catastrophic impact. This
+could be assured by buffering newly issued SFOs longer as in the full design,
+which brings back the threat and complexity of minor impact scenarios. Another
+option that is appealing for Tor (but less so for CT) is to operate the
+\texttt{add-sfo} API with the expectation of \emph{delayed merges} that account
+for MMDs before making an SFO public, effectively moving lengthy buffering from
+CTRs to CT logs with persistent storage.  Trillian-based CT logs already support
+delayed merges of (pre)certificates, see
+\texttt{sequencer\_guard\_window}~\cite{delayed-merge}.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/src/design.tex b/summary/src/ctor/src/design.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b887fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/src/design.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,377 @@
+\section{Design} \label{ctor:sec:base}
+A complete design---a design that detects misbehavior by both CAs and CT logs
+within our strong threat model---requires a considerable degree of
+complexity. In this section we present such a full design by breaking it up
+into four phases as shown in Figure~\ref{ctor:fig:design}, demonstrating the need for
+the involved complexity in each step.  Section~\ref{ctor:sec:incremental} presents
+two incremental versions of the full design that are less complicated.  The
+first increment comes as the cost of having a weaker threat model and security
+goal.  The second increment does not have a weaker security goal but requires a
+new CT log API.
+
+A design that starts by validating SCT signatures like Apple's Safari is
+promising and assumed~\cite{apple-log-policy,apple-on-independence}, but it does
+not stand up against a malicious CA and two CT logs that work in concert.  If
+the logs cannot be trusted blindly, the presented SCTs need to be audited.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+    \centering
+	\includegraphics[width=\columnwidth]{src/ctor/img/design-full}
+	\caption{%
+		An overview of the four phases of the full CTor design. In phase 1 Tor
+	Browser submits an SFO (SCT Feedback Object) to a Certificate Transparency
+	Relay (CTR), followed by phase 2 where the CTR buffers the SFO. In phase 3
+	the relay attempts to audit the SFO, and in case of failure, it reports the
+	SFO to an auditor with the help of a watchdog CTR in phase 4.}
+	\label{ctor:fig:design}
+\end{figure}
+
+\subsection{Phase~1: Submission} \label{ctor:sec:base:phase1}
+
+The least complicated auditing design would be one where Tor Browser receives a
+TLS certificate and accompanying SCTs (we will refer to this bundle as an SCT
+Feedback Object, or SFO for short) and talks to the corresponding logs, over
+Tor, requesting an inclusion proof for each SCT. In an ordinary browser, this
+would be an unacceptable privacy leak to the log of browsing behavior associated
+with an IP address; performing this request over Tor hides the user's IP address
+but still leaks real-time browsing behavior.
+
+An immediate problem with this design is that a primary requirement of Tor
+Browser is to persist no data about browsing behavior after the application
+exits. If we assume that browsers are not left running for long periods of time,
+the inclusion proof request can be easily circumvented by the attacker by using
+a fresh SCT whose MMD has not completed---thus no inclusion proof needs to be
+provided (yet) by the log as per the CT standard. A second problem is that the
+STH that an inclusion proof refers to exists in a \emph{trust vacuum}:
+	there is no way to know that it is consistent with other STHs and not part
+	of a split view (assuming that there is no proactive STH
+	gossip~\cite{dahlberg,syta}, which is not deployed).
+
+We can evolve the design by adding two components: a list of STHs that Tor
+Browser receives over a trusted channel and the participation of a trusted third
+party with the ability to persist data and perform auditing actions at a later
+point in time.
+
+A single third party used by all users of Tor Browser would receive a
+considerable aggregation of browsing behavior and would need to scale in-line
+with the entire Tor network. A small number of auditors presents privacy and
+single-point-of-failure concerns. A large number would be ideal but presents
+difficulties in curation and independent management and still requires scaling
+independent of the Tor network. These concerns do not entirely preclude the
+design, but they can be easily avoided by reusing relays in the Tor network as
+our trusted third parties: we call the relays so designated Certificate
+Transparency Relays (CTRs).
+
+Now, when the browser is completing the TLS handshake, it simultaneously either
+passes the SFO to a CTR (if the MMD of the SCT has not elapsed) or queries the
+log itself for an inclusion proof to a trusted STH\@.  However, if we presume
+the attacker can serve an exploit to the browser, the latter behavior is
+immediately vulnerable. The log, upon receiving an inclusion proof request for
+an SCT that it knows is malicious, can delay its response. The TLS connection in
+the browser, having succeeded, will progress to the HTTP request and response,
+at which point the exploit will be served, and the SFO (containing the
+cryptographic evidence of CA and log misbehavior) will be deleted by the exploit
+code. While blocking the TLS connection until the CT log responds is an option,
+experience related to OCSP hard-fail indicates that this notion is likely doomed
+to fail~\cite{no-hard-fail}.
+
+The final change of the design has Tor Browser submit the SFO to the CTR
+immediately upon receipt (with some probability) in all cases. A consequence of
+this shift is that the trusted STH list no longer needs to be delivered to the
+browser but rather the CTRs. To mitigate the risk of a browser exploit being
+able to identify the CTR to the attacker (who could then target it), we prepare
+\emph{CTR circuits} ahead of time that are closed and discarded as soon as the
+SFO is sent. This allows the SFO submission to race with the TLS connection
+completion and HTTP request/response. An added detail is to block the TLS
+connection in the case that an SFO is unusually large, as defined by a parameter
+\texttt{ct-large-sfo-size}. A large SFO may indicate an attempt to win the race
+between SFO submission and exploitation. The parameter can be set such that it
+happens extremely rarely on legitimate connections, as shown in
+Section~\ref{ctor:sec:performance}.
+
+We summarize phase~1 with the following algorithm that provides more explicit
+steps and details, including the addition of a parameter \texttt{ct-submit-pr}
+that indicates a probability that an SFO is submitted to a CTR. This provides
+probabilistic security while providing the ability to adjust submission rates to
+account for
+CTR and more general network scaling/health issues. Given an incoming SFO $s$,
+Tor Browser should:
+\begin{enumerate}
+    \item Raise a certificate error and stop if the certificate chain of $s$
+        is not rooted in Tor Browser's trust store.
+    \item Raise a certificate transparency error and stop if the SCTs of $s$
+        fail Tor Browser's CT policy.
+    \item If $\mathsf{len}(s) < \texttt{ct-large-sfo-size}$, accept $s$ and
+        conduct the remaining steps in the background while the TLS connection
+        and subsequent HTTP request/response proceed. If $\mathsf{len}(s) \geq
+        \texttt{ct-large-sfo-size}$ pause the TLS handshake, complete the
+        remaining steps, accept~$s$ as valid and then continue the handshake.
+    \item Flip a biased coin based on \texttt{ct-submit-pr} and stop if the
+        outcome indicates no further auditing.
+    \item Submit $s$ to a random CTR on a pre-built circuit. The circuit used
+        for submission is closed immediately without waiting for any
+        acknowledgment.
+\end{enumerate}
+
+\subsection{Phase 2: Buffering} \label{ctor:sec:base:phase2}
+
+Once received, the most straightforward thing for a CTR to do would be to
+contact the issuing log and request an inclusion proof relative to a trusted
+STH\@. (And if the SCT's MMD has not elapsed, hold the SFO until it has.)
+However, this proposal has two flaws, the first of which leads us to the actual
+design of phase 2.
+
+Immediately contacting the log about an SFO (i) allows the log to predict when
+exactly it will receive a request about an SFO and (ii) discloses real-time
+browsing behavior to the log. The former problem means that an attacker can
+position resources for perpetuating an attack ahead-of-time, as well as letting
+it know with certainty whether a connection was audited (based on
+\texttt{ct-submit-pr}). The latter is some amount of information leakage that
+can help with real-time traffic analysis.
+
+Because a CTR must support buffering SCTs regardless (due to the MMD), we can
+schedule an event in the future for when each SFO should be audited. Adding a
+per-SFO value sampled from \texttt{ct-delay-dist} effectively adds stop-and-go
+mixing~\cite{kesdogan:ih1998} to the privacy protection, but where there is only
+one mix (CTR) between sender (client) and receiver (CT log). So there is no
+point in a client-specified interval-start-time such that the mix drops messages
+arriving before then, and there is no additional risk in having the interval end
+time set by the mix rather than the sender. This means both that some SFOs a
+client sends to a CTR at roughly the same time might be audited at different
+times and that SFOs submitted to that CTR by other honest clients are more
+likely to be mixed with these.
+
+In addition to buffering SFOs for mixing effects, we also add a layer of caching
+to reduce the storage overhead, prevent unnecessary log connections, and limit
+the disclosure to logs. With regards to some CT circuit, an incoming SFO $s$ is
+processed as follows by a CTR:
+\begin{enumerate}
+    \item\label{ctor:enm:storage:close} Close the circuit to enforce one-time use.
+    \item\label{ctor:enm:storage:unrecognized} Discard all SCTs in the SFO for logs
+        the CTR is not aware of; if no SCT remains then discard the SFO.
+	\item\label{ctor:enm:storage:cached} Stop if $s$ is cached or already pending to
+		be audited in the buffer.  See caching details in
+		Section~\ref{ctor:sec:performance:estimates}.
+    \item\label{ctor:enm:storage:fix-log} Sample a CT log $l$ that issued a
+        remaining SCT in~$s$.
+    \item\label{ctor:enm:storage:audit-after} Compute an \texttt{audit\_after}
+		time~$t$, see Figure~\ref{ctor:fig:audit-after}.
+    \item\label{ctor:enm:storage:store} Add $(l,t,s)$ to a buffer of pending SFOs to
+    audit.
+\end{enumerate}
+
+What makes a CT log known to the CTR is part of the Tor consensus, see
+Section~\ref{ctor:sec:base:consensus}.  It implies knowledge of a trusted STH for the
+sampled CT log $l$, which refers to an entity that (i) issued an SCT in the
+submitted SFO, and (ii) will be challenged to prove inclusion in phase~3
+sometime after the \texttt{audit\_after} timestamp $t$ elapsed. We choose one
+SCT (and thus log) at random from the SFO because it is sufficient to suspect
+only one misbehaving log so long as we report the entire SFO, allowing us to
+identify the other malicious CT logs later on (a risk averse-attacker would not
+conduct an attack without controlling enough logs, i.e., one benign log would
+otherwise make the mis-issued certificate public).
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\pseudocode[linenumbering, syntaxhighlight=auto]{%
+		\textrm{t} \gets \mathsf{now}() +
+			\mathsf{MMD} +
+			\mathsf{random}(\texttt{ct-delay-dist}) \\
+		\pcif \textrm{SCT.timestamp} + \textrm{MMD} <
+				\mathsf{now}():\\
+			\pcind\textrm{t} \gets \mathsf{now}() +
+				\mathsf{random}(\texttt{ct-delay-dist})
+	}
+	\caption{%
+		Algorithm that computes an \texttt{audit\_after} timestamp $t$.
+	}
+	\label{ctor:fig:audit-after}
+\end{figure}
+
+The \texttt{audit\_after} timestamp specifies the earliest point in time that an
+SCT from an SFO will be audited in phase~3, which adds random noise that
+obfuscates real-time browsing patterns in the Tor network and complicates
+predictions of when it is safe to assume no audit will take place. If memory
+becomes a scarce resource, pending triplets should be deleted at
+random~\cite{nordberg}. Figure~\ref{ctor:fig:audit-after} shows that $t$ takes the
+log's MMD into account. This prevents an \emph{early signal} to the issuing CT
+logs that an SFO is being audited.  For example, if an SFO is audited before the
+MMD elapsed, then the issuing CT log could simply merge the underlying
+certificate chain to avoid any MMD violation. However, by taking the MMD into
+account, this results in a relatively large time window during which the
+attacker can attempt to \emph{flood} all CTRs in hope that they delete the
+omitted SFO at random before it is audited. We discuss the threat of flooding
+further in Section~\ref{ctor:sec:analysis}, noting that such an attack can
+be detected if CTRs publish two new metrics in the extra-info document:
+\texttt{ct-receive-bytes} and \texttt{ct-delete-bytes}. These metrics indicate
+how many SFO bytes were received and deleted throughout different time
+intervals, which is similar to other extra-info metrics such as
+\texttt{read-history} and \texttt{write-history}.
+
+\subsection{Phase 3: Auditing} \label{ctor:sec:base:phase3}
+
+As alluded to in phase 2, there is a second problem why the simple behavior of
+``contact the log and request an inclusion proof'' is unacceptable. We include
+the ability to DoS an individual Tor relay in our threat model---if the log
+knows which CTR holds the evidence of its misbehavior, it can take the CTR
+offline, wiping the evidence of the log's misbehavior from its memory. 
+
+We can address this concern in a few ways. The simple proposal of contacting the
+log over a Tor circuit will not suffice:
+	a log can tag each CTR by submitting unique SFOs to them all, and
+	recognize the CTR when they are submitted (see
+	Section~\ref{ctor:sec:analysis}).
+Even using a unique Tor circuit for each SFO might not suffice to prevent
+effective tagging attacks. For example, after tagging all CTRs, a malicious log
+could ignore all but innocuous untagged requests and tagged requests matching
+tags for whichever CTR it decides to respond to first. If some kind of
+back-off is supported (common to delay retransmissions and avoid congestion),
+the rest of the CTRs will likely be in back-off so that there is a high
+probability that the first CTR is the one fetching proofs.  The log can repeat
+this process---alternating tagged CTRs it replies to---until it receives the
+offending SFO from an identifiable CTR with high probability.  CTRs may report
+the log as inaccessible for days, but that is not the same as direct
+cryptographic evidence of misbehavior.
+
+While there are ways to detect this attack after-the-fact, and there may be ways
+to mitigate it, a more robust design would tolerate the disclosure of a CTRs
+identity to the log during the auditing phase without significant security
+implications.  A simple appealing approach is to write the data to disk prior
+to contacting the log; however, Tor relays are explicitly designed not to write
+data about user behavior to disk unless debug-level logging is enabled. Relay
+operators have expressed an explicit desire to never have any user data
+persisted to disk, as it changes the risk profile of their servers with regards
+to search, seizure, and forensic analysis.
+
+The final design is to have the CTR work with a partner CTR---we call it a
+\emph{watchdog}---that they choose at random and contact over a circuit. Prior
+to attempting to fetch a proof from a log, the CTR provides the watchdog with
+the SFO it is about to audit. After an appropriate response from the log, the
+CTR tells the watchdog that the SFO has been adequately addressed.
+
+In more detail, each CTR maintains a single shared circuit that is used to
+interact with all CT logs known to the CTR (we are not using one circuit per
+SFO given the overhead and unclear security benefit noted above). For
+\emph{each} such log $l$, the CTR runs the following steps: %indefinitely:
+\begin{enumerate}
+    \item\label{ctor:enm:auditing:backoff} Sample a delay $d \gets
+        \mathsf{random}(\texttt{ct-backoff-dist})$ and wait until $d$ time units
+        elapsed.
+    \item Connect to a random watchdog CTR\@.
+    \item\label{ctor:enm:auditing:loop} For each pending buffer entry $(l',s,t)$,
+    where $l' = l$ and $t <= \mathsf{now}()$:
+		\begin{enumerate}
+			\item\label{ctor:enm:ext:auditing:watchdog} Share $s$ with the current
+				watchdog.
+			\item\label{ctor:enm:ext:auditing:challenge} Challenge the log to prove
+                                  inclusion to the closest STH in the Tor
+								  consensus where $t$ $\leq$
+								  STH\texttt{.timestamp}. Wait
+								  \texttt{ct-log-timeout} time units for the
+								  complete proof before timing out.
+				\begin{itemize}
+					\item\label{ctor:enm:ext:auditing:challenge:success} On valid
+						proof: send an acknowledgment to the watchdog, cache $s$
+						and then discard it.
+					\item\label{ctor:enm:ext:auditing:challenge:fail} On any other
+						outcome: close circuit to the watchdog CTR, discard $s$,
+						and go to step~1.
+				\end{itemize}
+		\end{enumerate}
+\end{enumerate}
+
+\subsection{Phase 4: Reporting}
+
+At any given time, a CTR may be requesting inclusion proofs from logs and act as
+a watchdog for one or more CTRs. A CTR acting as a watchdog will have at
+most one SFO held temporarily for each other CTR it is interacting with. If an
+acknowledgement from the other CTR is not received within
+\texttt{ct-watchdog-timeout}, it becomes the watchdog's responsibility to report
+the SFO such that it culminates in human review if need be.
+
+Because human review and publication is critical at this end-stage, we envision
+that the watchdog (which is a Tor relay that cannot persist any evidence to disk
+and may not be closely monitored by its operator) provides the SFO to an
+independent CT auditor that is run by someone that closely monitors its
+operation. When arriving at the design of the CTR being a
+role played by a Tor relay, we eschewed separate auditors because of the lack of
+automatic scaling with the Tor network, the considerable aggregation of browsing
+behavior across the Tor network, and the difficulties of curation and validation
+of trustworthy individuals. SFOs submitted to auditors at this stage have been
+filtered through the CTR layer (that additionally backs-off if the logs become
+unavailable to prevent an open pipe of SFOs from being reported), resulting in
+an exponentially smaller load and data exposure for auditors. This should allow
+for a smaller number of them to operate without needing to scale with the
+network.
+
+While we assume that most auditors are trusted to actually investigate the
+reported SFOs further, the watchdog needs to take precautions talking to them
+because the network is not trusted.\footnote{%
+	While our threat model, and Tor's, precludes a global network adversary,
+	both include partial control of the network.
+}  The watchdog can contact the auditor immediately, but must do so over
+an independent Tor circuit.\footnote{%
+	This is also important because CTRs are not necessarily exits, i.e., the
+	exiting traffic must be destined to another Tor relay.
+}  If a successful acknowledgement from the auditor is not received within
+\texttt{ct-auditor-timeout}, the SFO is buffered for a random time using
+\texttt{ct-delay-dist} before being reported to the same auditor again over a
+new independent Tor circuit.
+
+When an auditor receives an SFO, it should persist it to durable storage until
+it can be successfully resolved to a specific STH.\footnote{%
+	The fetched inclusion proof must be against the first known STH that
+	should have incorporated the certificate in question by using the
+	history of STHs in Tor's consensus:
+		the mis-issued certificate might have been merged into the log
+		reactively upon learning that a CTR reported the SFO, such that a valid
+		inclusion proof can be returned with regards to a more recent STH but
+		not earlier ones that actually captured the log's misbehavior.
+}  Once so persisted, the auditor can begin querying the log itself asking for
+an inclusion proof. If no valid inclusion proof can be provided after some
+threshold of time, the auditor software should raise the details to a human
+operator for investigation.
+
+Separately, the auditor should be retrieving the current Tor consensus and
+ensuring that a consistency proof can be provided between STHs from the older
+consensus and the newer. If consistency cannot be established after some
+threshold of time, the auditor software should raise the details to a human
+operator for investigation. An auditor could also monitor a log's uptime and
+report on excessive downtime. Finally, it is paramount that the auditor
+continuously monitors its own availability from fresh Tor-circuits by submitting
+known SFOs to itself to ensure that an attacker is not keeping watchdogs from
+connecting to it.
+
+\subsection{Setup} \label{ctor:sec:base:consensus}
+
+There are a number of additional details missing to setup phases 1--4 for the
+design. Most of these details relate to the Tor consensus. Directory authorities
+influence the way in which Tor Browser and CTRs behave by voting on necessary
+parameters, such as the probability of submission of an SFO
+(\texttt{ct-submit-pr}) and the timeout used by CTRs when auditing CT logs
+(\texttt{ct-log-timeout}), as introduced earlier as part of the design. See
+Appendix~\ref{ctor:app:consensus-params} for details on these parameters and their
+values that were previously used. Next, we briefly introduce a number of
+implicitly used parts from our design that should also be part of the consensus.
+
+In the consensus, the existing \texttt{known-flags} item determines the
+different flags that the consensus might contain for relays.  We add another
+flag named \texttt{CTR}, which indicates that a Tor relay should support
+CT-auditing as described here. A relay qualifies as a CTR if it is flagged as
+\texttt{stable} and not \texttt{exit}, to spare the relatively sparse exit
+bandwidth and only use relays that can be expected to stay online.
+Section~\ref{ctor:sec:privacy} discusses trade-offs in the assignment of the
+\texttt{CTR} flag.
+
+The consensus should also capture a fixed view of the CT log ecosystem by
+publishing STHs from all known logs.  A CT log is known if a majority of
+directory authorities proposed a \texttt{ct-log-info} item, which contains a
+log's ID, public key, base URL, MMD, and most recent STH.  Each directory
+authority proposes its own STH, and agrees to use the most recent STH as
+determined by timestamp and lexicographical order.  Since CTRs verify inclusion
+with regards to SCTs that Tor Browser accepts, the CT logs recognized by Tor
+Browser must be in Tor's consensus.
+
+Tor's directory authorities also majority-vote on \texttt{ct-auditor} items,
+which pin base URLs and public keys of CT auditors that watchdogs contact in
+case that any log misbehavior is suspected. 
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/src/introduction.tex b/summary/src/ctor/src/introduction.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2206ec5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/src/introduction.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+\section{Introduction} \label{ctor:sec:introduction}
+Metrics reported by Google and Mozilla reveal that encryption on the web
+skyrocketed the past couple of years: at least 84\% of all web pages load using
+HTTPS~\cite{google-metrics,mozilla-metrics}. An HTTPS connection is initiated by
+a TLS handshake where the client's web browser requires that the web server
+presents a valid certificate to authenticate the identity of the server, e.g.,
+to make sure that the client who wants to visit \texttt{mozilla.org} is really
+connecting to Mozilla, and not, say, Google. A certificate specifies the
+cryptographic key-material for a given domain name, and it is considered valid
+if it is digitally signed by a Certificate Authority (CA) that the web browser
+trusts.
+
+It is a long-known problem that the CA trust model suffers from
+weakest-link security:
+	web browsers allow hundreds of CAs to sign arbitrary domain-name to
+		key-bindings,
+	which means that it suffices to compromise a single CA to acquire any
+		certificate~\cite{https-sok,ca-ecosystem}.
+Motivated by prominent CA compromises, such as the issuance of fraudulent
+certificates for
+	\texttt{*.google.com},
+	\texttt{*.mozilla.org} and
+	\texttt{*.torproject.org}
+by DigiNotar~\cite{diginotar}, multiple browser vendors mandated
+that certificates issued by CAs must be publicly disclosed in Certificate
+Transparency (CT) logs to be valid.  The idea behind CT is that, by making all
+CA-issued certificates transparent, mis-issued ones can be detected
+\emph{after the fact}~\cite{ct/a,ct,ct/bis}.  The appropriate actions can then
+be taken to keep the wider web safe, e.g., by
+	investigating the events that lead up to a particular incident,
+	removing or limiting trust in the offending CA, and
+	revoking affected certificates.
+Google Chrome and Apple's Safari currently enforce CT by augmenting the TLS
+handshake to require cryptographic proofs from the server that the presented
+certificate \emph{will appear} in CT logs that the respective web browsers
+trust~\cite{apple-log-policy,google-log-policy}.
+
+In addition to increased encryption on the web, the ability to access it
+anonymously matured as well.  Tor with its Tor Browser has millions of daily
+users~\cite{tor,mani}, and efforts are ongoing to mature the technology 
+for wider use~\cite{fftor}.  Tor Browser builds on-top of Mozilla's Firefox:
+	it relays traffic between the user and the web server in question by routing
+		everything through the Tor network,
+	which is composed of thousands of volunteer-run relays that are located
+		across the globe~\cite{relay-by-flag}.
+Just like attackers may wish to break security properties of HTTPS, it may also
+be of interest to break the anonymity provided by Tor.  A common technique for
+deanonymization (known to be used in practice) is to compromise Tor
+Browser instead of circumventing the anonymity provided by
+Tor~\cite{lepop1,selfrando,lepop2,zerotor}.  Web browsers like Firefox
+(or forks thereof) are one of the most complex software types that are widely
+used today, leading to security vulnerabilities and clear incentives for
+exploitation.  For example, the exploit acquisition platform Zerodium offers up
+to \$$100,000$ for a Firefox zero-day exploit that provides remote code
+execution and local privilege escalation (i.e., full control of the
+browser)~\cite{zeromain}.
+
+An attacker that wishes to use such an exploit to compromise and then ultimately
+deanonymize a Tor Browser user has to deliver the exploit somehow.  Since the
+web is mostly encrypted, this primarily needs to take place over an HTTPS
+connection where the attacker controls the content returned by the web server.
+While there are numerous possible ways that the attacker can accomplish this,
+e.g., by compromising a web server that a subset of Tor Browser users visit,
+another option is to \emph{impersonate} one or more web servers by acquiring
+fraudulent certificates. Due to the Tor network being run by volunteers, getting
+into a position to perform such an attack is relatively straightforward:
+	the attacker can volunteer to run malicious exit
+		relays~\cite{spoiled-onions}.
+The same is true for an attacker that wishes to man-in-the-middle connections
+made by Tor Browser users.  In some cases a Tor Browser exploit may not even be
+needed for deanonymization, e.g., the attacker can observe if the user logs-on
+to a service linking an identity.
+
+\subsection{Introducing CTor}
+We propose an incrementally deployable and privacy-preserving design that is
+henceforth referred to as CTor.  By bringing CT to Tor, HTTPS-based
+man-in-the-middle attacks against Tor Browser users can be detected \emph{after
+the fact} when conducted by attackers that:
+\begin{enumerate}
+	\item can acquire any certificate from a trusted CA,
+	\item with the necessary cryptographic proofs from enough CT logs so that
+		Tor Browser accepts the certificate as valid without the attacker
+		making it publicly available in any of the controlled logs, and
+	\item with the ability to gain full control of Tor Browser shortly after
+		establishing an HTTPS connection.
+\end{enumerate}
+
+The first and third capabilities are motivated directly by shortcomings in the
+CA ecosystem as well as how the anonymity of Tor Browser is known to be
+attacked.  The second capability assumes the same starting point as Google
+Chrome and Apple's Safari, namely, that the logs are trusted to \emph{promise}
+public logging, which is in contrast to being untrusted and thus forced to
+\emph{prove} it.  This is part of the gradual CT deployment that avoided
+breakage on the web~\cite{does-ct-break-the-web}.  Therefore, we start
+from the assumption that Tor Browser accepts a certificate as valid if 
+accompanied by two independent promises of public logging.  The limitation of
+such CT enforcement is that it is trivially bypassed by an attacker that
+controls two seemingly independent CT logs.  This is not to say that trusting
+the log ecosystem would be an insignificant Tor Browser improvement when
+compared to no CT at all, but CTor takes us several steps further by relaxing
+and ultimately eliminating the trust which is currently (mis)placed in today's
+browser-recognized CT logs.
+We already observed instances of CT logs that happened to
+	violate their promises of public logging~\cite{gdca1-omission},
+	show inconsistent certificate contents to different
+		parties~\cite{izenpe-disqualified,venafi-disqualified}, and
+	get their secret signing keys compromised due to disclosed remote
+		code-execution vulnerabilities~\cite{digicert-log-compromised}. 
+
+The first design increment uses the CT landscape against the attacker to
+ensure a non-zero (tweakable) probability of public disclosure \emph{each time}
+a fraudulent certificate is used against Tor Browser.  This is done by randomly
+adding a subset of presented certificates to CT logs that the attacker may not
+control (inferred from the accompanied promises of public logging).  Such
+\emph{certificate cross-logging} distributes trust across all CT logs, raising
+the bar towards unnoticed certificate mis-issuance.  Motivated by factors like
+privacy, security and deployability, Tor Browser uses Tor relays as
+intermediates to cache and interact with CT logs on its behalf.  Such deferred
+auditing is a fundamental part of our setting unless future distributed auditing
+mechanisms turn out to be non-interactive from the browser's perspective.
+
+The next incremental step is to not only cross-log certificates but also their
+promises of public logging.  While it requires an additional CT log API
+endpoint, it facilitates auditing of these promises if some logs are
+trustworthy.  The full design also holds logs accountable but without any such
+assumption:
+	Tor relays challenge the logs to prove correct operation with regards to a
+		single fixed view in Tor's consensus, and
+	potential issues are reported to auditors that investigate them further.
+
+\subsection{Contribution and Structure}
+Section~\ref{ctor:sec:background} introduces background on the theory and practise of
+CT, as well as the anonymity network Tor.  Section~\ref{ctor:sec:adversary} motivates
+the intended attacker and presents a unified threat model for CT and Tor.
+Section~\ref{ctor:sec:base} describes the full CTor design that \emph{eliminates all
+trust in the browser-recognized CT logs} by challenging them to prove
+certificate inclusion cryptographically, and would result in a \emph{single
+probabilistically-verified view of the CT log ecosystem available from Tor's
+consensus}.  This view could be used by other browsers as the basis of trust,
+\emph{greatly improving the security posture of the entire web}.  The security
+analysis in Section~\ref{ctor:sec:analysis} shows that one of the best bets for the
+attacker would be to take network-wide actions against Tor to avoid public
+disclosure of certificate mis-issuance and log misbehavior.  Such an attack is
+trivially detected, but it is hard to attribute unless reactive defenses are
+enabled at the cost of trade-offs.
+
+The full design involves many different components that add deployment burdens,
+such as the requirement of reliable CT auditors that investigate suspected log
+misbehavior further.  Therefore, we additionally propose two initial increments
+that place \emph{some trust in CT logs} (Section~\ref{ctor:sec:incremental}).  The
+first increment \emph{provides evidence to independent CT logs that fraudulent
+certificates were presented while preserving privacy}.  This greatly impacts
+risk-averse attackers because one part of their malicious behavior becomes
+transparent \emph{if the randomly selected log operator is benign}.  For
+example, the targeted domain name is disclosed as part of the cross-logged
+certificate, and awareness of the event draws unwanted attention.
+
+The next increment is minor from the perspective of Tor, but requires CT logs to
+support an additional API.  Similar changes were proposed in the context of CT
+gossip~\cite{minimal-gossip}.  If supported, Tor relays could expose both the
+mis-issued certificates and the operators that promised to log them publicly
+\emph{without the complexity of ever distinguishing between what is benign and
+fraudulent}.
+This API change happens to also build auditor infrastructure
+directly into CT log software, thereby paving the path towards the missing component of
+the full design.  We argue that CTor can be deployed incrementally:
+	complete Firefox's CT enforcement~\cite{ffct},
+	add our cross-logging increments, and
+	finally put the full design into operation.
+Each part of CTor would \emph{greatly contribute to the open question of how
+to reduce and/or eliminate trust in browser-recognized log operators}, which is
+caused by the lack of an appropriate gossip mechanism as well as privacy issues
+while interacting with the logs~\cite{ct-with-privacy,minimal-gossip,nordberg}.
+
+We show that circuit-, bandwidth- and memory-\emph{overheads are modest} by
+computing such estimates in Section~\ref{ctor:sec:performance}.  Therefore, we do not
+investigate performance further in any experimental setting.
+Section~\ref{ctor:sec:privacy} discusses privacy aspects of our design choices with
+a focus on the essential role of the Tor network's distributed nature to
+preserve user privacy as well as the overall security.  In gist,
+\emph{a similar approach would be privacy-invasive without Tor}, e.g., if
+adopted by Google Chrome.  Section~\ref{ctor:sec:related} outlines related work.
+Section~\ref{ctor:sec:conclusion} concludes the paper.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/src/performance.tex b/summary/src/ctor/src/performance.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e641ba1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/src/performance.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+\section{Performance} \label{ctor:sec:performance}
+The following analysis shows that CTor's overhead is modest based on computing
+performance estimates from concrete parameter properties and two public data
+sets.
+
+\subsection{Setup}
+Mani~\emph{et~al.} derived a distribution of website visits over Tor and an
+estimation of the number of circuits through the network~\cite{mani}.  We use
+their results to reason about overhead as the Tor network is under heavy load,
+assuming 140~million daily website visits (the upper bound of a 95\% confidence
+interval).  Our analysis also requires a distribution that captures typical SFO
+properties per website visit.  Therefore, we collected an SFO data set by
+browsing the most popular webpages submitted to Reddit (r/frontpage, all time)
+on December 4, 2019.  The data set contains SFOs from 8858 webpage visits, and
+it is available online as an open access artifact together with the associated
+scripts~\cite{sfo-dist}.  Notably we hypothesized that browsing actual webpages
+as opposed to front-pages would yield more SFOs.  When compared to Alexa's
+list it turned out to be the case:
+	our data set has roughly two additional SFOs per data point.
+This makes it less likely that our analysis is an underestimate.
+
+We found that an average certificate chain is 5440~bytes, and it is seldom
+accompanied by more than a few SCTs.  As such, a typical SFO is in the order of
+6~KiB.  No certificate chain exceeded 20~KiB, and the average number of SFOs per
+webpage was seven.  The latter includes 1--2 SFOs per data point that followed
+from our client software calling home on start-up (Chromium~77).
+
+We assume no abnormal CTor behavior, which means that there will be little or
+no CTR back-offs due to the high uptime requirements of today's CT logs: 99\%.
+We set \texttt{ct-large-sfo-size} conservatively to avoid blocking in the TLS
+handshake (e.g., 20~KiB), and use a 10\% submission probability as well as a
+10~minute random buffer delay on average.  It is likely unwarranted to use a
+higher submission probability given that the intended attacker is risk-averse.
+Shorter buffer times would leak finer-grained browsing patterns to the logs,
+while longer ones increase the attack surface in phase~2.  Therefore, we
+selected an average for \texttt{ct-delay-dist} that satisfies none of the two
+extremes.  The remaining CTor parameters are timeouts, which have little or no
+performance impact if set conservatively (few seconds).
+
+\subsection{Estimates} \label{ctor:sec:performance:estimates}
+The incremental cross-logging designs are analyzed first without any caching.
+Caching is then considered, followed by overhead that appears only in the full
+design.
+
+\textbf{Circuit Overhead.}
+Equation~\ref{ctor:eq:sub-oh} shows the expected circuit overhead from Tor Browser
+over time, where $p$ is the submit probability and $\bar{d}$ the average number
+of SFOs per website visit.  The involved overhead is linear as either of the two
+parameters are tuned up or down.
+
+\begin{equation} \label{ctor:eq:sub-oh}
+	p\bar{d}
+\end{equation}
+
+Using $p\gets\frac{1}{10}$ and our approximated SFO distribution $\bar{d}\gets7$
+yields an average circuit overhead of $0.70$, i.e., for every three Tor Browser
+circuits CTor adds another two.  Such an increase might sound
+daunting at first,\footnote{%
+	Circuit establishment involves queueing of onionskins~\cite{onionskins} and
+	it is a likely bottleneck, but since the introduction of ntor it is not a
+	scarce resource so such overhead is acceptable if it (i) serves a purpose,
+	and (ii) can be tuned.  Confirmed by Tor developers.
+} but these additional circuits are short-lived and light-weight; transporting
+6~KiB on average.  Each CTR also maintains a long-lived circuit for CT log
+interactions.
+
+\textbf{Bandwidth Overhead.}  Equation~\ref{ctor:eq:bw} shows the expected
+bandwidth overhead for the Tor network over time, where
+	$V$ is the number of website visits per time unit,
+	$p$ the submit probability,
+	$\bar{d}$ the average number of SFOs per website visit, and
+	$\bar{s}$ the average SFO byte-size.
+
+\begin{equation} \label{ctor:eq:bw}
+	6Vp\bar{d}\bar{s}
+\end{equation}
+
+$Vp\bar{d}$ is the average number of SFO submissions per time unit, which can be
+converted to bandwidth by weighting each submission with the size of
+a typical SFO and accounting for it being relayed six times:
+	three hops from Tor Browser to a CTR, then
+	another three hops from the CTR to a CT log
+	(we assumed symmetric Tor relay bandwidth).
+Using
+	$V\gets 140\textrm{~M/day}$,
+	$p \gets \frac{1}{10}$,
+	$\bar{d} \gets 7$,
+	$\bar{s} \gets 6\textrm{~KiB}$
+and converting the result to bps yields 334.5~Mbps in total.  Such order of
+overhead is small when compared to Tor's capacity:
+450~Gbps~\cite{tor-bandwidth}.
+
+\textbf{Memory Overhead.}
+Equation~\ref{ctor:eq:memory} shows the expected buffering overhead, where
+	$V_m$ is the number of website visits per minute,
+	$t$ the average buffer time in minutes,
+	$R$ the number of Tor relays that qualify as CTRs, and
+	$\bar{s}$ the typical SFO size in bytes.
+
+\begin{equation} \label{ctor:eq:memory}
+	\frac{V_mt}{R} \bar{s}
+\end{equation}
+
+$V_mt$ represent incoming SFO submissions during the average buffer time, which
+are randomly distributed across $R$ CTRs.  Combined, this yields the expected
+number of SFOs that await at a single CTR in phase~2, and by taking the
+byte-size of these SFOs into account we get an estimate of the resulting memory
+overhead.  Using
+	$V_m \gets \frac{140\textrm{~M}}{24\cdot60}$,
+	$t \gets 10$~m,
+	$R \gets 4000$ based on the CTR criteria in
+		Section~\ref{ctor:sec:base:consensus}, and
+	$\bar{s} \gets 6\textrm{~KiB}$
+yields 1.42~MiB.  Such order of overhead is small when compared to the
+recommended relay configuration:
+	at least 512~MiB~\cite{relay-config}.
+
+A cache of processed SFOs reduces the CTR's buffering memory and log
+interactions proportionally to the cache hit ratio.  Mani~\emph{et al.} showed
+that if the overrepresented \texttt{torproject.org} is removed, about one third
+of all website visits over Tor can be attributed to Alexa's top-1k and another
+one third to the top-1M~\cite{mani}.
+Assuming 32~byte cryptographic hashes and seven SFOs per website visit, a cache
+hit ratio of $\frac{1}{3}$ could be achieved by a 256~KiB LFU/LRU cache that
+eventually captures Alexa's top-1k.  Given that the cache requires memory as
+well, this is mainly a bandwidth optimization.
+
+\textbf{Full Design.}
+For each CTR and CT log pair, there is an additional watchdog circuit that
+transports the full SFO upfront before fetching an inclusion proof.  The
+expected bandwidth overhead is at most $9Vp\bar{d}\bar{s}$, i.e., now
+also accounting for the three additional hops that an SFO is subject to.  In
+practise the overhead is slightly less, because an inclusion query and its
+returned proof is smaller than an SFO.  We expect little or no
+watchdog-to-auditor overhead if the logs are available, and otherwise one
+light-weight circuit that reports a single SFO for each CTR that goes into
+back-off.  Such overhead is small when compared to all Tor Browser submissions.
+Finally, the required memory increases because newly issued SFOs are buffered
+for at least an MMD.  Only a small portion of SFOs are newly issued, however:
+	the short-lived certificates of Let's Encrypt are valid for
+	90~days~\cite{le}, which is in contrast to 24~hour
+	MMDs~\cite{google-log-policy}.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/src/privacy.tex b/summary/src/ctor/src/privacy.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2738dba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/src/privacy.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+\section{Privacy} \label{ctor:sec:privacy}
+There is an inherent privacy problem in the setting due to how CT is designed
+and deployed. A browser, like Tor Browser, that wishes to validate that SFOs presented to
+it are \emph{consistent} and \emph{included} in CT logs must directly or
+indirectly interact with CT logs wrt. its observed SFOs. Without protections
+like Private Information Retrieval (PIR)~\cite{PIR} that require server-side
+support or introduction of additional parties and trust
+assumptions~\cite{kales,lueks-and-goldberg}, exposing SFOs to any party risks
+leaking (partial) information about the browsing activities of the user.
+
+Given the constraints of the existing CT ecosystem, CTor is made
+privacy-preserving thanks to the distributed nature of Tor with its anonymity
+properties and high-uptime relays that make up the Tor network. First, all
+communication between Tor Browser, CTRs, CT logs, and auditors are made over
+full Tor-circuits. This is a significant privacy-gain, not available, e.g., to
+browsers like Chrome that in their communications would reveal their public
+IP-address (among a number of other potentially identifying metadata). Secondly,
+the use of CTRs as intermediaries probabilistically delays the interaction with
+the CT logs---making correlating Tor Browser user browsing with CT log
+interaction harder for attackers---and safely maintains a dynamic cache of the
+most commonly already verified SFOs. While browsers like Chrome could maintain a
+cache, Tor Browser's security and privacy goals
+(Section~\ref{ctor:sec:background:tor}) prohibit such shared (persisted) dynamic
+state.
+
+In terms of privacy, the main limitation of CTor is that CTor continuously leaks
+to CT logs---and to a \emph{lesser extent} auditors (depending on design)---a
+fraction of certificates of websites visited using Tor Browser to those that
+operate CT logs. This provides to a CT log a partial list of websites visited
+via the Tor network over a period of time (determined by
+\texttt{ct-delay-dist}), together with some indication of distribution based on
+the number of active CTRs. It does not, however, provide even pseudonymously any
+information about which sites individual users visit, much less with which
+patterns or timing. As such it leaks significantly less information than does
+OCSP validation by Tor Browser or DNS resolution at exit-relays~\cite{TorDNS},
+both of which indicate visit activity in real time to a small number of
+entities.
+
+Another significant limitation is that relays with the CTR flag learn real-time
+browser behavior of Tor users. Relays without the \texttt{exit} flag primarily
+only transport encrypted Tor-traffic between clients and other relays, never to
+destinations. If such relays are given the CTR flag---as we stated in the full
+design, see Section~\ref{ctor:sec:base:consensus}---then this might discourage some
+from running Tor relays unless it is possible to opt out. Another option is to
+give the CTR flag only to exit relays, but this \emph{might be} undesirable for
+overall network performance despite the modest overhead of CTor
+(Section~\ref{ctor:sec:performance}). Depending on the health of the network and the
+exact incremental deployment of CTor, there are different trade-offs.
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/src/ref.bib b/summary/src/ctor/src/ref.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b39ae33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/src/ref.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,536 @@
+@misc{apple-on-independence,
+	author = {Clint Wilson},
+	title = {{CT} Days 2020},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/ct-policy/c/JWVVhZTL5RM}, accessed 2020-12-15}
+}
+
+@misc{onionskins,
+	author = {{Tor Project}},
+	title = {Functions to queue create cells for processing},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://src-ref.docs.torproject.org/tor/onion__queue_8c_source.html}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{delayed-merge,
+	author = {{Google LLC.}},
+	title = {Trillian Log Signer},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/google/trillian/blob/master/cmd/trillian_log_signer/main.go}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{stark,
+	title = {Opt-in {SCT} Auditing},
+	author = {Emily Stark and Chris Thompson},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://docs.google.com/document/d/1G1Jy8LJgSqJ-B673GnTYIG4b7XRw2ZLtvvSlrqFcl4A/edit}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@article{meiklejohn,
+  author    = {Sarah Meiklejohn and Pavel Kalinnikov and Cindy S. Lin and Martin Hutchinson and Gary Belvin and Mariana Raykova and Al Cutter},
+  title     = {Think Global, Act Local: Gossip and Client Audits in Verifiable Data Structures},
+  journal   = {CoRR},
+  volume    = {abs/2011.04551},
+  year      = {2020},
+}
+
+@misc{sfo-dist,
+	author = {Rasmus Dahlberg and Tobias Pulls and Tom Ritter and Paul Syverson},
+	title = {{SFO} Distribution Artificat},
+	year = {2020},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/rgdd/ctor/tree/master/artifact}},
+}
+
+@misc{ct-policy-mailing-list,
+	author = {{CT policy mailing list}},
+	title = {{Certificate Transparency} Policy},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/\#!forum/ct-policy}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{no-hard-fail,
+	author = {Adam Langley},
+	title = {No, don't enable revocation checking},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/04/19/revchecking.html}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{de-anonymize-exploit,
+	author = {Joseph Cox},
+	title = {The {FBI} Used a 'Non-Public' Vulnerability to Hack Suspects on {Tor}},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/kb7kza/the-fbi-used-a-non-public-vulnerability-to-hack-suspects-on-tor}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@Misc{forbes-fbi-tor,
+  author = {Kashmir Hill},
+  title = {How Did The {FBI} Break {Tor}?},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/11/07/how-did-law-enforcement-break-tor/#6cf2ed594bf7}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+
+@Misc{doj-fbi-tor,
+  author = {{U.S. Dept. of Justice}},
+  title = {More Than 400 .Onion Addresses, Including Dozens of ‘Dark Market’ Sites, Targeted as Part of Global Enforcement Action on {Tor} Network},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/more-than-400-.onion-addresses-including-dozens-of-dark-market-sites-targeted-as-part-of-global-enforcement-action-on-tor-network}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+
+@Misc{syria-facebook-mitm,
+  author = {Peter Eckersley},
+  title = {A {Syrian} Man-In-The-Middle Attack against {Facebook}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/05/syrian-man-middle-against-facebook}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{wiki-bgp,
+	author = {{Wikipedia contributors}},
+	title = {{BGP} hijacking---{Wikipedia}{,} The Free Encyclopedia},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=BGP_hijacking&oldid=964360841}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{bgp-hijacking-for-crypto-2,
+	author = {Ameet Naik},
+	title = {Anatomy of a {BGP} Hijack on {Amazon’s} Route 53 {DNS} Service},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://blog.thousandeyes.com/amazon-route-53-dns-and-bgp-hijack}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{bgp-hijacking-for-crypto,
+	author = {Joe Stewart},
+	title = {{BGP} Hijacking for Cryptocurrency Profit},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://www.secureworks.com/research/bgp-hijacking-for-cryptocurrency-profit}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{myetherwallet,
+	author = {Russell Brandom},
+	title = {Hackers emptied {Ethereum} wallets by breaking the basic infrastructure of the {Internet}},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/24/17275982/myetherwallet-hack-bgp-dns-hijacking-stolen-ethereum}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@Misc{ethereum-hijack-isoc,
+  author = {Aftab Siddiqui},
+  title = {What Happened? {The Amazon Route 53 BGP} Hijack to Take Over {Ethereum} Cryptocurrency Wallets},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2018/04/amazons-route-53-bgp-hijack/}, accessed 2020-12-15}}
+
+@Misc{iran-telegram-bgp,
+  author = {Patrick Howell O'Neill},
+  title = {Telegram traffic from around the world took a detour through {Iran}}, 
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.cyberscoop.com/telegram-iran-bgp-hijacking/}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{google-log-policy,
+	author = {{Google LLC.}},
+	title = {Chromium {Certificate Transparency} Policy},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/chromium/ct-policy/blob/master/README.md}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{apple-log-policy,
+	author = {{Apple Inc.}},
+	title = {Apple's {Certificate Transparency} log program},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://support.apple.com/en-om/HT209255}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{tor-bandwidth,
+	author = {{Tor project}},
+	title = {Advertised and consumed bandwidth by relay flag},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth-flags.html}, accessed 2020-05-30},
+}
+
+@misc{relay-by-flag,
+	author = {{Tor project}},
+	title = {Relays by relay flag},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://metrics.torproject.org/relayflags.html}, accessed 2020-05-29},
+}
+
+@misc{relay-config,
+	author = {{Tor project}},
+	title = {Relay requirements},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://community.torproject.org/relay/relays-requirements/}, accessed 2020-05-29},
+}
+
+@misc{turktrust,
+	author = {Adam Langley},
+	title = {Enhancing digital certificate security},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://security.googleblog.com/2013/01/enhancing-digital-certificate-security.html}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{doublecheck,
+  author    = {Mansoor Alicherry and Angelos D. Keromytis},
+  title     = {{DoubleCheck}: Multi-path verification against man-in-the-middle attacks},
+  booktitle = {ISCC},
+  year      = {2009},
+}
+
+@misc{consensus-transparency,
+	author = {Linus Nordberg},
+	title = {{Tor} Consensus Transparency},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec/-/blob/main/proposals/267-tor-consensus-transparency.txt}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{sth-push,
+  author      = {Ryan Sleevi and Eran Messeri},
+  title       = {Certificate transparency in {Chrome}: Monitoring {CT} Logs consistency},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FP5J5Sfsg0OR9P4YT0q1dM02iavhi8ix1mZlZe_z-ls/edit?pref=2&pli=1}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{minimal-gossip,
+	author = {{Google LLC.}},
+	title = {Minimal Gossip},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/google/trillian-examples/blob/master/gossip/minimal/README.md}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{catena,
+  author    = {Alin Tomescu and Srinivas Devadas},
+  title     = {Catena: Efficient Non-equivocation via {Bitcoin}},
+  booktitle = {IEEE S\&P},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{chase,
+  author    = {Melissa Chase and Sarah Meiklejohn},
+  title     = {Transparency Overlays and Applications},
+  booktitle = {CCS},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{kales,
+  author    = {Daniel Kales and Olamide Omolola and Sebastian Ramacher},
+  title     = {Revisiting User Privacy for {Certificate Transparency}},
+  booktitle = {IEEE EuroS\&P},
+  year      = {2019},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{lueks-and-goldberg,
+  author    = {Wouter Lueks and Ian Goldberg},
+  title     = {Sublinear Scaling for Multi-Client Private Information Retrieval},
+  booktitle = {FC},
+  year      = {2015},
+}
+
+@misc{ct-over-dns,
+  author = {Ben Laurie},
+  title  = {{Certificate Transparency} over {DNS}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/blob/master/dns/draft-ct-over-dns.md}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{lwm,
+  author    = {Rasmus Dahlberg and Tobias Pulls},
+  title     = {Verifiable Light-Weight Monitoring for {Certificate Transparency} Logs},
+  booktitle = {NordSec},
+  year      = {2018},
+}
+
+@article{ct-with-privacy,
+  author    = {Saba Eskandarian and Eran Messeri and Joseph Bonneau and Dan Boneh},
+  title     = {{Certificate Transparency} with Privacy},
+  journal   = {PETS},
+  volume    = {2017},
+  number    = {4},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{ct-monitors,
+  author    = {Bingyu Li and Jingqiang Lin and Fengjun Li and Qiongxiao Wang and Qi Li and Jiwu Jing and Congli Wang},
+  title     = {{Certificate Transparency} in the Wild: Exploring the Reliability of Monitors},
+  booktitle = {CCS},
+  year      = {2019},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{syta,
+  author    = {Ewa Syta and Iulia Tamas and Dylan Visher and David Isaac Wolinsky and Philipp Jovanovic and Linus Gasser and Nicolas Gailly and Ismail Khoffi and Bryan Ford},
+  title     = {Keeping Authorities "Honest or Bust" with Decentralized Witness Cosigning},
+  booktitle = {IEEE S\&P},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{dahlberg,
+	author = {Rasmus Dahlberg and Tobias Pulls and Jonathan Vestin and Toke H{\o}iland-J{\o}rgensen and Andreas Kassler},
+	title = {Aggregation-Based {Certificate Transparency} Gossip},
+	booktitle = {SECURWARE},
+	year = {2019},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{secure-logging-and-ct,
+  author    = {Benjamin Dowling and Felix G{\"{u}}nther and Udyani Herath and Douglas Stebila},
+  title     = {Secure Logging Schemes and {Certificate Transparency}},
+  booktitle = {ESORICS},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@misc{tor-browser,
+	author = {Mike Perry and Erinn Clark and Steven Murdoch and Georg Koppen},
+	title = {The Design and Implementation of the {Tor Browser [DRAFT]}},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://2019.www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{mani,
+  author    = {Akshaya Mani and T. Wilson{-}Brown and Rob Jansen and Aaron Johnson and Micah Sherr},
+  title     = {Understanding {Tor} Usage with Privacy-Preserving Measurement},
+  booktitle = {IMC},
+  year      = {2018},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{ct-root-landscape,
+  author    = {Nikita Korzhitskii and Niklas Carlsson},
+  title     = {Characterizing the Root Landscape of {Certificate Transparency} Logs},
+  booktitle = {IFIP Networking},
+  year      = {2020},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{spoiled-onions,
+  author    = {Philipp Winter and Richard K{\"{o}}wer and Martin Mulazzani and Markus Huber and Sebastian Schrittwieser and Stefan Lindskog and Edgar R. Weippl},
+  title     = {Spoiled Onions: Exposing Malicious {Tor} Exit Relays},
+  booktitle = {PETS},
+  year      = {2014},
+}
+
+@misc{gdca1-omission,
+	title = {Un-incorporated {SCTs} from {GDCA1}},
+	author = {Brendan McMillion},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-policy/Emh3ZaU0jqI}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{digicert-log-compromised,
+	title = {{CT2} Log Compromised via {Salt} Vulnerability},
+	author = {Jeremy Rowley},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-policy/aKNbZuJzwfM}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{izenpe-disqualified,
+	title = {Upcoming {CT} Log Removal: {Izenpe}},
+	author = {Ryan Sleevi},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-policy/qOorKuhL1vA}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{venafi-disqualified,
+	title = {Upcoming Log Removal: {Venafi} {CT} Log Server},
+	author = {Ryan Sleevi},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-policy/KMAcNT3asTQ}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{does-ct-break-the-web,
+  author    = {Emily Stark and Ryan Sleevi and Rijad Muminovic and Devon O'Brien and Eran Messeri and Adrienne Porter Felt and Brendan McMillion and Parisa Tabriz},
+  title     = {Does {Certificate Transparency} Break the Web? {Measuring} Adoption and Error Rate},
+  booktitle = {IEEE S\&P},
+  year      = {2019},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{https-sok,
+  author    = {Jeremy Clark and Paul C. van Oorschot},
+  title     = {{SoK:} {SSL} and {HTTPS:} Revisiting Past Challenges and Evaluating Certificate Trust Model Enhancements},
+  booktitle = {IEEE S\&P},
+  year      = {2013},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{ca-ecosystem,
+  author    = {Zakir Durumeric and James Kasten and Michael Bailey and J. Alex Halderman},
+  title     = {Analysis of the {HTTPS} certificate ecosystem},
+  booktitle = {IMC},
+  year      = {2013},
+}
+
+@article{ct/a,
+  author    = {Ben Laurie},
+  title     = {Certificate transparency},
+  journal   = {CACM},
+  volume    = {57},
+  number    = {10},
+  year      = {2014},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{tor,
+  author    = {Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson and Paul F. Syverson},
+  title     = {Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router},
+  booktitle = {USENIX Security},
+  year      = {2004},
+}
+
+@misc{rapid-tls13,
+	author = {Joseph A.\ Salowey and Sean Turner and Christopher A.\ Wood},
+	title = {{TLS} 1.3: One Year Later},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://www.ietf.org/blog/tls13-adoption}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{chrome-ui,
+	author = {Emily Schechter},
+	title = {Evolving {Chrome's} Security Indicators},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://blog.chromium.org/2018/05/evolving-chromes-security-indicators.html}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{firefox-ui,
+	author = {Johann Hofmann},
+	title = {Improved Security and Privacy Indicators in {Firefox} 70},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2019/10/15/improved-security-and-privacy-indicators-in-firefox-70/}, accessed 2020-12-15}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{le,
+  author    = {Josh Aas and Richard Barnes and Benton Case and Zakir Durumeric and Peter Eckersley and Alan Flores{-}L{\'{o}}pez and J. Alex Halderman and Jacob Hoffman{-}Andrews and James Kasten and Eric Rescorla and Seth D. Schoen and Brad Warren},
+  title     = {{Let's Encrypt}: An Automated Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web},
+  booktitle = {CCS},
+  year      = {2019},
+}
+
+@misc{google-metrics,
+	author = {{Google LLC}},
+	title = {{HTTPS} encryption on the web},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://transparencyreport.google.com/https/overview?hl=en}, accessed 2020-05-19},
+}
+
+@misc{mozilla-metrics,
+	author = {{Mozilla}},
+	title = {{SSL} Ratios},
+	howpublished = {\url{https://docs.telemetry.mozilla.org/datasets/other/ssl/reference.html}, accessed 2020-05-19},
+}
+
+@techreport{nordberg,
+  author      = {Linus Nordberg and Daniel Kahn Gillmor and Tom Ritter},
+  title       = {Gossiping in {CT}},
+  number      = {draft-ietf-trans-gossip-05},
+  type        = {Internet-draft},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  year        = {2018},
+  url         = {https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-trans-gossip-05}
+}
+
+@techreport{ct,
+	author = {Ben Laurie and Adam Langley and Emilia Kasper},
+	title =	 {{Certificate Transparency}},
+	number = {6962},
+	type = {RFC},
+	institution = {IETF},
+	year = {2013},
+	url = {https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962},
+}
+
+@techreport{ct/bis,
+  author      = {Ben Laurie and Adam Langley and Emilia Kasper and Eran Messeri and Rob Stradling},
+  title       = {{Certificate Transparency} Version 2.0},
+  number      = {draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-34},
+  type        = {Internet-draft},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  year        = {2019},
+  url         = {https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-34},
+}
+
+@techreport{hpkp,
+	author = {Chris Evans and Chris Palmer and Ryan Sleevi},
+	title = {Public Key Pinning Extension for {HTTP}},
+	number = {7469},
+	type = {RFC},
+	institution = {IETF},
+	year = {2015},
+	url = {https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7469},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{chuat,
+  author    = {Laurent Chuat and Pawel Szalachowski and Adrian Perrig and Ben Laurie and Eran Messeri},
+  title     = {Efficient Gossip Protocols for Verifying the Consistency of Certificate Logs},
+  booktitle = {CNS},
+  year      = {2015},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{TorDNS,
+  author    = {Benjamin Greschbach and Tobias Pulls and Laura M. Roberts and Philipp Winter and Nick Feamster},
+  title     = {The Effect of {DNS} on {Tor's} Anonymity},
+  booktitle = {NDSS},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{trickle02,
+  author = {Andrei Serjantov and Roger Dingledine and Paul Syverson},
+  title = {From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types},
+  booktitle = {IH},
+  year = {2002},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{kesdogan:ih1998,
+  title = {{Stop-and-Go} {MIX}es: Providing Probabilistic Anonymity in an Open System}, 
+  author = {Dogan Kesdogan and Jan Egner and Roland B\"uschkes}, 
+  booktitle = {IH},
+  year = {1998}, 
+}
+
+@inproceedings{danezis:pets2008,
+  author = {George Danezis and Paul Syverson},
+  title = {Bridging and Fingerprinting: Epistemic Attacks on Route Selection},
+  booktitle = {PETS},
+  year = {2008},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{long-paths,
+  author = 	 {Nathan S. Evans and Roger Dingledine and Christian Grothoff},
+  title = {A Practical Congestion Attack on {Tor} Using Long Paths},
+  booktitle = {USENIX Security},
+  year = {2009},
+}
+
+
+@misc{tor-documentation,
+  author = {{Tor Project}},
+  title = {Getting up to speed on {Tor's} past, present, and future},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/documentation.html.en}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{PIR,
+  author    = {Benny Chor and Oded Goldreich and Eyal Kushilevitz and Madhu Sudan},
+  title     = {Private Information Retrieval},
+  booktitle = {FOCS},
+  year      = {1995},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/pam/AmannS16,
+  author    = {Johanna Amann and Robin Sommer},
+  title     = {Exploring {Tor's} Activity Through Long-Term Passive {TLS} Traffic Measurement},
+  booktitle = {PAM},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{1mtrack,
+  author    = {Steven Englehardt and Arvind Narayanan},
+  title     = {Online Tracking: A 1-million-site Measurement and Analysis},
+  booktitle = {CCS},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@techreport{diginotar,
+  author = {J.R. Prins},
+  title = {{DigiNotar} Certificate Authority breach “Operation Black Tulip”}, 
+  institution = {Fox-IT},
+  year = {2011},
+  type = {Interim Report},
+}
+
+@misc{ffct,
+  author = {{Bugzilla}},
+  title = {Implement {Certificate Transparency} support ({RFC} 6962)},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1281469}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{fftor,
+  author = {{Mozilla}},
+  title = {Mozilla Research Grants {2019H1}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://mozilla-research.forms.fm/mozilla-research-grants-2019h1/forms/6510}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{zerotor,
+  author = {{Zerodium}},
+  title = {{Tor Browser} Zero-Day Exploit Bounty (Expired)},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://zerodium.com/tor.html}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{zeromain,
+  author = {{Zerodium}},
+  title = {Our Exploit Acquisition Program},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://zerodium.com/program.html}, accessed 2020-05-21},
+}
+
+@misc{lepop1,
+  author = {{Catalin Cimpanu}},
+  title = {Exploit vendor drops {Tor Browser} zero-day on {Twitter}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.zdnet.com/article/exploit-vendor-drops-tor-browser-zero-day-on-twitter/}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@misc{lepop2,
+  author = {{firstwatch at sigaint.org}},
+  title = {[tor-talk] Javascript exploit},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2016-November/042639.html}, accessed 2020-12-15},
+}
+
+@article{selfrando,
+  author    = {Mauro Conti and Stephen Crane and Tommaso Frassetto and Andrei Homescu and Georg Koppen and Per Larsen and Christopher Liebchen and Mike Perry and Ahmad{-}Reza Sadeghi},
+  title     = {Selfrando: Securing the {Tor Browser} against De-anonymization Exploits},
+  journal   = {PETS},
+  volume    = {2016},
+  number    = {4},
+}
diff --git a/summary/src/ctor/src/related.tex b/summary/src/ctor/src/related.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc5ae60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/ctor/src/related.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+\section{Related Work} \label{ctor:sec:related}
+The status quo is to consider a certificate CT compliant if it is accompanied by
+two independent SCTs~\cite{google-log-policy,apple-on-independence}.  Therefore we
+proposed that Tor Browser should do the same, but unlike any other CT-enforcing
+web browser CTor also provides concrete next steps that relax the centralized
+trust which is otherwise misplaced in CT logs~\cite{%
+	gdca1-omission,%
+	digicert-log-compromised,%
+	izenpe-disqualified,%
+	venafi-disqualified%
+}.  Several proposals surfaced that aim to do better with regards to omissions
+and split-views.
+
+% Privacy preserving inclusion proofs
+Laurie proposed that inclusion proofs could be fetched over DNS to avoid
+additional privacy leaks, i.e., a user's browsing patterns are already exposed
+to the DNS resolver but not the logs in the CT landscape~\cite{ct-over-dns}.
+CT/bis provides the option of serving stapled inclusion proofs as part of the
+TLS handshake in an extension, an OCSP response, or the certificate
+itself~\cite{ct/bis}. Lueks and Goldberg proposed that a separate database of
+inclusion proofs could be maintained that supports information-theoretic
+PIR~\cite{lueks-and-goldberg}. Kales~\emph{et~al.} improved scalability by
+reducing the size of each entry in the PIR database at the cost of transforming
+logs into multi-tier Merkle trees, and additionally showed how the upper tier
+could be expressed as a two-server computational PIR database to ensure that any
+inclusion proof can be computed privately on-the-fly~\cite{kales}.
+Nordberg~\emph{et~al.} avoid inclusion proof fetching by hanging on to presented
+SFOs, handing them back to the same origin at a later time~\cite{nordberg}. In
+contrast, CTor protects the user's privacy without any persistent browser state
+by submitting SFOs on independent Tor circuits to CTRs, which in turn add random
+noise before there is any log interaction.  The use of CTRs enable caching
+similar to CT-over-DNS, but it does not put the logs in the dark like PIR could.
+
+% The same consistent view
+Inclusion proofs are only meaningful if everyone observes the same consistent
+STHs. One option is to configure client software with a list of entities that
+they should gossip with, e.g., CT monitors~\cite{chase}, or, browser vendors
+could push a verified view~\cite{sth-push}. Such trusted auditor relationships
+may work for some but not others~\cite{nordberg}. Chuat~\emph{et~al.} proposed
+that HTTPS clients and HTTPS servers could pool STHs and consistency proofs,
+which are gossiped on website visits~\cite{chuat}. Nordberg~\emph{et~al.}
+suggested a similar variant, reducing the risk of user tracking by pooling fewer
+and recent STHs~\cite{nordberg}. Dahlberg~\emph{et~al.} noted that such
+privacy-insensitive STHs need not be encrypted, which could enable network
+operators to use programmable data planes to provide gossip
+as-a-service~\cite{dahlberg}. Syta~\emph{et~al.} proposed an alternative to
+reactive gossip mechanisms by showing how an STH can be cosigned efficiently by
+many independent witnesses~\cite{syta}. A smaller-scale version of witness
+cosigning could be instantiated by cross-logging STHs in other CT
+logs~\cite{minimal-gossip}, or in other append-only ledgers~\cite{catena}.
+CTor's full design (Section~\ref{ctor:sec:base}) ensures that anyone connected to the
+Tor network is on the same view by making STHs public in the Tor consensus.  In
+contrast, the first incremental design (Section~\ref{ctor:sec:incremental}) is not
+concerned with catching log misbehavior, while the second incremental design
+(also Section~\ref{ctor:sec:incremental}) exposes misbehaving logs \emph{without}
+first trying to fetch inclusion proofs.
+
+% Other work that is closely related to our approach
+Nordberg proposed that Tor clients could enforce public logging of consensus
+documents and votes~\cite{consensus-transparency}.  Such an initiative is mostly
+orthogonal to CTor, as it strengthens the assumption of a secure Tor consensus
+by enabling detection of compromised signing keys rather than mis-issued TLS
+certificates.  Winter~\emph{et~al.} proposed that Tor Browser could check
+self-signed TLS certificates for exact matches on independent Tor
+circuits~\cite{spoiled-onions}.  Alicherry~\emph{et~al.} proposed that any web
+browser could double-check TLS certificates on first encounter using alternative
+paths and Tor, again, looking for certificate mismatches and generating warnings
+of possible man-in-the-middle attacks~\cite{doublecheck}.  The submission phase
+in CTor is similar to double-checking, except that there are normally no TLS
+handshake blocking, browser warnings, or strict assumptions regarding the
+attacker's location.
+
+% Parallel to our work
+In parallel Stark and Thompson proposed that Chrome could submit a random subset
+of encountered SCTs to a trusted auditor that Google runs~\cite{stark}.  CTor
+also propagates a random subset of SCTs to a trusted auditor, but does so while
+preserving privacy because of and how Tor is used.  Meiklejohn additionally
+proposed witness cosigning on-top of consistent STHs~\cite{meiklejohn}.  CTor
+adds signatures on-top of STHs too, but only as part of the Tor consensus that
+directory authorities sign.
diff --git a/summary/src/introduction/img/contribs.pdf b/summary/src/introduction/img/contribs.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a7baa39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/introduction/img/contribs.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/introduction/img/contribs.svg b/summary/src/introduction/img/contribs.svg
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c05e93d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/introduction/img/contribs.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,2213 @@
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diff --git a/summary/src/introduction/main.tex b/summary/src/introduction/main.tex
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+\section{Introduction}
+
+The security posture of the Internet increased significantly throughout the
+last decade.  For example,
+  the cleaned-up and formally verified TLS 1.3 protocol that underpins HTTPS
+    has been rolled-out gradually~\cite{tls-timeline},
+  the certificates that specify which public keys to use when bootstrapping a
+    secure connection can be obtained for free and automatically~\cite{le}, and
+  web browsers have shifted from positive to negative security indicators in
+    favor of security-by-default~\cite{browser-ui}.
+The use of end-to-end encryption has further become the norm with services such
+as
+  DNS-over-HTTPS~\cite{rfc8484},
+  virtual private networks~\cite{wireguard},
+  Tor~\cite{tor}, and
+  secure messaging~\cite{mls}
+gaining traction.  In other words, the era of attackers that can passively snoop
+and actively tamper with unencrypted~network~traffic~is~over.
+
+What will remain the same is the incentive for attackers to snoop and tamper
+with network traffic.  Therefore, the focus is (and will likely continue to be)
+on circumventing protocols that add security and privacy as they are deployed
+in the real world.  For example, there is a long history of certificate
+mis-issuance that allows attackers to impersonate websites and thus insert
+themselves as machines-in-the-middle (``MitM'') without actually breaking
+TLS~\cite{sok-https,sslmate-history}.  Or, in the case of encrypted channels
+that are hard to intercept, instead analyzing traffic patterns to infer user
+activity like which website is being
+visited~\cite{cheng98,herrmann09,hintz02,liberatore06,panchenko11,sun02}.  The
+bad news is that attackers only need to find one vulnerability in a deployed
+protocol or its software.  Sometimes, such vulnerabilities can be purchased by
+zero-day brokers like Zerodium~\cite{zerodium}.
+
+To address an attack vector, it is common to add countermeasures that frustrate
+attackers and/or increase the risk involved while trying to exploit a system.
+A good example is how the certificate authority ecosystem evolved.  For
+background, certificate authorities are trusted parties that validate domain
+names before issuing certificates that list their public keys.  Web browsers
+are shipped with hundreds of trusted certificate authorities, which means that
+the resulting TLS connections cannot be more secure than the difficulty of
+hijacking the weakest-link certificate authority~\cite{sok-https}.  A proposal
+eventually deployed to mitigate this issue is Certificate Transparency: an
+ecosystem of public append-only logs that publishes all certificates so that
+any mis-issuance can be \emph{detected} by monitors~\cite {ct,rfc6962}.
+These logs have a cryptographic foundation that holds them and the issuing
+certificate authorities \emph{accountable}, at least in theory.  In practice,
+the logs are essentially trusted parties that must act honestly due to how web
+browsers shape their policies to respect user
+privacy~\cite{apple-log-policy,google-log-policy,sok-sct-auditing,ct-history}.
+
+The first objective of this thesis is to better understand the current limits
+of Certificate Transparency by proposing and evaluating improvements which
+\emph{reduce} the amount of trust that needs to be placed in third-party
+monitors and logs.  We make a dent in the problem of Certificate Transparency
+verification both generally and concretely in the context of Tor Browser, which
+unlike Google Chrome and Apple's Safari does not support Certificate
+Transparency yet.  For context, Tor Browser is a fork of
+Mozilla's Firefox that (among other things) routes user traffic through the
+low-latency anonymity network Tor~\cite{tor,tb}.  As part of our pursuit to
+improve the status quo for Certificate Transparency verification in Tor
+Browser, the second objective of this thesis is to evaluate how the protocols
+used during website visits affect unlinkability between senders (web browsers)
+and receivers (websites).  Our evaluation applies to our addition of
+Certificate Transparency and other protocols already in use, e.g.,
+  DNS,
+  real-time bidding~\cite{rtb}, and
+  certificate revocation checking~\cite{ocsp}.
+
+The remainder of the introductory summary is structured as follows.
+Section~\ref{sec:background} introduces background that will help the reader
+  understand the context and preliminaries of the appended papers.
+Section~\ref{sec:rqs} defines our research questions and overall objective.
+Section~\ref{sec:methods} provides an overview of our research methods.
+Section~\ref{sec:contribs} describes our contributions succinctly.
+Section~\ref{sec:appended} summarizes the appended papers that are published in
+  NordSec (Paper~\ref{paper:lwm}),
+  SECURWARE (Paper~\ref{paper:ctga}),
+  PETS (Paper~\ref{paper:ctor} and~\ref{paper:cat}),
+  WPES (Paper~\ref{paper:sauteed}), and
+  USENIX Security (Paper~\ref{paper:tlwo}).
+Section~\ref{sec:related} positions our contributions with regard to related
+work.  Section~\ref{sec:concl} concludes and briefly discusses future work.
+
+\section{Background} \label{sec:background}
+
+This section introduces background on Certificate Transparency and Tor.
+
+\subsection{Certificate Transparency}
+
+The web's public-key infrastructure depends on certificate authorities to issue
+certificates that map domain names to public keys.  For example, the
+certificate of \texttt{www.example.com} is issued by DigiCert and lists a
+2048-bit RSA key~\cite{crt:www.example.com}.  The fact that DigiCert signed
+this certificate means that they claim to have verified that the requesting
+party is really \texttt{www.example.com}, typically by first ensuring that a
+specified DNS record can be uploaded on request~\cite{ca/b}.  If all
+certificate authorities performed these checks correctly and the checks
+themselves were fool-proof, a user's browser could be sure that any
+certificate signed by a certificate authority would list a verified public key
+that can be used for authentication when connecting to a website via TLS.
+Unfortunately, there are hundreds of trusted certificate authorities and a long
+history of issues surrounding their operations in
+practice~\cite{bambo-cas,sok-https,sslmate-history}.  One of the most famous
+incidents took place in 2011: an attacker managed to mis-issue certificates from
+DigiNotar to intercept traffic towards Google and others in
+Iran~\cite{black-tulip}.  The astonishing part is that this incident was first
+detected \emph{seven weeks later}.
+
+Certificate Transparency aims to facilitate \emph{detection} of issued
+certificates, thus holding certificate authorities \emph{accountable} for any
+certificates that they mis-issue~\cite{ct,rfc6962}.  The basic idea is shown in
+Figure~\ref{fig:ct-idea}.  In addition to regular validation rules, browsers
+ensure certificates are included in a public append-only Certificate
+Transparency \emph{log}.
+This allows anyone to get a concise view of all certificates that users
+may encounter, including domain owners like Google who can then see for
+themselves whether any of the published certificates are mis-issued.  The
+parties inspecting the logs are called \emph{monitors}.  Some monitors mirror
+all log entries~\cite{crt.sh}, while others discard most of them in pursuit of
+finding matches for pre-defined criteria like
+\texttt{*.example.com}~\cite{certspotter}.  Another option is subscribing to
+certificate notifications from a trusted third-party~\cite{ct-monitors}.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+  \centering\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{src/introduction/img/ct}
+  \caption{%
+    The idea of Certificate Transparency.  Certificates encountered by users
+    must be included in a public log so that monitors can detect mis-issuance.
+  }
+  \label{fig:ct-idea}
+\end{figure}
+
+What makes Certificate Transparency a significant improvement compared to the
+certificate authority ecosystem is that the logs stand on a cryptographic
+foundation that can be verified.  A log can be viewed as an append-only
+tamper-evident list of certificates.  It is efficient\footnote{%
+  Efficient refers to space-time complexity $\mathcal{O}(\mathsf{log}(n))$,
+  where $n$ is the number of log entries.
+} to prove cryptographically that a certificate is in the list, and that a
+current version of the list is append-only with regard to a previous version
+(i.e., no tampering or reordering).\footnote{%
+  Interested readers can refer to our Merkle tree and proof technique
+  introduction online~\cite{merkle-intro}.
+} These properties follow from using a Merkle tree structure that supports
+\emph{inclusion} and \emph{consistency}
+proofs~\cite{history-trees,ct-formal,rfc6962,merkle}.
+The reader
+only needs to know that these proofs are used to reconstruct a log's Merkle tree
+head, often referred to as a \emph{root hash}.  It is a cryptographic hash
+identifying a list of certificates uniquely in a tree data structure.  The logs
+sign root hashes with the number of entries and a timestamp to form \emph{signed
+tree heads}.  So, if an inconsistency is discovered, it cannot be denied.  Log
+operators are therefore held accountable for maintaining the append-only
+property.  A party that verifies the efficient transparency log proofs without
+downloading all the logs is called an \emph{auditor}.
+
+A log that signs two inconsistent tree heads is said to perform a
+\emph{split-view}.  To ensure that everyone observes the same append-only logs,
+all participants of the Certificate Transparency ecosystem must engage in a
+\emph{gossip protocol}~\cite{chuat,nordberg}.  In other words, just because
+Alice observes an append-only log, it is not necessarily the \emph{same
+append-only log} that Bob observes.  Therefore, Alice and Bob must exchange
+signed tree heads and verify consistency to assert that the log operators play
+by the rules and only append certificates.  Without a secure gossip protocol,
+log operators would have to be trusted blindly (much like certificate
+authorities before Certificate Transparency).  RFC~6962 defers the specification
+of gossip~\cite{rfc6962}, with little or no meaningful gossip deployed yet.
+
+Rolling out Certificate Transparency without breakage on the web is a
+challenge~\cite{does-ct-break-the-web}.  Certificates must be logged, associated
+proofs delivered to end-user software, and more.  One solution RFC~6962
+ultimately put forth was the introduction of \emph{signed certificate
+timestamps}.  A signed certificate timestamp is a log's \emph{promise} that a
+certificate will be appended to the log within a \emph{maximum merge delay}
+(typically 24 hours).  Verifying if a log holds its promise is
+usually called \emph{auditing}.
+Certificate authorities can obtain signed certificate
+timestamps and embed them in their final certificates by logging a
+\emph{pre-certificate}.  As such, there is no added latency from building the
+underlying Merkle tree and no need for server software to be updated (as the
+final certificate contains the information needed).  The current policy for
+Google Chrome and Apple's Safari is to reject certificates with fewer than two
+signed certificate timestamps~\cite{apple-log-policy,google-log-policy}.  How to
+request an inclusion proof for a promise without leaking the user's browsing
+history to the log is an open problem~\cite{sok-sct-auditing}.  In other words,
+asking for an inclusion proof trivially reveals the certificate of interest to
+the log.
+
+Other than embedding signed certificate timestamps in certificates, they can be
+delivered dynamically to end-users in TLS extensions and stapled certificate
+status responses.  For example, Cloudflare uses the TLS extension delivery
+method to recover from log incidents without their customers needing to acquire
+new certificates~\cite{cloudflare-scts}.  Several log incidents have already
+happened in the past, ranging from
+split-views~\cite{trustasia-err,izenpe-err,venafi-err} to broken promises of
+timely logging~\cite{wosign-err,google-err,digicert-err,starcom-err} and
+potential key compromise~\cite{digicert-kc}.  These are all good \emph{scares}
+motivating continued completion of Certificate Transparency in practice.
+
+In summary, the status quo is for web browsers to require at least two signed
+certificate timestamps before accepting a certificate as valid.  Merkle tree
+proofs are not verified.  Gossip is not deployed.  The lack of a reliable
+\emph{gossip-audit model} means that the logs are largely trusted
+parties.\footnote{%
+  Historical remark: the lack of verification led Google to require that all
+  certificates be disclosed in at least one of their logs to
+  validate~\cite{ct-history}.  The so-called \emph{one-Google log requirement}
+  was recently replaced.  Google Chrome instead interacts with Google's trusted
+  auditor.  See Section~\ref{sec:related}.
+} We defer discussion of related work in the area of gossip-audit models until
+Section~\ref{sec:related}.
+
+\subsection{Tor}
+
+The Tor Project is a 501(c)(3) US nonprofit that advances human rights and
+defends privacy online through free software and open networks~\cite{tpo}.  Some
+of the maintained and developed components include Tor Browser and Tor's relay
+software.  Thousands of volunteers operate relays as part of the Tor network,
+which routes the traffic of millions of daily users with low
+latency~\cite{mani}.  This frustrates attackers like Internet service providers
+that may try linking \emph{who is communicating with whom} from their local
+(non-global) vantage points~\cite{tor}.
+
+Usage of Tor involves tunneling the TCP traffic of different destinations (such
+as all flows associated with a website visit to \texttt{example.com}) in
+fixed-size \emph{cells} on independent \emph{circuits}.  A circuit is built
+through a guard, a middle, and an exit relay.  At each hop of the circuit, one
+layer of symmetric encryption is peeled off.  The used keys are ephemeral and
+discarded together with all other circuit state after at most 10 minutes (the
+maximum circuit lifetime).  This setup allows guard relays to observe users' IP
+addresses but none of the destination traffic.  In contrast, exit relays can
+observe destination traffic but no user IP addresses.  The relays used in a
+circuit are determined by Tor's end-user software.  Such path selection
+is randomized and bandwidth-weighted but starts with a largely static guard set
+to protect users from \emph{eventually} entering the network from a relay an
+attacker volunteered to run.
+
+Tor's \emph{consensus} lists the relays that make up the network.  As the name
+suggests, it is a document agreed upon by a majority of trusted \emph{directory
+authorities}.  Five votes are currently needed to reach a consensus.  Examples
+of information added to the Tor consensus include tunable network parameters and
+uploaded relay descriptors with relevant metadata, e.g., public key, available
+bandwidth, and exit policy.  Each relay in the consensus is also assigned
+different flags based on their configuration and observed performance, e.g.,
+\texttt{Guard}, \texttt{MiddleOnly}, \texttt{Fast}, \texttt{Stable}, and
+\texttt{HSDir}.  The latter means that the relay is a \emph{hidden service
+directory}, which refers to being part of a distributed hash table that helps
+users lookup \emph{onion service introduction points}.
+
+An onion service is a self-authenticated server identified by its public key.
+Onion services are only reachable through the Tor network.  Users that are aware
+of a server's \emph{onion address} can consult the distributed hash table to
+find its introduction points.  To establish a connection, a user builds a
+circuit to a \emph{rendezvous point}.  A request is then sent to one of the
+current introduction points, which informs the onion service that it may build
+its own circuit to meet the user at their rendezvous point.  In total, six
+relays are traversed while interacting with an onion service.  This setup allows
+not only the sender but also the receiver to be anonymous.  The receiver also
+benefits from a large degree of censorship resistance as the server location may
+be hidden.  The main drawback of onion services is that their non-mnemonic names
+are hard to discover and remember.  Some sites try to overcome this by setting
+their onion addresses in \emph{onion location} HTTP headers or HTML
+attributes~\cite{onion-location}.
+
+Many users use Tor Browser to connect to the Tor network.  In addition to
+routing traffic as described above, Tor Browser ships with privacy-preserving
+features like first-party isolation to not share any state across
+different origins, settings that frustrate browser fingerprinting, and
+\emph{disk-avoidance} to not store browsing-related history as well as other
+identifying information to disk~\cite{tb}.  Tor Browser is a fork of Mozilla's
+Firefox.  Unfortunately, neither Firefox nor Tor Browser supports any form of
+Certificate Transparency.  Conducting undetected machine-in-the-middle attacks
+against Tor users is thus relatively straightforward: compromise or coerce the
+weakest-link certificate authority, then volunteer to operate an exit relay and
+intercept network traffic.  Such interception has previously been found with
+self-signed certificates~\cite{spoiled-onions}.
+
+While global attackers are not within Tor's threat model, it is in scope to
+guard against various local attacks~\cite{tor}.  For example, the intended
+attacker may passively observe a small fraction of the network and actively
+inject their own packets.  Figure~\ref{fig:wf} shows the typical attacker
+setting of \emph{website fingerprinting}, where the attacker observes a user's
+entry traffic with the goal of inferring which website was visited solely based
+on analyzing encrypted
+traffic~\cite{cheng98,herrmann09,hintz02,liberatore06,panchenko11,sun02}.
+Website fingerprinting attacks are evaluated in the \emph{open-world} or
+\emph{closed-world} settings.  In the closed-world setting, the attacker
+monitors (not to be confused with Certificate Transparency monitoring) a fixed
+list of websites.  A user visits one of the monitored sites, and the attacker
+needs to determine which one.  The open-world setting is the same as the
+closed-world setting, except that the user may also visit unmonitored sites.
+The practicality of website fingerprinting attacks is up for debate, e.g.,
+ranging from challenges handling false positives to machine-learning dataset
+drift~\cite{onlinewf,juarez14,perryCrit,realistic}.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+  \centering\includegraphics[width=0.85\textwidth]{src/cat/img/setting}
+  \caption{
+    The setting of a website fingerprinting attack.  A local passive attacker
+    analyzes a user's encrypted network traffic as it enters the network.  The
+    goal is to infer which website is visited.  (Figure reprinted from
+    Paper~\ref{paper:cat}.)
+  }
+  \label{fig:wf}
+\end{figure}
+
+In summary, Tor is a low-latency anonymity network often accessed with Tor
+Browser.  Among the threats that Tor aims to protect against are local attackers
+that see traffic as it enters or leaves the network (but not both at the same
+time all the time).  A website fingerprinting attack is an example of a passive
+attack that operates on entry traffic.  A machine-in-the-middle attack is an
+example of an active attack that typically operates on exit traffic.  Discussion
+of related work in the area of website fingerprinting is deferred until
+Section~\ref{sec:related}.
+
+\section{Research Questions} \label{sec:rqs}
+
+The overall research objective spans two different areas: transparency logs and
+low-latency anonymity networks.  We aim to reduce trust assumptions in
+transparency log solutions and to apply such solutions in anonymous settings for
+improved security and privacy.  We defined the following research questions to
+make this concrete in Certificate Transparency and Tor, the two ecosystems with
+the most history and dominant positions in their respective areas.
+
+\begin{researchquestions}
+  \item[Can trust requirements in Certificate Transparency be reduced in
+    practice?]
+
+  Transparency logs have a cryptographic foundation that supports efficient
+  verification of inclusion and consistency proofs.  Such proofs are useful to
+  reduce the amount of trust that is placed in the logs.  The roll-out of
+  Certificate Transparency has yet to start using these proofs, and to employ a
+  gossip protocol that ensures the same append-only logs are observed.  Part of
+  the challenge relates to privacy concerns as parties interact with each other,
+  as well as deploying gradually without breakage.
+
+  We seek practical solutions that reduce the trust requirements currently
+  placed in the logs and third-party monitors while preserving user privacy.
+
+  \item[How can authentication of websites be improved in the context of Tor?]
+
+  Tor Browser has yet to support Certificate Transparency to facilitate
+  detection of hijacked websites.  This includes HTTPS sites but also onion
+  services that may be easier to discover reliably with more transparency.
+
+  We seek incremental uses of Certificate Transparency in Tor that preserve user
+  privacy while engaging in new verification protocols to reduce trust.
+
+  \item[How do the protocols used during website visits affect
+    unlinkability between Tor users and their destination websites?]
+
+  Several third-parties become aware of a user's browsing activities while a
+  website is visited.  For example, DNS resolvers and certificate status
+  responders may be consulted for domain name resolution and verification of if
+  a certificate has been revoked.  Fetching an inclusion proof from a
+  Certificate Transparency log would reveal the same type of information.
+
+  We seek to explore how unlinkability between Tor users and their exit
+  destinations is affected by the multitude of protocols used during website
+  visits.  The considered setting is the same as in website fingerprinting,
+  except that the attacker may take additional passive and active measures.
+  For example, the attacker may volunteer to run a Certificate Transparency log
+  (passive) or inject carefully-crafted packets into Tor~(active).
+\end{researchquestions}
+
+\section{Research Methods} \label{sec:methods}
+
+We tackle privacy and security problems in the field of computer
+science~\cite{icss,smics}.  Our work is applied, following the scientific method
+for security and experimental networking research.  \emph{Exactly} what it means
+to use the scientific method in these areas is up for debate~\cite{rfenr,sse}.
+However, at a glance, it is about forming precise and consistent theories with
+falsifiable predictions \emph{as in other sciences} except that the objects of
+study are \emph{information systems in the real world}.
+
+A prerequisite to formulating precise, consistent, and falsifiable theories is
+that there are few implicit assumptions.  Therefore, scientific security
+research should be accompanied by definitions of security goals and attacker
+capabilities: what does it mean that the system is secure, and what is the
+attacker (not) allowed to do while attacking it~\cite{secdefs}?  Being explicit about the
+overall \emph{setting} and \emph{threat model} is prevalent in formal security
+work like cryptography, where an abstract (mathematical) model is used to show
+that security can be \emph{proved} by reducing to a computationally hard problem
+(like integer factorization) or a property of some primitive (like the collision
+resistance of a hash function)~\cite{provsec}.  It is nevertheless just as crucial in less
+formal work that deals with security of systems in the real (natural)
+world---the exclusive setting of the scientific method---which usually lends
+itself towards break-and-fix cycles in light of new observations.  Where to draw
+the line between \emph{security work} and \emph{security research} is not
+trivial.  However, a few common \emph{failures} of past ``security research''
+include not bringing observations in contact with theory, not making claims and
+assumptions explicit, or simply relying on unfalsifiable claims~\cite{sse}.
+
+While deductive approaches (like formal reduction proofs) are instrumental in
+managing complexity and gaining confidence in different models, more than these
+approaches are required as a model's \emph{instantiation} must also be secure~\cite{secdefs}.
+It is common to complement abstract modeling with \emph{real-world measurements}
+as well as \emph{systems prototyping and evaluations}~\cite{rfenr}.  Real-world
+measurements measure properties of deployed systems like the Internet, the web,
+and the Tor network.  For example, a hypothesis in a real-world measurement
+could be that (non-)Tor users browse according to the same website popularity
+distribution.  Sometimes these measurements involve the use of research
+prototypes, or the research prototypes themselves become the objects of study to
+investigate properties of selected system parts (say, whether a packet processor
+with new features is indistinguishable from some baseline as active network
+attackers adaptively inject packets of their choosing).  If it is infeasible,
+expensive, or unsafe (see below) to study a real-world system, a simulation may
+be studied instead.  The downside of simulation is that the model used may not
+be a good approximation of the natural world, similar to formal
+cryptographic~modeling.
+
+The appended papers use all of the above approaches to make claims about
+security, privacy, and performance in different systems, sometimes with regard
+to an abstract model that can be used as a foundation in the natural world to
+manage complexity.  Paper~\ref{paper:lwm} contains a reduction proof sketch to
+show reliance on standard cryptographic assumptions.  Paper~\ref{paper:cat}
+extends past simulation setups to show the impact of an added attacker
+capability.  Meanwhile, Paper~\ref{paper:ctor} models part of the Tor network
+with mathematical formulas to estimate performance overhead.  All but
+Paper~\ref{paper:sauteed} contain real-world measurements relating to Internet
+infrastructure, websites, certificates, Tor, or practical deployability of our
+proposals.  All but Paper~\ref{paper:ctor} contain research prototypes with
+associated evaluations, e.g., performance profiling, as well as corroborating or
+refuting our security definitions in experimental settings.  All papers include
+discussions of security and privacy properties as well as their limitations and
+strengths in the chosen settings (where assumptions are explicit and threat
+models motivated).
+
+Throughout our experiments, we strived to follow best practices like documenting
+the used setups, making datasets and associated tooling available, reducing
+potential biases by performing repeated measurements from multiple different
+vantage points, and discussing potential biases (or lack thereof)~\cite{rfenr}.
+We also interacted with Tor's research safety board~\cite{trsb} to discuss the
+ethics and safety of our measurements in Paper~\ref{paper:tlwo}, and refrained
+from measuring real (i.e., non-synthetic) usage of Tor whenever possible
+(Papers~\ref{paper:ctor} and~\ref{paper:cat}).  Finally, the uncovered bugs and
+vulnerabilities in Papers~\ref{paper:cat}--\ref{paper:tlwo} were responsibly
+disclosed to the Tor project.  This included suggestions on how to move forward.
+
+\section{Contributions} \label{sec:contribs}
+
+The main contributions of this thesis are listed below.  An overview of how they
+relate to our research questions and appended papers is shown in
+Figure~\ref{fig:contrib}.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+  \centering
+  \includegraphics[width=0.83\textwidth]{src/introduction/img/contribs}
+  \caption{%
+    Overview of appended papers, contributions, and research questions.
+  }
+  \label{fig:contrib}
+\end{figure}
+
+\vspace{1cm}
+\begin{contributions}
+  \item[Reduced trust in third-party monitoring with a signed tree head
+    extension that shifts trust from non-cryptographic certificate notifications
+    to a log's gossip-audit model (or if such a model does not exist yet, the
+    logs themselves).]
+
+    Paper~\ref{paper:lwm} applies existing cryptographic techniques for
+    constructing static and lexicographically ordered Merkle trees so that
+    certificates can be wild-card filtered on subject alternative names with
+    (non-)membership proofs.  This building block is evaluated in the context of
+    Certificate Transparency, including a security sketch and performance
+    benchmarks.
+
+  \item[Increased probability of split-view detection by proposing gossip
+    protocols that disseminate signed tree heads without bidirectional
+    communication.]
+
+    Paper~\ref{paper:ctga} explores aggregation of signed tree heads at line
+    speed in programmable packet processors, facilitating consistency proof
+    verification on the level of an entire autonomous system.  Such verification
+    can be indistinguishable from an autonomous system without any split-view
+    detection to achieve herd immunity, i.e., protection without aggregation.
+    Aggregation at 32 autonomous systems can protect 30-50\% of the IPv4 space.
+    Paper~\ref{paper:ctor} explores signed tree heads in Tor's consensus.  To
+    reliably perform an undetected split-view against log clients that have Tor
+    in their trust root, a log must collude with a majority of directory
+    authorities.
+
+  \item[Improved detectability of website hijacks targeting Tor Browser by
+    proposing privacy-preserving and gradual roll-outs of Certificate
+    Transparency in Tor.]
+
+    Paper~\ref{paper:ctor} explores adoption of Certificate Transparency in Tor
+    Browser with signed certificate timestamps as a starting point, then
+    leveraging the decentralized network of relays to cross-log certificates
+    before ultimately verifying inclusion proofs against a single view in Tor's
+    consensus.  The design is probabilistically secure with tunable parameters
+    that result in modest overheads.  Paper~\ref{paper:sauteed} shows that
+    Certificate Transparency logging of domain names with associated onion
+    addresses helps provide forward censorship-resistance and detection of
+    unwanted onion associations.
+
+  \item[An extension of the attacker model for website fingerprinting that
+    provides attackers with the capability of querying a website oracle.]
+
+    A website oracle reveals whether a monitored website was (not) visited by
+    any network user during a specific time frame.  Paper~\ref{paper:cat}
+    defines and simulates website fingerprinting attacks with website oracles,
+    showing that most false positives can be eliminated for all but the most
+    frequently visited websites.  A dozen sources of real-world website oracles
+    follow from the protocols used during website visits.  We enumerate and
+    classify those sources based on ease of accessibility, reliability, and
+    coverage.  The overall analysis includes several Internet measurements.
+
+  \item[Remotely-exploitable probing-attacks on Tor's DNS cache that instantiate
+    a real-world website oracle without any special attacker capabilities or reach.]
+
+    Paper~\ref{paper:cat} shows that timing differences in end-to-end response
+    times can be measured to determine whether a domain name is (not) cached by
+    a Tor relay.  An estimated true positive rate of 17.3\% can be achieved
+    while trying to minimize false positives.  Paper~\ref{paper:tlwo} improves
+    the attack by exploiting timeless timing differences that depend on
+    concurrent processing.  The improved attack has no false positives or false
+    negatives.  Our proposed bug fixes and mitigations have been merged in Tor.
+
+  \item[A complete redesign of Tor's DNS cache that defends against all (timeless)
+    timing attacks while retaining or improving performance compared~to~today.]
+
+    Paper~\ref{paper:tlwo} suggests that Tor's DNS cache should only share the
+    same preloaded domain names across different circuits to remove the
+    remotely-probable state that reveals information about past exit traffic.  A
+    network measurement with real-world Tor relays shows which popularity lists
+    are good approximations of Tor usage and, thus, appropriate to preload.
+    Cache-hit ratios can be retained or improved compared to today's Tor.
+\end{contributions}
+
+\section{Summary of Appended Papers} \label{sec:appended}
+
+The appended papers and their contexts are summarized below.  Notably, all
+papers are in publication-date order except that Paper~\ref{paper:cat} predates
+Papers~\ref{paper:ctor}--\ref{paper:sauteed}.
+
+{
+  \hypersetup{linkcolor=black}
+  \listofsummaries
+}
+
+\section{Related Work} \label{sec:related}
+
+This section positions the appended papers with regard to related work.  For
+Certificate Transparency, this includes approaches towards signed certificate
+timestamp verification, gossip, and the problem of monitoring the logs.  The
+related work with regard to Tor is focused on the practicality of website
+fingerprinting attacks and prior use of side-channels (such as timing attacks).
+
+\subsection{Certificate Transparency Verification}
+
+Approaches that fetch inclusion proofs have in common that they should preserve
+privacy by not revealing the link between users and visited websites.
+Eskandarian~\emph{et~al.}\ mention that Tor could be used to overcome privacy
+concerns; however, it comes at the cost of added infrastructure
+requirements~\cite{eskandarian}.  Lueks and Goldberg~\cite{lueks} and
+Kales~\emph{et~al.}~\cite{kales} suggest that logs could provide inclusion
+proofs using multi-server private information retrieval.  This requires a
+non-collusion assumption while also adding significant overhead.
+Laurie suggests that users can fetch inclusion proofs via DNS as their resolvers
+already learned the destination sites~\cite{ct-over-dns}.  While surveying
+signed certificate timestamp auditing,
+Meiklejohn~\emph{et~al.}\ point out that Certificate Transparency over DNS may
+have privacy limitations~\cite{sok-sct-auditing}.  For example, the time of
+domain lookups and inclusion proof queries are detached.
+Paper~\ref{paper:ctga} uses Laurie's approach as a premise while
+proposing a gossip protocol.
+Paper~\ref{paper:ctor} applies Certificate Transparency in a context
+where Tor is not additional infrastructure~(Tor~Browser).
+
+Several proposals try to avoid inclusion proof fetching altogether.
+Dirksen~\emph{et~al.}\ suggest that all logs could be involved in the issuance of
+a signed certificate timestamp~\cite{dirksen}.  This makes it harder to violate
+maximum merge delays without detection but involves relatively large changes to
+log deployments.  Nordberg~\emph{et~al.}\ suggest that signed certificate
+timestamps can be handed back to the origin web servers on subsequent
+revisits~\cite{nordberg}, which has the downside of assuming that
+machine-in-the-middle attacks eventually cease for detection.
+Nordberg~\emph{et~al.}~\cite{nordberg} as well as Chase and
+Meiklejohn~\cite{chase} suggest that some clients/users could collaborate with a
+trusted auditor.  Stark and Thompson describe how users can opt-in to use Google
+as a trusted auditor~\cite{opt-in-sct-auditing}.  This approach was recently
+replaced by opt-out auditing that cross-checks a fraction of signed
+certificate timestamps with Google using
+k-anonymity~\cite{opt-out-sct-auditing}.  Henzinger~\emph{et al.} show how such
+k-anonymity can be replaced with a single-server private information retrieval
+setup that approaches the performance of prior multi-server
+solutions~\cite{henzinger}.  None of the latter two proposals provide a solution
+for privately reporting that a log may have violated its maximum merge delay
+because the trusted auditor is assumed to know about all signed certificate
+timestamps.  Eskandarian~\emph{et~al.}\ show how to prove that a log omitted a
+certificate privately~\cite{eskandarian}.  However, they use an invalid
+assumption about today's logs being in strict timestamp
+order~\cite{sok-sct-auditing}.  Paper~\ref{paper:ctor} suggests that Tor Browser
+could submit a fraction of signed certificate timestamps to randomly selected
+Tor relays.  These relays perform further auditing on Tor Browser's behalf: much
+like a trusted auditor, except that no single entity is running it.
+
+Merkle trees fix log content---not promises of logging.  Therefore,
+inclusion proof fetching by users or their trusted parties must be accompanied
+by consistency verification and gossip to get a complete gossip-audit
+model~\cite{rfc6962}.  Chuat~\emph{et~al.}\ suggest that users and web servers
+can pool signed tree heads, gossiping about them as they interact~\cite{chuat}.
+Nordberg~\emph{et~al.}\ similarly suggest that users can pollinate signed tree
+heads as they visit different web servers~\cite{nordberg}.  Hof and Carle
+suggest that signed tree heads could be cross-logged to make all logs
+intertwined~\cite{hof}.  Gunn~\emph{et~al.}\ suggest multi-path fetching of
+signed tree heads~\cite{gunn}, which may make persistent split-views hard
+depending on the used multi-paths.  Syta~\emph{et~al.}\ suggest that independent
+witnesses could cosign the logs using threshold signatures~\cite{syta}.
+Smaller-scale versions of witness cosigning received attention in
+industry~\cite{sigsum-witness,trustfabric-arxiv}, and generally in other types
+of transparency logs as well~\cite{parakeet}.  Larger browser vendors could
+decide to push the same signed tree heads to their users, as proposed by Sleevi
+and Messeri~\cite{sth-push}.  Paper~\ref{paper:ctga} uses the operators of
+network vantage points for aggregating and verifying signed tree heads to
+provide their users with gossip-as-a-service, however assuming plaintext
+DNS traffic and a sound signed tree head frequency as defined by
+Nordberg~\emph{et~al.}~\cite{nordberg}.  We used the multi-path assumptions of
+Gunn~\emph{et~al.}\ to break out of local vantage points.  In contrast,
+Paper~\ref{paper:ctor} ensures that the same logs are observed in the Tor
+network by incorporating signed tree heads into Tor's consensus (thus making
+directory authorities into witnesses).
+
+Li~\emph{et~al.}\ argue that it would be too costly for most domains to run a
+monitor~\cite{li}.\footnote{%
+  Whether the third-party monitors in this study misbehaved or not can be
+  questioned~\cite{ayer-on-li}.
+} Similar arguments have been raised before, and lead to alternative data
+structures that could make monitoring more efficient than today's
+overhead~\cite{vds,coniks,tomescu}.  Paper~\ref{paper:lwm} falls into this
+category, as the root of an additional static lexicographically-ordered Merkle
+tree is added to a log's signed tree heads to encode batches of included
+certificates.  The downside is that a non-deployed signed tree head extension is
+assumed~\cite{rfc9162}, as well as a tree head frequency similar to those
+described by Nordberg
+\emph{et~al.}~\cite{nordberg}~to~get~efficiency~in~practise.
+
+Paper~\ref{paper:sauteed} uses a Mozilla Firefox web extension to verify
+embedded signed certificate timestamps in Tor Browser.  Such verification is
+similar to the gradual deployments of Certificate Transparency in other
+browsers~\cite{ct-history,does-ct-break-the-web}, and the starting point to
+improve upon in Papers~\ref{paper:ctga}--\ref{paper:ctor}.  Moreover, the use of
+Certificate Transparency to associate human-meaningful domain names with
+non-mnemonic onion addresses (as in Paper~\ref{paper:sauteed}) is one of many
+proposals for alternative naming systems and onion search
+solutions~\cite{kadianakis,muffet-onions,nurmi,onion-location,h-e-securedrop,onio-ns}.
+
+\subsection{Website Fingerprinting and Side-Channels}
+
+Several researchers outline how past website fingerprinting attacks have been
+evaluated in unrealistic conditions~\cite{juarez14,perryCrit,realistic}.
+This includes not accounting for the size of the open-world setting, failing to
+keep false positive rates low enough to be useful, assuming that homepages are
+browsed one at a time, how to avoid dataset drift, and training classifiers on
+synthetic network traces.  While some of these challenges were
+addressed~\cite{onlinewf,realistic}, the question of how to deal with false
+positives remains open.  Papers~\ref{paper:cat}--\ref{paper:tlwo} make a
+significant dent in this problem by providing evidence that the website
+fingerprinting attacker model could be made \emph{stronger} to capture
+\emph{realistic real-world capabilities} that eliminate most false positives
+around Alexa top-10k and the long tail~of~unpopular~sites.
+
+Others have evaluated traffic analysis attacks against Tor beyond the website
+fingerprinting setting.  On one side of the spectrum are end-to-end
+correlation/confirmation attacks that typically consider a global passive
+attacker that observes all network
+traffic~\cite{johnson13,nasr18,oh22,rimmer22}.  Such strong attackers are not
+within the scope of Tor~\cite{tor}.  On the other side of the spectrum are local
+attackers that see a small fraction of the network, typically in a position to
+observe a user's encrypted entry traffic (Figure~\ref{fig:wf}).  Many have
+studied those \emph{weak attacks} in lab settings where, e.g., advances in deep
+learning improved the accuracy significantly~\cite{wfdef,tiktok,df}.  Others
+have focused on improved attacks that are \emph{active} in the Tor network from
+their own local vantage points~\cite{chakravarty10,mittal11,murdoch05}, which is
+similar to the techniques in Papers~\ref{paper:cat}--\ref{paper:tlwo}.
+Greschbach~\emph{et~al.}\ show that an attacker who gains access to (or traffic
+to~\cite{siby20}) commonly used DNS resolvers like Google's \texttt{8.8.8.8} get
+valuable information to improve both end-to-end correlation and website
+fingerprinting attacks~\cite{greschbach}.  Paper~\ref{paper:cat} generalizes the
+attacker capability they uncovered by allowing the attacker to query Tor's
+receiver anonymity set with a website oracle of time-frame~$t$.  It is further
+shown that it is possible to instantiate such an abstraction in the real-world
+while \emph{staying within Tor's threat model}.  In other words, the attacker is
+still local but may employ passive and active measures to narrow down the
+receiver anonymity set.  Paper~\ref{paper:ctor} proposes Certificate
+Transparency verification that gives log operators website oracle access.
+Tor's directory authorities tune $t$.
+
+Website oracles exist because Tor is designed for anonymity---not unobservable
+communication~\cite{anonterm}.  The instantiation of a real-world website oracle
+is either a direct result of observing network flows from the protocols
+used during website visits, or due to state of these network flows being stored
+and inferable.  Inferring secret system state is widely studied in applied
+cryptography and hardware
+architecture~\cite{lucky13,ge18,kocher96,mart21,tsunoo03,heist}, where the goal
+is usually to determine a key, decrypt a ciphertext, forge a message, or similar
+using side-channels.  A side-channel can be local or remote and ranges from
+analysis of power consumption to cache states and timing differences.  There is
+a long history of remote timing attacks that are
+practical~\cite{bbrumley11,dbrumley03,crosby09,wang22}.  A recent improvement in
+this area that is relevant for Tor is timeless timing attacks, which exploit
+concurrency and message reordering to eliminate network jitter~\cite{timeless}.
+Paper~\ref{paper:cat} demonstrates a remote timing attack against Tor's DNS
+cache that achieves up to 17.3\% true positive rates while minimizing false
+positives.  Paper~\ref{paper:tlwo} instead uses a remote timeless timing attack
+with no false positives, no false negatives, and a small time-frame $t$.  This
+approaches an ideal website oracle without special attacker capabilities or
+reach into third-parties.
+
+\section{Conclusions and Future Work} \label{sec:concl}
+
+Throughout the thesis, we contributed to the understanding of how trust
+requirements in Certificate Transparency can be reduced.  Efficient and reliable
+monitoring of the logs is easily overlooked.  If the broader ecosystem achieves
+monitoring through third-parties, they should be subject to the same scrutiny as
+logs.  We proposed a solution that makes it hard for third-party monitors to
+provide subscribers with selective certificate notifications.  We also proposed
+a gossip-audit model that plugs into interacting with the logs over DNS by
+having programmable packet processors verify that the same append-only logs are
+observed.  Avoiding the addition of complicated verification logic into end-user
+software is likely a long-term win because it reduces the number of moving
+parts.  In other words, simple gossip-audit models will be much easier to deploy
+in the wide variety of end-user software that embeds TLS clients.
+
+We also contributed to the understanding of how Certificate Transparency can be
+applied in the context of Tor Browser.  Compared to a regular browser, this
+results in a different setting with its own challenges and opportunities.  On
+the one hand, Tor Browser benefits from the ability to preserve privacy due to
+using the anonymity network Tor.  On the other hand, data relating to
+website visits cannot be persisted to disk (such as signed certificate
+timestamps blocked by maximum merge delays).  Our incrementally-deployable
+proposal keeps the logic in Tor Browser simple by offloading all Certificate
+Transparency verification to randomly selected Tor relays.  The design is
+complete because mis-issued certificates can eventually reach a trusted auditor
+who acts on incidents.  In addition to proposing Certificate Transparency in Tor
+Browser, we also explored how certificates with onion addresses may improve the
+association of domain names with onion addresses.  Such certificates ensure
+domain owners know which onion addresses can be discovered for their sites, much
+like Certificate Transparency does the same thing for public TLS keys.  This
+also adds censorship resistance to the discovery as logs are append-only.
+
+As part of exploring Certificate Transparency in Tor Browser, we further
+contributed to the understanding of how the protocols used during website visits
+affect unlinkability between Tor users and their destination websites.  For
+example, fetching an inclusion proof from a Certificate Transparency log is one
+such protocol.  We extended the attacker model of website fingerprinting attacks
+with website oracles that reveal whether any network user visited a website
+during a specific time frame.  Our results show that website oracles eliminate
+most false positives for all but the most frequently visited websites.  In
+addition to the theoretical evaluation of the extended attacker model, we could
+exploit (timeless) timing attacks in Tor's DNS cache to instantiate real-world
+website oracles without any special capabilities or reach into third-parties.
+This led us to contribute to the understanding of how Tor's DNS cache performs
+today, including a proposal for a performant alternative that preloads the same
+popular domains on all Tor relays to withstand all (timeless) timing attacks.
+
+As an outlook, our angle on Certificate Transparency verification has mostly
+been \emph{reactive} for end-users.  In other words, some or all certificate
+verification occurs asynchronously after a website visit.  An alternative to
+this would be upfront delivery of inclusion proofs that reconstruct tree heads
+which witnesses cosigned; a form of \emph{proactive} gossip as proposed by
+Syta~\emph{et al.}~\cite{syta}.  The significant upside is that the browser's
+verification could become non-interactive, eliminating privacy concerns and
+ensuring end-users only see certificates merged into the append-only logs.
+Investigating what the blockers for such a proposal are in
+practice---today---would be valuable as log verification quickly becomes
+complicated with signed certificate timestamps and reactive gossip-audit models.
+Are these blockers significant?  Are they significant over time as other
+\emph{eventual} changes will be needed, like post-quantum secure certificates?
+New transparency log applications are unlikely to need the complexity of
+Certificate Transparency, and should likely not copy something that was designed
+to fit into an existing system with a large amount of legacy (such as
+certificate authorities, their established processes for certificate issuance,
+and the many client-server implementations already deployed on the Internet).
+
+Orthogonal to the verification performed by end-users, contributing to the
+understanding of how domains (fail to) use Certificate Transparency for
+detecting mis-issued certificates is largely unexplored.  For example,
+subscribing to email notifications of newly issued certificates becomes less
+useful in an era where certificates are renewed frequently and automatically.
+Instead, domain owners need easy-to-use solutions that raise alarms only if
+there is a problem.
+
+Finally, the mitigation deployed to counter our (timeless) timing attacks in
+Tor's DNS cache is just that: a mitigation, not a defense, that applies to
+modestly popular websites but not the long tail where the base rate is low.
+This is because the attacker's needed website oracle time frame is so large that
+a fuzzy time-to-live value does nothing.  Practical aspects of a preloaded DNS
+cache need to be explored further before deployment, such as the assumption of a
+third-party that visits popular domains to assemble an allowlist.  We may also
+have \emph{underestimated} the utility of the existing Umbrella list, which in
+and of itself does not require any new third-party.  Does the use of Umbrella
+impact page-load latency?  Latency is the most crucial parameter to keep
+minimized.  The question is whether frequently looked-up domains are missed or
+not by skipping the website-visit step, as for the non-extended Alexa and Tranco
+lists.
+
+More broadly, the question of how to strike a balance between \emph{efficiency}
+and \emph{effectiveness} of website fingerprinting defenses is open.  How much
+overhead in terms of added latency and/or bandwidth is needed?  How much of that
+overhead is sustainable, both from a user perspective (where, e.g., latency is
+crucial for web browsing and other interactive activities) and a network health
+perspective (such as the amount of volunteered relay bandwidth that is wasted)?  It is
+paramount to neither overestimate nor underestimate attacker capabilities, which
+goes back to the still-debated threat model of website fingerprinting attacks.
+Regardless of if Tor's DNS cache becomes preloaded or not, it will be difficult
+to circumvent DNS lookups from happening.  Someone---be it a weak attacker like
+ourselves or a recursive DNS resolver at an Internet service provider---is in a
+position to narrow down the destination anonymity set.  This is especially true
+when also considering other protocols that reveal information about the
+destination anonymity set during website visits.  Accepting that sources of
+real-world website oracles are prevalent implies that \emph{the world can be
+closed}.  Therefore, a closed world is more realistic than an open world.
+
+\subsection*{Acknowledgments}
+I received valuable feedback while writing the introductory summary from
+  Simone Fischer-H\"{u}bner
+  Johan Garcia,
+  Stefan Lindskog, and
+  Tobias Pulls.
+The final draft was further improved with helpful nudges from Grammarly.
+
+\bibliographystyle{plain}
+\bibliography{src/introduction/refs}
diff --git a/summary/src/introduction/refs.bib b/summary/src/introduction/refs.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc31dd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/introduction/refs.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,954 @@
+%%%
+% Certificate transparency
+%%%
+@techreport{rfc6962,
+  author      = {Ben Laurie and Adam Langley and Emilia Kasper},
+  title       = {{Certificate Transparency}},
+  number      = {6962},
+  type        = {RFC},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  year        = {2013},
+  url         = {https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962},
+}
+
+@techreport{rfc9162,
+  author      = {Ben Laurie and Eran Messeri and Rob Stradling},
+  title       = {{Certificate Transparency} Version 2.0},
+  number      = {9162},
+  type        = {RFC},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  year        = {2021},
+  url         = {https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc9162},
+}
+
+@misc{google-log-policy,
+  author       = {{Google LLC.}},
+  title        = {{Certificate Transparency} in {Chrome}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://googlechrome.github.io/CertificateTransparency/ct_policy.html}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{apple-log-policy,
+  author       = {{Apple Inc.}},
+  title        = {Apple's {Certificate Transparency} Policy},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT205280}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{ct-monitors,
+  author = {{Google LLC.}},
+  title = {The list of existing monitors},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://certificate.transparency.dev/monitors/}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{sslmate-history, 
+  author       = {{SSLMate Inc.}},
+  title        = {Timeline of Certificate Authority Failures},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://sslmate.com/resources/certificate_authority_failures}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{merkle-intro,
+  author = {Rasmus Dahlberg},
+  title = {Transparency log preliminaries},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://gitlab.torproject.org/rgdd/ct/-/blob/main/doc/tlog-preliminaries.md}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@article{ct,
+  author    = {Ben Laurie},
+  title     = {{Certificate Transparency}},
+  journal   = {CACM},
+  volume    = {57},
+  number    = {10},
+  year      = {2014},
+}
+
+@article{ct-history,
+  author    = {Emily Stark and
+               Joe DeBlasio and
+               Devon O'Brien and
+               Davide Balzarotti and
+               William Enck and
+               Samuel King and
+               Angelos Stavrou},
+  title     = {{Certificate Transparency} in {Google Chrome}: Past, Present, and Future},
+  journal   = {{IEEE} {S\&P}},
+  volume    = {19},
+  number    = {6},
+  year      = {2021},
+}
+
+@article{sok-sct-auditing,
+  author    = {Sarah Meiklejohn and
+               Joe DeBlasio and
+               Devon O'Brien and
+               Chris Thompson and
+               Kevin Yeo and
+               Emily Stark},
+  title     = {{SoK}: {SCT} Auditing in {Certificate Transparency}},
+  journal   = {PETS},
+  volume    = {2022},
+  number    = {3},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{does-ct-break-the-web,
+  author    = {Emily Stark and Ryan Sleevi and Rijad Muminovic and Devon O'Brien and Eran Messeri and Adrienne Porter Felt and Brendan McMillion and Parisa Tabriz},
+  title     = {Does {Certificate Transparency} Break the Web? {Measuring} Adoption and Error Rate},
+  booktitle = {IEEE S\&P},
+  year      = {2019},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{ct-formal,
+  author    = {Benjamin Dowling and
+    Felix G{\"{u}}nther and
+    Udyani Herath and
+    Douglas Stebila},
+  title     = {Secure Logging Schemes and {Certificate Transparency}},
+  booktitle = {ESORICS},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@techreport{nordberg,
+  author      = {Linus Nordberg and Daniel Kahn Gillmor and Tom Ritter},
+  title       = {Gossiping in {CT}},
+  number      = {draft-ietf-trans-gossip-05},
+  type        = {Internet-draft},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  year        = {2018},
+  url         = {https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-trans-gossip-05}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{chuat,
+  author    = {Laurent Chuat and Pawel Szalachowski and Adrian Perrig and Ben Laurie and Eran Messeri},
+  title     = {Efficient Gossip Protocols for Verifying the Consistency of Certificate Logs},
+  booktitle = {CNS},
+  year      = {2015},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{gunn,
+  author    = {Lachlan J. Gunn and Andrew Allison and Derek Abbott},
+  title     = {Safety in Numbers: Anonymization Makes Keyservers Trustworthy},
+  booktitle = {HotPETs},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@article{hof,
+  author    = {Benjamin Hof and Georg Carle},
+  title     = {Software Distribution Transparency and Auditability},
+  journal   = {CoRR},
+  volume    = {abs/1711.07278},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{syta,
+  author    = {Ewa Syta and Iulia Tamas and Dylan Visher and David Isaac Wolinsky and Philipp Jovanovic and Linus Gasser and Nicolas Gailly and Ismail Khoffi and Bryan Ford},
+  title     = {Keeping Authorities "Honest or Bust" with Decentralized Witness Cosigning},
+  booktitle = {IEEE S\&P},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@article{trustfabric-arxiv,
+  author       = {Sarah Meiklejohn and
+                  Pavel Kalinnikov and
+                  Cindy S. Lin and
+                  Martin Hutchinson and
+                  Gary Belvin and
+                  Mariana Raykova and
+                  Al Cutter},
+  title        = {Think Global, Act Local: Gossip and Client Audits in Verifiable Data Structures},
+  journal      = {CoRR},
+  volume       = {abs/2011.04551},
+  year         = {2020},
+}
+
+@misc{sigsum-witness,
+  author       = {Sigsum Project Contributors},
+  title        = {Witness {API} v0},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://git.glasklar.is/sigsum/project/documentation/-/blob/main/witness.md}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{parakeet,
+  author       = {Harjasleen Malvai and
+                  Lefteris Kokoris{-}Kogias and
+                  Alberto Sonnino and
+                  Esha Ghosh and
+                  Ercan Ozt{\"{u}}rk and
+                  Kevin Lewi and
+                  Sean F. Lawlor},
+  title        = {Parakeet: Practical Key Transparency for End-to-End Encrypted Messaging},
+  booktitle    = {{NDSS}},
+  year         = {2023},
+}
+
+@article{dirksen,
+  author       = {Alexandra Dirksen and
+                  David Klein and
+                  Robert Michael and
+                  Tilman Stehr and
+                  Konrad Rieck and
+                  Martin Johns},
+  title        = {{LogPicker}: Strengthening {Certificate Transparency} Against Covert Adversaries},
+  journal      = {PETS},
+  volume       = {2021},
+  number       = {4},
+}
+
+@misc{ct-over-dns,
+  author = {Ben Laurie},
+  title  = {{Certificate Transparency} over {DNS}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/blob/master/dns/draft-ct-over-dns.md}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{lueks,
+  author    = {Wouter Lueks and Ian Goldberg},
+  title     = {Sublinear Scaling for Multi-Client Private Information Retrieval},
+  booktitle = {FC},
+  year      = {2015},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{kales,
+  author    = {Daniel Kales and Olamide Omolola and Sebastian Ramacher},
+  title     = {Revisiting User Privacy for {Certificate Transparency}},
+  booktitle = {IEEE EuroS\&P},
+  year      = {2019},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{henzinger,
+  author    = {Alexandra Henzinger and Matthew M. Hong and Henry Corrigan-Gibbs and Sarah Meiklejohn and Vinod Vaikuntanathan},
+  title     = {One Server for the Price of Two: Simple and Fast Single-Server Private Information Retrieval},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX Security}},
+  year      = {2023},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{chase,
+  author    = {Melissa Chase and Sarah Meiklejohn},
+  title     = {Transparency Overlays and Applications},
+  booktitle = {CCS},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@article{eskandarian,
+  author       = {Saba Eskandarian and
+                  Eran Messeri and
+                  Joseph Bonneau and
+                  Dan Boneh},
+  title        = {{Certificate Transparency} with Privacy},
+  journal      = {PETS},
+  volume       = {2017},
+  number       = {4},
+}
+
+@misc{opt-in-sct-auditing,
+  title = {Opt-in {SCT} Auditing},
+  author = {Emily Stark and Chris Thompson},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://docs.google.com/document/d/1G1Jy8LJgSqJ-B673GnTYIG4b7XRw2ZLtvvSlrqFcl4A/edit}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{opt-out-sct-auditing,
+  title = {Opt-out {SCT} Auditing in {Chrome}},
+  author = {Joe DeBlasio},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://docs.google.com/document/d/16G-Q7iN3kB46GSW5b-sfH5MO3nKSYyEb77YsM7TMZGE/edit}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{sth-push,
+  author       = {Ryan Sleevi and Eran Messeri},
+  title        = {{Certificate Transparency} in {Chrome}: Monitoring {CT} Logs consistency},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FP5J5Sfsg0OR9P4YT0q1dM02iavhi8ix1mZlZe_z-ls/edit?pref=2&pli=1}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{crt.sh,
+  author       = {{Sectigo Limited}},
+  title        = {{crt.sh}: certificate search},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/crtsh}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{certspotter,
+  author       = {{SSLMate Inc.}},
+  title        = {Cert Spotter---{Certificate Transparency} Monitor},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/SSLMate/certspotter}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{vds,
+  author        = {Adam Eijdenberg and Ben Laurie and Al Cutter},
+  title         = {Verifiable Data Structures},
+  howpublished  = {\url{https://github.com/google/trillian/blob/master/docs/papers/VerifiableDataStructures.pdf}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{coniks,
+  author       = {Marcela S. Melara and
+                  Aaron Blankstein and
+                  Joseph Bonneau and
+                  Edward W. Felten and
+                  Michael J. Freedman},
+  title        = {{CONIKS:} Bringing Key Transparency to End Users},
+  booktitle    = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year         = {2015},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{tomescu,
+  author       = {Alin Tomescu and
+                  Vivek Bhupatiraju and
+                  Dimitrios Papadopoulos and
+                  Charalampos Papamanthou and
+                  Nikos Triandopoulos and
+                  Srinivas Devadas},
+  title        = {Transparency Logs via Append-Only Authenticated Dictionaries},
+  booktitle    = {{CCS}},
+  year         = {2019},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{li,
+  author       = {Bingyu Li and
+                  Jingqiang Lin and
+                  Fengjun Li and
+                  Qiongxiao Wang and
+                  Qi Li and
+                  Jiwu Jing and
+                  Congli Wang},
+  title        = {{Certificate Transparency} in the Wild: Exploring the Reliability of Monitors},
+  booktitle    = {{CCS}},
+  year         = {2019},
+}
+
+@misc{ayer-on-li,
+  author = {Andrew Ayer},
+  title  = {Reliability of Monitors | Mitigations},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/ct-policy/c/zCtQrn_7QK8}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{cloudflare-scts,
+  author       = {Nick Sullivan},
+  title        = {Understanding use-cases for {SCTs} delivered via {OCSP} stapling for {TLS} extension},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/ct-policy/c/WX6iZt7uJBs}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{izenpe-err,
+  author       = {Ryan Sleevi},
+  title        = {Upcoming {CT} Log Removal: {Izenpe}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-policy/qOorKuhL1vA}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{venafi-err,
+  author       = {Ryan Sleevi},
+  title        = {Upcoming Log Removal: {Venafi CT} Log Server},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-policy/KMAcNT3asTQ}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{trustasia-err,
+  author       = {Andrew Ayer},
+  title        = {{Trust Asia} 2021 has produced inconsistent {STHs}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/ct-policy/c/VJaSg717m9g}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{google-err,
+  author       = {Paul Hadfield},
+  title        = {Google {Aviator} incident under investigation},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/ct-policy/c/ZZf3iryLgCo/m/mi-4ViMiCAAJ}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{starcom-err,
+  author       = {Ryan Sleevi},
+  title        = {{StartCom} Log misbehaving: Failure to incorporate {SCTs}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/ct-policy/c/92HIh2vG6GA/m/hBEHxcpoCgAJ}, accessed 2023-04-30}},
+}
+
+@misc{wosign-err,
+  author       = {Graham Edgecombe},
+  title        = {{WoSign} log failure to incorporate entry within the {MMD}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/ct-policy/c/-eV4Xe8toVk/m/pC5gSjJKCwAJ}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{digicert-err,
+  author       = {Andrew Ayer},
+  title        = {Retiring {DigiCert} Log Server (aka {``CT1''}) in {Chrome}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/ct-policy/c/P5aj4JEBFPM/m/9AEcvY01EQAJ}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{digicert-kc,
+  title        = {{CT2} Log Compromised via {Salt} Vulnerability},
+  author       = {Jeremy Rowley},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-policy/aKNbZuJzwfM}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+%%%
+% Tor and traffic analysis
+%%%
+@misc{tpo,
+  author = {Tor Project},
+  title = {Browse Privately.  {Explore} Freely.  {Defend} yourself against tracking and surveillance. {Circumvent} censorship.},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.torproject.org/}, accessed 2022-04-30},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{tor,
+  author    = {Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson and Paul F. Syverson},
+  title     = {Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX Security}},
+  year      = {2004},
+}
+
+@misc{tb,
+  author       = {Mike Perry and Erinn Clark and Steven Murdoch and Georg Koppen},
+  title        = {The Design and Implementation of the {Tor Browser [DRAFT]}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://2019.www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{mani,
+  author    = {Akshaya Mani and
+               T. Wilson{-}Brown and
+               Rob Jansen and
+               Aaron Johnson and
+               Micah Sherr},
+  title     = {Understanding {Tor} Usage with Privacy-Preserving Measurement},
+  booktitle = {{IMC}},
+  year      = {2018}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{johnson13,
+  author    = {Aaron Johnson and Chris Wacek and Rob Jansen and Micah Sherr and Paul F. Syverson},
+  title     = {Users get routed: traffic correlation on {Tor} by realistic adversaries},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2013}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{nasr18,
+  author    = {Milad Nasr and Alireza Bahramali and Amir Houmansadr},
+  title     = {{DeepCorr}: Strong Flow Correlation Attacks on {Tor} Using Deep Learning},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2018}
+}
+
+@article{rimmer22,
+  author       = {Vera Rimmer and
+                  Theodor Schnitzler and
+                  Tom van Goethem and
+                  Abel Rodr{\'{\i}}guez Romero and
+                  Wouter Joosen and
+                  Katharina Kohls},
+  title        = {Trace Oddity: Methodologies for Data-Driven Traffic Analysis on {Tor}},
+  journal      = {PETS},
+  volume       = {2022},
+  number       = {3},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{oh22,
+  author       = {Se Eun Oh and
+                  Taiji Yang and
+                  Nate Mathews and
+                  James K. Holland and
+                  Mohammad Saidur Rahman and
+                  Nicholas Hopper and
+                  Matthew Wright},
+  title        = {{DeepCoFFEA}: Improved Flow Correlation Attacks on {Tor} via Metric Learning and Amplification},
+  booktitle    = {{IEEE} {S\&P}},
+  year         = {2022},
+}
+
+@article{cheng98,
+  title   = {Traffic analysis of {SSL} encrypted web browsing},
+  author  = {Cheng, Heyning and Avnur, Ron},
+  journal = {Project paper, University of Berkeley},
+  year    = {1998}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{herrmann09,
+  author    = {Dominik Herrmann and Rolf Wendolsky and Hannes Federrath},
+  title     = {Website fingerprinting: attacking popular privacy enhancing technologies with the multinomial na{\"{\i}}ve-bayes classifier},
+  booktitle = {{CCSW}},
+  year      = {2009}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{hintz02,
+  author    = {Andrew Hintz},
+  title     = {Fingerprinting Websites Using Traffic Analysis},
+  booktitle = {{PETS}},
+  year      = {2002}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{liberatore06,
+  author    = {Marc Liberatore and Brian Neil Levine},
+  title     = {Inferring the source of encrypted {HTTP} connections},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2006}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{panchenko11,
+  author    = {Andriy Panchenko and Lukas Niessen and Andreas Zinnen and Thomas Engel},
+  title     = {Website fingerprinting in onion routing based anonymization networks},
+  booktitle = {{WPES}},
+  year      = {2011}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{sun02,
+  author    = {Qixiang Sun and Daniel R. Simon and Yi{-}Min Wang and Wilf Russell and Venkata N. Padmanabhan and Lili Qiu},
+  title     = {Statistical Identification of Encrypted Web Browsing Traffic},
+  booktitle = {{IEEE S\&P}},
+  year      = {2002}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{juarez14,
+  author    = {Marc Ju{\'{a}}rez and Sadia Afroz and Gunes Acar and Claudia D{\'{\i}}az and Rachel Greenstadt},
+  title     = {A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2014},
+}
+
+@misc{perryCrit,
+  author       = {Mike Perry},
+  title        = {A Critique of Website Traffic Fingerprinting Attacks},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://blog.torproject.org/critique-website-traffic-fingerprinting-attacks}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@article{realistic,
+  author    = {Tao Wang and Ian Goldberg},
+  title     = {On Realistically Attacking {Tor} with Website Fingerprinting},
+  journal   = {PETS},
+  volume    = {2016},
+  number    = {4},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{onlinewf,
+  title={Online Website Fingerprinting: Evaluating Website Fingerprinting Attacks on {Tor} in the Real World},
+  author={Cherubin, Giovanni and Jansen, Rob and Troncoso, Carmela},
+  booktitle={{USENIX Security}},
+  year={2022}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{df,
+  author    = {Payap Sirinam and
+               Mohsen Imani and
+               Marc Ju{\'{a}}rez and
+               Matthew Wright},
+  title     = {Deep Fingerprinting: Undermining Website Fingerprinting Defenses with
+               Deep Learning},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2018}
+}
+
+@article{tiktok,
+  author    = {Mohammad Saidur Rahman and
+               Payap Sirinam and
+               Nate Mathews and
+               Kantha Girish Gangadhara and
+               Matthew Wright},
+  title     = {{Tik-Tok}: The Utility of Packet Timing in Website Fingerprinting Attacks},
+  journal   = {{PETS}},
+  volume    = {2020},
+  number    = {3},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{wfdef,
+  title={{SoK}: A Critical Evaluation of Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defenses},
+  author={Mathews, Nate and Holland, James K and Oh, Se Eun and Rahman, Mohammad Saidur and Hopper, Nicholas and Wright, Matthew},
+  booktitle = {{IEEE} S{\&}P},
+  year={2023}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{spoiled-onions,
+  author    = {Philipp Winter and Richard K{\"{o}}wer and Martin Mulazzani and Markus Huber and Sebastian Schrittwieser and Stefan Lindskog and Edgar R. Weippl},
+  title     = {Spoiled Onions: Exposing Malicious {Tor} Exit Relays},
+  booktitle = {PETS},
+  year      = {2014},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{murdoch05,
+  author       = {Steven J. Murdoch and George Danezis},
+  title        = {Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of {Tor}},
+  booktitle    = {{IEEE S\&P}},
+  year         = {2005},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{chakravarty10,
+  author       = {Sambuddho Chakravarty and Angelos Stavrou and Angelos D. Keromytis},
+  title        = {Traffic Analysis against Low-Latency Anonymity Networks Using Available Bandwidth Estimation},
+  booktitle    = {{ESORICS}},
+  year         = {2010},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{mittal11,
+  author       = {Prateek Mittal and
+                  Ahmed Khurshid and
+                  Joshua Juen and
+                  Matthew Caesar and
+                  Nikita Borisov},
+  title        = {Stealthy traffic analysis of low-latency anonymous communication using throughput fingerprinting},
+  booktitle    = {{CCS}},
+  year         = {2011},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{greschbach,
+  author    = {Benjamin Greschbach and
+               Tobias Pulls and
+               Laura M. Roberts and
+               Phillip Winter and
+               Nick Feamster},
+  title     = {The Effect of {DNS} on {Tor}'s Anonymity},
+  booktitle = {{NDSS}},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{siby20,
+  author    = {Sandra Siby and Marc Ju{\'{a}}rez and Claudia D{\'{\i}}az and Narseo Vallina{-}Rodriguez and Carmela Troncoso},
+  title     = {Encrypted {DNS} -{\textgreater} Privacy? {A} Traffic Analysis Perspective},
+  booktitle = {NDSS},
+  year      = {2020},
+}
+
+@misc{anonterm,
+  title={A terminology for talking about privacy by data minimization: Anonymity, unlinkability, undetectability, unobservability, pseudonymity, and identity management},
+  author={Pfitzmann, Andreas and Hansen, Marit},
+  publisher={Dresden, Germany},
+  year={2010},
+}
+
+###
+# Side-channels
+###
+@inproceedings{kocher96,
+  author       = {Paul C. Kocher},
+  title        = {Timing Attacks on Implementations of {Diffie-Hellman}, {RSA}, {DSS}, and Other Systems},
+  booktitle    = {{CRYPTO}},
+  year         = {1996},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{dbrumley03,
+  author       = {David Brumley and Dan Boneh},
+  title        = {Remote Timing Attacks Are Practical},
+  booktitle    = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year         = {2003},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{tsunoo03,
+  author       = {Yukiyasu Tsunoo and
+                  Teruo Saito and
+                  Tomoyasu Suzaki and
+                  Maki Shigeri and
+                  Hiroshi Miyauchi},
+  title        = {Cryptanalysis of {DES} Implemented on Computers with Cache},
+  booktitle    = {{CHES}},
+  year         = {2003},
+}
+
+@article{crosby09,
+  author       = {Scott A. Crosby and Dan S. Wallach and Rudolf H. Riedi},
+  title        = {Opportunities and Limits of Remote Timing Attacks},
+  journal      = {{ACM} Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur.},
+  volume       = {12},
+  number       = {3},
+  year         = {2009},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{bbrumley11,
+  author       = {Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri},
+  title        = {Remote Timing Attacks Are Still Practical},
+  booktitle    = {{ESORICS}},
+  year         = {2011},
+}
+
+@article{ge18,
+  author       = {Qian Ge and
+                  Yuval Yarom and
+                  David A. Cock and
+                  Gernot Heiser},
+  title        = {A survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware},
+  journal      = {JCEN},
+  volume       = {8},
+  number       = {1},
+  year         = {2018},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{mart21,
+  author       = {Macarena C. Mart{\'{\i}}nez{-}Rodr{\'{\i}}guez and
+                  Ignacio M. Delgado{-}Lozano and
+                  Billy Bob Brumley},
+  title        = {{SoK}: Remote Power Analysis},
+  booktitle    = {{ARES}},
+  year         = {2021},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{lucky13,
+  author       = {Nadhem J. AlFardan and Kenneth G. Paterson},
+  title        = {Lucky Thirteen: Breaking the {TLS} and {DTLS} Record Protocols},
+  booktitle    = {{IEEE} {S\&P}},
+  year         = {2013},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{heist,
+  author    = {Mathy Vanhoef and Tom Van Goethem},
+  title     = {{HEIST}: {HTTP} Encrypted Information can be
+Stolen through {TCP}-windows},
+  booktitle = {Black Hat US Briefings},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{timeless,
+  author    = {Tom van Goethem and Christina P{\"{o}}pper and Wouter Joosen and Mathy Vanhoef},
+  title     = {Timeless Timing Attacks: Exploiting Concurrency to Leak Secrets over Remote Connections},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year      = {2020},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{wang22,
+  author       = {Yingchen Wang and
+                  Riccardo Paccagnella and
+                  Elizabeth Tang He and
+                  Hovav Shacham and
+                  Christopher W. Fletcher and
+                  David Kohlbrenner},
+  title        = {Hertzbleed: Turning Power Side-Channel Attacks Into Remote Timing Attacks on x86},
+  booktitle    = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year         = {2022},
+}
+
+%%%
+% Research methods
+%%%
+@inproceedings{sse,
+  author    = {Cormac Herley and Paul C. van Oorschot},
+  title     = {{SoK}: Science, Security and the Elusive Goal of Security as a Scientific Pursuit},
+  booktitle = {{IEEE} {S\&P}},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{smics,
+  author    = {Dodig-Crnkovic, Gordana},
+  title     = {Scientific methods in computer science},
+  booktitle = {Proceedings of the Conference for the Promotion of Research in IT at New Universities and at University Colleges in Sk\"{o}vde, Sweden},
+  year      = {2002},
+}
+
+@article{icss,
+  author  = {Denning, Peter J},
+  title   = {Is computer science science?},
+  journal = {CACM},
+  volume  = {48},
+  number  = {4},
+  year    = {2005},
+}
+
+@article{rfenr,
+  author    = {Vaibhav Bajpai and
+               Anna Brunstr{\"{o}}m and
+               Anja Feldmann and
+               Wolfgang Kellerer and
+               Aiko Pras and
+               Henning Schulzrinne and
+               Georgios Smaragdakis and
+               Matthias W{\"{a}}hlisch and
+               Klaus Wehrle},
+  title     = {The Dagstuhl beginners guide to reproducibility for experimental networking research},
+  journal   = {CCR},
+  volume    = {49},
+  number    = {1},
+  year      = {2019},
+}
+
+% "There are several reasons why definitions are important [...]"
+% "[...] focusing their efforts on devising attacks that are outside the model"
+@article{secdefs,
+  author       = {Neal Koblitz and Alfred Menezes},
+  title        = {Another look at security definitions},
+  journal      = {AMC},
+  volume       = {7},
+  number       = {1},
+  year         = {2013},
+}
+
+% §1.1 gives the background of the first reduction proofs / provable security
+@article{provsec,
+  author       = {Neal Koblitz and
+                  Alfred Menezes},
+  title        = {Another Look at ``Provable Security''},
+  journal      = {J. Cryptol.},
+  volume       = {20},
+  number       = {1},
+  year         = {2007},
+}
+
+
+%%%
+% Naming of onion services
+%%%
+@misc{onion-location,
+  author       = {Tor Project},
+  title        = {{Onion-Location}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/advanced/onion-location/}, accessed 2023-04-30}, 
+}
+
+@misc{kadianakis,
+  author       = {George Kadianakis and Yawning Angel and David Goulet},
+  title        = {A Name System {API} for {Tor} Onion Services},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec/-/blob/main/proposals/279-naming-layer-api.txt}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{muffet-onions,
+  author       = {Alec Muffett},
+  title        = {Real-World Onion Sites},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/alecmuffett/real-world-onion-sites}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@phdthesis{nurmi,
+  author = {Nurmi, Juha},
+  title  = {Understanding the Usage of Anonymous Onion Services},
+  year   = {2019},
+  school = {Tampere University, Finland},
+}
+
+@Misc{h-e-securedrop,
+  author       = {SecureDrop},
+  title        = {Getting an Onion Name for Your {SecureDrop}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://securedrop.org/faq/getting-onion-name-your-securedrop/}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@article{onio-ns,
+  author    = {Jesse Victors and Ming Li and Xinwen Fu},
+  title     = {The Onion Name System},
+  journal   = {PETS},
+  volume    = {2017},
+  number    = {1},
+}
+
+%%%
+% Other
+%%%
+@inproceedings{le,
+  author    = {Josh Aas and
+               Richard Barnes and
+               Benton Case and
+               Zakir Durumeric and
+               Peter Eckersley and
+               Alan Flores{-}L{\'{o}}pez and
+               J. Alex Halderman and
+               Jacob Hoffman{-}Andrews and
+               James Kasten and
+               Eric Rescorla and
+               Seth D. Schoen and
+               Brad Warren},
+  title     = {{Let's Encrypt}: An Automated Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2019},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{sok-https,
+  author    = {Jeremy Clark and Paul C. van Oorschot},
+  title     = {{SoK}: {SSL} and {HTTPS:} Revisiting Past Challenges and Evaluating Certificate Trust Model Enhancements},
+  booktitle = {{IEEE} {S\&P}},
+  year      = {2013},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{browser-ui,
+  author    = {Emanuel von Zezschwitz and Serena Chen and Emily Stark},
+  title     = {``{It} builds trust with the customers''---Exploring User Perceptions of the Padlock Icon in Browser {UI}},
+  booktitle = {{IEEE} SPW},
+  year      = {2022},
+}
+
+@article{tls-timeline,
+  author    = {Ralph Holz and
+               Jens Hiller and
+               Johanna Amann and
+               Abbas Razaghpanah and
+               Thomas Jost and
+               Narseo Vallina{-}Rodriguez and
+               Oliver Hohlfeld},
+  title     = {Tracking the deployment of {TLS} 1.3 on the web: a story of experimentation and centralization},
+  journal   = {CCR},
+  volume    = {50},
+  number    = {3},
+  year      = {2020},
+}
+
+@misc{mls,
+  author       = {Nick Sullivan and Sean Turner},
+  title        = {Messaging Layer Security: Secure and Usable End-to-End Encryption},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.ietf.org/blog/mls-secure-and-usable-end-to-end-encryption/}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{wireguard,
+  author    = {Jason A. Donenfeld},
+  title     = {WireGuard: Next Generation Kernel Network Tunnel},
+  booktitle = {{NDSS}},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@techreport{rfc8484,
+  author       = {Paul Hoffman and Patrick McManus},
+  title        = {{DNS} Queries over {HTTPS} ({DoH})},
+  number       = {8484},
+  type         = {RFC},
+  institution  = {IETF},
+  year         = {2018},
+  howpublished = {https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8484},
+}
+
+@misc{zerodium,
+  author       = {{Zerodium}},
+  title        = {We pay big bounties},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://zerodium.com/}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{ca/b,
+  author       = {{CA/Browser Forum}},
+  title        = {Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Certificates},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.8.7.pdf}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@misc{crt:www.example.com,
+  author       = {{Sectigo Limited}},
+  title        = {crt.sh: certificate search {ID = '8913351873'}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://crt.sh/?id=8913351873}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{merkle,
+  author    = {Ralph C. Merkle},
+  title     = {A Digital Signature Based on a Conventional Encryption Function},
+  booktitle = {{CRYPTO}},
+  year      = {1987},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{history-trees,
+  author    = {Scott A. Crosby and Dan S. Wallach},
+  title     = {Efficient Data Structures For Tamper-Evident Logging},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year      = {2009},
+}
+
+@techreport{black-tulip,
+  author       = {Hans Hoogstraaten},
+  title        = {Black Tulip---Report of the investigation into the {DigiNotar} Certificate Authority breach},
+  institution  = {Fox-IT},
+  year         = {2012},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{bambo-cas,
+  author    = {Henry Birge{-}Lee and
+               Yixin Sun and
+               Anne Edmundson and
+               Jennifer Rexford and
+               Prateek Mittal},
+  title     = {Bamboozling Certificate Authorities with {BGP}},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX Security}},
+  year      = {2018},
+}
+
+@article{rtb,
+  author    = {Jun Wang and
+               Weinan Zhang and
+               Shuai Yuan},
+  title     = {Display Advertising with Real-Time Bidding {(RTB)} and Behavioural
+               Targeting},
+  journal   = {Foundations and Trends in Information Retrieval},
+  year      = {2017}
+}
+
+@techreport{ocsp,
+  author      = {Santesson, Stefan and Myers, Michael and Ankney, Rich and Malpani, Ambarish and Galperin, Slava and Adams, Carlisle},
+  title       = {X.509 {Internet} Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol---{OCSP}},
+  number      = {6960},
+  type        = {RFC},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  year        = {2013},
+  url         = {https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2560},
+}
+
+@misc{trsb,
+  author = {Tor Project},
+  title = {Research Safety Board},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://research.torproject.org/safetyboard/}, accessed 2023-04-30},
+}
diff --git a/summary/src/lwm/.gitignore b/summary/src/lwm/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bb88c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/lwm/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+main.pdf
+*.blg
+*.bbl
+*.fls
+*.fdb_latexmk
+*.log
+*.out
+*.aux
+*.swp
diff --git a/summary/src/lwm/img/mt.tex b/summary/src/lwm/img/mt.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a62b333
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/lwm/img/mt.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+\begin{tikzpicture}[
+  sibling distance=32pt,
+  -latex,
+  apnode/.style = {
+    draw=black,
+    dashed,
+  },
+  ap/.style = {
+    draw=black,
+    dashed,
+  },
+]
+  \Tree [
+    .$r\gets\hash(h_{ab}\concat h_{cd})$ [
+      .\node[apnode]{$h_{ab}\gets\hash(h_a\concat h_b)$}; [
+        .$h_a\gets\hash(a)$
+      ] [
+        .$h_b\gets\hash(b)$
+      ]
+    ] \edge[ap]; [
+      .$h_{cd}\gets\hash(h_c\concat h_d)$ [
+        .\node[apnode]{$h_c\gets\hash(c)$};
+      ] \edge[ap]; [
+        .$h_d\gets\hash(d)$
+      ]
+    ]
+  ]   
+\end{tikzpicture}
diff --git a/summary/src/lwm/img/overview.tex b/summary/src/lwm/img/overview.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f3a9d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/lwm/img/overview.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+\scalebox{0.9}{\begin{tikzpicture}[
+  -latex,
+  rrs/.style = {
+    draw = gray!30,
+    thick,
+    rounded rectangle,
+    fill = white,
+    minimum width = 2cm,
+    minimum height = 0.7cm,
+    font = \fontsize{10}{10}\selectfont,
+    text = white,
+  },
+  ls/.style = {
+    font=\fontsize{9}{8}\selectfont,
+  },
+]
+\draw (0, 1) node[rrs, fill=rgddTeal] (Log) {Log};
+\draw (0, -1) node[rrs, fill=rgddLime] (Subject) {Subject};
+\draw (3.5, 0) node[rrs, fill=rgddPurple] (Endpoint) {Notifier};
+\draw (-3.5, 0) node[rrs, fill=rgddRed] (Monitor) {Monitor};
+
+
+\path [draw, ->, rounded corners]
+  (Log.north) |-
+  ($ (Log.north) + (Log.west) - (Log) + (-0.25, 0.25) $)
+    node[ls, above, pos=0.75]{
+      STH with snapshot extension
+    } |-
+  (Log.west);
+
+\path [draw, ->, rounded corners]
+  (Monitor.south) |-
+  ($ (Monitor.south) + (Monitor.west) - (Monitor) + (-0.25, -0.25) $)
+    node[ls, below, pos=0.75]{
+      verify STH extension
+    } |-
+  (Monitor.west);
+
+\path [draw, ->, rounded corners]
+  (Subject.south) |-
+  ($ (Subject.south) + (Subject.east) - (Subject) + (0.25, -0.25) $)
+    node[ls, below, pos=0.75]{
+      verify notification
+    } |-
+  (Subject.east);
+
+\path [draw, <-, dashed, rounded corners]
+  (Endpoint.north) |-
+  ($ (Endpoint.east) + (Endpoint.north) - (Endpoint) + (0.25, 0.25) $)
+    node[ls, above, pos=0.75]{
+      optional verify
+    } |-
+  (Endpoint.east);
+
+\draw [->]
+  (Log.south east) --
+    node[ls, sloped, anchor=center, above]{%
+      batch, STH
+    }
+  (Endpoint.north west);
+
+\draw [->]
+  (Endpoint.south west) --
+    node[ls, sloped, anchor=center, above]{%
+      notification
+    }
+  (Subject.north east);
+
+\path [draw, ->]
+  (Log.south west) --
+    node[ls, sloped, pos=.59, above]{%
+      batch, STH
+    }
+  (Monitor.north east);
+\end{tikzpicture}}
diff --git a/summary/src/lwm/img/proofcom.pdf b/summary/src/lwm/img/proofcom.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..473d817
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/lwm/img/proofcom.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/lwm/img/proofgen.pdf b/summary/src/lwm/img/proofgen.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..deb7ca4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/lwm/img/proofgen.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/lwm/img/proofvf.pdf b/summary/src/lwm/img/proofvf.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a2db9d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/lwm/img/proofvf.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/lwm/img/snapshot.pdf b/summary/src/lwm/img/snapshot.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df185f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/lwm/img/snapshot.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/lwm/img/wildcard.tex b/summary/src/lwm/img/wildcard.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73f4262
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/lwm/img/wildcard.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+\begin{tikzpicture}[
+  sibling distance=6pt,
+  level distance=100pt,
+  -latex,
+  grow=left,
+]
+  \Tree [
+    .$r\gets\hash(h_{01}\concat h_{23})$ [
+      .$h_{01}\gets\hash(h_0\concat h_1)$ [
+        .$h_0\gets\hash(\mathsf{gro.elpmaxe})$
+      ] [
+        .$h_1\gets\hash(\mathsf{moc.elpmaxe})$
+      ]
+    ] [
+      .$h_{23}\gets\hash(h_2\concat h_3)$ [
+        .$h_2\gets\hash(\mathsf{moc.elpmaxe.bus})$
+      ] [
+        .$h_3\gets\hash(\mathsf{ten.elpmaxe})$
+      ]
+    ]
+  ]   
+\end{tikzpicture}
diff --git a/summary/src/lwm/main.tex b/summary/src/lwm/main.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e6951b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/lwm/main.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+\begin{kaupaper}[
+    author={%
+      \textbf{Rasmus Dahlberg} and Tobias Pulls
+    },
+    title={%
+      Verifiable Light-Weight Monitoring for Certificate Transparency Logs
+    },
+    reference={%
+      NordSec (2018)
+    },
+    summary={%
+      An often overlooked part of Certificate Transparency is that domain owners
+      are expected to inspect the logs for mis-issued certificates continuously.
+      The cost and required expertise to do so have led to the emergence of
+      third-party monitoring services that notify domain owners of newly issued
+      certificates that they subscribe to.  For example, one may subscribe to
+      email notifications whenever a certificate is issued for
+      \texttt{*.example.com}.  One downside of such third-party monitoring is
+      that these notification services become trusted parties with little or no
+      accountability with regard to omitted certificate notifications.  We show
+      how to add this accountability and tie it to the gossip-audit model
+      employed by the Certificate Transparency ecosystem by proposing
+      verifiable light-weight monitoring.  The idea is for logs to batch
+      appended certificates into an additional data structure that
+      supports \emph{wild-card (non-)membership proofs}.  As a result,
+      third-party monitors can prove cryptographically that they did not omit
+      any certificate notifications selectively.  Our experimental performance
+      evaluation shows that overhead can be tuned to be small for all involved
+      parts.
+    },
+    participation={\vspace{-0.75cm}
+      I had the initial idea and conducted most of the work myself.  Tobias
+      mainly contributed with discussions that lead to the final design.
+    },
+    label={
+      paper:lwm
+    },
+]
+  \maketitle
+  \begin{abstract}
+    \input{src/lwm/src/abstract}
+  \end{abstract}
+  
+  \input{src/lwm/src/introduction}
+  \input{src/lwm/src/background}
+  \input{src/lwm/src/lwm}
+  \input{src/lwm/src/evaluation}
+  \input{src/lwm/src/conclusion} 
+
+  \input{src/lwm/src/acknowledgments}
+  
+  \bibliographystyle{plain}
+  \bibliography{src/lwm/src/references}
+\end{kaupaper}
diff --git a/summary/src/lwm/src/abstract.tex b/summary/src/lwm/src/abstract.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f5a68b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/lwm/src/abstract.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+\noindent
+Trust in publicly verifiable Certificate Transparency (CT) logs is reduced
+through
+  cryptography,
+  gossip,
+  auditing, and
+  monitoring.
+The role of a monitor is to observe each and every log entry, looking for
+suspicious certificates that interest the entity running the monitor.
+While anyone can run a monitor, it requires
+  continuous operation and
+  copies of the logs to be inspected.
+This has lead to the emergence of monitoring as-a-service:
+  a trusted third-party runs the monitor and provides registered subjects with
+  selective certificate notifications.
+We present a CT/bis extension for verifiable \emph{light-weight monitoring} that
+enables subjects to verify the correctness of such certificate notifications,
+making it easier to distribute and reduce the trust which is otherwise placed in
+these monitors. Our extension
+supports verifiable monitoring of wild-card domains and piggybacks on CT's
+existing gossip-audit security model.
diff --git a/summary/src/lwm/src/acknowledgments.tex b/summary/src/lwm/src/acknowledgments.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3e7d56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/lwm/src/acknowledgments.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+\section*{Acknowledgments}
+We would like to thank Linus Nordberg for valuable feedback. This research was
+funded by the Swedish Knowledge Foundation as part of the HITS research profile.
diff --git a/summary/src/lwm/src/background.tex b/summary/src/lwm/src/background.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bac403b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/lwm/src/background.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+\section{Background} \label{lwm:sec:background}
+Suppose that a trusted content provider would like to outsource its operation to
+an untrusted third-party. This is often referred to as the three-party setting,
+in which a trusted source maintains an authenticated data structure through a
+responder that answers client queries on the source's behalf~\cite{ads}.
+The data structure is authenticated in the sense that every answer is
+accompanied by a cryptographic proof that can be verified for correctness by
+only trusting the source.
+While there are many settings and flavors of authenticated data
+structures~\cite{history-tree,pad,accumulator}, our scope is narrowed down to CT
+which builds upon Merkle trees.
+
+\subsection{Merkle Trees} \label{lwm:sec:background:mt}
+The seminal work by Merkle~\cite{mt} proposed a \emph{static}  binary tree where
+each leaf stores the hash of a value and every interior node hashes its children
+  (Figure~\ref{lwm:fig:mt}).
+The root hash serves as a succinct snapshot of the tree's structure and content,
+and by revealing a logarithmic number of hashes it can be reconstructed to prove
+whether a value is stored in a leaf. These hashes compose an audit path for
+a value, and it is obtained by taking every sibling hash while traversing the
+tree from the root down towards the leaf being authenticated. An audit path is
+verified by reversing the traversal used during generation, first reconstructing
+the leaf hash and then every interior node recursively
+  (using the provided sibling hashes) 
+until finally reaching the root. Given a collision resistant hash function,
+an audit path proves that a given leaf contains a value iff the reconstructed
+root hash is known to be authentic. For example, the trusted source might sign
+it.
+\begin{figure}
+  \centering
+  \input{src/lwm/img/mt.tex}
+  \caption{%
+    Merkle tree containing four values $a$--$d$. The dashed arrows show the
+    traversal used to generate an audit path for the right-most leaf (dashed
+    nodes).
+  }
+  \label{lwm:fig:mt}
+\end{figure}
+
+While non-membership of a value can be proven by providing the entire data
+structure, this is generally too inefficient since it requires linear space and
+time. A better approach is to structure the tree such that the node which should
+contain a value is known if it exists. This property is often discussed in
+relation to certificate revocation:
+  as opposed to downloading a list of serial numbers that represent the set of
+    revoked certificates,
+  each leaf in a static Merkle tree could (for example) contain an interval
+    $[a, b)$ where $a$ is revoked and the open interval $(a,b)$
+    current~\cite{crt}.
+Given a serial number $x$, an audit path can be generated in logarithmic space
+and time for the leaf where $x \in [a,b)$ to prove (non-)membership. Similar
+constructions that are \emph{dynamic} support updates more
+efficiently~\cite{pad,vds,coniks}.
+
+\subsection{Certificate Transparency} \label{lwm:sec:bac:ct}
+The CA ecosystem involves hundreds of trusted third-parties that issue TLS
+certificates~\cite{ca-ecosystem}. Once in a while \emph{somebody} gets this process
+wrong, and as a result a fraudulent identity-to-key binding may be issued for
+\emph{any} subject~\cite{enisa}.
+It is important to detect such incidents because mis-issued certificates can
+be used to intercept TLS connections. However, detection is hard unless the
+subjects \emph{who can distinguish between anything benign and fraudulent}
+get a concise view of the certificates that are being served to the clients.
+By requiring that every CA-issued certificate must be disclosed in a public
+and append-only log, CT layers on-top of the error-prone CA ecosystem to provide
+such a view:
+  in theory anyone can inspect a log and determine for herself if a certificate
+  is mis-issued~\cite{ct}.
+
+It would be counter-intuitive to `solve' blind trust in CAs by suggesting that
+everybody should trust a log. Therefore, CT is designed such that the log can
+be distrusted based on two components:
+  a dynamic append-only Merkle tree that supports verifiable membership and
+    consistency queries~\cite{history-tree}, as well as
+  a gossip protocol that detects split-views~\cite{sthnp,ietf-gossip}.
+We already introduced the principles of membership proofs in
+Section~\ref{lwm:sec:background:mt}, and consistency proofs are similar in that
+a logarithmic number of hashes are revealed to prove two snapshots consistent.
+In other words, anyone can verify that a certificate is included in the log
+without fully downloading it, and whatever was in the log before still remains
+unmodified. Unlike the three-party setting, gossip is needed because there is no
+trusted source that signs-off the authenticated data structure:
+  consistency and inclusion proofs have limited value if everybody observes
+  different (but valid) versions of the log.
+
+\subsubsection*{Terminology, Policy Parameters, and Status Quo}
+A new STH---recall that this is short for Signed Tree Head---is issued by the
+log at least every Maximum Merge Delay (MMD) and no faster than allowed by an
+STH frequency~\cite{ct/bis}. An MMD is the
+longest time until a certificate must be included in the log after promising to
+include it. This promise is referred to as a Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT).
+An STH frequency is relative to the MMD, and limits the number of STHs that can
+be issued. These parameters (among others) are defined in a log's policy, and if
+a violation is detected there are non-repudiable proofs of log misbehavior that
+can be presented. For example, show
+  an SCT that is not included after an MMD,
+  too many STHs during the period of an MMD, or
+  two STHs that are part of two inconsistent versions of the log.
+In other words, rather than being a trusted source a log signs statements to be
+held accountable.
+
+Ideally we would have all of these components in place at once: anyone that
+interacts with a log audits it for correctness based on partial information
+  (SCTs, STHs, served certificates, and proofs),
+subjects monitor the logs for newly included certificates to check that they are
+free from mis-issuance (full download), and a gossip protocol detects or deters
+logs from presenting split-views. This is not the case in practice, mainly
+because CT is being deployed incrementally~\cite{sth-push}
+but also because the cost and complexity of self-monitoring is relatively high.
+For example,
+a subject that wants rapid detection of mis-issuance needs continuous operation
+and full downloads of the logs. It appears that the barrier towards self-%
+monitoring have lead to the emergence of monitoring as-a-service, where a
+trusted third-party monitors the logs on a subject's behalf by selectively
+notifying her of relevant certificates, e.g., mail the operator of
+$\mathsf{example.com}$ if $\mathsf{*.example.com}$ certificates are ever found.
+Third-party monitoring is convenient for logs too because it reduces the
+bandwidth required to serve many subjects. However, for CT it is an unintuitive
+concept given that it requires blind trust.
diff --git a/summary/src/lwm/src/conclusion.tex b/summary/src/lwm/src/conclusion.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e071935
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/lwm/src/conclusion.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+\section{Conclusion} \label{lwm:sec:conclusion}
+We proposed a backwards-compatible CT/bis extension that enables light-weight
+monitoring (in short LWM). At the cost of a few hundred Kb per day, a subject
+can either self-monitor or subscribe to verifiable certificate notifications for
+a dozen of logs via an untrusted notifier. The security of LWM piggybacks on the
+gossip-audit model of CT, and it relies only on the existence of at least one
+honest monitor that verifies our extension. The cost of a compliant log is
+overhead during the tree head construction, and this overhead is insignificant
+in comparison to a log's STH frequency. A notifier can generate verifiable
+certificate notifications---even for wild-card queries for all domains under a
+top-level domain---in the order of milliseconds on a single core. Given an
+STH frequency of one hour and 288~M LWM subjects, the incurred bandwidth
+overhead is roughly 640~Mbps for proofs. As such, a log could easily be its
+own notifier on a 1~Gbps connection. Further, any willing third-party could
+notify for a dozen of logs on a 10~Gbps connection.
diff --git a/summary/src/lwm/src/evaluation.tex b/summary/src/lwm/src/evaluation.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d9d508d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/lwm/src/evaluation.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+\section{Evaluation} \label{lwm:sec:evaluation}
+First we discuss assumptions and sketch on relevant security properties for LWM.
+Next, we examine performance properties of our open-source proof-of-concept
+implementation experimentally and reason about bandwidth overhead in theory.
+Finally, we present differences and similarities between LWM and related work.
+
+\subsection{Assumptions and Security Notions} \label{lwm:sec:eval:security}
+The primary threat is a computationally bound attacker that attempts to forge or omit a
+certificate notification without being detected.
+We rely on standard cryptographic assumptions, namely an unforgeable digital
+signature scheme and a collision resistant hash function $\hash$ with
+$2\secpar$-bit output for a security parameter~$\secpar$.
+The former means that an LWM snapshot must originate from the (untrusted) log in
+question. While an incorrect snapshot could be created intentionally to hide a
+mis-issued certificate, it would be detected if at least one honest monitor
+exists because our STH extension piggybacks on the gossip-audit model of CT
+(that we assume is secure).\footnote{%
+  Suppose that witness cosigning is used~\cite{cosi}. Then we rely on at least
+  one witness to verify our extension. Or, suppose that STH pollination is
+  used~\cite{ietf-gossip}. Then we rely on the most recent window of STHs to
+  reach a monitor that verifies our extension.
+}
+A subject can further detect missing notifications by checking the STH index for
+monotonic increases and the STH timestamp for freshness. Thus, given secure
+audit paths and correct verification checks as described in
+Section~\ref{lwm:sec:lwm:wildcard}, no certificate notification can be forged or
+omitted.  Our cryptographic assumptions ensure that every leaf is fixed by a
+secure audit path as in CT, i.e., a leaf hash with value $v$ is encoded as
+$\hash(0x00 \concat v$) and an interior hash with children $L,R$ as
+$\hash(0x01 \concat L \concat R)$~\cite{history-tree,ct}. To exclude any
+unnecessary data on the ends of a range, the value $v$ is a subject name
+concatenated with a hashed list of associated certificates in LWM (subject
+names suffice to verify $\Omega$~order).
+
+CT makes no attempt to offer security in the multi-instance setting~\cite{katz}.
+Here, an attacker that targets many different Merkle trees in parallel should
+gain no advantage while trying to forge \emph{any} valid (non-)membership
+proof. By design there will be many different wild-card Merkle trees in LWM, and
+so the (strictly stronger) multi-instance setting is reasonable. We can
+provide full bit-security in this setting by ensuring that no node's pre-image
+is valid across different trees by incorporating a unique tree-wide
+constant $c_t$ in leaf and empty hashes \emph{per batch}, e.g.,
+$c_t \sample \set{0,1}^\secpar$. Melera \emph{et~al.}~\cite{coniks}
+describe this in detail while also ensuring that no node's pre-image is valid
+across different locations within a Merkle tree.
+
+In an ecosystem where CT is being deployed incrementally without gossip, the
+benefit of LWM is that a subject who subscribes for certificate notifications
+can trust the log only (as opposed to \emph{also} trusting the notifier).
+Therefore, today's trust in third-party monitoring services can be reduced
+significantly. A log must also present a split-view or an invalid snapshot to
+deceive a subject with false notifications. As such, subjects accumulate binding
+evidence of log misbehavior that can be audited sometime in the future if
+suspicion towards a log is raised. Long-term the benefit of LWM is that it is
+easier to distribute the trust which is placed in third-party monitors, i.e.,
+anyone who processes a (small in comparison to the entire log) batch of
+certificates can full-audit it without being a notifier.
+
+\subsection{Implementation and Performance} \label{lwm:sec:eval:perf}
+We implemented multi-instance secure LWM in less than 400 lines of
+Go~\cite{artifact}.
+Our wild-card structure uses an existing implementation of a radix tree to find
+leaf indices and data. To minimize proof-generation times, all hashes are
+cached in an in-memory Merkle tree which uses SHA-256. We benchmarked snapshot
+creation, proof generation, and proof verification times on a single core as the
+batch size increases from 1024--689,245~certificates using 
+  Go's built-in benchmarking tool,
+  an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2500 CPU @ 3.30GHz, and
+  2x8 Gb DDR3 RAM.
+We assumed real subject names from Alexa's top-1M~\cite{alexa}.  and
+average-sized certificates of 1500~bytes~\cite{cert-size}, where a batch of $n$
+subject names refers to the $n$ most popular domains.  Notably 689,245
+certificates is the largest batch observed by us in Google's Icarus log between
+2017-01-25 and 2018-08-05, corresponding to an STH interarrival time of
+27.1~hours. The median (average) batch size and STH interarrival time were 22818
+(23751) certificates and 60.1 (61.6) minutes.  Only two batches were larger than
+132077 certificates. Considering that Icarus is one of the logs that see largest
+loads~\cite{log-growth}, we can make non-optimistic conclusions regarding the
+performance overhead of LWM without inspecting other logs.
+
+Figure~\ref{lwm:fig:snapshot} shows snapshot creation time as a function of batch
+size. Nearby the median ($2^{15}$) it takes 0.39~seconds to create a
+snapshot from scratch, initializing state from an unordered dictionary and
+caching all hashes for the first time. For the largest batch, the snapshot
+creation time is roughly 10 seconds. Arguably this overhead is still
+insignificant for logs, monitors, and notifiers because the associated STH
+interarrival times are orders of magnitude larger.
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+  \centering
+  \includegraphics[width=.9\columnwidth]{src/lwm/img/snapshot.pdf}
+  \caption{%
+    Snapshot creation time as a function of batch size.
+  }
+  \label{lwm:fig:snapshot}
+\end{figure}
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+  \centering
+  \includegraphics[width=.9\columnwidth]{src/lwm/img/proofgen.pdf}
+  \caption{%
+    Membership and non-membership proof query time as a function of batch
+    size for a single and no match, respectively.
+  }
+  \label{lwm:fig:proofgen}
+\end{figure}
+
+Figure~\ref{lwm:fig:proofgen} shows proof generation time as a function of batch size
+while querying for the longest wild-card prefix with a single match
+(membership), as well as another wild-card prefix without any match in com's
+top-level domain (non-membership).
+There is little or no difference between the generation time for these types
+of wild-card proofs, and nearby the median it takes
+around 7~$\mu s$. For the largest batch, this increased to $12.5$~$\mu s$.
+A notifier can thus generate 288 million non-membership
+notifications per hour \emph{on a single core}. Verification is also in the
+order of $\mu s$, which should be negligible for a subject
+(see Figure~\ref{lwm:fig:proofvf}).
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+  \centering
+  \includegraphics[width=.9\columnwidth]{src/lwm/img/proofvf.pdf}
+  \caption{%
+    Membership and non-membership verification time as a function of batch
+    size for a single and no match, respectively.
+  }
+  \label{lwm:fig:proofvf}
+\end{figure}
+
+To evaluate the cost of generating and verifying a wild-card notification with
+a large number of matches, we queried for com's entire top-level domain
+  (see Figure~\ref{lwm:fig:proofcom}).
+In the largest batch where there are 352,383 matches, the proof
+generation time is still relatively low: 134~ms. This corresponds to 28.9k
+notifications per hour on a single core. The verification time is much larger:
+3.5~seconds. This is expected since verification involves reconstructing the
+root from all the matching leaves, which is at least as costly as creating a
+snapshot of the same size
+  (cf.\ $2^{18}$ in Figure~\ref{lwm:fig:snapshot}).
+While these are relevant performance numbers, anyone who is interested in a
+top-level domain would likely just download the entire batch.
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+  \centering
+  \includegraphics[width=.9\columnwidth]{src/lwm/img/proofcom.pdf}
+  \caption{%
+    Membership query and verification time for $\mathsf{*.com}$.
+  }
+  \label{lwm:fig:proofcom}
+\end{figure}
+
+Finally, the space \emph{overhead} of a verifiable wild-card notification is
+dominated by the two audit paths that enclose the matching subject names. Given
+that an audit path contains at most $\ceil{\log_2 n}$ sibling hashes for a batch
+of size $n$, the median overhead is roughly one Kb per STH, log, and LWM
+subject.  Viewed from the perspective of a self-monitor, this is a significant
+bandwidth improvement:
+  as opposed to downloading the median batch of 32.6~Mb,
+  one Kb and any matching certificate(s) suffice.
+In the case of multiple logs, the bandwidth improvement is even greater. For
+the notifier we already established that it is relatively cheap to generate new
+notifications. Namely, in the single-core case of 288~M notifications per hour
+the bandwidth overhead would be 640~Mbs (i.e., all proofs must be distributed
+before the next STH is issued). A notifier can thus notify for a dozen of logs
+and a significant amount of LWM subjects without running into any CPU or
+bandwidth restrictions. Notably this is under the assumption of a sound STH
+frequency---one hour in our evaluation, as used by Icarus and many other logs.
+
+\subsection{Related Work} \label{lwm:sec:eval:related}
+Earlier work related to transparent certificate and key management often use
+dynamic authenticated dictionaries~\cite{pad,accumulator,vds,aki}.
+CONIKS maps a user's mail address to her public key in a binary Merkle prefix
+tree, and after each update a client self-monitors her own key-binding by
+fetching an exact-match (non-)membership proof~\cite{coniks}. While our work
+is conceptually similar to CONIKS since a subject receives one (non-)membership
+proof per log update, the main difference is that LWM builds a new Merkle tree
+for each update in which wild-card queries are supported. This idea is
+inapplicable for CONIKS because a user is potentially interested in the public
+key of any mail address (hence the ability to query the entire data structure
+on an exact-match).
+CONIKS is similarly inapplicable for self-monitors in CT because a subject cares
+about \emph{wild-card queries} and \emph{new certificates}.
+Without the need for wild-cards, any authenticated dictionary could be used as
+a batch building block to instantiate LWM.
+While a radix tree viewed as a Merkle tree could support efficient wild-card
+proofs~\cite{patricia}, it is more complex than necessary.  Therefore, we built
+upon the work of Kocher~\cite{crt} and Nuckolls~\cite{range-mt} with a twist on
+how to group the data for a new use-case: LWM.
diff --git a/summary/src/lwm/src/introduction.tex b/summary/src/lwm/src/introduction.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fce2bcf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/lwm/src/introduction.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+\section{Introduction}
+Certificate Transparency (CT)~\cite{ct} is an experimental standard that
+enhances the public-key infrastructure by adding transparency for certificates
+that are issued by Certificate Authorities (CAs). The idea is to mandate
+that every certificate must be publicly logged in an append-only tamper-evident
+data structure~\cite{history-tree}, such that anyone can observe what has been
+issued for whom. This means that a subject can determine for herself if anything
+is mis-issued by downloading all certificates; so called \emph{self-monitoring}.
+An alternative monitoring approach is to rely on a trusted third-party that
+\emph{notifies} the subject if relevant certificates are ever found. Given that
+self-monitoring involves set-up, continuous operation, and exhaustive
+communication effort, the concept of subscribing for monitoring
+\emph{as-a-service} is simpler for the subject. This model is already prevalent
+in the wild, and is provided both by CAs and industry vendors---see for example
+SSLMate's Cert Spotter~\cite{certspotter} or Facebook's monitoring
+tool~\cite{fbmon}.  Third-party monitors can also offer related services, such
+as searching for certificates interactively or inspecting other log properties.
+The former is provided by Facebook and Comodo's \texttt{crt.sh}; the latter by
+Graham Edgecombe's CT monitoring tool~\cite{grahmon}.
+
+It would be an unfortunate short-coming if CT did not change the status quo of
+centralized trust by forcing subjects who cannot operate a self-monitor to trust
+certificate notifications that are provided by a third-party monitor. While it
+is true that a subject could subscribe to a large number of monitors to reduce
+this trust, it is overall cumbersome and does not scale well beyond a handful
+of notifying monitors (should they exist). To this end, we suggest a CT/bis
+extension for verifiable Light-Weight Monitoring (LWM) that makes it easier to
+distribute the trust which is otherwise placed in these monitors by decoupling
+the notifier from the full-audit function of inspecting all certificates. Our
+idea is best described in terms of a self-monitor that polls for new updates,
+but as opposed to processing all certificates we can filter on wild-card
+prefixes such as \texttt{*.example.com} in a verifiable manner.
+LWM relies on the ability to define a new Signed Tree Head (STH) extension, and
+thus a CT/bis compliant log is necessary~\cite{ct/bis}. At the time of writing
+CT/bis have yet to be published as an IETF standard. We are not aware of any log
+that deploys a drafted version.
+
+As a brief overview, each batch of newly included certificates are grouped as a
+static Merkle tree in LWM. The resulting snapshot (also know as a fingerprint or
+a root hash) is then incorporated into the corresponding STH as an extension.
+An LWM subject receives one verifiable certificate notification per log update
+from an untrusted \emph{notifier}
+  (who could be the log, a monitor, or anyone else),
+and this notification is based on the smaller static Merkle tree rather than the
+complete log. This is because monitoring as-a-service is mainly about
+identifying newly included certificates. Moreover, we can order each static
+Merkle tree so that verifiable wild-card filtering is possible. For security we
+rely on at least one entity to verify that each snapshot is correct---which is
+a general monitoring function that is independent of the subjects using LWM---as
+well as a gossip protocol that detects split-views~\cite{sthnp}. Since our
+extension is part of an STH, we piggyback on any gossip-like protocol that deals
+with the exchange and/or distribution of (verified)
+STHs~\cite{ctga,ietf-gossip,sth-push,cosi}.  Our contributions are as follows:
+\begin{itemize}
+  \item The design of a backwards-compatible CT/bis extension for light-weight
+    monitoring of wild-card prefixes such as \texttt{*.example.com}
+      (Section~\ref{lwm:sec:lwm}).
+  \item A security sketch showing that an attacker cannot omit a certificate
+    notification without being detected, relying on standard cryptographic
+    assumptions and piggybacking on the proposed gossip-audit models of CT
+      (Section~\ref{lwm:sec:eval:security}).
+  \item An open-source proof-of-concept implementation written in Go, as well
+    as a performance evaluation that considers computation time and bandwidth
+    requirements (Section~\ref{lwm:sec:eval:perf}). In particular we find that the
+    overhead during tree head construction is small in comparison to a sound STH
+    frequency of one hour; a notifier can easily notify 288~M subjects in a
+    verifiable manner for Google's Icarus log on a single core and a 1~Gbps
+    connection; and a subject receives about 24~Kb of proofs per day and log
+    which is verified in negligible time (the order of $\mu$s for the common
+    case of non-membership, and seconds in the extreme case of verifying
+    membership for \emph{an entire top-level domain}).
+\end{itemize}
+
+Background on Merkle trees and CT is provided in Section~\ref{lwm:sec:background}.
+Related work is discussed in Section~\ref{lwm:sec:eval:related}.
+Conclusions are presented in Section~\ref{lwm:sec:conclusion}.
diff --git a/summary/src/lwm/src/lwm.tex b/summary/src/lwm/src/lwm.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..70641a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/lwm/src/lwm.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+\section{Light-Weight Monitoring} \label{lwm:sec:lwm}
+To reduce the trust which is placed in today's third-party monitors,
+the idea of LWM is to lower the barrier towards self-monitoring. As shown in
+Figure~\ref{lwm:fig:idea}, an untrusted notifier provides a subject with
+efficient\footnote{%
+  Efficient iff less than a linear number of log entries are received per log
+	update.
+} certificate notifications that can be cryptographically verified: each batch
+of certificates is represented by an additional Merkle tree that supports
+wild-card (non-)membership queries
+  (described further in Section~\ref{lwm:sec:lwm:wildcard}),
+and the resulting snapshot is signed by the log as part of an STH extension.
+As such, a subject can deal only with those certificates that are relevant,
+relying on wild-card proofs to verify correctness and completeness:
+  said certificates are included and nothing is being omitted.
+Anyone can check that an LWM snapshot is correct by inspecting the corresponding
+batch of certificates. Notably this is \emph{a general monitoring function},
+rather than a \emph{selective notification component} which is verifiable in
+LWM. This decoupling allows anyone to be a notifier, including logs and
+monitors that a subject distrust.
+\begin{figure}
+  \centering
+  \input{src/lwm/img/overview}
+  \caption{%
+    An overview of LWM. In addition to normal operation, a log creates an
+    additional (smaller) Merkle tree that supports wild-card (non-)membership
+    queries. The resulting snapshot is signed as part of an STH extension that
+    can be verified by any monitor that downloads the corresponding batch. A
+    subject receives one verifiable certificate notification per STH from an
+    untrusted notifier.
+  }
+  \label{lwm:fig:idea}
+\end{figure}
+
+\subsection{Authenticated Wild-Card Queries} \label{lwm:sec:lwm:wildcard}
+Thus far we only discussed Merkle trees in terms of verifying whether a single
+value is a (non-)member:
+  membership is proven by presenting an audit path down to the leaf in question,
+    while
+  non-membership requires a lexicographical ordering that allows a verifier
+    to conclude that a value is absent unless provided in a particular location.
+The latter concept naturally extends to \emph{prefix wild-card queries}---such
+as $\mathsf{*.example.com}$ and $\mathsf{*.sub.example.com}$---by finding a
+suitable ordering function $\Omega$ which ensures that related leaves are
+grouped together as a consecutive range. We found that this requirement is
+satisfied by sorting on reversed subject names:
+  suppose that we have a batch of certificates
+    $\mathsf{example.com}$,
+    $\mathsf{example.org}$,
+    $\mathsf{example.net}$, and
+    $\mathsf{sub.example.com}$.
+After applying $\Omega$ we get the static Merkle tree in
+Figure~\ref{lwm:fig:wildcard}. A prefix wild-card proof is constructed by
+finding the relevant range in question, generating an audit path for the
+leaves that are right outside of the range~\cite{range-mt}. Such a proof is
+verified by checking that
+  (i) $\Omega$ indicates that the left (right) end is less (larger) than the
+    queried prefix,
+ (ii) the leaves are ordered as dictated by $\Omega$, and
+(iii) the recomputed root hash is valid.
+
+\begin{figure}
+  \centering
+  \input{src/lwm/img/wildcard}
+  \caption{%
+    Merkle tree where the leaves are ordered on reversed subject names.
+  }
+  \label{lwm:fig:wildcard}
+\end{figure}
+
+The exact details of reconstructing the root hash is a bit tedious because there
+are several corner cases. For example, either or both of the two audit paths may
+be empty depending on batch size (${\leq}1$) and location of the relevant range
+(left/right-most side). Therefore, we omit the details and
+focus on the concept:
+  given two audit paths and a sequence of data items ordered by $\Omega$ that
+    includes the left leaf, matching range, and right leaf, repeatedly
+    reconstruct interior nodes to the largest extent possible and then use the
+    sibling hash which is furthest from the root to continue.
+For example, consider a proof for $\mathsf{*sub.example.com}$ in
+Figure~\ref{lwm:fig:wildcard}: it is composed of
+  (i) the left leaf data and its audit path $h_0,h_{23}$ on index 1,
+ (ii) the right leaf data and its audit path $h_2,h_{01}$ on index 3, and
+(iii) the matching range itself which is a single certificate.
+After verifying $\Omega$~order, recompute the root hash $r'$ and check if
+it matches an authentic root $r$ as follows:
+\begin{enumerate}
+  \item Compute leaf hashes $h_1'$, $h_2'$, and $h_3'$ from the provided data.
+    Next, compute the interior node $h_{23}' \gets \hash(h_2'\concat h_3')$.
+    Because no additional interior node can be computed without a sibling hash,
+    consider $h_0$ in the left audit path.
+  \item Compute the interior node $h_{01}' \gets \hash(h_0\concat h_1')$, then
+    $r' \gets \hash(h_{01}'\concat h_{23}')$.\footnote{%
+      Two audit paths may contain redundancy, but we ignored this favouring
+      simplicity.
+    }
+\end{enumerate}
+
+Given an $\Omega$~ordered list of certificates it is trivial to locate where
+a subject's wild-card matches are:
+  binary search to find the index of an exact match (if any), then up to
+  $t$ matches follow in order.
+This is not the only way to find the right range and matches. For example, a
+radix tree could be used with the main difference being $\bigO{t+\log n}$
+against $\bigO{t+k}$ complexity for a batch of size $n$, a wild-card string of
+length $k$, and $t$ matches. Since the complexity of generating two audit
+paths is $\bigO{\log n}$ for any number of matches, the final space and time
+complexity for a wild-card structure based on an ordered list is
+$\bigO{t+\log n}$.
+
+\subsection{Notifier} \label{lwm:sec:lwm:notifier}
+A notifier must obtain every STH to generate wild-card proofs that can be traced
+back to the log. Albeit error-prone in case of network issues, the simplest
+way to go about this is to poll the log's get-STH endpoint \emph{frequently
+enough}.\footnote{%%
+  It would be better if logs supported verifiable and historical get-STH
+  queries.
+}
+Once an updated is spotted every new certificate is downloaded and the wild-card
+structure is reconstructed. A subject receives her verifiable certificate
+notifications from the notifier via a push (`monitoring as-a-service') or pull
+(`self-monitoring') model. For example, emails could be delivered after every
+update or in daily digests. Another option is to support queries like
+  ``what's new since STH~$x$''.
+
+A subject can verify that a certificate notification is fresh by inspecting the
+STH timestamp. However, it is hard to detect missing certificate notifications
+unless every STH trivially follows from the previous one. While there are
+several methods to achieve this---%
+  for example using indices (Section~\ref{lwm:sec:lwm:instantiation}) or
+  hash chains~\cite{coniks}---%
+the log must always sign a snapshot per STH using an extension.
+
+\subsection{Instantiation Example} \label{lwm:sec:lwm:instantiation}
+Instantiating LWM depends upon the ability to support an STH extension. In the
+latest version of CT, this takes the form of a sorted list of
+key-value pairs where the key is unique and the value an opaque byte
+array~\cite{ct/bis}. We could reserve the keywords \emph{lwm} for snapshots and
+\emph{index} for monotonically increasing counters.\footnote{%
+		Instead of an index to detect missing notifications (STHs), a log could
+    announce STHs as part of a verifiable get-STH endpoint. See the sketch of
+    Nordberg~\cite{nordberg-sketch}.
+} Besides an LWM-compliant log, an untrusted notifier must support pushed or
+pulled certificate notifications that are verifiable by tracking the most recent
+or every wild-card structure. Examples of likely notifiers include
+  logs (who benefit from the reduced bandwidth) and
+  monitors (who could market increased transparency)
+that already process all certificates regardless of LWM.
diff --git a/summary/src/lwm/src/references.bib b/summary/src/lwm/src/references.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3fe96a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/lwm/src/references.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+%                                 References                                   %
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+@misc{patricia,
+  author = {Ethereum/wiki},
+  title = {Patricia Tree},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Patricia-Tree}, accessed 2018-08-15},
+} 
+
+@misc{log-growth,
+  author = {SSLMate},
+  title = {{Certificate Transparency} Log Growth},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://sslmate.com/labs/ct_growth/}, accessed 2018-08-15},
+} 
+
+@misc{cert-size,
+  author = {Graham Edgecombe},
+  title = {Compressing {X.509} certificates},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.grahamedgecombe.com/blog/2016/12/22/compressing-x509-certificates}, accessed 2018-08-15},
+} 
+
+@misc{alexa,
+  author = {Amazon},
+  title = {Alexa {top-1M}},
+  howpublished = {\url{http://s3.amazonaws.com/alexa-static/top-1m.csv.zip}, accessed 2018-08-05},
+} 
+
+@misc{artifact,
+  title = {Paper artifact},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/rgdd/lwm}},
+  year = {2018},
+} 
+
+@misc{nordberg-sketch,
+  author = {Linus Nordberg},
+  title = {{Re: [Trans] Providing} the history of {STHs} a log has issued (in 6962-bis)},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/trans/JbFiwO90PjcYzXrEgh-Y7bFG5Fw}, accessed 2018-09-16},
+} 
+
+@misc{grahmon,
+  author = {Graham Edgecombe},
+  title = {{Certificate Transparency} Monitor},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://ct.grahamedgecombe.com/}, accessed 2018-09-15.},
+} 
+
+@misc{fbmon,
+  author = {Facebook},
+  title = {{Certificate Transparency} Monitoring},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://developers.facebook.com/tools/ct/}, accessed 2018-09-15},
+} 
+
+@misc{certspotter,
+  author = {SSLMate},
+  title = {Better uptime and security with {Cert Spotter}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://sslmate.com/certspotter/}, accessed 2018-09-15},
+} 
+
+@article{ctga,
+  author    = {Rasmus Dahlberg and
+               Tobias Pulls and
+               Jonathan Vestin and
+               Toke H{\o}iland{-}J{\o}rgensen and
+               Andreas Kassler},
+  title     = {Aggregation-Based Gossip for {Certificate Transparency}},
+  journal   = {CoRR abs/1806.08817},
+  year      = {2018},
+}
+
+@misc{enisa,
+  author      = {ENISA},
+  title       = {Certificate Authorities---The Weak Link of Internet Security},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/info-notes/certificate-authorities-the-weak-link-of-internet-security}, accessed 2018-09-16},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{sthnp, 
+  author    = {Laurent Chuat and Pawel Szalachowski and Adrian Perrig and Ben Laurie and Eran Messeri}, 
+  title     = {Efficient gossip protocols for verifying the consistency of Certificate logs}, 
+  booktitle = {CNS},
+  year      = {2015}, 
+}
+
+@misc{sth-push,
+  author      = {Ryan Sleevi and Eran Messeri},
+  title       = {{Certificate Transparency} in {Chrome}: Monitoring {CT} Logs consistency},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FP5J5Sfsg0OR9P4YT0q1dM02iavhi8ix1mZlZe_z-ls/edit?pref=2&pli=1}, accessed 2018-09-16},
+}
+
+@misc{chrome-policy,
+  author        = {Ben Laurie},
+  title         = {Improving the Security of {EV} Certificates},
+  howpublished  = {\url{https://goo.gl/DdEKz1}, accessed 2018-09-16},
+}
+
+@misc{vds,
+  author        = {Adam Eijdenberg and Ben Laurie and Al Cutter},
+  title         = {Verifiable Data Structures},
+  howpublished  = {\url{https://github.com/google/trillian/blob/master/docs/VerifiableDataStructures.pdf}, accessed 2018-09-16},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{cosi,
+  author    = {Ewa Syta and
+               Iulia Tamas and
+               Dylan Visher and
+               David Isaac Wolinsky and
+               Philipp Jovanovic and
+               Linus Gasser and
+               Nicolas Gailly and
+               Ismail Khoffi and
+               Bryan Ford},
+  title     = {Keeping Authorities ``Honest or Bust'' with Decentralized Witness Cosigning},
+  booktitle = {{IEEE S\&P}},
+  year      = {2016},
+  month     = {May},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{ads,
+  author    = {Roberto Tamassia},
+  title     = {Authenticated Data Structures},
+  booktitle = {{ESA}},
+  year      = {2003},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{history-independence,
+ author     = {Moni Naor and Vanessa Teague},
+ title      = {Anti-persistence: History Independent Data Structures},
+ booktitle  = {{STOC}},
+ year       = {2001},
+}
+
+@techreport{ct,
+  author      = {Ben Laurie and Adam Langley and Emilia Kasper},
+  title       = {{Certificate Transparency}},
+  type        = {RFC},
+  number      = {6962},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  year        = {2013},
+}
+
+@techreport{dns-name-ref,
+  author      = {Mockapetris, Paul},
+  title       = {Domain Names---Implementation and specification},
+  type        = {RFC},
+  number      = {1035},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  year        = {1987},
+}
+
+@techreport{ct/bis,
+  author      = {Ben Laurie and Adam Langley and Emilia Kasper and Eran Messeri and Rob Stradling},
+  title       = {{Certificate Transparency} Version 2.0},
+  number      = {draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-28},
+  type        = {Internet-draft},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  year        = {2018},
+}
+
+@techreport{ietf-gossip,
+  author      = {Linus Nordberg and Daniel Kahn Gillmor and Tom Ritter},
+  title       = {Gossiping in {CT}},
+  number      = {draft-ietf-trans-gossip-05},
+  type        = {Internet-draft},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  year        = {2018},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{balloon,
+  author    = {Tobias Pulls and Roel Peeters},
+  title     = {Balloon: A Forward-Secure Append-Only Persistent Authenticated Data Structure},
+  booktitle = {{ESORICS}},
+  year      = {2015},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{mt,
+  author    = {Ralph C. Merkle},
+  title     = {A Digital Signature Based on a Conventional Encryption Function},
+  booktitle = {{CRYPTO}},
+  year      = {1987},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{coniks,
+  author    = {Marcela S. Melara and
+               Aaron Blankstein and
+               Joseph Bonneau and
+               Edward W. Felten and
+               Michael J. Freedman},
+  title     = {{CONIKS:} {Bringing} Key Transparency to End Users},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year      = {2015},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{aki,
+  author    = {Tiffany Hyun{-}Jin Kim and
+               Lin{-}Shung Huang and
+               Adrian Perrig and
+               Collin Jackson and
+               Virgil D. Gligor},
+  title     = {Accountable key infrastructure {(AKI):} {A} proposal for a public-key validation infrastructure},
+  booktitle = {{WWW}},
+  year      = {2013},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{history-tree,
+  author    = {Scott A. Crosby and Dan S. Wallach},
+  title     = {Efficient Data Structures For Tamper-Evident Logging},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year      = {2009},
+}
+
+@article{pad,
+  author    = {Scott A. Crosby and Dan S. Wallach},
+  title     = {Authenticated Dictionaries: {Real}-World Costs and Trade-Offs},
+  journal   = {{ACM} {TISSEC}},
+  volume    = {14},
+  number    = {2},
+  year      = {2011},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{katz,
+  author    = {Jonathan Katz},
+  title     = {Analysis of a Proposed Hash-Based Signature Standard},
+  booktitle = {{SSR}},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{ca-ecosystem,
+  author    = {Zakir Durumeric and
+    James Kasten and
+    Michael Bailey and
+    J. Alex Halderman},
+  title     = {Analysis of the {HTTPS} certificate ecosystem},
+  booktitle = {{IMC}},
+  year      = {2013},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{accumulator,
+  author    = {David Derler and Christian Hanser and Daniel Slamanig},
+  title     = {Revisiting Cryptographic Accumulators, Additional Properties and
+    Relations to Other Primitives},
+  booktitle = {{CT-RSA}},
+  year      = {2015},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{crt,
+  author    = {Paul C. Kocher},
+  title     = {On Certificate Revocation and Validation},
+  booktitle = {{FC}},
+  year      = {1998},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{range-mt,
+  author    = {Glen Nuckolls},
+  title     = {Verified Query Results from Hybrid Authentication Trees},
+  booktitle = {{IFIP} {WG} 11.3 Working Conference on Data and Application Security},
+  year      = {2005},
+}
diff --git a/summary/src/other.tex b/summary/src/other.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dda33d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/other.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+\section*{List of Other Contributions}
+
+Throughout and before my PhD studies, I also contributed to the following:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+  \item The Sigsum Project.
+    \url{https://www.sigsum.org/} (2020-present).
+
+    Sigsum is a free and open-source software project that brings transparency
+    to signed checksums.  The design is simple and uses a proactive gossip-audit
+    model.  I founded Sigsum with Linus Nordberg and Fredrik Str\"{o}mberg while
+    working at Mullvad VPN as a side-line occupation.
+
+  \item Tobias Pulls and \textbf{Rasmus Dahlberg}.
+    Steady:
+    A Simple End-to-End Secure Logging System.
+    NordSec (2018).
+
+    Tobias was the main driver.  I mostly contributed with design discussions
+    and a security formalization.
+
+  \item \textbf{Rasmus Dahlberg}, Tobias Pulls, and Roel Peeters.
+    Efficient Sparse Merkle Trees:
+    Caching Strategies and Secure (Non-)Membership Proofs.
+    NordSec (2016).
+    
+    This work started with my Bachelor's thesis.  I did most writing with
+    input from Tobias and Roel.  Tobias did our benchmarking experiments.
+
+  \item \textbf{Rasmus Dahlberg} and Tobias Pulls.
+    Standardized Syslog Processing:
+    Revisiting Secure Reliable Data Transfer and Message Compression.
+    Technical Report, Karlstad University (2016).
+
+    I was the main driver.  Tobias contributed with continuous feedback.
+\end{itemize}
diff --git a/summary/src/sammanfattning.tex b/summary/src/sammanfattning.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbc68d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/sammanfattning.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+Projektet \emph{Certificate Transparency} är ett ekosystem av loggar, övervakare
+och granskare som håller certifikatutfärdare till svars för utfärdade
+webbcertifikat.  Vi visar hur säkerheten kan höjas i ekosystemet för både
+domäninnehavare och TLS-klienter i nuvarande system samt som del av
+anonymitetsnätverket Tor.  Bland våra större bidrag är
+  förbättrad övervakning av loggarna,
+  ett skvallerprotokoll som integrerats med DNS,
+  ett skvaller- och granskningsprotokoll som utformats specifikt för Tors
+    webbläsare och
+  ett förslag på hur domännamn med adresser i Tor kan bli mer tillgängliga.
+De metoder som använts varierar från säkerhetsbevis till internetmätningar och
+utvärderingar av forskningsprototyper.
+En viktig del av vår utvärdering i Tor är att avgöra hur protokoll som
+används av webbläsare påverkar möjligheten att koppla ihop användare med besökta
+webbplatser.  Detta inkluderar existerande protokoll samt nya tillägg för att
+verifiera om webbplatsers certifikat är transparensloggade.  Våra resultat visar
+att i många fall kan falska positiva utslag filtreras bort vid
+mönsterigenkänning av Tor-användares krypterade trafik
+(eng: \emph{website fingerprinting}).
+Orsaken är att besök till de flesta webbplatser kan uteslutas till följd av hur
+internetprotokoll fungerar: kommunikation är observerbar och involverar ofta
+interaktioner med tredjeparter.  Vissa protokoll har dessutom sidokanaler som
+kan analyseras.  Vi visar exempelvis att Tors DNS-cache kan undersökas med olika
+varianter av tidtagningsattacker.  Dessa attacker är enkla att utföra över
+internet och avslöjar vilka domännamn som slagits upp vid angivna tidpunkter.
+De förbättrade mönsterigenkänningsattackerna mot webbplatser är realistiska och
+hotar därför Tors anonymitet.
+Vår slutsats är att framtida försvar bör utvärderas utifrån att angripare har
+tillgång till ett så kallat webbplatsorakel.
+
+\paragraph{Nyckelord:}
+  Granskning,
+  Certificate Transparency,
+  DNS,
+  Skvaller,
+  Sidokanaler,
+  Tidtagningsattacker,
+  Tor,
+  Tors webbläsare,
+  Mönsterigenkänning,%
+  Webbplatsorakel
diff --git a/summary/src/sauteed/.gitignore b/summary/src/sauteed/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bb88c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/sauteed/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+main.pdf
+*.blg
+*.bbl
+*.fls
+*.fdb_latexmk
+*.log
+*.out
+*.aux
+*.swp
diff --git a/summary/src/sauteed/img/onion-location.pdf b/summary/src/sauteed/img/onion-location.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21fde5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/sauteed/img/onion-location.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/sauteed/img/onion-search.pdf b/summary/src/sauteed/img/onion-search.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5867270
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/sauteed/img/onion-search.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/sauteed/main.tex b/summary/src/sauteed/main.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e0c7cda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/sauteed/main.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+\begin{kaupaper}[
+    author={%
+      \textbf{Rasmus Dahlberg},
+      Paul Syverson,
+      Linus Nordberg, and
+      Matthew Finkel
+    },
+    title={%
+      Sauteed Onions: Transparent Associations from Domain Names to Onion Addresses
+    },
+    reference={%
+      WPES (2022)
+    },
+    summary={%
+      Many prominent websites are also hosted as Tor onion services.  Onion
+      services are identified by their public keys and subject to onion routing,
+      thus offering self-authenticated connections and censorship resistance.
+      However, the non-mnemonic names are a limitation due to being hard to
+      discover and remember.  We explore how certificates with onion addresses
+      may improve the status quo by proposing sauteed onions, \emph{transparent
+      associations from domain names to onion addresses} with the help of
+      Certificate Transparency logs.  The idea is to extend a website's regular
+      certificate with an associated onion address.  This makes it possible to
+      offer certificate-based onion location that is no less targeted than the
+      HTTPS connection facilitating the discovery, as well as name-to-onion
+      search engines that use the append-only logs for verifiable population of
+      their databases.  The achieved goals are
+        consistency of available onion associations,
+        improved third-party discovery of onion associations, and
+        forward censorship-resistance.
+      To be discovered, sites must opt-in by obtaining a sauteed onion
+      certificate.  Our prototypes for certificate-based onion location and
+      third-party search engines use an existing backward-compatible format.  We
+      discuss this trade-off and note that a certificate extension may be used
+      in the future.
+    },
+    participation={\vspace{-.25cm}
+      Paul, Linus, and I had the initial idea of exploring how onion addresses
+      fit into Certificate Transparency.  Paul and I did most of the writing.  I
+      implemented our monitor, Linus our search engine, Matt our web extension.
+    },
+    label={
+      paper:sauteed
+    },
+]
+  \maketitle
+  \begin{abstract}
+    \input{src/sauteed/src/abstract}
+  \end{abstract}
+  
+  \input{src/sauteed/src/intro}
+  \input{src/sauteed/src/preliminaries}
+  \input{src/sauteed/src/sauteed}
+  \input{src/sauteed/src/related}
+  \input{src/sauteed/src/conc}
+  \input{src/sauteed/src/acks}
+  
+  \bibliographystyle{plain}
+  \bibliography{src/sauteed/src/refs}
+
+  \begin{appendices}
+    \input{src/sauteed/src/appendix}
+  \end{appendices}
+\end{kaupaper}
diff --git a/summary/src/sauteed/src/abstract.tex b/summary/src/sauteed/src/abstract.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bdcd81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/sauteed/src/abstract.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+\noindent
+Onion addresses offer valuable features such as lookup and routing
+security, self-authenticated connections, and censorship resistance.
+Therefore, many websites are also available as onionsites in Tor.  The way
+registered domains and onion addresses are associated is however a weak link.
+We introduce \emph{sauteed onions}, \emph{transparent associations from domain
+names to onion addresses}.
+Our approach relies on TLS certificates to establish onion associations.  It is
+much like today's onion location which relies on Certificate Authorities (CAs)
+due to its HTTPS requirement, but has the added benefit of becoming public for
+everyone to see in Certificate Transparency (CT) logs.  We propose and prototype
+two uses of sauteed onions:
+  certificate-based onion location and
+  search engines that use CT logs as the underlying database.
+The achieved goals are
+  \emph{consistency of available onion associations}, which mitigates attacks
+    where users are partitioned depending on which onion addresses they are
+    given,
+  \emph{forward censorship-resistance} after a TLS site has been configured
+    once, and
+  \emph{improved third-party discovery of onion associations}, which requires
+    less trust while easily scaling to all onionsites that opt-in.
diff --git a/summary/src/sauteed/src/acks.tex b/summary/src/sauteed/src/acks.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..590558a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/sauteed/src/acks.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+\section*{Acknowledgments}
+We would like to thank
+  Kushal Das,
+  Daniel Kahn Gillmor,
+  Silvio Rhatto, and
+  Tobias Pulls
+for helpful discussions and comments.
+Rasmus Dahlberg was supported by the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research.
+Paul Syverson was supported by ONR\@.
diff --git a/summary/src/sauteed/src/appendix.tex b/summary/src/sauteed/src/appendix.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7850d49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/sauteed/src/appendix.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+\section{Onion Association Search Examples} \label{sauteed:app:search}
+We host the search engine described in Section~\ref{sauteed:sec:search-engine} on a
+Debian VM with 1GB RAM, 20GB SSD, and a single vCPU.  It is available at
+\texttt{api.sauteed-onions.o
+rg} as well as
+\texttt{zpadxxmoi42k45iifrzuktwqktihf5didbaec3xo4dhvlw2hj54
+doiqd.onion}.
+Please note that we operate this prototype on a best-effort level until
+December, 2022.
+
+An example for the \texttt{search} endpoint is provided in
+Figure~\ref{sauteed:fig:search}, followed by extracting additional certificate
+information using the \texttt{get} endpoint in Figure~\ref{sauteed:fig:get}.  There are
+many CT-logged certificates for the same onion association because certificates
+are renewed periodically and typically submitted to multiple CT logs.
+
+\begin{sidewaysfigure}[!t]
+    \centering
+    \begin{lstlisting}
+        $ curl -s https://api.sauteed-onions.org/search?in=www.sauteed-onions.org | json_pp
+        [
+           {
+              "identifiers" : [
+                 "2",
+                 "3",
+                 "24",
+                 "25",
+                 "28",
+                 "29",
+                 "37"
+              ],
+              "onion_addr" : "qvrbktnwsztjnbga6yyjbwzsdjw7u5a6vsyzv6hkj75clog4pdvy4cyd.onion",
+              "domain_name" : "www.sauteed-onions.org"
+           }
+        ]
+    \end{lstlisting}
+    \caption{Find onion associations for \texttt{www.sauteed-onions.org}.}
+    \label{sauteed:fig:search}
+\end{sidewaysfigure}
+
+\begin{sidewaysfigure}[!t]
+    \centering
+    \begin{lstlisting}
+	$ curl -s https://api.sauteed-onions.org/get?id=2 | json_pp
+        {
+           "onion_addr" : "qvrbktnwsztjnbga6yyjbwzsdjw7u5a6vsyzv6hkj75clog4pdvy4cyd.onion",
+           "domain_name" : "www.sauteed-onions.org",
+           "log_id" : "b1N2rDHwMRnYmQCkURX/dxUcEdkCwQApBo2yCJo32RM=",
+           "log_index" : 582362461,
+           "cert_path" : "db/logs/Mammoth/582362461.pem"
+        }
+        $ curl -L https://api.sauteed-onions.org/db/logs/Mammoth/582362461.pem | \
+	  openssl x509 -text -noout
+	...
+    \end{lstlisting}
+    \caption{Get further information relating to the certificate with identifier ``2''.}
+    \label{sauteed:fig:get}
+\end{sidewaysfigure}
+
+\section{Configuration Example} \label{sauteed:app:setup}
+
+We used \texttt{certbot} to set up sauteed onions using Let's Encrypt and
+\texttt{apache} on a Debian system.  The difference when
+compared to the usual \texttt{certbot} instructions is that the \texttt{-d} flag
+must be specified to enumerate all SANs as a comma-separated
+list~\cite{certbot}.  The domain name with an associated onion address as a
+subdomain also needs to be reachable via DNS for Let's Encrypt to perform domain
+validation.  Therefore, an appropriate A/AAAA or CNAME record is required.  A
+sanity-check for \texttt{www.sauteed-onions.org} would be to verify that
+	\texttt{dig qvrbktnwsztjnbga6yyjbwzsdjw7u5a6vsyzv6hkj75clog4pdvy4cydonion
+	.www.sauteed-onions.org}
+returns the same IP address as
+	\texttt{dig www.sauteed
+	-onions.org}
+before running
+	\texttt{certbot --apache -d~www.sauteed-onions.
+	org,qvrbktnwsztjnbga6yyjbwzsdjw7u5a6vsyzv6hkj75clog4pdvy4cydo
+	nion.www.sauteed-onions.org}.
+See \texttt{crt.sh} for an example certificate~\cite{sauteed-onion-cert}.
diff --git a/summary/src/sauteed/src/conc.tex b/summary/src/sauteed/src/conc.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b26a56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/sauteed/src/conc.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+\section{Conclusion} \label{sauteed:sec:conclusion}
+Sauteed onions declare unidirectional associations from domain names to onion
+addresses.  These onion associations are established in CA-issued and CT-logged
+TLS certificates, thereby making them public for everyone to see.  We propose
+two immediate applications:
+	certificate-based onion location and
+	more automated verifiable search.
+Both applications are opt-in for domain owners, and rely on similar assumptions
+as today's onion location.  The added benefit is more transparency, which
+facilitates a higher degree of consistency between found onion associations as
+well as more censorship-resistance for TLS sites after setup.  Configuration of
+sauteed onions requires one more DNS record and a domain-validated certificate
+from any CA (such as Let's Encrypt).  In the future, the additional DNS record
+may be replaced by an X.509v3 extension.  We leave it as a fun exercise to find
+the onion address of a TLS site that is intentionally being censored by us:
+\texttt{blocked.sauteed-onions.org}.
diff --git a/summary/src/sauteed/src/intro.tex b/summary/src/sauteed/src/intro.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bfad238
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/sauteed/src/intro.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+\section{Introduction} \label{sauteed:sec:intro}
+Onion addresses are domain names with many useful properties.  For example, an
+onion address is self-authenticated due to encoding its own public key.  It
+also makes integral use of the anonymity network Tor to provide secure and
+private lookups as well as routing~\cite{tor-design}.  A major usability concern
+is that onion addresses are random-looking strings; they are difficult to
+discover, update, and remember~\cite{winter}.  Existing solutions approach these
+limitations in different ways, e.g., ranging from setting onion addresses in
+HTTP headers over HTTPS with so-called \emph{onion
+location}~\cite{onion-location} and bookmarking found results to making use of
+manually curated third-party
+lists~\cite{muffet-onions,onion-service-overview,h-e-securedrop} as well as
+search engines like DuckDuckGo or \texttt{ahmia.fi}~\cite{nurmi,winter}.
+
+Herein we refer to the unidirectional association from a domain name to an onion
+address as an \emph{onion association}.  The overall goal is to facilitate
+transparent discovery of onion associations.  To achieve this we rely on the
+observation that today's onion location can be implemented in certificates
+issued by Certificate Authorities (CAs).  This is not an additional dependency
+because onion location already requires HTTPS~\cite{onion-location}.  The main
+benefit of transitioning from HTTP headers to TLS certificates is that all such
+onion associations become signed and sequenced in tamper-evident Certificate
+Transparency (CT) logs~\cite{ct/a,ct-rfc}, further tightening the relation
+between CAs and onion keys~\cite{cab-ballot144,cab-onion-dv,secdev19} as well as
+public CT logging and Tor~\cite{ctor-popets,muffet-onions}.
+
+Our first contribution is to make onion associations identical for all Tor
+users, and otherwise the possibility of inconsistencies becomes public via CT.
+Consistency of available onion associations mitigates the threat of users
+being partitioned without anyone noticing into subsets according to which
+onion address they received during onion association.
+Our second contribution is to construct a search engine that allows Tor users to
+look up onion associations without having to trust the service provider
+completely.  Other than being helpful to validate onion addresses as
+authentic~\cite{winter}, such discovery can continue to work \emph{after} a TLS
+site becomes censored.
+
+Section~\ref{sauteed:sec:preliminaries} briefly covers CT preliminaries.
+Section~\ref{sauteed:sec:trans} describes \emph{sauteed onions}, an approach that makes
+discovery of onion associations more transparent and censorship-resistant
+compared to today.  Section~\ref{sauteed:sec:related} discusses related work.
+Section~\ref{sauteed:sec:conclusion} concludes the paper.
+Appendix~\ref{sauteed:app:search} contains query examples for our search engine.
+Appendix~\ref{sauteed:app:setup} outlines an example setup.
+All artifacts are online~\cite{sauteed-onion-artifacts}.
diff --git a/summary/src/sauteed/src/preliminaries.tex b/summary/src/sauteed/src/preliminaries.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f01aeba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/sauteed/src/preliminaries.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+\section{Certificate Logging Preliminaries} \label{sauteed:sec:preliminaries}
+CT is a system of public append-only logs that store TLS certificates issued by
+trusted CAs~\cite{ct/a,ct-rfc}.  If web browsers add the criterion that a
+certificate must be logged before accepting it as valid, certificate issuance
+practices by CAs effectively become transparent so that mistakes and malfeasance
+can be detected by anyone that observes the logs.  These observers are
+called \emph{monitors} because they download every certificate from all logs.
+One can self-host a monitor, or use a third-party service like
+\texttt{crt.sh}, or follow other models based on
+subscriptions~\cite{lwm,li}.  To avoid introducing more parties that are trusted
+blindly as in the CA ecosystem, CT stands on a cryptographic foundation that
+permits efficient verification of inclusion (a certificate is in the log) and
+the append-only property (no certificate has been removed or
+modified)~\cite{ct-foundation}.  A party engaging in verification of these
+(logarithmic) proofs is called an \emph{auditor}.
+
+In practice, CT has been rolled-out gradually to not break the
+web~\cite{does-ct-break-the-web}.  One facilitating factor has been the
+introduction of Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs).  An SCT is a log's
+\emph{promise} to include a certificate within a certain amount of time;
+typically 24~hours.  This guarantees low-latency certificate issuance so that
+CAs can \emph{embed} SCTs in certificates to keep web servers oblivious to CT.
+Google Chrome and Apple's Safari require SCTs before accepting a certificate as
+valid, and steps towards further SCT verification have been taken
+recently~\cite{ct-in-chrome}.  Tor Browser does not require CT yet~\cite{ctor-popets}.
diff --git a/summary/src/sauteed/src/refs.bib b/summary/src/sauteed/src/refs.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..876fed4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/sauteed/src/refs.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+@misc{ahmia.fi,
+  author       = {Ahmia},
+  title        = {Indexing and crawling},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://ahmia.fi/documentation/indexing/}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@misc{sauteed-onion-artifacts,
+  title        = {Paper artifact},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/onion-services/sauteed-onions}}, 
+  year         = {2022}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{le,
+  author    = {Josh Aas and Richard Barnes and Benton Case and Zakir Durumeric and Peter Eckersley and Alan Flores{-}L{\'{o}}pez and J. Alex Halderman and Jacob Hoffman{-}Andrews and James Kasten and Eric Rescorla and Seth D. Schoen and Brad Warren},
+  title     = {{Let's Encrypt}: An Automated Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2019},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{le-multi-path,
+  author    = {Henry Birge{-}Lee and Liang Wang and Daniel McCarney and Roland Shoemaker and Jennifer Rexford and Prateek Mittal},
+  title     = {Experiences Deploying Multi-Vantage-Point Domain Validation at {Let's Encrypt}},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year      = {2021},
+}
+
+@Misc{cab-ballot144,
+  author       = {\relax{{CA}/Browser Forum}},
+  title        = {Ballot 144 -- Validation rules for .onion names},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://cabforum.org/2015/02/18/ballot-144-validation-rules-dot-onion-names/}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@misc{cab-onion-dv,
+  author = {\relax{{CA}/Browser Forum}},
+  title = {Ballot SC27v3: Version 3 Onion Certificates},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://cabforum.org/2020/02/20/ballot-sc27v3-version-3-onion-certificates/}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{chuat-gossip,
+  author    = {Laurent Chuat and Pawel Szalachowski and Adrian Perrig and Ben Laurie and Eran Messeri},
+  title     = {Efficient gossip protocols for verifying the consistency of Certificate logs},
+  booktitle = {{CNS}},
+  year      = {2015},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{lwm,
+  author    = {Rasmus Dahlberg and Tobias Pulls},
+  title     = {Verifiable Light-Weight Monitoring for {Certificate Transparency} Logs},
+  booktitle = {NordSec},
+  year      = {2018},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{smt,
+  author    = {Rasmus Dahlberg and Tobias Pulls and Roel Peeters},
+  title     = {Efficient Sparse {Merkle} Trees - Caching Strategies and Secure (Non-)Membership Proofs},
+  booktitle = {NordSec},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@article{ctor-popets,
+  author  = {Rasmus Dahlberg and Tobias Pulls and Tom Ritter and Paul Syverson}, 
+  title   = {Privacy-Preserving \& Incrementally-Deployable Support for {Certificate Transparency} in {Tor}}, 
+  journal = {PETS},
+  volume  = {2021},
+  number  = {2},
+}
+
+@misc{digicert-onion,
+  author       = {\relax{DigiCert Inc.}},
+  title        = {Ordering a .onion certificate from {DigiCert}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.digicert.com/blog/ordering-a-onion-certificate-from-digicert}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{tor-design,
+  title     = {Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router},
+  author    = {Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson and Paul Syverson},
+  booktitle = {USENIX Security},
+  year      = {2004},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{ct-foundation,
+  author    = {Benjamin Dowling and Felix G{\"{u}}nther and Udyani Herath and Douglas Stebila},
+  title     = {Secure Logging Schemes and {Certificate Transparency}},
+  booktitle = {{ESORICS}},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@misc{vds,
+  author       = {Adam Eijdenberg and Ben Laurie and Al Cutter},
+  title        = {Verifiable Data Structures},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/google/trillian/blob/111e9369ab032e493a2f19f9be6d16c4f78ccca5/docs/papers/VerifiableDataStructures.pdf}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@misc{certbot,
+  key          = {EFF},
+  title        = {Changing a Certificate's Domain},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://eff-certbot.readthedocs.io/en/stable/using.html\#changing-a-certificate-s-domains}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@misc{fink,
+  author       = {Alex Fink},
+  title        = {Mnemonic .onion {URLs}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/194-mnemonic-urls.txt}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@techreport{dangerous-labels,
+  author      = {Daniel Kahn Gillmor},
+  title       = {{Dangerous Labels in DNS and E-mail}},
+  type        = {Internet-Draft},
+  number      = {draft-dkg-intarea-dangerous-labels-01},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  year        = {2022},
+}
+
+@misc{chrome-logs,
+  title        = {{Google LLC.}},
+  key          = {Known Logs},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-community-site/blob/master/docs/google/known-logs.md}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@misc{harica-onion,
+  author       = {\relax{Harica}},
+  title        = {{DV} certificates for Onion websites},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://news.harica.gr/article/onion_announcement/}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@misc{kadianakis,
+  author       = {George Kadianakis and Yawning Angel and David Goulet},
+  title        = {A Name System {API} for {Tor} Onion Services},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/279-naming-layer-api.txt}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@article{ct/a,
+  author    = {Ben Laurie},
+  title     = {Certificate transparency},
+  journal   = {CACM},
+  volume    = {57},
+  number    = {10},
+  year      = {2014},
+}
+
+@misc{trans-laurie,
+  title        = {{Re: [Trans] Mozilla's} basic take on Binary Transparency},
+  author       = {Ben Laurie},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/trans/1FxzTkn4LVxU6KN2P3YfbVsKpho/}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@techreport{ct-rfc,
+  author      = {Ben Laurie and Adam Langley and Emilia Kasper},
+  title       =	 {{Certificate Transparency}},
+  type        = {RFC},
+  number      = {6962},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  year        = {2013},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{li,
+  author    = {Bingyu Li and Jingqiang Lin and Fengjun Li and Qiongxiao Wang and Qi Li and Jiwu Jing and Congli Wang},
+  title     = {{Certificate Transparency} in the Wild: Exploring the Reliability of Monitors},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2019},
+}
+
+@inproceedings {coniks,
+  author    = {Marcela S. Melara and Aaron Blankstein and Joseph Bonneau and Edward W. Felten and Michael J. Freedman}, 
+  title     = {{CONIKS}: Bringing Key Transparency to End Users},
+  booktitle = {USENIX Security},
+  year      = {2015},
+}
+
+@misc{russia-blocks,
+  author       = {Simon Migliano and Samuel Woodhams},
+  title        = {Websites Blocked in {Russia} Since {Ukraine} Invasion},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.top10vpn.com/research/websites-blocked-in-russia/}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@misc{vanity-address,
+  title        = {mkp224o---vanity address generator for ed25519 onion services},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/cathugger/mkp224o}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@misc{mozilla-bt,
+  author       = {Mozilla},
+  title        = {Security/Binary Transparency},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Binary_Transparency}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@misc{muffet-onions,
+  author       = {Alec Muffett},
+  title        = {Onion {Certificate Transparency} Log},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/alecmuffett/real-world-onion-sites}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@misc{sooc,
+  author       = {Alec Muffett},
+  title        = {Same Origin Onion Certificates},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://crt.sh/?id=6819596552}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@misc{namecoin,
+  title        = {Namecoin},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.namecoin.org/}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@misc{nordberg-tor,
+  author       = {Linus Nordberg},
+  title        = {{Tor} Consensus Transparency},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/267-tor-consensus-transparency.txt}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@phdthesis{nurmi,
+  author = {Nurmi, Juha},
+  title  = {Understanding the Usage of Anonymous Onion Services},
+  year   = {2019},
+  school = {Tampere University, Finland},
+}
+
+@Misc{haroi-tor-dev,
+  author       = {nusenu},
+  title        = {{HAROI}: Human Readable Authenticated Relay Operator Identifier},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2021-December/014688.html}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@misc{onion-location,
+  author       = {Tor Project},
+  title        = {Onion-Location},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/advanced/onion-location/}, accessed 2022-08-01}, 
+}
+
+@misc{onion-service-overview,
+  author       = {Tor Project},
+  title        = {Onion Services},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@misc{rhatto,
+  author       = {Silvio Rhatto},
+  title        = {Sauteed Week {API} Backend},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://gitlab.torproject.org/rhatto/sauteed-week/-/blob/main/docs/api.md}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@misc{sauteed-onion-cert,
+  title        = {Sauteed Onion Certificate},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://crt.sh/?id=5957691193}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{onion-dns,
+  author    = {Nolen Scaife and Henry Carter and Patrick Traynor},
+  title     = {{OnionDNS}: A seizure-resistant top-level Domain},
+  booktitle = {{CNS}},
+  year      = {2015},
+}
+
+@article{ct-in-chrome,
+  author    = {Emily Stark and Joe DeBlasio and Devon O'Brien and Davide Balzarotti and William Enck and Samuel King and Angelos Stavrou},
+  title     = {{Certificate Transparency} in {Google Chrome}: Past, Present, and Future},
+  journal   = {{IEEE} Secur. Priv.},
+  volume    = {19},
+  number    = {6},
+  year      = {2021},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{does-ct-break-the-web,
+  author    = {Emily Stark and Ryan Sleevi and Rijad Muminovic and Devon O'Brien and Eran Messeri and Adrienne Porter Felt and Brendan McMillion and Parisa Tabriz},
+  title     = {Does {Certificate Transparency} Break the Web? {Measuring} Adoption and Error Rate},
+  booktitle = {{IEEE S\&P}},
+  year      = {2019},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{once-and-future,
+  author    = {Paul Syverson},
+  title     = {The Once and Future Onion},
+  booktitle = {ESORICS},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{onion-discovery-attacks,
+  author    = {Paul Syverson and Matt Finkel and Saba Eskandarian and Dan Boneh},
+  title     = {Attacks on Onion Discovery and Remedies via Self-Authenticating Traditional Addresses}, 
+  booktitle = {WPES},
+  year      = {2021},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{secdev19,
+  author    = {Paul Syverson and Matt Traudt},
+  title     = {Self-Authenticating Traditional Domain Names},
+  booktitle = {{SecDev}},
+  year      = {2019},
+}
+
+@misc{plex,
+  title        = {How {Plex} is doing {HTTPS} for all its users},
+  author       = {Filippo Valsorda},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://words.filippo.io/how-plex-is-doing-https-for-all-its-users/}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@Misc{h-e-securedrop,
+  author       = {SecureDrop},
+  title        = {Getting an Onion Name for Your {SecureDrop}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://securedrop.org/faq/getting-onion-name-your-securedrop/}, accessed 2022-08-01},
+}
+
+@article{onio-ns,
+  author    = {Jesse Victors and Ming Li and Xinwen Fu},
+  title     = {The Onion Name System},
+  journal   = {PETS},
+  volume    = {2017},
+  number    = {1},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{winter,
+  author    = {Philipp Winter and Anne Edmundson and Laura M. Roberts and Agnieszka Dutkowska{-}Zuk and Marshini Chetty and Nick Feamster},
+  title     = {How Do {Tor} Users Interact With Onion Services?},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year      = {2018},
+}
+
+@techreport{nordberg-gossip,
+  author      = {Linus Nordberg and Daniel Kahn Gillmor and Tom Ritter},
+  title       = {Gossiping in {CT}},
+  type        = {Internet-draft},
+  number      = {draft-ietf-trans-gossip-05},
+  institution = {IETF},
+  year        = {2018},
+}
diff --git a/summary/src/sauteed/src/related.tex b/summary/src/sauteed/src/related.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d772d0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/sauteed/src/related.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+\section{Related Work} \label{sauteed:sec:related}
+The CA/B forum accepts certificates with \texttt{.onion}
+addresses~\cite{cab-ballot144,cab-onion-dv}.  DigiCert supports extended
+validation of \texttt{.onion} addresses~\cite{digicert-onion}, and HARICA domain
+validation~\cite{harica-onion}.  Muffett proposed same-origin onion certificates
+that permit clients to omit verification of the CA trust chain for
+onionsites~\cite{sooc}.  Sauteed onions help Tor users \emph{discover}
+domain names with associated onion addresses.  Therefore, it is a
+complement to approaches that bring HTTPS to onionsites.
+
+Syverson suggested that traditional domain names and \texttt{.onion} addresses
+can be glued into a single registered domain~\cite{once-and-future}.  Nusenu
+proposed long-term Tor relay identifiers based on domain names to retrieve lists
+of relevant public keys via HTTPS~\cite{haroi-tor-dev}.  Sauteed onions may be
+used for such associations with the benefit of transparency, and it is further a
+\emph{lighter} version of Syverson and Traudt's self-authenticated traditional
+addresses which favors early deployment over properties like bidirectional onion
+associations, guaranteed timeliness of revocation, and addressing all known
+threats~\cite{onion-discovery-attacks,secdev19}.
+
+Winter~\emph{et al.} studied how users engage with onion services~\cite{winter}.
+A gist is that Tor users have a hard time discovering onion addresses and
+verifying them as authentic.  Common discovery mechanisms that are associated
+with human-meaningful identifiers include
+  personal communication,
+  webpage links,
+  onion-location redirects~\cite{onion-location},
+  third-party lists~\cite{onion-service-overview}, and
+  search engines like DuckDuckGo.
+Prior work has also focused on enumerating onion addresses without any
+associated identity, e.g., through CT-logged certificates with \texttt{.onion}
+addresses~\cite{muffet-onions} and crawling~\cite{ahmia.fi,nurmi}.
+Sauteed onions enhance onion location by making the claimed associations
+transparent in CT, and facilitate third-party solutions with less blind trust
+and without assumptions about TLS sites not becoming blocked in the future.
+
+Several ideas were proposed that mitigate or bypass the problem of
+random-looking onion addresses.  Some sites generate vanity addresses that,
+e.g., start with a prefix and have other memorable traits~\cite{vanity-address}.
+Fink sketched out how to map onion addresses to a set of words~\cite{fink}.
+Kadianakis~\emph{et al.} defined a common API to hook into alternative
+naming systems that give onion addresses pet names~\cite{kadianakis}.
+SecureDrop Onion Names is one such example that is, however,
+implemented directly
+in Tor Browser as an HTTPS Everywhere ruleset for selected news sites.  Other
+alternative naming systems include Namecoin~\cite{namecoin} and
+OnioNS~\cite{onio-ns}.  Sauteed onions is also an alternative naming system, but
+one that relies on CAs and CT logs.
+It may be possible to construct sauteed onions via DNSSEC, but then relying on
+the DNS hierarchy without transparency logging.
+Scaife~\emph{et~al.}~\cite{onion-dns} proposed the \texttt{.o} TLD as an
+onionsite with DNSSEC.
+
+Nordberg connected transparency logs and the consensus mechanism that Tor
+uses~\cite{nordberg-tor}.  Dahlberg~\emph{et~al.} proposed CT in Tor for all
+certificate validations~\cite{ctor-popets}.  We only check signatures of
+embedded SCTs in relation to onion location, and our search engine is
+a simple application of CT monitoring.
+There is a large body of orthogonal work that improve CAs and CT.  For example,
+multi-path domain-validation makes it harder to hijack onion
+associations~\cite{le-multi-path}, and deployment of gossip would harden our
+CT log assumptions~\cite{chuat-gossip,nordberg-gossip}.
diff --git a/summary/src/sauteed/src/sauteed.tex b/summary/src/sauteed/src/sauteed.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06a581c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/sauteed/src/sauteed.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+\section{Saut\'{e} Onions Until Discovery is Transparent and Confection is Firm} \label{sauteed:sec:trans}
+
+\subsection{System Goals} \label{sauteed:sec:system-goals}
+Let an onion association be unidirectional from a traditional domain name to an
+onion address.  Three main system goals are as follows:
+
+\begin{description}
+  \item[Privacy-Preserving Onion Associations] Users should discover the same
+    onion associations, and otherwise the possibility of an
+    inconsistency must become public knowledge.
+  \item[Forward Censorship Resistance] Unavailability of a TLS
+    site must not impede discovery of past onion associations.
+  \item[Automated Verifiable Discovery] Onion association search should be
+    possible without requiring blind trust in third-parties.  It must be hard to
+    fabricate non-empty answers, and easy to automate the setup for scalability
+    and robustness.
+\end{description}
+
+For comparison, today's onion location~\cite{onion-location} does not assure a
+user that the same HTTP header is set for them as for everyone else.  Classes of
+users that connect to a domain at different times or via different
+links can be given targeted redirects to distinct onion addresses
+without detection~\cite{onion-discovery-attacks}.  Onion location also
+does not work if a regular site becomes unavailable due to censorship.
+The \emph{search engine approach} is further a frequent ask by Tor
+users~\cite{winter}.  The solutions that exist in practice rely on
+manually curated
+lists~\cite{muffet-onions,onion-service-overview,h-e-securedrop}, notably with
+little or no retroactive accountability.  As specified above, we aim for a
+similar utility but with a setup that can be automated for all onion
+associations and without the ability to easily fabricate non-empty answers
+without trivial detection.  We sketch out how these security properties are
+achieved in Section~\ref{sauteed:sec:security-sketch}.
+
+\subsection{Threat Model and Scope} \label{sauteed:sec:threat-model}
+We consider an attacker that wants to trick a user into visiting a targeted
+onionsite without anyone noticing the possibility of such behavior.  Users are
+assumed to know the right traditional domain name that is easy to remember (such
+as \texttt{torproject.org}), but not its corresponding onion address.  We
+further assume that the attacker either controls a trusted CA sufficiently to
+issue certificates or is able to deceive them sufficiently during certificate
+issuance to obtain a valid certificate
+from that CA\@.  Any misbehavior is however assumed to be detectable in CT.  So,
+the certificate ecosystem is treated as a \emph{building block} that we make no
+attempt to improve.
+
+We permit the attacker to make TLS sites unavailable after setup, but
+we assume it is difficult to censor the CT log ecosystem because it can
+be mirrored by anyone. Also, as part of the Internet authentication
+infrastructure, adversaries may have equities conflicts in blocking CT logs,
+and if concerned at all about appearance would have a
+harder time justifying such a block versus, e.g., a political,
+journalism, or social media site.
+Similar to CT, we do not attempt to solve certificate revocation and
+especially not in relation to certificates that are connected to
+discovery of onion associations.  This is consistent with Tor Browser's existing
+model for revocation with onion location, which similarly depends on the
+certificate for the redirecting domain. There is no formal counterpart to revoke
+a result in a search engine, but we outline future work related to this.
+
+Our threat model includes countries that block direct access to HTTPS
+sites~\cite{russia-blocks}.
+This is arguably a capable attacker, as no country is currently known to
+completely block indirect access via the Tor network (though in some places
+Tor bridges and/or obfuscated transport is needed).  Our threat model also
+considers the plethora of blindly trusted parties that help users discover onion
+addresses with little or no retroactive
+accountability~\cite{ahmia.fi,muffet-onions,onion-service-overview,h-e-securedrop}.
+In other words, it is in-scope to pave the path towards more accountability.
+
+\subsection{Description of Sauteed Onions} \label{sauteed:sec:sauteed-onions}
+An observation that inspired work on sauteed onions is that onion
+location requires HTTPS~\cite{onion-location}.  This means that
+discovery of onion associations \emph{already} relies on the CA ecosystem.  By
+incorporating the use of CT, it is possible to add accountability to CAs and
+other parties that help with onion address discovery while also raising the bar
+for censoring sites and reducing anonymity.  The name sauteed onions is a cooking pun;
+the association of an onion address with a domain name becomes transparent for
+everyone to see in CT logs.
+
+For background, a CA-issued certificate can contain both a traditional domain
+name and a \texttt{.onion address}~\cite{cab-ballot144,cab-onion-dv}.  This can
+be viewed as a mutual association because the issuing CA must verify the
+traditional domain name \emph{and} the specified onion address.  An immediate
+problem is that this would be ambiguous if there are multiple domain names;
+which one (if any) should be associated with an onion address with such
+certificate coalescence?  A more appropriate path forward would therefore be to
+define an X.509v3 extension for sauteed onions which clearly \emph{declares that
+a domain-validated name wants to be associated with an onion address}.
+
+We describe two uses of sauteed onions that achieve our goals; first assuming it
+is easy to get CA-issued certificates that contain associated onion addresses
+for domain-validated names, and then a short-term roll-out approach that
+could make it a reality now.  A sauteed onion is simply a CT-logged certificate
+that claims \texttt{example.com} wants to be associated with
+\texttt{<addr>.onion} but not necessarily the other way around, i.e., a
+unidirectional association.
+
+\subsubsection{Onion Location} \label{sauteed:sec:onion-location}
+Figure~\ref{sauteed:fig:onion-location} illustrates onion location that uses
+certificates.  A user establishes a TLS connection to a site as usual.  Upon
+encountering a certificate that is CT-logged with an associated onion address
+for the visited site \texttt{example.com}, an onion-location prompt becomes
+available in Tor Browser or the onion site is visited automatically.  This is the same type
+of redirect behavior as today's onion location~\cite{onion-location}, except
+that the possibility of such a redirect is disclosed in public CT logs.
+Attempts at targeted redirects would thus be visible to site owners and
+independent third-parties.  A redirect to someone else's onion address would
+also be visible to the respective site owners.  Notably the ability to detect
+inappropriate redirects acts as a deterrence while also being the first step
+towards remediation, e.g., if users bookmarked onion addresses~\cite{winter}
+to achieve trust on first use or to avoid visiting a regular site \emph{and} an
+onionsite in a way that might reduce a user's anonymity set.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\includegraphics[width=.6\columnwidth]{src/sauteed/img/onion-location}
+	\caption{Onion location based on a CT-logged certificate.}
+	\label{sauteed:fig:onion-location}
+\end{figure}
+
+A key observation is that onion location has always been a feature
+facilitated by TLS.  By implementing it in certificates rather than HTTP
+headers that are delivered via HTTPS connections, TLS applications that are ``not
+web'' can use it too without rolling their own mechanisms.  The addition of
+requiring CT to follow onion-location redirects is also an improvement compared
+to today, although one that could be achieved with an HTTP-based approach as
+well (or more ambitiously, for all Tor Browser certificate
+validations~\cite{ctor-popets}).
+
+We prototyped the above in a web extension that is free and open
+source~\cite{sauteed-onion-artifacts}.  The criterion for CT logging is at least
+one embedded SCT from a log in the policy used by Google
+Chrome~\cite{chrome-logs}.  If an onion-location redirect is followed, the
+path of the current webpage is preserved, similar to a typical configuration of
+today's HTTP-based onion location header that instead lists a complete
+URL~\cite{onion-location}.
+
+\subsubsection{Search Engine} \label{sauteed:sec:search-engine}
+A significant challenge for third-parties that help users discover TLS sites
+that are available as onion services is to gain confidence in the underlying
+dataset at scale.  For example, SecureDrop onion names are scoped to news
+sites~\cite{h-e-securedrop}; the list by Muffett is scoped as ``no sites for tech
+with less than (arbitrary) 10,000 users''~\cite{muffet-onions}; and
+\texttt{ahmia.fi} does not even attempt to give onion addresses human-meaningful
+names~\cite{nurmi}.  To make matters worse, solutions based on manually curated
+lists and third-party search are currently implemented with little or no
+accountability.
+
+Figure~\ref{sauteed:fig:search-engine} shows what our approach brings to the table.
+All CT logs can be monitored by a third-party to discover sauteed onions.
+A search API can then be presented to users for the resulting dataset, similar
+to existing monitoring services but scoped specifically for discovery of onion
+associations.  The utility of such a search API is:
+``\emph{what onion addresses are available for \texttt{www.example.com}}''.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\includegraphics[width=.6\columnwidth]{src/sauteed/img/onion-search}
+	\caption{Verifiable domain name to onion address search.}
+	\label{sauteed:fig:search-engine}
+\end{figure}
+
+The expected behavior of the search API is that an answer can not be fabricated
+without controlling a CA or hijacking certificate issuance, and any CA
+malfeasance should further be caught by CT\@.  This
+means that no party can fabricate inappropriate answers without detection.
+This is a major improvement compared to the alternative of no verifiability at
+all, although one that in and of itself does not prevent \emph{false negatives}.
+In other words, available answers could trivially be omitted.  This is a
+limitation with the authenticated data structure in CT that can be fixed; see
+security sketch in Section~\ref{sauteed:sec:security-sketch} for an intuition of how to
+work around it.
+
+We specified an HTTP REST API that facilitates search using a domain name; the
+API also makes available additional information like the actual certificate and
+its exact index in a CT log.  In total there are two endpoints: \texttt{search}
+(list of matches with identifiers to more info) and \texttt{get} (more info).  The
+complete API specification is available online together with our implementation,
+which is free and open source~\cite{sauteed-onion-artifacts}.  An independent
+implementation from Tor's hack week is also available by Rhatto~\cite{rhatto}.
+Our prototype runs against all CT logs in Google Chrome for certificates
+logged after July 16, 2022.  A few query examples are available in
+Appendix~\ref{sauteed:app:search}.
+
+\subsubsection{Certificate Format} \label{sauteed:sec:cert-format}
+Until now we assumed that a sauteed onion is easily set up, e.g., using an
+X.509v3 extension.  The bad news is that such an extension does not exist, and
+it would likely be a long journey to standardize and see deployment by CAs.
+Therefore, our prototypes rely on a backwards-compatible approach that encodes
+onion addresses as subdomains~\cite{once-and-future}.  To declare that
+\texttt{example.com} wants to be associated with \texttt{<addr>.onion}, one can
+request a domain-validated certificate that contains both \texttt{example.com}
+and \texttt{<addr>onion.example.com}~\cite{secdev19}.  The inclusion of
+\texttt{example.com} ensures that such a setup does not result in a dangerous
+label~\cite{dangerous-labels}.  The \emph{hack to encode an onion address as a
+subdomain} makes it part of the certificate without requiring changes to CAs.
+Appendix~\ref{sauteed:app:setup} details the necessary setup-steps further.  The gist
+is the addition of a subdomain DNS record and using the \texttt{-d} option in
+\texttt{certbot}~\cite{certbot}.
+
+Although the subdomain approach is easy to deploy right now, it is by
+no means a perfect solution.  An X.509v3 extension would not require
+the configuration of an
+additional DNS record.  In other words, the unidirectional sauteed onions
+property works just as well if the subdomain is not domain-validated.  The
+important part is that the CA validates \texttt{example.com}, and that the
+associated onion address can be declared somewhere in the issued certificate
+without an ambiguous intent.
+Another imperfection that goes hand-in-hand with backwards-compatibility is that
+CAs would have to \emph{opt-out} from sauteed onions, unlike site owners
+that instead have to \emph{opt-in}.
+
+To avoid recommending a pattern that is discouraged by CAs, the Tor Project
+should at least have a dialog with Let's Encrypt which issues the most
+certificates~\cite{le}.  Somewhat similar subdomain hacks related to CAs exist,
+but then with explicit negotiations~\cite{plex}.
+Subdomain hacks without a relation to CAs and TLS were discouraged in the
+past~\cite{trans-laurie}.  We argue that sauteed onions is related because
+CA-validated names are at the heart of our approach.  For example, this is
+unlike Mozilla's binary transparency idea that just wanted to reuse a public
+log~\cite{mozilla-bt}.  Sauteed onions also do not result in more issued
+certificates; it is just the number of domain-validated names that increase by
+one for TLS sites that do the setup.
+
+\subsubsection{Security Sketch} \label{sauteed:sec:security-sketch}
+Our threat model disallows the attacker to tamper with CT and to make the log
+ecosystem unavailable.  Onion location as described in
+Section~\ref{sauteed:sec:onion-location} therefore ensures that a redirect becomes
+public, achieving detectability as defined in our privacy-preserving onion
+association goal.  The search engine in Section~\ref{sauteed:sec:search-engine}
+trivially achieves the same goal because onion associations are \emph{found}
+via CT.  Blocking a TLS site is additionally \emph{too late} if an association
+is already in a CT log, thus achieving forward censorship resistance.
+Our search engine approach further makes it hard to forge non-answers without
+detection because it requires control of a CA and defeating the tamper-evidence
+of CT logs.  While it is possible to omit available answers, this can be
+mitigated by having multiple search APIs, domains that check the integrity of
+their own onion associations similar to the proposed verification pattern in
+CONIKS~\cite{coniks}, or to represent the sauteed onion dataset as a sparse
+Merkle tree to get a verifiable log-backed map that additionally supports
+efficient non-membership proofs that CT lacks~\cite{smt,vds}.
+
+\subsection{Future Work}
+It would be valuable to implement proofs of no omissions as well as native
+lookups in a web extension or Tor Browser to verify everything before showing
+the user a result (certificates, proofs of logging, etc).  The entire or
+selected parts of the sauteed onion dataset may further be delivered to Tor
+Browser similar to SecureDrop onion names~\cite{h-e-securedrop}.  The difference
+would be that the list is automated using a selection criteria from CT logs
+rather than doing it manually on a case-by-case basis.  A major benefit is that
+the sauteed onion dataset can then be queried locally, completely avoiding
+third-party queries and visits to the regular site.  Another approach to explore
+is potential integration of the sauteed onion dataset into Tor's DHT: a
+cryptographic source of truth for available onion associations is likely a
+helpful starting point so that there is \emph{something to distribute}.  It
+would also be interesting to consider other search-engine policies than
+\emph{show everything} as in our work, e.g., only first association or last
+association.  (These policies can be verified with \emph{full
+audits}~\cite{vds}.)
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+*.blg
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diff --git a/summary/src/tlwo/img/repeat-attack.pdf b/summary/src/tlwo/img/repeat-attack.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36e2f73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/tlwo/img/repeat-attack.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/tlwo/img/resolve.pdf b/summary/src/tlwo/img/resolve.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff7ab6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/tlwo/img/resolve.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/tlwo/img/setting.pdf b/summary/src/tlwo/img/setting.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aee9012
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/tlwo/img/setting.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/tlwo/img/uncached.pdf b/summary/src/tlwo/img/uncached.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a83a17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/tlwo/img/uncached.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/tlwo/main.tex b/summary/src/tlwo/main.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09110c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/tlwo/main.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+\begin{kaupaper}[
+    author={%
+      \textbf{Rasmus Dahlberg} and
+      Tobias Pulls
+    },
+    title={%
+      Timeless Timing Attacks and Preload Defenses in Tor's DNS Cache
+    },
+    reference={%
+      USENIX Security (2023)
+    },
+    summary={%
+      Tor relays cache resolved domains with constant time-to-live values not to
+      reveal information about past exit traffic while boosting performance.  We
+      show that this caching strategy and its implementation in the live Tor
+      network can be exploited by a \emph{timeless timing attack} that leaks if a
+      domain is (not) cached.  Further, the time that a domain was inserted into
+      the cache can be inferred by repeated probes.  Our attack prototype's
+      experimental evaluation in real conditions shows that there are neither
+      false positives nor false negatives (10M~repetitions).  Thus, it is useful
+      for instantiating a real-world website oracle without requiring any special attacker
+      capabilities or reach (just a modest computer that can create a Tor
+      circuit).  One of our mitigations has been merged in Tor: probabilistic
+      time-to-live values that make the time-of-insertion fuzzy.  Long-term,
+      Tor's DNS cache could be redesigned to \emph{preload} the same domains at all
+      exits.  Such preloading would eliminate all (timeless) timing attacks in
+      Tor's DNS cache because the same domains would always be (un)cached across
+      different circuits.  To retain performance within the same circuit, we
+      propose that the preloaded domains should be complemented by a dynamic
+      same-circuit cache that is not shared across circuits.  Our
+      four-month-long DNS cache measurement at two 100~Mbit/s exit relays
+      informs on today's baseline performance.  It is compared to a preloaded
+      DNS cache based on different variations of three popularity lists: Alexa,
+      Tranco, and Umbrella.  A preloaded DNS cache can be as performant as today
+      with similar resource usage or significantly improve cache-hit ratios by
+      2-3x. However, the increased cache-hit ratios have the cost of modest
+      increases in memory and resolver load.
+    },
+    participation={\vspace{-.25cm}
+      Tobias and I collaborated closely from start to finish with the following
+      exceptions.  I did most implementation work.  Volunteers from DFRI---a
+      Swedish non-profit and non-partisan organization that promotes digital
+      rights---operated our exit relays.  Tobias did most DNS cache data
+      analysis.  Tobias also had the initial idea, which was refined with
+      feedback~from~Roger~Dingledine.
+    },
+    label={
+      paper:tlwo
+    },
+]
+  \maketitle
+  \begin{abstract}
+    \input{src/tlwo/src/abstract}
+  \end{abstract}
+
+  \input{src/tlwo/src/introduction}
+  \input{src/tlwo/src/background}
+  \input{src/tlwo/src/tor-cache}
+  \input{src/tlwo/src/attack}
+  \input{src/tlwo/src/short}
+  \input{src/tlwo/src/long}
+  \input{src/tlwo/src/related}
+  \input{src/tlwo/src/conclusion}
+  \input{src/tlwo/src/acknowledgements}
+  \input{src/tlwo/src/availability}
+  
+  \bibliographystyle{plain}
+  \bibliography{src/tlwo/src/ref}
+\end{kaupaper}
diff --git a/summary/src/tlwo/src/abstract.tex b/summary/src/tlwo/src/abstract.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df4fa1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/tlwo/src/abstract.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+\noindent
+We show that Tor's DNS cache is vulnerable to a timeless timing attack, allowing
+anyone to determine if a domain is cached or not  without any false positives.
+The attack requires sending a single TLS record. It can be repeated to determine
+when a domain is no longer cached to leak the insertion time.  Our evaluation in
+the Tor network shows no instances of cached domains being reported as uncached
+and vice versa after 12M repetitions while only targeting our own domains. This
+shifts DNS in Tor from an unreliable side-channel---using traditional timing
+attacks with network jitter---to being perfectly reliable.  We responsibly
+disclosed the attack and suggested two short-term mitigations.
+
+As a long-term defense for the DNS cache in Tor against all types of (timeless)
+timing attacks, we propose a redesign where only an allowlist of domains is
+preloaded to always be cached across circuits.  We compare the performance of a
+preloaded DNS cache to Tor's current solution towards DNS by measuring
+aggregated statistics for four months from two exits (after engaging with the
+Tor Research Safety Board and our university ethical review process). The
+evaluated preload lists are variants of the following top-lists: Alexa, Cisco
+Umbrella, and Tranco. Our results show that four-months-old preload lists can be
+tuned to offer comparable performance under similar resource usage or to
+significantly improve shared cache-hit ratios (2--3x) with a modest increase in
+memory usage and resolver load compared to a 100 Mbit/s exit.  We conclude that
+Tor's current DNS cache is mostly a privacy harm because the majority of cached
+domains are unlikely to lead to cache hits but remain there to be probed by
+attackers.
diff --git a/summary/src/tlwo/src/acknowledgements.tex b/summary/src/tlwo/src/acknowledgements.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..84302c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/tlwo/src/acknowledgements.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+\section*{Acknowledgments}
+Many thanks to
+  Georg Koppen and
+  Marc Juarez
+for engaging with us in continuous Tor Research Safety Board discussions, as
+well as
+  Elias Rudberg,
+  Johan Nilsson, and
+  Linus Nordberg
+who operated our modified Tor relays at the premises of DFRI.
+We would further like to thank our shepherd, the anonymous reviewers,
+  Mike Perry,
+  Nick Mathewson,
+  Paul Syverson, and
+  Roger Dingledine
+for their valuable feedback.
+The authors were supported by
+  Mullvad VPN,
+  the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research, and
+  the Swedish Internet Foundation.
diff --git a/summary/src/tlwo/src/attack.tex b/summary/src/tlwo/src/attack.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..542cdb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/tlwo/src/attack.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+\section{Timeless Timing Attack} \label{tlwo:sec:attack}
+
+Past work demonstrated timing attacks against Tor's DNS cache~\cite{wfwo}. In
+short, anyone can observe the latency of a domain lookup to determine if it is
+more or less likely that an answer is (not) cached.  A quick response is more
+likely to be cached, thereby leaking information about past traffic on an exit.
+A downside of such a remote timing attack is that it is subject to network
+jitter while traversing hops in the Tor network.  We show how to bypass this
+limitation by constructing a timeless timing attack that is immune to network
+jitter~\cite{timeless}.  Notably the attack only requires Internet access and a
+very modest computer.
+
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:attack:detailed} outlines the attack, followed by a description
+of our prototype implementation in Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:attack:prototype},
+evaluation in Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:attack:measurements}, as well as ethical
+considerations in Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:attack:ethical}.
+
+\subsection{Detailed Description} \label{tlwo:sec:attack:detailed}
+An exit's processing of an incoming RESOLVE cell depends on if an answer is
+cached or not, see Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:resolve}.  An answer may already be available
+and a RESOLVED cell can be scheduled for sending immediately (``cached'').
+Otherwise an answer is not yet available and a resolve process needs to take
+place concurrently to avoid blocking (``uncached''). We construct a timeless
+timing attack by exploiting the fact that scheduling RESOLVED cells for sending
+with different concurrent timings depend on if an answer is cached (send
+immediately) or uncached (send based on an event later on)~\cite{ctor-1}.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\includegraphics[width=.67\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/resolve}
+	\caption{%
+		Processing of an incoming RESOLVE cell at an exit relay.
+		Answers of concurrent resolves are triggered by events.
+	}
+	\label{tlwo:fig:resolve}
+\end{figure}
+
+\subsubsection{Attack Outline}
+
+Suppose that we craft two RESOLVE cells for \texttt{example.com} and
+\texttt{evil.com} such that they are processed by an exit \emph{directly after
+each other without any events in between}.  Further suppose that
+\texttt{evil.com} is cached.  The first RESOLVE cell is \texttt{example.com}.
+The second RESOLVE cell is \texttt{evil.com}.  Following from the flow in
+Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:resolve}, we can determine if \texttt{example.com} is (un)cached
+by observing only the order in which the two RESOLVED cells come back.  The
+order will be switched if \texttt{example.com} needs concurrent resolving
+because \emph{the answer is not available until after an event} (uncached).
+Otherwise the order is preserved (cached).  Sending two requests to be processed
+at the same time and exploiting concurrency as well as differences in processing
+time that affects the response order is what makes it
+\emph{timeless}~\cite{timeless}.
+
+Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:timeless} provides a detailed description on how to satisfy the
+presumed setup.  The attacker starts by looking up its own domain name for a
+selected exit.  This ensures that \texttt{evil.com} is cached. Next, two RESOLVE
+cells are sent in the same TLS record from a hop proceeding the exit. Both cells
+will be unpacked at the same time by TLS~\cite{ctor-2},
+% Note: input parameter at_most is set to -1 by tor's main loop
+and when processing starts all available cells will be handled before giving
+control back to Tor's main loop~\cite{ctor-3}.
+Now recall that Tor is single-threaded.  An event from any concurrent DNS
+resolve can thus not be completed before all unpacked cells were fully
+processed.  This ensures that the order in which our two RESOLVED cells come
+back in is guaranteed to leak if \texttt{example.com} is (un)cached as long as
+both RESOLVE cells arrived together in-order and \texttt{evil.com} is really
+cached.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\subfloat[][uncached]{%
+		\includegraphics[width=.7\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/uncached}
+		\label{tlwo:fig:timeless:a}
+	}\\
+	\subfloat[][cached]{%
+		\includegraphics[width=.7\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/cached}
+		\label{tlwo:fig:timeless:b}
+	}
+	\caption{%
+		The attacker ensures a domain \texttt{evil.com} is cached. Next, two
+		RESOLVE cells are sent to arrive at the same time in-order.  The relay
+		processes both cells before triggering any resolve event.  This means
+		that answers can only be sent directly if no resolving is needed.  The
+		order of RESOLVED cells switch if \texttt{example.com} is uncached.
+		Otherwise the order is preserved. }
+	\label{tlwo:fig:timeless}
+\end{figure}
+
+It should be noted that an attacker can gain full control of how their TLS
+records are packed to exits by either running a modified Tor relay or creating
+one-hop circuits.  In practise, it is also possible to omit the step of caching
+\texttt{evil.com} and instead send a \texttt{RESOLVE} cell containing an IP
+address.  Tor will simply echo the IP as if it was cached~\cite{ctor-4}.  We
+describe the attack without this optimization because it is more general.
+
+\subsubsection{Repeated Attack to Learn Insertion Time}
+So far we described how to determine if a domain is (un)cached at an exit.
+Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:attack-repeated} shows how to derive the exact time that a
+domain was added to an exit's DNS cache.  First determine whether the domain's
+TTL will be clipped to 300 or 3,600 seconds by observing the TTL returned from
+the authoritative name server or the configured resolvers of the
+exit~\cite{GreschbachPRWF17}.  Then repeat the timeless timing attack
+periodically until the domain is no longer cached, say, once per second. Suppose
+the expected clip is 300 seconds and the attack started at time $t$.  If it
+takes $x < 300$ seconds for the entry to become uncached, it was added to the
+exit's DNS cache at time $t+x - 300\textrm{s}$.  Observing $x > 300$ seconds
+means that a different party inserted the entry into the cache between probes
+(may happen for some of the most frequently looked-up domains, depending on
+probing frequency).  To recover, the attacker can perform the same steps again
+until they succeed.  For example, with two tries the initial insertion happened
+at $t+x - 600\textrm{s}$. Notably these estimates cannot be more precise than
+the attacker's repetition interval.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\includegraphics[width=.53\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/repeat-attack}
+	\caption{%
+		Repeated timeless timing attack to infer the exact time that a domain
+		was cached by someone at an exit relay.  For example, if the expected
+		clip is 300s ($\mathsf{ttl}\le300$s), the attack is repeated every
+		second, and the observed $x$ is 40s, then caching of
+		\texttt{example.com} happened at time $\approx t-260$s. }
+	\label{tlwo:fig:attack-repeated}
+\end{figure}
+
+\subsubsection{Discussion}
+While an attacker can determine if a domain is cached by an exit and if so the
+exact time it was added, the attacker cannot determine the number or timings of
+lookups for a domain after entering the cache.  In isolation, the attacker also
+cannot determine which identifiable user cached a given domain.
+
+It is easy to conduct the attack in parallel because
+probing for the status of \texttt{foo.org} is completely independent from
+\texttt{bar.org} at the same relay as well as other probes on different relays.
+In other words, an attacker can probe a single domain on all exits
+simultaneously, many different domains at a single exit, or both.  Network-wide
+probes for the same domain may be detectable by observing the DNS caches of
+multiple relays and correlating their contents. However, note that a risk-averse
+attacker~\cite{AumannL07} may spread their probes over time (five or sixty
+minutes) and domains (expected twelve domains per website on Alexa top-1M
+websites~\cite{GreschbachPRWF17}), if the goal is to confirm a website visit.
+
+An example use-case for a parallel attack is answering network-wide queries, for
+example, ``is \texttt{foo.org} visited more frequently than \texttt{bar.org}, or
+did any Tor user visit \texttt{baz.org} at a particular point in time?'' The
+latter is an instantiation of a so-called website oracle~\cite{wfwo}.  Website
+oracles remove virtually all false positives in WF attacks for all but the most
+popular websites on the web, and WF attacks may connect identifiable users with
+visited websites.  See Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:setting} in
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:introduction} for an overview of this attack setting.
+
+\subsection{Prototype Implementation} \label{tlwo:sec:attack:prototype}
+
+We prototyped our timeless timing attack so that it runs for a given exit and a
+list of domains.  Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:attack} shows the overall setup which consists
+of \texttt{carml},
+\texttt{tor-resolve}, a locally patched Tor process, and a Python script
+automating the entire setup. First Tor is started, a \emph{one-hop circuit} is
+built to the selected exit, and all streams are attached to it using
+\texttt{carml}.  Next, \texttt{tor-resolve} is used to send a special lookup
+query for \texttt{example.com} by simply appending a magic string
+\texttt{---sc}.  The patched Tor process splits such requests into two RESOLVE
+cells in the same TLS record: one for the specified domain, and another one that
+is guaranteed to not need any concurrent resolving. Finally Tor sets the output
+to \texttt{0.0.0.0} if the resulting RESOLVED cells switched order, otherwise
+\texttt{1.1.1.1} (arbitrary constants).
+After processing all domains Tor is closed and the output
+is a list where each item is zero (uncached), one (cached), or negative
+(unknown, e.g., due to a resolve timeout, a stream attach failure, or a vanished
+circuit).
+The complete attack required less than 100 lines of C to patch Tor, as well as
+200 lines of Python to make it fully automated.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\includegraphics[width=.53\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/attack}
+	\caption{%
+		Local attack setup consisting of \texttt{carml} to build one-hop
+		circuits, \texttt{tor-resolve} to inject queries, and a patched
+		tor process that transforms them into timeless timing attacks.
+	}
+	\label{tlwo:fig:attack}
+\end{figure}
+
+\subsection{Network Measurements} \label{tlwo:sec:attack:measurements}
+
+We conducted measurements in the live Tor network to evaluate the reliability of
+our prototype with four parallel instances of
+the setup in Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:attack} on a system with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU
+E5-2630 @ 2.30GHz and 4GB of DRAM. All targeted domains were our own, see
+ethical considerations in Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:attack:ethical}. In total there were
+$14,446$ runs between May 17--26, 2022.  Each run used an exit that was sampled
+uniformly at random.  Assuming $1,000$ exits at all times (conservative), the
+individual select probability should not exceed $0.004$ per run.  Each run
+performed up to $1,000$ timeless timing attacks, chunked into $500$ attacks per
+circuit and alternating between uncached and cached lookups by specifying a
+unique domain twice in a row: \texttt{<counter>.<timestamp>.<instance
+id>.example.com}. The maximum runtime was set to ten minutes.  Each query also
+had a ten second timeout.  In the advent of errors like circuit failure or
+timeouts, the remainder of the run was canceled but all results up until that
+point were collected.  The average number of DNS requests leaving the Tor
+network from \emph{all four combined instances} was $8.6$ per second.  The
+effective queries per second was slightly higher due to brief pauses while
+setting up a new run.  For reference, Sonntag reported in 2018 that the DNS
+resolver of an exit with $200$Mbit/s received an average and maximum of $18$ and
+$81$ requests per second~\cite{sonntag-metrics}. Earlier,
+Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:lookups} also showed significant variability in lookups.
+Handling our per-exit overhead during a couple of minutes should thus be
+insignificant when compared to regular patterns for DNS traffic in the network.
+
+Table~\ref{tlwo:tab:attack} summarizes our results.  After 12M timeless timing
+attacks, there were no cases of uncached lookups being reported as cached and
+vice versa.  This is consistent with the description in
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:attack:detailed}: neither false positives nor false negatives
+are expected.  The observed probability to not get an answer due to
+detectable failures were $0.00025$.
+
+\begin{table}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\caption{%
+		Timeless timing attack results.  Neither false negatives nor
+		false positives were observed with 6M repetitions each.
+	}
+	\begin{tabular}{c|ccc}
+		Type       & Got uncached & Got cached  & Failures \\
+		\hline
+		Uncached   & $6,034,779$  & $0$         & $2,858$  \\
+		Cached     & $0$          & $6,034,594$ & $142$    \\
+	\end{tabular}
+	\label{tlwo:tab:attack}
+\end{table}
+
+\subsection{Ethical Considerations} \label{tlwo:sec:attack:ethical}
+
+We responsibly disclosed our attack to the Tor Project through their security
+list. The submitted disclosure included a theoretical attack description, a
+prototype implementation with measurements showing how reliable it was, as well
+as a sketch of short-term and long-term defenses. As part of our dialog, we also
+coordinated with the Tor Project on submitting this paper to USENIX Security to
+get peer review.
+
+The conducted network measurements targeted domains under our own control. This
+ensured that we did not learn anything about real Tor users.  Performance
+overhead on exits and the Tor network at large was also modest, see
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:attack:measurements}.  In other words, the downsides were
+negligible while the significance of evaluating \emph{real-world reliability}
+was helpful to inform and motivate the need for mitigations and defenses.
diff --git a/summary/src/tlwo/src/availability.tex b/summary/src/tlwo/src/availability.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cff4dbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/tlwo/src/availability.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+\section*{Availability}  \label{tlwo:sec:availability}
+We make the following three artifacts available:
+
+\begin{enumerate}
+    \item Patches to Tor, associated scripts and data, and documentation for
+    performing timeless timing attacks.
+    \item The measurement data from our two exits, a detailed timeline of
+    operations, scripts for creating extended preload lists, and associated
+    Python scripts for parsing all stats and generating figures.
+    Sharing of the dataset was discussed as part of the contact with the Tor
+    Research Safety Board and our university ethical review process. Relevant
+    parts of our research safety board contact are included in our artifact.
+    \item Contributions to the Tor Project, including source code and associated
+    tooling for our Fuzzy TTLs mitigation and preload defense.
+\end{enumerate}
+
+See
+\url{https://gitlab.torproject.org/rgdd/ttapd}
+to locate the above.
diff --git a/summary/src/tlwo/src/background.tex b/summary/src/tlwo/src/background.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..719dec6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/tlwo/src/background.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+\section{Background} \label{tlwo:sec:background}
+The remainder of the paper requires preliminaries about DNS
+(Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:background:dns}), in particular in relation to Tor
+(Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:background:tor}).
+
+\subsection{DNS} \label{tlwo:sec:background:dns} DNS is a hierarchical system that
+maps domain names (``domains'') to IP addresses.  The hierarchy is composed of
+root servers, top-level domain (TLD) servers, and authoritative name servers.
+Root servers are aware of TLD servers like \texttt{.com}.  TLD servers are aware
+of authoritative name servers in their zone like \texttt{example.com}.
+Authoritative name servers are aware of the actual answers to a domain lookup.
+A domain lookup for \texttt{example.com} involves asking the root server for the
+TLD server of \texttt{.com}; the TLD server for the authoritative name server of
+\texttt{example.com}; and finally the authoritative name server for the IP
+address of \texttt{example.com}.  The resolve process is typically performed
+iteratively in plaintext over UDP by a third-party resolver that caches
+responses, e.g., to improve performance.  The default is usually to rely on ISP
+DNS resolvers.  It is also possible to configure other ones, e.g., Google's
+\texttt{8.8.8.8} or self-hosted using \texttt{unbound}, \texttt{bind}, etc.
+
+Of note is that the resolved domains are associated with a Time To Live (TTL)
+value.  As the name suggest, it is the amount of time that a resolved domain
+should be considered fresh.  TTL values are sometimes overridden in caches to
+improve reliability~\cite{rfc8767,MouraHMSD18} or preserve
+privacy~\cite{GreschbachPRWF17}.
+
+\subsection{Tor} \label{tlwo:sec:background:tor}
+The Tor network is composed of thousands of relays that route encrypted traffic
+on behalf of millions of daily users~\cite{tor,ManiWJJS18}.  Ordinary uses of
+Tor include preserving privacy, safety and freedom as well as facilitating
+dissent and circumventing censorship~\cite{tpo-russia,tpo-who-uses-tor}.  Access
+to the Tor network is easy using Tor Browser (TB), which is configured to proxy
+all traffic through a local Tor process that takes care of routing.  TB adds
+many other protections that are orthogonal to our work~\cite{tb}.
+
+During a regular website visit a circuit is built through a guard, middle, and
+exit relay. The first relay is fixed in a small guard set that rarely changes
+once selected, while the middle and exit relays are randomly selected weighted
+by bandwidth for each new circuit.  A circuit may have many streams (analogous
+to TCP/IP connections), typically corresponding to separate flows for a
+particular destination.  Control traffic and data is transported through the
+network in fixed-size cells that are encrypted in layers.  At each hop in a
+circuit, one layer of encryption is peeled-off. Outstanding cells from relay A
+to relay B are sent in a shared channel that is TLS protected.  Public keys,
+relay identities, and more are discovered in Tor's consensus, which is secure if
+a threshold of trusted directory authorities act honestly.
+
+We are particularly interested in how Tor interacts with DNS.  To look up a
+domain, the user's Tor process may send a RESOLVE cell that requests resolution
+by the exit.  Some exits are configured with their own iterative resolvers,
+while others rely on DNS from their ISP or other
+third-parties~\cite{GreschbachPRWF17}.  The answer to a lookup is stored in the
+exit's cache, but with the TTL \emph{clipped} to 300 or 3600 seconds depending
+on if the TTL is $\le 300$ seconds or not.  A RESOLVED cell is then sent to the
+user, who only gets to see the clipped TTL regardless of how long it has been
+stored in the cache to avoid leaking information about past exit traffic (like
+the insertion time which would be trivial to infer from a counted-down TTL).  If
+too many entries are added to Tor's DNS cache and memory becomes a scarce
+resource, an Out-Of-Memory (OOM) job deletes domains until freeing enough
+memory.  This is all controlled by an event-driven single-threaded main loop.
+
+Of further note is that TB is based on Firefox.  As part of connecting to a
+website, DNS is handled transparently through a SOCKS proxy provided by the
+local Tor process. Requests to connect to a domain through the SOCKS proxy
+results in the user's Tor process sending a BEGIN cell to establish a connection
+to the destination, which in turn triggers domain resolution at the exit.  In
+other words, there are two ways to look up domains: RESOLVE cells and BEGIN
+cells.  At no point is any resolved IP address cached in TB or in the user's Tor
+process.  This prevents shared state (the cache) from being used to
+fingerprint a user's activity across different circuits.
+
+We continue our introduction to Tor's DNS cache next while describing the
+first measurement of its performance.
diff --git a/summary/src/tlwo/src/conclusion.tex b/summary/src/tlwo/src/conclusion.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..485c593
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/tlwo/src/conclusion.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+\section{Conclusion} \label{tlwo:sec:conclusion} 
+Our timeless timing attack on Tor's DNS cache is virtually perfect,
+significantly improving over earlier timing attacks~\cite{wfwo}. Based on 12
+million measurements in the live Tor network, we only observed a 0.00025 failure
+rate due to vanished circuits and other transient networking errors that are
+easy to account for. We responsibly disclosed the attack to the Tor Project
+and coordinated the process around defenses with them.
+
+Our proposed mitigations are just that---mitigations---and do not completely
+address the underlying issues. The fuzzy TTLs mitigation primarily addresses
+confirmation with WF attacks involving moderately popular domains. Cover
+lookups, while valuable if done, does not scale and requires continuous efforts
+that are not easily automated on a large scale.
+
+Setting out to find long-term solutions, we landed in redesigning Tor's DNS
+cache completely with a preload design. To inform the design and to evaluate its
+feasibility, we ran a four-month experiment starting in May 2022 measuring key
+performance metrics. To ensure that our measurements were safe, we repeatedly
+consulted the Tor Research Safety Board and completed our university ethical
+review process. We received positive feedback as well as invaluable suggestions
+along the way to minimize any potential harm to the Tor network and its users.
+
+First, the preload design is immune to timing and timeless attacks due to never
+sharing any data in the DNS cache injected due to user activity across circuits.
+Secondly, the preload lists of domains based on extended Alexa, extended Tranco,
+and Cisco Umbrella all show impressive cache-hit ratios. Depending on list, it
+is possible to get comparable cache-hit ratios, memory usage, and resolver load
+as Tor today. More extensive lists can trade modest increases in memory and
+resolver load with significantly higher cache-hit ratios, especially for web
+traffic. Important future work is improving how the extended lists are
+generated---e.g., by tailoring them specifically for relays in certain regions
+(location sensitivity), excluding unique tracking domains, or crawling websites
+to discover subdomains---which is likely to lead to higher cache-hit ratios and
+smaller lists.
+
+One of the biggest downsides of the preload design is that the most effective
+preload lists are extended lists based on Alexa or Tranco, requiring continuous
+efforts to update. Fortunately, our measurements show that even four-month-old
+extended lists remain effective with significant improvement over baseline Tor.
+It is likely feasible for the Tor Project to generate and ship hard-coded
+preload lists as part of regular Tor releases and still improve performance
+compared to today.
+
+Like Mani \emph{et~al.}~\cite{ManiWJJS18}, we see that traffic in the Tor
+network appears to reasonably match website/domain popularity lists like Alexa,
+Tranco, and Umbrella. This is fundamental for the preload design, and likely
+also a contributing factor for the observed long stability of the extended
+preload lists, since the most popular sites see relatively little
+churn~\cite{PochatGJ19}. Finally, our measurements indicate that the Tor network
+has grown by about 300\% in terms of number of streams since 2018, and that the
+large majority of Tor's current DNS caching is a privacy harm rather than a
+cross-circuit performance boost.
diff --git a/summary/src/tlwo/src/introduction.tex b/summary/src/tlwo/src/introduction.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..04dd6bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/tlwo/src/introduction.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+\section{Introduction} \label{tlwo:sec:introduction}
+Tor~\cite{tor} is a volunteer-operated anonymity network composed of relays that
+route encrypted traffic with low latency.
+One of Tor's trade-offs is to not provide anonymity against a global passive
+attacker that observes traffic as it enters and leaves the
+network~\cite{trilemma,tor}.
+A typical attacker setting is therefore to only observe encrypted traffic as it
+enters the network from an identifiable user, forcing traffic analysis of the
+encrypted packets to classify the user's behavior.  An attacker that tries to
+classify visited websites is said to perform Website Fingerprinting
+(WF)~\cite{cheng1998traffic,HerrmannWF09,Hintz02,DBLP:conf/ccs/LiberatoreL06,PanchenkoNZE11,DBLP:conf/sp/SunSWRPQ02}.
+Many questions about the practicality of WF attacks have been raised, ranging
+from how to keep a trained dataset updated to managing false
+positives~\cite{onlinewf,JuarezAADG14,perryCrit,realistic}. False positives in
+WF may be ruled out using side-channels~\cite{JuarezAADG14,wfwo}.  For example,
+an attacker with access to (traffic to~\cite{SibyJDVT20}) Google's public DNS
+resolver can use it to confirm if a website visit really happened over
+Tor~\cite{GreschbachPRWF17}.
+
+Side-channels that leak information about exiting traffic are in fact
+many~\cite{wfwo}.  For example, during the course of a website visit there may
+be interactions with DNS resolvers, OCSP responders, real-time bidding
+platforms, and CDNs.  An attacker that is able to query or gain access to the
+resulting datasets learns partial information about destination traffic, notably
+without ever observing any of the exiting TCP flows typically associated with
+correlation attacks on Tor~\cite{JohnsonWJSS13,deepcorr}.  Depending on the ease
+of accessibility (e.g., does it require Google reach), reliability (e.g., are
+there any false positives), and coverage (e.g., is it only applicable for a
+small fraction of exit traffic), the impact of a given side-channel will be more
+or less urgent to address with mitigations and/or defenses~\cite{tor}.
+
+\subsection{Timeless Timing Attacks in Tor's DNS}
+Timing attacks exploit that an operation takes more or less time to execute
+depending on something secret.  The attacker's goal is to infer the secret
+information by merely observing the non-constant execution times, e.g., to
+recover a private key~\cite{timing-attack}, decrypt a ciphertext~\cite{lucky13},
+or check if a domain is cached by a Tor exit~\cite{wfwo}.  A remote timing
+attack takes place over a network.  Repeated measurements and statistics are
+usually required to account for network jitter, which adds noise to the observed
+timings~\cite{remote-timing-attacks}.  Van Goethem~\emph{et~al.}~\cite{timeless}
+proposed a technique that eliminates all network jitter in remote attacks.  It is applicable if
+two requests can be sent to arrive at the same time, request processing is
+concurrent, and the order in which responses are returned reflects differences in
+execution time.
+
+We find that Tor's DNS cache at exits fulfills all three criteria of a timeless
+timing attack, allowing anyone to determine if a domain is cached or not by
+sending a single TLS record.  The attack is reliable (neither false positives
+nor negatives), confirmed by using our prototype to make 12M network
+measurements against our own domains.  The attack is also repeatable, making the
+exact time that a domain was inserted into the cache inferable due to
+determinism in Tor's TTL logic.
+
+Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:setting} provides a summary of how the ability to infer whether
+domains are (un)cached at exits make WF attacks more practical.
+The attacker observes encrypted traffic from a client
+to a guard relay at time $t$, classifying the network trace as associated with
+\texttt{foo.org}.  The attacker then conducts timeless timing attacks against
+all exits in the Tor network to determine if \texttt{foo.org} was really visited
+by \emph{someone} at time $t$.  If the answer is yes the classification is
+accepted, otherwise it is rejected.  Prior work by Pulls and Dahlberg show that
+the capability to determine whether a website was visited from Tor at time $t$
+removes virtually all false positives in WF attacks for all but the most popular
+websites on the web~\cite{wfwo}.  We provide further evidence that this is a
+realistic capability to assume by demonstrating that \emph{any attacker with an
+Internet connection could have used it in attacks for the last two decades}.
+While it is a powerful capability to eliminate false positives, the overall
+success in linking users with their website visits also depends on the WF
+attack~\cite{onlinewf,JuarezAADG14,perryCrit,realistic}.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\includegraphics[width=0.67\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/setting}
+	\caption{%
+		WF with an attacker that rules out false positives by checking
+		that the expected DNS records were cached at the right time by
+		conducting timeless timing attacks against exits.
+	}
+	\label{tlwo:fig:setting}
+\end{figure}
+
+\subsection{Preload Defenses and Measurements}
+Patching Tor's DNS cache to resist (timeless) timing attacks is challenging
+without hurting performance.  For example, making all DNS lookups constant time
+would defeat the purpose of having a cache.  The idea of our long-term defense
+is to remove harmful cross-circuit caching that is unlikely to boost performance
+while still safely caching useful domains.  The Tor-network measurements of Mani
+\emph{et~al.}~\cite{ManiWJJS18} tell us that web-traffic from the Tor network
+matches that of the rest of the Internet, following popularity lists like
+Alexa~\cite{alexa}. What should boost cross-circuit performance is the upper
+parts of a representative popularity list; not the long tail of infrequently
+visited sites. This is the intuition of our defense.  Preload a list of popular
+domains that are cached and continuously refreshed by all exits.  A domain name
+is either always cached as part of the preload list or not shared across
+circuits at all.
+
+We conduct four months of measurements in the live Tor network to evaluate 400
+popularity lists derived from Alexa~\cite{alexa}, Cisco
+Umbrella~\cite{umbrella}, and Tranco~\cite{tranco}.  To put our results into
+perspective, we also measure a baseline of Tor's current DNS cache performance.
+The measurement method is to collect aggregated counters every 15 minutes, e.g.,
+the number of lookups cache-hits, and memory overhead, from two 100 Mbit/s
+relays with web and permissive exit port policies.
+
+Tor's mean \emph{cross-circuit} cache-hit ratio is currently 11\% (web) and 17\%
+(permissive).  Variants of Alexa/Tranco top-200 (web) and Alexa/Tranco top-700
+(permissive) achieve the same cross-circuit cache-hit ratios.  A preload list
+from the top-10k can achieve 2--3 times higher cross-circuit cache-hit ratios at
+the cost of at most 60 MiB memory and some increased resolver load (manageable
+in part due to RFC 8767~\cite{rfc8767}).  Throughout the entire measurement we
+noted only a slight decline in effectiveness while using stale preload lists
+(i.e., when using four-month-old lists at the end). This adds to the feasibility
+of using preload lists, as in practice someone has to assemble and deliver them
+to all exits in the Tor network.
+
+\subsection{Contributions and Outline}
+Our contributions are as follows:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+	\item Performance measurements of the DNS cache in Tor over four months from
+	two exits, showing an average 80--83\% cache-hit ratio with approximately
+	10,000 entries in the cache; around 11--17\% of the observed cache hits are
+	due to the cache being shared across circuits, and the number of lookups
+	appears weakly correlated with exit probability
+	(Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:torcache}).
+	\item Demonstration of a timeless timing attack that probes for cached
+		domains in Tor's DNS cache without any false positives or false
+		negatives after 12M repetitions against our own domain in the Tor
+		network (Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:attack}).
+	\item Mitigations based on fuzzy TTLs and cover lookups that add some
+		limited short-term protections (Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:short}).
+	\item A long-term redesign of Tor's DNS cache that defends against
+		(timeless) timing attacks.  Cache-hit ratios can be tuned to offer
+		comparable performance under similar resource usage as today or to
+		significantly improve shared cache-hit ratios (2--3x) with a modest
+		increase in memory usage and resolver load, notably invariant to
+		exit probability as preload lists are fixed (Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long}).
+\end{itemize}
+
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:background} provides necessary background on DNS and Tor,
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:related} discusses related work, and
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:conclusion} offers conclusions, followed by the availability of
+our research artifacts.
+
+We would like to highlight that Sections~\ref{tlwo:sec:torcache:ethics},
+\ref{tlwo:sec:attack:ethical}, and \ref{tlwo:sec:long:preload:ethics} describe ethical and
+safety precautions to ensure that no users were harmed by our research and to
+maximize its positive impact. We responsibly disclosed our timeless timing
+attack to the Tor Project and engaged with the Tor Research Safety Board as well
+as our university's ethical review process as part of performing network
+measurements to inform our defenses.
diff --git a/summary/src/tlwo/src/long.tex b/summary/src/tlwo/src/long.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16331ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/tlwo/src/long.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,473 @@
+\section{Redesigning Tor's DNS Cache} \label{tlwo:sec:long} 
+To address (timeless) timing attacks in Tor's DNS cache we considered a
+number of possible smaller changes.  All of them failed for different reasons,
+however.  Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long:strawman} presents a straw-man design that is
+helpful to understand \emph{why}, while at the same time being closely related
+to the properties achieved by the preload DNS cache design in
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long:preload}.  Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long:evaluation} presents an
+extensive evaluation that answers questions about how feasible and performant
+our proposal is.
+
+\subsection{Straw-man Design} \label{tlwo:sec:long:strawman}
+We omit all but one
+straw-man design that is particularly important to understand the proposed
+redesign in Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long:preload}: \emph{simply remove Tor's DNS
+cache}.  If there is no DNS cache to speak of in Tor, it is easy to see that
+there cannot be any (timeless) timing attacks against Tor's DNS cache (because
+it does not exist).  What these attacks would instead target is the exit's DNS
+resolver which also has a cache.  At a first glance it may seem like an
+insignificant improvement that just moves the problem elsewhere. This would be
+the case if every exit used its own dedicated DNS resolver. However, an exit may
+share a resolver with other exits or most importantly clients outside of the Tor
+network.  A prime example is the resolver of the ISP of the exit.  Any inference
+made from the state of shared resolvers would thus not be directly attributable
+to activity on the Tor network. This would therefore make \emph{false positives}
+a reality with regards to if a domain was cached or not as a consequence of
+activity in the Tor network.
+
+Introducing false positives to the timeless timing attack itself is in general
+challenging because an answer needs to be available at the same time regardless
+of there being a cache hit or miss. False negatives may seem easier and could
+make the attacker discard otherwise correct classifications, e.g., because an
+attack only works half of the time. However, without false positives, attackers
+are still able to reliably remove otherwise incorrect classification through
+confirmation~\cite{wfwo}. Because websites typically make use of multiple domain
+names, defenses that add random delays to responses (to cause false negatives)
+would need to consistently add similar delays for all relevant domains tied to
+websites or other user activity the attacker is trying to infer. The semantics
+surrounding user activity is hard if not impossible to capture at the DNS level.
+Therefore, all false negative defenses we could think of failed.
+
+Now suppose that Tor has no DNS cache and exits always use a shared resolver
+that may introduce false positives.
+A major downside is that performance would take a significant hit due to the
+lack of a cache in Tor, especially since a shared resolver is likely not running
+locally, but provided by the ISP or some third-party.  It is likely that both
+page-load latency and resolver load would increase. Worsening performance and
+especially latency is the opposite of what the Tor project is working
+towards~\cite{tor,tor-congestion}.  Next we show how to get the good properties
+of not having a DNS cache in Tor (potential for false positives) while improving
+performance.
+
+\subsection{The Preload DNS Cache} \label{tlwo:sec:long:preload} 
+This is not only a defense against (timeless) timing attacks in the DNS cache,
+but a complete redesign of Tor's DNS cache. Ultimately, \emph{what we want to
+achieve is false positives for an attacker trying to determine client activity
+in the Tor network with the help of DNS}. The only way to achieve this---upon
+learning that a domain associated with some activity has been looked up---is if
+there is a possibility that this domain lookup was caused from outside of the
+Tor network. Therefore, as a starting point, we assume that the Tor Project
+would strongly encourage exit operators to not run local resolvers dedicated to
+exits. Instead, exit operators should configure their systems to use their ISP
+resolvers or use a third-party provider. Greschbach
+\emph{et~al.}~\cite{GreschbachPRWF17} investigated the effect of DNS on Tor's
+anonymity, including resolver configuration, and found that using the ISP's
+resolver would be preferable.
+
+First remove all of Tor's current DNS caching as in our straw-man design.  The
+preloaded DNS cache instead contains two types of caches: a same-circuit cache
+and a shared preload cache, see Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:preload}.  The preloaded cache
+only contains domains from an allowlist.  This allowlist is compiled by a
+central party (e.g., by the Network Health team in the Tor Project) by visiting
+popular sites from several different vantage points. The allowed domains are
+then delivered to exits and continuously resolved to IPs by each exit. During
+domain resolution on a circuit, the client's lookup first hits the preload
+cache.  If the domain is preloaded, a cache hit is guaranteed regardless of if
+anyone performed a lookup before. Therefore, it is safe to share this cache
+across circuits without leaking information about past exit traffic.  On a cache
+miss, the circuit's same-circuit cache is consulted.  As the name suggests, this
+cache is shared for streams on the same circuit but not across different
+circuits.  Due to Tor's circuit isolation, an attacker is unable to probe any
+other cache than their own.  Therefore, (timeless) timing attacks are eliminated
+(similar to if Tor did not have a DNS cache at all), but without removing the
+possibility of cache hits.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\includegraphics[width=.85\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/preload}
+	\caption{%
+		Overview of the preloaded DNS cache design.  A central party
+		visits sites on a popularity list from different vantage points
+		to compile an allowlist of domains that each relay keeps
+		preloaded at all times by resolving them continuously.  DNS
+		looks-ups start in the shared preload cache and moves on to a
+		dynamic cache that is never shared across circuits on cache
+		misses.
+	}
+	\label{tlwo:fig:preload}
+\end{figure}
+
+Including a same-circuit cache in the defense is motivated by Tor's significant
+same-circuit caching to retain performance, see
+Figures~\ref{tlwo:fig:metrics:hitsweb} and~\ref{tlwo:fig:metrics:hitsperm} in
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:torcache:metrics}. One can confirm that this is most likely due
+to Tor Browser opening several concurrent connections by referring to the
+\texttt{network.http.max-persistent-con
+nections-per-proxy} option and/or
+enabling debug logging,\footnote{%
+	Enable debug logging in Tor Browser: \url{https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/wikis/Hacking\#debugging-the-tor-browser}
+} observing that multiple streams are often created to the same destination.
+Note that these destinations are domains and not IPs, and that neither TB nor
+the client-side Tor process has any notion of a DNS cache to prevent
+cross-circuit fingerprinting (see Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:background:tor}).  While a
+hypothetical \emph{per-circuit client-side cache} would be an option, it would
+per definition not be able to generate cache hits for concurrent resolves
+(without violating circuit isolation, potentially leading to cross-circuit
+fingerprinting) and put pressure on exits unless they do the appropriate
+caching.  This is why our design places the same-circuit cache at exits instead
+of clients.
+
+A preload cache is also motivated by performance, however without any of the
+harmful cross-circuit sharing.  The remainder of this section explores the
+performance impact of compiling an allowlist from popularity lists---like
+Alexa~\cite{alexa}, Cisco Umbrella~\cite{umbrella}, and
+Tranco~\cite{tranco}---by comparing the resulting cache-hit ratios to baseline
+Tor today.  The preloaded DNS cache is inspired by RFC 8767~\cite{rfc8767} which
+allows resolvers to serve stale data in some cases (see
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:related}). Here, exits keep domains on a preloaded allowlist
+fresh on a best-effort level, serving stale records if necessary. Upon shutdown,
+exits could persist IPs in the preload cache to disk as a starting point on
+startup.  Upon startup, if the preload cache have yet to be populated with IPs,
+simply treat lookups as cache misses.  We discuss periodic refresh overhead
+further in Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long:preload:resolverload}.
+
+\subsection{Data Collection} \label{tlwo:sec:long:preload:collection}
+
+As part of understanding Tor's DNS cache (Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:torcache}) we also
+collected data to be able to evaluate the performance of the preload design. In
+particular, we evaluate different popularity lists, the impact on cache-hit
+ratio, estimated DNS cache size, and how these change over time.
+
+Central to the preload design is domain popularity lists. We included the Alexa
+list~\cite{alexa} because that is what Mani \emph{et~al.} showed to be accurate for
+Tor~\cite{ManiWJJS18}, the newer Tranco list because it may be more
+accurate~\cite{tranco}, and the Cisco Umbrella list because it also contains
+``non-web'' domains~\cite{umbrella}.
+
+In addition to considering the popularity lists, we also created \emph{extended}
+lists from Alexa and Tranco by visiting each domain on those lists using the
+Chromium browser and recording all requests for additional domains. We repeated
+this three times from Europe, twice from the US, and twice from Hong Kong by
+using a popular VPN service. Each visit was given a timeout of 20 seconds. No
+pruning of the resulting extended lists of domains was done. Much can likely be
+done to make these lists of domains significantly more comprehensive (e.g., by
+considering popular subpages that might contain domains not on the front-page of
+websites) and smaller (e.g., by pruning unique tracking domains: in one of our
+biggest lists, \texttt{*.safeframe.googlesyndication.com} makes up 8\% of
+domains with unique tracking subdomains with no value for caching).  Another
+direction to explore that could result in lists that are smaller and/or more
+comprehensive would be to tailor them specifically for relays in certain
+regions.  For example, website visits from Europe may be treated differently by
+website operators due to regulations like the GDPR. (In other words, there could
+be differences with regards to \emph{domains}---not to be confused with IPs that
+each relay already resolves locally---that are encountered during website
+visits.)
+
+Based on the regular and extended popularity lists, we made several lists from
+top-10 up to and including top-10,000 in increments. Further, the weekend before
+each of the \emph{first four weeks} of data collection (see
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:torcache}), we downloaded fresh popularity lists (Fridays) and
+generated new extended lists (Saturdays and Sundays). We generated in total
+$4*20*5 = 400$ lists: for the first four weeks, 20 lists each for \{Alexa,
+Tranco, Umbrella, extended Alexa, extended Tranco\}.
+
+Our data collection involving the lists took place in three phases. The first
+phase consisted of the first four weeks with increasingly more lists, which was
+followed by two weeks of analysis of our results and dialog with the Tor
+Research Safety Board. This lead us to the third and final phase of data
+collection where we excluded the vast majority of lists, focusing only on
+getting extended data for about eleven more weeks on the most informative and
+useful lists (see Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long:evaluation}).
+
+\subsection{Further Ethical Considerations} \label{tlwo:sec:long:preload:ethics}
+
+We discussed the preload additions as part of our other data collection,
+received feedback from the Tor Research Safety Board, and passed our
+university's ethical review process. 
+
+Our rationale for why including counters for preload lists is safe was as
+follows. We collect counters of aggregate lookups that would have been
+cache-hits on each list over 15 minutes. Except for the top-10 lists
+(non-extended), all other lists contain in the order of 100--1,000 unique
+domains aggregated into a single counter. The main harm associated with the
+dataset is if they enable an attacker to \emph{rule out} that a particular
+website or Tor-user activity took place at our exits (see following paragraph).
+So, little to no zero counters in our data is what we set out to achieve.  As an
+additional safety precaution our exits only have a $0.1$\% exit probability,
+further making any zero counter less useful.
+
+Let us look more closely at the potential harm. For websites, the results of Mani
+\emph{et~al.}~\cite{ManiWJJS18} tell an attacker to expect a power-law-like
+distribution of website popularity in the network. As discussed in
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:torcache:ethics}, we expect on average about 725 website visits
+to each exit per 15 minute period. This is \emph{the prior of an attacker}
+wishing to perform confirmation or correlation attacks. Most of the visits
+should be to popular websites (per definition) and if the dataset allows an
+attacker to rule such visits out it may cause harm because it is useful
+information to the attacker~\cite{wfwo}. Because of this, we grouped our lists
+into intervals of 100s (for top-?00) and 1000s (for top-?000). We stopped at
+top-10k because we estimated little utility of caching domains of even less
+popular websites. Further, to illustrate when the type of data we collect can be
+harmful, the results of Mani \emph{et~al.}~\cite{ManiWJJS18} and Pulls and
+Dahlberg~\cite{wfwo} tell us that at some point the logic becomes flipped in
+terms of attacker utility: confirming that it was possible that a visit took
+place to a \emph{rarely visited website} is useful. The popularity (i.e.,
+network base rate) of websites is central. We set out to only collect data on
+the most popular of websites/domains, so for us, the focus is on when the
+attacker can rule out website visits or some user activity: an attacker already
+expects that popular websites/domains are visited.
+
+We analyzed the 1,330,400 sample counters we collected over the first four weeks
+for different popularity lists. We found 33 zero counters. All of them belonged
+to Alexa top-10 lists from different weeks! Besides Alexa top-10, the next list
+with the lowest counter was Tranco top-100 from 20 May with 39 hits. Finding
+empty counters for Alexa top-10 was at first very surprising, because the list
+contains the most popular websites on the web (e.g., from 20 May:
+\texttt{google.com}, \texttt{youtube.com}, \texttt{baidu.com},
+\texttt{facebook.com}, \texttt{instagram.com}, \texttt{bilibili.com},
+\texttt{qq.com}, \texttt{wikipedia.org}, \texttt{amazon.com}, and
+\texttt{yahoo.com}).  H-owever, note how the actual \emph{domains} on the list (of
+\emph{websites}) do not contain the \texttt{www} prefix nor any other popular subdomain
+associated with the sites. This highlights how poor the regular non-extended
+lists are at capturing actual \emph{website} traffic. We can further see this
+for both Alexa and Tranco in Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:preload:heatmap}, presented next in
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long:preload:lists}. Even the top-10k lists have low
+cache-hit ratios.
+
+By comparing a list with a more popular list (which should be a strict subset)
+and observing the same counter value it is also possible to infer that
+\emph{likely} no visits took place to the unique domains on the less popular
+list. (This could happen by chance though.) We found 16,055 (1.2\%) such
+samples: 5,073 to top-10k lists, 3,703 to top-[1k,10k) lists, and 7,279 to
+top-[200,1k) lists. None of them were to top-100 lists. This might seem alarming
+at first glance, but taking a closer look at the lists we find that only 135 of
+the samples were to extended lists (77 to x-Tranco top-10k, the highest rank
+list was x-Tranco top-600 with one sample). Further, only five of the samples
+belonged to a list from Umbrella. The remaining 15,915 samples were to the
+regular (non-extended) Alexa and Tranco lists. This is of limited use to
+attackers for popular domains, because while the lists capture popular
+\emph{websites}, our dataset contains counters of \emph{aggregate domain
+lookups}. An inferred zero counter \emph{does not mean that no visits took
+place} to \emph{websites} for the \emph{non-extended} lists. For example, if you
+enter \texttt{www.google.com} or \texttt{www.wikipedia.org} into Tor Browser,
+neither \texttt{google.com} nor \texttt{wikipedia.org} are actually connected
+to. The recursive resolver of the exit may perform the lookup, but Tor will not,
+so it is not captured in our dataset for the non-extended lists. The extended
+lists, due to being generated from actual website visits, include domains
+typically connected to by Tor Browser. Another example is users visiting direct
+links to websites and not entering the domain manually in the browser, such as
+when following links from search engines or sent through social media.
+
+When designing our measurements the above detail was not considered. We included
+the regular popularity lists for sake of comparison. Ideally the non-extended
+lists would have been effective sources for preload lists. This was evidently
+not the case for Alexa and Tranco (see later results), but was the case for
+Umbrella. So while what we did learn helped us understand the value of using
+extended lists to improve cache hits, in hindsight we could have come to the
+same conclusion without the same granularity for non-extended lists.
+
+In the second phase of our data collection (see
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long:preload:collection}), we discussed the above detail with
+the Tor Research Safety Board and concluded to stop collecting data for
+(non-extended) Alexa and Tranco, and to minimize the lists for future collection
+to those necessary to determine the longevity of potentially useful preload
+lists (based on our findings). Out of an abundance of caution, we will only
+share the collected counters for non-extended Alexa and Tranco lists with
+researchers for research purposes (the rest of the data is public). The counters
+collected during the second phase were consistent with the data from the first
+phase.
+
+During the third phase of data collection, we limited the collection to extended
+Tranco top-\{10, 100, 1k, 2k, 4k, 5k, 7k, 10k\} lists and the Umbrella top-10k
+list, all from April 29. The goal was to learn how cache hits get worse over
+time with old lists. Out of 141,624 sample counters collected, three were zero
+and 59 were relatively zero when compared to the more popular list.
+
+\subsection{Performance Evaluation} \label{tlwo:sec:long:evaluation}
+
+The goal of our evaluation is to determine over time:
+  cache-hit ratio of potential preload lists (Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long:preload:lists}),
+  memory usage at exits (Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long:preload:entries}), and
+  resolver load (Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long:preload:resolverload}).
+
+\subsubsection{Results: Preload Lists} \label{tlwo:sec:long:preload:lists}
+
+\begin{figure}
+	\centering
+	\subfloat[][web]{%
+		\includegraphics[width=.75\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/plot_preload_lists-web.pdf}
+		\label{tlwo:fig:preload:heatmap:web}
+	}\\
+	\subfloat[][permissive]{%
+		\includegraphics[width=.75\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/plot_preload_lists-permissive.pdf}
+		\label{tlwo:fig:preload:heatmap:perm}
+	}
+	\caption{%
+	Shared cross-circuit cache-hit ratios (\%) for selected preload lists during
+	the first six weeks (x-axis) of data collection. The plotted values are medians over
+	24h, and dates on the y-axis show the date of original list download.}
+	\label{tlwo:fig:preload:heatmap}
+\end{figure}
+
+Our dataset is extensive with 2,498,424 sample counters from 400 popularity
+lists spanning about four months. Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:preload:heatmap} shows
+comprehensive heatmaps of shared cross-circuit cache-hit ratios for the web
+(Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:preload:heatmap:web}) and permissive
+(Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:preload:heatmap:perm}) exits over the first six weeks of data
+collection (first and second phases). Cache-hit ratios are medians (very similar
+to the mean) for 24h periods. In each figure, the groupings of the four weeks
+when we added new lists are visible (top to bottom), as well as baseline Tor at
+the bottom row for sake of comparison. Note how the regular Alexa and Tranco
+top-10k lists perform poorly: the two black ($<5\%$ cache-hit ratio) lines at
+the top of each grouping. Even Umbrella 1k is better, with Umbrella 10k being
+comparable to baseline Tor. The extended lists clearly improve over baseline
+Tor, with the extended 10k-lists even reaching over 30\% cross-circuit cache-hit
+ratios some days. Look at how the lists change over time: we see no real
+difference between lists generated at end of April and those generated during
+May, but consistent changes across all lists over time, likely due to varying
+traffic at the exits. The differences between using Alexa or Tranco to generate
+extended lists are negligible, so we focus on Tranco for the remainder of this
+analysis as it is open, maintained, and a more recent source of website
+popularity~\cite{tranco}.
+
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\subfloat[][web]{%
+		\includegraphics[width=.67\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/plot_preload_hits-web.pdf}
+		\label{tlwo:fig:preload:hits:web}
+	}\\
+	\subfloat[][permissive]{%
+		\includegraphics[width=.67\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/plot_preload_hits-permissive.pdf}
+		\label{tlwo:fig:preload:hits:perm}
+	}
+	\caption{%
+	Shared cross-circuit cache-hit ratios for eight different extended Tranco
+	lists, Umbrella top-10k, and Tor baseline during four months in 2022.}
+	\label{tlwo:fig:preload:hits}
+\end{figure}
+
+Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:preload:hits} shows the observed \emph{cross-circuit} cache-hit
+ratios for eight different extended Tranco lists, Umbrella top-10k, and Tor
+baseline. We used lists from the end of April because they have the most data.
+As a baseline, Tor's current DNS cache has a mean cache-hit ratio of 11\% for
+web and 17\% for permissive. In terms of different popularity lists, the regular
+(non-extended) Tranco and Alexa lists are ineffective: the top-10k lists are
+regularly below $5\%$ for web and permissive (see
+Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:preload:heatmap}). Umbrella top-10k does much better with mean
+17\% (web) and 16\% (permissive). This is slightly worse (permissive) and
+comparable (web) to baseline Tor.
+
+The extended lists show a further improvement, comparable in terms of
+\emph{average} (full duration of lists) cross-circuit cache-hit ratios to
+baseline Tor at top-200 for Alexa and Tranco for web and at top-700 for
+permissive. The extended lists from top-1k get (depending on which of the
+compiled extended Tranco lists) 20--24\% (web) and 15--18\% (permissive) and up
+to 27--32\% (web) and 22--27\% (permissive) at 10k. There is very little gain
+between top-7k and top-10k. In general, the extended lists do relatively worse
+on the permissive exit and the Tor baseline is higher: this makes sense, since
+Alexa and Tranco are focused on websites. This is further confirmed by Umbrella
+doing better as a more general-purpose domain popularity list.
+
+Note that Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:preload:hits} shows the cross-circuit cache-hit ratios
+for a selection of the very first preload lists we created on the April 29. The
+results are very encouraging: time seems to have only a slight detrimental
+impact on cache hits. After four months the larger extended lists show a
+noticable performance improvement over baseline, with the exception of an odd
+spike in baseline in early September (we speculate that this is DDoS-related).
+The robustness of preload lists removes one of the main downsides of the preload
+design, i.e., to maintain and deliver a current list to exits. It is likely
+feasible to ship hard-coded preload lists as part of regular Tor releases and
+still improve performance, assuming that exit operators upgrade their software a
+couple of times per year.
+
+\subsubsection{Results: Cache Entries} \label{tlwo:sec:long:preload:entries}
+
+\begin{figure}
+	\centering
+	\subfloat[][web]{%
+		\includegraphics[width=.67\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/plot_preload_entries-web.pdf}
+		\label{tlwo:fig:preload:entries:web}
+	}\\
+	\subfloat[][permissive]{%
+		\includegraphics[width=.67\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/plot_preload_entries-permissive.pdf}
+		\label{tlwo:fig:preload:entries:perm}
+	}
+	\caption{%
+	Estimated cache entries for eight different extended Tranco lists, Umbrella
+	top-10k, and Tor baseline.}
+	\label{tlwo:fig:preload:entries}
+\end{figure}
+
+Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:preload:entries} shows the number of cache entries needed in Tor
+as-is (``baseline Tor'') and for the preload design for a range of different
+popularity lists. We can accurately estimate an upper bound because we collected
+the total number of entires in all same-circuit caches as part of our
+measurements. This count is an upper bound, because some of those entries would
+have already been cached in the preload cache. The popularity lists have static
+sizes, and to be an accurate upper bound we used the largest observed size for
+each list over the four weeks.
+
+Starting with the same-circuit cache, look at the line for extended Tranco
+top-10 (``x-Tranco 10'') in Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:preload:entries}: this extended list
+contains only 90 entries, so the lines at the bottom show mostly the number of
+entries used by the same circuit cache. The size of the same-circuit caches
+should be proportional to the number of open circuits, and therefore follow exit
+probability. Based on the data from Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:preload:entries}, we do not
+suspect this to be a significant burden. It would be trivial to cap the size
+and/or prune the size as part of OOM-management, or dropping entries based on
+their age would probably have little impact on performance (presumably most
+value is at the start of the circuit when most streams are attached).
+
+Recall from Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:torcache:metrics} and
+Figures~\ref{tlwo:fig:metrics:cacheweb} and~\ref{tlwo:fig:metrics:cacheperm} that the
+permissive exit had a mean of 12,130 entries compared to the web exit's 7,672
+mean. We see the same figures for the baseline in
+Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:preload:entries}. Albeit slightly higher on average for the web
+exit but more stable, we see that Umbrella 10k as well as extended Tranco top-1k
+are about the same as Tor baseline. So with about the same memory usage as now
+the preload design would offer slightly (permissive) or noticeably (web) better
+cache-hit ratios. Looking at the top-2k up until top-10k extended lists we see a
+significant higher memory usage (only slightly sublinear) but that comes with
+significantly higher cache-hit ratios, as seen in Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:preload:hits}.
+In absolute terms, for extended Tranco top-10k, about 60,000 cache
+entries---even if pessimistically assuming 1 KiB per entry---would end up using
+about 60 MiB of memory for the cache. Since domains can be at most 255 bytes and
+most domains are much shorter, one could clearly implement the cache
+more memory-efficiently. Also, as mentioned earlier, it is likely possible to
+reduce the size of the extended top-10k lists by removing useless tracking
+domains. Further note that the memory needed to cache the preload list---unlike
+the same-circuit cache---only depends on the size of the list, not the number
+circuits or streams created at the exit.
+
+\subsubsection{Results: Resolver Load} \label{tlwo:sec:long:preload:resolverload}
+
+In general, on the one hand, improving cache-hit ratios will reduce resolver load
+and scale well with increased traffic. On the other hand, continuously
+refreshing domains on the preload list increases resolver load. Consider the
+mean number of lookups at the web exit, 17,529, and its mean/median cache-hit
+ratio of 0.80 (see Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:torcache}). This implies an expected
+$3.9\gets\frac{17529(1-0.80)}{15\cdot60}$ requests per second to the exit's
+resolver.  For the permissive exit we observed about 7.8 requests per second. As
+a source of comparison, Sonntag~\cite{sonntag-metrics,Sonntag19} reports for a
+DNS resolver dedicated to a 200 Mbit/s exit in 2018 an average of 18.5 requests
+per second.
+
+The resolver load for the different preload lists should be proportional to the
+estimated number of cache entries shown in Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:preload:entries}. The
+estimated load for an extended top-1k list would be similar to current Tor,
+while the extended top-10k list would see about a seven-fold increase without
+changes. This may or may not be problem. Given the variability of lookups we
+observed throughout our data collection (Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:lookups}) and reported
+by Sonntag, resolvers are clearly capable of dealing with increased loads.
+Requests due to the preload list should be predictable, consistent, and cheap in
+terms of bandwidth even for a low-capacity exit.
+
+Regardless, the load on resolvers could be lowered by reducing the number of
+domains, e.g., the increased cache-hit ratio from top-7k to top-10k is very
+small ($\approx$1\%) for a 20--30\% increase in entries. One could also increase
+the internal TTLs, i.e., the frequency of refreshing the entries in the preload
+cache. In Tor, this is especially practical since circuits use random exits. In
+the rare case of stale data causing issues, simply create a fresh circuit.
+Serving stale data is not uncommon in DNS~\cite{rfc8767}, further discussed next
+in Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:related}.
diff --git a/summary/src/tlwo/src/ref.bib b/summary/src/tlwo/src/ref.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c62bea8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/tlwo/src/ref.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+@misc{ctor-1,
+  author       = {Tor Project},
+  title        = {{Tor source code}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/blob/tor-0.4.7.7/src/feature/relay/dns.c\#L600-689}, accessed 2022-06-01},
+}
+
+@misc{ctor-2,
+  author       = {Tor Project},
+  title        = {{Tor source code}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/blob/tor-0.4.7.7/src/lib/tls/buffers\_tls.c\#L43-100}, accessed 2022-06-01},
+}
+
+@misc{ctor-3,
+  author       = {Tor Project},
+  title        = {{Tor source code}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/blob/tor-0.4.7.7/src/core/or/connection\_or.c\#L2361-2426}, accessed 2022-06-01},
+}
+
+@misc{ctor-4,
+  author       = {Tor Project},
+  title        = {{Tor source code}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/blob/tor-0.4.7.7/src/feature/relay/dns.c\#L725-732}, accessed 2022-06-01},
+}
+
+@misc{network-ddos,
+  author       = {Tor Project},
+  title        = {{Tor Project status}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://web.archive.org/web/20220906145324/https://status.torproject.org/}},
+}
+
+@article{jung,
+  author    = {Jaeyeon Jung and Emil Sit and Hari Balakrishnan and Robert Tappan Morris},
+  title     = {{DNS} performance and the effectiveness of caching},
+  journal   = {{IEEE/ACM} Trans. Netw.},
+  volume    = {10},
+  number    = {5},
+  year      = {2002},
+}
+
+@article{hao-and-wang,
+  author    = {Shuai Hao and Haining Wang},
+  title     = {Exploring Domain Name Based Features on the Effectiveness of {DNS} Caching},
+  journal   = {CCR},
+  volume    = {47},
+  number    = {1},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+
+
+@inproceedings{trilemma,
+  author    = {Debajyoti Das and Sebastian Meiser and Esfandiar Mohammadi and Aniket Kate},
+  title     = {Anonymity Trilemma: Strong Anonymity, Low Bandwidth Overhead, Low Latency---Choose Two},
+  booktitle = {{IEEE} {S\&P}},
+  year      = {2018},
+}
+
+@article{remote-timing-attacks,
+  author    = {Scott A. Crosby and Dan S. Wallach and Rudolf H. Riedi},
+  title     = {Opportunities and Limits of Remote Timing Attacks},
+  journal   = {{ACM} Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur.},
+  volume    = {12},
+  number    = {3},
+  year      = {2009},
+}
+
+
+@inproceedings{lucky13,
+  author    = {Nadhem J. AlFardan and Kenneth G. Paterson},
+  title     = {Lucky Thirteen: Breaking the {TLS} and {DTLS} Record Protocols},
+  booktitle = {{IEEE} {S\&P}},
+  year      = {2013},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{timing-attack,
+  author    = {Paul C. Kocher},
+  title     = {Timing Attacks on Implementations of {Diffie-Hellman}, {RSA}, {DSS}, and Other Systems},
+  booktitle = {{CRYPTO}},
+  year      = {1996},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{tor,
+  author    = {Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson and Paul F. Syverson},
+  title     = {Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router},
+  booktitle = {USENIX Security},
+  year      = {2004},
+}
+
+@article{wfwo,
+  author    = {Tobias Pulls and Rasmus Dahlberg},
+  title     = {Website Fingerprinting with Website Oracles},
+  journal   = {PETS},
+  volume    = {2020},
+  number    = {1},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{timeless,
+  author    = {Tom van Goethem and Christina P{\"{o}}pper and Wouter Joosen and Mathy Vanhoef},
+  title     = {Timeless Timing Attacks: Exploiting Concurrency to Leak Secrets over Remote Connections},
+  booktitle = {{USENIX} Security},
+  year      = {2020},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{sonntag-metrics,
+  author    = {Michael Sonntag},
+  title     = {{DNS} Traffic of a {Tor} Exit Node---An Analysis},
+  booktitle = {{SpaCCS}},
+  year      = {2018},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{ManiWJJS18,
+  author    = {Akshaya Mani and T. Wilson{-}Brown and Rob Jansen and Aaron Johnson and Micah Sherr},
+  title     = {Understanding {Tor} Usage with Privacy-Preserving Measurement},
+  booktitle = {{IMC}},
+  year      = {2018},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{tranco,
+   author    = {{Le Pochat}, Victor and {Van Goethem}, Tom and Tajalizadehkhoob, Samaneh and Korczy\'{n}ski, Maciej and Joosen, Wouter},
+   title     = {Tranco: A Research-Oriented Top Sites Ranking Hardened Against Manipulation},
+   booktitle = {NDSS},
+   year      = {2019},
+}
+
+@misc{umbrella,
+  author       = {Cisco},
+  title        = {Umbrella Popularity List},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://umbrella-static.s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/index.html}, accessed 2022-04-29},
+}
+
+@misc{alexa,
+  author       = {Amazon},
+  title        = {Alexa Top 1 Million},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://www.alexa.com/}, accessed 2022-04-29},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{GreschbachPRWF17,
+  author    = {Benjamin Greschbach and Tobias Pulls and Laura M. Roberts and Philipp Winter and Nick Feamster},
+  title     = {The Effect of {DNS} on {Tor}'s Anonymity},
+  booktitle = {NDSS},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@techreport{rfc8767,
+  author       = {David C Lawrence and Warren Kumari and Puneet Sood},
+  title        = {Serving Stale Data to Improve {DNS} Resiliency},
+  type         = {RFC},
+  institution  = {IETF},
+  number       = {8767},
+  year         = {2020},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{Sonntag19,
+  title     = {Malicious {DNS} Traffic in {Tor}: Analysis and Countermeasures},
+  author    = {Sonntag, Michael},
+  booktitle = {ICISSP},
+  year      = {2019}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{privcount,
+  author    = {Rob Jansen and Aaron Johnson},
+  title     = {Safely Measuring {Tor}},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2016},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{privex,
+  author    = {Tariq Elahi and George Danezis and Ian Goldberg},
+  title     = {{PrivEx}: Private Collection of Traffic Statistics for Anonymous Communication Networks},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2014},
+}
+
+
+@inproceedings{FenskeMJS17,
+  author    = {Ellis Fenske and Akshaya Mani and Aaron Johnson and Micah Sherr},
+  title     = {Distributed Measurement with Private Set-Union Cardinality},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{JansenTH18,
+  author    = {Rob Jansen and Matthew Traudt and Nicholas Hopper},
+  title     = {Privacy-Preserving Dynamic Learning of {Tor} Network Traffic},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2018},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{MouraHMSD18,
+  author    = {Giovane C. M. Moura and John S. Heidemann and Moritz M{\"{u}}ller and Ricardo de Oliveira Schmidt and Marco Davids},
+  title     = {When the Dike Breaks: Dissecting {DNS} Defenses During {DDoS}},
+  booktitle = {{IMC}},
+  year      = {2018},
+}
+
+@misc{unbound,
+  author       = {{NLnet Labs}},
+  title        = {Serving Stale Data---Unbound 1.14.0 documentation},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://unbound.docs.nlnetlabs.nl/en/latest/topics/serve-stale.html}, accessed 2022-06-01},
+}
+
+@article{cheng1998traffic,
+  title   = {Traffic analysis of {SSL} encrypted web browsing},
+  author  = {Cheng, Heyning and Avnur, Ron},
+  journal = {Project paper, University of Berkeley},
+  year    = {1998}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/sp/SunSWRPQ02,
+  author    = {Qixiang Sun and Daniel R. Simon and Yi{-}Min Wang and Wilf Russell and Venkata N. Padmanabhan and Lili Qiu},
+  title     = {Statistical Identification of Encrypted Web Browsing Traffic},
+  booktitle = {{IEEE S\&P}},
+  year      = {2002}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{Hintz02,
+  author    = {Andrew Hintz},
+  title     = {Fingerprinting Websites Using Traffic Analysis},
+  booktitle = {{PETS}},
+  year      = {2002}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/ccs/LiberatoreL06,
+  author    = {Marc Liberatore and Brian Neil Levine},
+  title     = {Inferring the source of encrypted {HTTP} connections},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2006}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{HerrmannWF09,
+  author    = {Dominik Herrmann and Rolf Wendolsky and Hannes Federrath},
+  title     = {Website fingerprinting: attacking popular privacy enhancing technologies with the multinomial na{\"{\i}}ve-bayes classifier},
+  booktitle = {{CCSW}},
+  year      = {2009}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{PanchenkoNZE11,
+  author    = {Andriy Panchenko and Lukas Niessen and Andreas Zinnen and Thomas Engel},
+  title     = {Website fingerprinting in onion routing based anonymization networks},
+  booktitle = {{WPES}},
+  year      = {2011}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{PochatGJ19,
+  author    = {Victor Le Pochat and Tom van Goethem and Wouter Joosen},
+  title     = {Evaluating the Long-term Effects of Parameters on the Characteristics of the {Tranco} Top Sites Ranking},
+  booktitle={{USENIX Security}},
+  year={2019}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{JuarezAADG14,
+  author    = {Marc Ju{\'{a}}rez and Sadia Afroz and Gunes Acar and Claudia D{\'{\i}}az and Rachel Greenstadt},
+  title     = {A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2014},
+}
+
+@misc{perryCrit,
+  author       = {Mike Perry},
+  title        = {A Critique of Website Traffic Fingerprinting Attacks},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://blog.torproject.org/critique-website-traffic-fingerprinting-attacks}, accessed 2022-06-01},
+}
+
+@article{realistic,
+  author    = {Tao Wang and Ian Goldberg},
+  title     = {On Realistically Attacking {Tor} with Website Fingerprinting},
+  journal   = {PETS},
+  volume    = {2016},
+  number    = {4},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{JohnsonWJSS13,
+  author    = {Aaron Johnson and Chris Wacek and Rob Jansen and Micah Sherr and Paul F. Syverson},
+  title     = {Users get routed: traffic correlation on {Tor} by realistic adversaries},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2013}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{deepcorr,
+  author    = {Milad Nasr and Alireza Bahramali and Amir Houmansadr},
+  title     = {DeepCorr: Strong Flow Correlation Attacks on {Tor} Using Deep Learning},
+  booktitle = {{CCS}},
+  year      = {2018}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{AumannL07,
+  author    = {Yonatan Aumann and Yehuda Lindell},
+  title     = {Security Against Covert Adversaries: Efficient Protocols for Realistic Adversaries},
+  booktitle = {{TCC}},
+  year      = {2007},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{chen,
+  author    = {Yizheng Chen and Manos Antonakakis and Roberto Perdisci and Yacin Nadji and David Dagon and Wenke Lee},
+  title     = {{DNS} Noise: Measuring the Pervasiveness of Disposable Domains in Modern {DNS} Traffic},
+  booktitle = {{IEEE/IFIP} {DSN}},
+  year      = {2014},
+}
+
+
+@inproceedings{exitmap,
+  author    = {Philipp Winter and Richard K{\"{o}}wer and Martin Mulazzani and Markus Huber and Sebastian Schrittwieser and Stefan Lindskog and Edgar R. Weippl},
+  title     = {Spoiled Onions: Exposing Malicious {Tor} Exit Relays},
+  booktitle = {{PETS}},
+  year      = {2014},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{SibyJDVT20,
+  author    = {Sandra Siby and Marc Ju{\'{a}}rez and Claudia D{\'{\i}}az and Narseo Vallina{-}Rodriguez and Carmela Troncoso},
+  title     = {Encrypted {DNS} -{\textgreater} Privacy? {A} Traffic Analysis Perspective},
+  booktitle = {NDSS},
+  year      = {2020},
+}
+
+@misc{tpo-russia,
+  author       = {Gustavo Gus},
+  title        = {Responding to {Tor} censorship in {Russia}},
+  year         = {2021},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://blog.torproject.org/tor-censorship-in-russia/}, accessed 2022-06-01},
+}
+
+@misc{tpo-who-uses-tor,
+  author       = {Al Smith},
+  title        = {Tor and the humans who use it},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://blog.torproject.org/tor-and-the-humans-who-use-it/}, accessed 2022-06-01},
+}
+
+@misc{tb,
+  author       = {Mike Perry and Erinn Clark and Steven Murdoch and Georg Koppen},
+  title        = {The Design and Implementation of the {Tor Browser} {[DRAFT]}},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://2019.www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/}, accessed 2022-06-01},
+}
+
+@misc{tor-congestion,
+  author       = {Mike Perry},
+  title        = {Congestion Control Arrives in {Tor} 0.4.7-stable!},
+  howpublished = {\url{https://blog.torproject.org/congestion-contrl-047/}, accessed 2022-06-01},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{histor,
+  author    = {Akshaya Mani and Micah Sherr},
+  title     = {HisTor{\(\epsilon\)}: Differentially Private and Robust Statistics Collection for {Tor}},
+  booktitle = {NDSS},
+  year      = {2017},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{onlinewf,
+  title={Online Website Fingerprinting: Evaluating Website Fingerprinting Attacks on {Tor} in the Real World},
+  author={Cherubin, Giovanni and Jansen, Rob and Troncoso, Carmela},
+  booktitle={{USENIX Security}},
+  year={2022}
+}
diff --git a/summary/src/tlwo/src/related.tex b/summary/src/tlwo/src/related.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3521d45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/tlwo/src/related.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+\section{Related Work} \label{tlwo:sec:related}
+
+Van Goethem \emph{et~al.}~\cite{timeless} originally proposed timeless timing
+attacks, showing significant improvements against HTTP/2 web servers, Tor onion
+services, and EAP-pwd.  All timeless timing attacks exploit concurrent
+processing, e.g., in HTTP/2, by filling buffers at the relay closest to an onion
+service, or packing two authentication requests in EAP-pwd into the same RadSec
+(TLS over TCP) packet. The latter was the inspiration for our timeless timing
+attack on Tor's DNS cache, i.e., packing two RESOLVE cells into a single TLS
+record.
+
+There has been a long body of work on how to safely perform measurements of the
+Tor network~\cite{privex,FenskeMJS17,privcount,histor}, laying the foundation
+for safely performing large-scale measurements~\cite{JansenTH18,ManiWJJS18}. Our
+timeless timing attack enables anyone to do network-wide measurements for exact
+domains on specific exits with a precision of at least one second.  This is
+highly invasive and a useful resource to deanonymize Tor-users, discussed
+further shortly. Our network measurements to inform the design of defenses have
+been focused around the DNS in Tor.  Similar to other related work (see below),
+we focused on how to make those limited measurements safe; not on how to broadly
+perform a much wider range of measurements safely.
+
+%% ATTACK
+Greschbach \emph{et~al.}~\cite{GreschbachPRWF17} investigated the effect of DNS on
+Tor's anonymity. They quantified the use of DNS resolvers in the network, the
+impact of choice of resolver on correlation and confirmation attacks, and how to
+incorporate observed DNS traffic with website fingerprinting
+attacks~\cite{cheng1998traffic,HerrmannWF09,Hintz02,DBLP:conf/ccs/LiberatoreL06,PanchenkoNZE11,DBLP:conf/sp/SunSWRPQ02}
+to make improved correlation attacks. In their construction, DNS traffic is used
+to either reduce the number of websites to consider during classification or to
+confirm classification. A key observation was that Tor, due to a bug, clipped
+all TTLs to 60 seconds. This was resolved and lead to the current approach of
+clipping to 300 or 3,600 seconds.  One of our short-time mitigations update
+these clips to be fuzzy.
+
+Greschbach \emph{et~al.}~\cite{GreschbachPRWF17} also measured DNS requests from
+an exit for both web and a more permissive exit policy in 2016. The collection
+was done by observing DNS requests to the exit's resolver and aggregating
+results into five-minute buckets. Similarly, we aggregate over time in 15-minute
+buckets and do not directly collect resolved domains. They found a small
+difference between exit policies, with the permissive exit having slightly fewer
+(3\% smaller median) lookups. Our results are very different: the permissive
+exit policy resulted in significantly more (double the median) lookups.
+
+Pulls and Dahlberg~\cite{wfwo} generalized the classifier confirmation attack of
+Greschbach \emph{et~al.}~\cite{GreschbachPRWF17} into a new security notion for website
+fingerprinting attacks, and further explored the use of DNS. They showed that
+timing attacks were possible in Tor's DNS cache, performing network-wide
+measurements on a domain under their control with a true positive
+rate of 17.3\% when attempting to minimize false positives. We use a similar
+method for measurements, but our attack is significantly better with a
+100\% true positive rate and no false positives at all.
+
+Sonntag collected hourly data from the resolver of an exit during five months in
+2018~\cite{sonntag-metrics,Sonntag19}. In terms of frequency, they noted about
+18.5 requests per second, with a peak of 291,472 requests in an hour. The
+average is higher than ours (3.9 and 7.8 requests per second) while the peak
+significantly smaller (1,183,275 requests in 15 minutes). Sonntag also analyzed
+the actual domains looked up, including categorization (porn, social network,
+shopping, advertisement etc). We do not collect domains; only cache-hits as part
+of popularity lists by aggregating domains into buckets like top-100, top-1k,
+etc.
+
+Mani \emph{et~al.}~\cite{ManiWJJS18} used PrivCount~\cite{privcount} and
+PSC~\cite{FenskeMJS17} to safely make extensive network-wide measurements of the
+Tor network. They measured, e.g., circuits, streams, destination ports, and exit
+domains at exits, as well as client connections, churn, composition, and
+diversity at clients. Their exit probability ranged between 1.5--2.2\%, compared
+to our peak of 0.1\%. While our data is much more limited and targeted around
+DNS, there are two interesting comparisons to consider:
+\begin{itemize}
+    % mean lookups: 17529.813 and 41099.697
+    % 15 minutes x4 = 1h, 24h per day
+    % mean exit probabilities: 0.041% and 0.049%
+    % (17529.813+41099.697)×4×24÷(0.01×(0.041+0.049)) = 6,253,814,400
+
+    \item Mani \emph{et~al.} observed 2.1 billion exit streams inferred in the
+    network every 24 hours. Extrapolating on our lookup statistics we have an
+    average of 6.3 billion lookups, which corresponds to the number of
+    streams.\footnote{Streams either do a lookup with RELAY\_BEGIN or are closed
+    after a RELAY\_RESOLVE cell. Timeout and retries are possible on resolver
+    failure, but the way we measure hides those extra lookups.} This suggests a
+    significant increase ($\approx3x$) in the number of streams in the Tor network since 2018.
+    \item Mani \emph{et~al.} measured the frequency of how well the primary
+    domain on a circuit matched the Alexa top-one-million list. We transform
+    their reported relative counts and compare it to the relative count of
+    average lookups in the same intervals in our dataset for top-10k, shown in
+    Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:mani:popularity}. Note that this only uses data from phase
+    one of our data collection. Broadly, we see that their results show
+    significantly more traffic to top-10 than any of the lists we use. That
+    said, our data supports one of Mani \emph{et~al.}'s conclusion that the
+    popularity lists are reasonably accurate representations of traffic from the
+    Tor network.
+\end{itemize}
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+    \centering
+    \subfloat[][web]{%
+        \includegraphics[width=.67\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/plot_popularity_match-web.pdf}
+        \label{tlwo:fig:mani:popularity:web}
+    }\\
+    \subfloat[][permissive]{%
+        \includegraphics[width=.67\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/plot_popularity_match-permissive.pdf}
+        \label{tlwo:fig:mani:popularity:perm}
+    }
+    \caption{%
+    Comparison of \emph{relative popularity} of popularity rankings with the
+    results of Mani \emph{et~al.}~\cite{ManiWJJS18}.}
+    \label{tlwo:fig:mani:popularity}
+\end{figure}
+
+%% DNS prefetching paragraphs and software from there
+% Defenses can expand on DNS prefetching
+% https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8767
+% https://unbound.docs.nlnetlabs.nl/en/latest/topics/serve-stale.html
+
+The relatively recent RFC 8767~\cite{rfc8767} allows for DNS data to be served
+``stale'', i.e., after expiry according to its TTL, in the exceptional
+circumstance that a recursive resolver is unable to refresh the information. In
+case data goes stale, RFC 8767 suggests serving it for at most one to three days.
+The background of RFC 8767 aptly motivates this with the saying that
+\emph{``stale bread is better than no bread''}. In addition to serving
+potentially stale data, modern resolvers like Unbound~\cite{unbound} further
+support prefetching: preemptively refreshing domains in the cache before TTL
+expiry. These measures all serve to improved reliability and have been found to
+be used for sake of resiliency~\cite{MouraHMSD18}. Tor already clips TTLs, in a
+sense serving stale data for the vast majority of domains. Our preload design
+takes this further by introducing continuous prefetching of domains on a fixed
+allowlist.
+
+Two decades ago, Jung \emph{et~al.}~\cite{jung} found that cache-hit ratios on
+the order of 80--87\% are achieved if a resolver has ten or more clients and
+TTLs are at least ten minutes.  More recently Hao and Wang~\cite{hao-and-wang}
+reported that 100k cached entries are required to achieve a baseline of 86\%
+cache-hits for a first-come first-serve cache in a university network.  Their
+dataset had similar characteristics to a DNS trace collected for an ISP resolver
+by Chen \emph{et~al.}~\cite{chen} with regards to \emph{disposable domains} that
+are never requested more than once in the long-tail of DNS; out of the 11\% of
+domains that are not disposable, 5\% and 30\% of them have cache-hit ratios of
+at least 95\% and 80\% respectively.  It appears that fewer disposable domains
+are resolved in Tor because the observed cache sizes are not large enough for
+89\% unique lookups.  Achieving an 80\% cache-hit ratio with a cache of 10k
+entries does not seem to be an outlier.
+
+% Chen et al. (2014), DNS noise: Measuring the pervasiveness of disposable domains in modern DNS traffic
+% - ISP data set from end of 2011
+% - Fig 3, long-tail of domains with no additional look-ups (89%)
+% - Fig 4, cache hit distribution
+% - Fig 7, 30% of all non-unique domain names have at least 80% cache hit ratio
+% and 5% have at least 95% cache-hit ratios.
+%
+% Hao and Wang. (2017) Exploring Domain Name Based Features on the Effectiveness of DNS Caching
+% - University data set
+% - "we observe that a size of 100,000 entries would have a cache hit rate of about 86%"
+% - (context is to use this baseline for other policies than fifo/lru etc.)
+%
+% Avoiding to cache "disposable domains", i.e., domains that are only used
+% once seems to be a thing to research.  This is what Hao and Wang does.
+%
+% Jung et al. (2002) DNS Performance and the Effectiveness of Caching
+% - MIT network 80-86% cache hits, much because multiple TCP connections from
+% browsers
+% - "We find that the distribution of names is Zipf-like, which immeaditely
+% limits even the theoretical effectivness of caching"
+% - 10 min TTL yields almost the same cache-hit ratio as a longer TTL
+% - Already with 10 clients, same cache-hit ratio as 1000 clients
+%
+% https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/docs/performance
+% - "While a few sites (and consequently DNS names) are very popular, most are of
+% interest to only a few users and are accessed rarely; so the majority of
+% requests result in cache misses"
+% - (Could not find anything about Google/Cloudflare cache-hit ratios for DNS)
+% - (Found a white paper saying 70-90%, but not a good source)
+%   - https://www.senki.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/213049567-How-to-Measure-Resolver-Performance.pdf
diff --git a/summary/src/tlwo/src/short.tex b/summary/src/tlwo/src/short.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d06c86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/tlwo/src/short.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+\section{Mitigations} \label{tlwo:sec:short}
+
+Until a more comprehensive defense can be deployed we propose two short-term
+mitigations that require little (fuzzy TTLs) or no (cover lookups) changes to
+Tor.  The former adds some uncertainty with regards to when a domain was added
+to an exit's DNS cache. The latter can remove or reduce the attacker's ability
+to conduct attacks against specific domains but is limited in its scalability.
+
+\subsection{Fuzzy TTLs} \label{tlwo:sec:short:fuzzy}
+Recall that it is possible to determine when a domain was inserted into an
+exit's DNS cache (Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:attack:detailed}) once you know the time $t$
+when the timeless timing attack started, the duration until the domain was no
+longer cached $x$ (repeated probes), and the expected clip value
+$\mathsf{clipped\_ttl}$ of the domain.  The idea of fuzzy TTLs is to add
+uncertainty by randomizing the length of time that an entry is cached.
+
+In more detail, keep Tor's DNS cache as-is but sample the cache duration
+uniformly at random from $[m, \mathsf{clipped\_ttl}]$, where $m$ is the minimum
+duration to cache.  Upon observing the exact time of removal $t+x$, the attacker
+now learns that the domain has been in the cache for the duration $x$ and was
+thus cached between $[t+x-\mathsf{clipped\_ttl}, t-m]$. Note that if $m =
+\mathsf{clipped\_ttl}$, then $x = 0$; the same as in Tor today.
+
+The reality of websites is unfortunately that they consist of multiple domains,
+reducing the effectiveness of fuzzy TTLs because the attacker uses the most
+lucky sample. For a list of domains $d_1,\hdots,d_k$ that were added at the same
+time with identical clips, then $x \leftarrow \mathsf{max}(x_1,\hdots,x_k)$.
+Based on our preload list measurements presented in
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long:preload}, we expect around 8--13 domains per site
+available for an attacker to potentially query for. Earlier work found
+a median of two unique domains out of ten domains in total per website on Alexa
+top 1M~\cite{GreschbachPRWF17}.
+
+Fuzzy TTLs are an ineffective mitigation if the attacker just wants to confirm
+suspected activity with a low base rate, i.e., the mere existence of cached
+domains anywhere in the network is enough of a signal~\cite{wfwo}. Fuzzy TTLs
+are a plus for websites that are modestly popular in the network, since the
+attacker has to determine which of several exits with cached domains is the
+correct one. Having to consider multiple domains and exits (to narrow down the
+exact time) is more noisy in the network and increases the risk of
+detection~\cite{AumannL07}. Attackers may be forced to consider a time-window of
+several seconds or even minutes, which is a big win for defending against
+correlation and confirmation attacks~\cite{GreschbachPRWF17,wfwo}.
+
+\subsection{Cover Lookups}
+The idea of the cover lookups mitigation is to simply inject domains into DNS
+caches in the Tor network to create false positives.   Injected domains must be
+indistinguishable from domains cached from real Tor user activity. For this, a
+distribution that models website visits for a particular base rate should be
+used rather than running, e.g., a deterministic cron job.  Further, care has to
+be taken to capture all predictable domains for each website to defend.
+
+A more drastic mitigation would be to keep a site's domains cached at every exit
+all the time, e.g., by running \texttt{exitmap}~\cite{exitmap} every five
+minutes. This obviously scales poorly.  The network overhead would already be
+significant for a few hundred sites, e.g., estimates based on Alexa top-1k would
+add about 26.7~requests per second to each exit.
+
+Cover lookups do not scale, even if just injected at few exits probabilistically
+according to some target base rate. It is a last resort mitigation for site
+operators that fear that their users are targeted by motivated attackers and
+where, for some reason, the site cannot transition to being completely (no
+resources loaded from other domains) hosted as an onion service.
diff --git a/summary/src/tlwo/src/tor-cache.tex b/summary/src/tlwo/src/tor-cache.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..392b755
--- /dev/null
+++ b/summary/src/tlwo/src/tor-cache.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+\section{Tor's DNS Cache Today} \label{tlwo:sec:torcache}
+
+To better understand the DNS cache of Tor today, we set out to collect
+performance metrics from exits in the live Tor network.
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:torcache:ethics} covers ethical considerations, followed by
+data collection in Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:torcache:collection} and resulting metrics
+in Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:torcache:metrics}.
+
+\subsection{Ethical Considerations} \label{tlwo:sec:torcache:ethics}
+
+We submitted a proposal to the Tor Research Safety Board describing measurements
+that would ultimately inform the design of a long-term defense
+(Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long}) against our improved attack (Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:attack}).
+To be able to assess the impact of the defense we needed to better understand
+the DNS cache Tor has today as a baseline. After a couple of iterations with the
+Tor Research Safety Board we reached consensus, and then successfully completed
+our university's ethical review process. The proposal also included measurements
+needed for our defense, described later in
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long:preload:collection}. During the measurements period of
+four months we consulted the Tor Research Safety Board to discuss our results.
+
+The intuition of our measurement is as follows.  Two exit relays are operated to
+collect counters related to domain lookups.  For example, the number of lookups
+and cache hits (Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:torcache:collection}). These counters are the
+result of all traffic at the exit, aggregated over 15 minutes intervals before
+being written to disk and then reset in memory. Based on an exit probability of
+about $0.0005$ ($\approx 100$Mbit/s), we extrapolated from the measurements of
+Mani \emph{et~al.}~\cite{ManiWJJS18} that we should expect about 725 website
+visits during 15 minutes.  Each website visit typically triggers multiple domain
+lookups~\cite{GreschbachPRWF17} that affect our global counters.  A collection
+interval of 15 minutes should thus aggregate hundreds of website visits for a
+small fraction of the network, making the resulting dataset hardly useful for an
+attacker performing correlation or confirmation attacks on the network.
+This sketch appears to be confirmed by our measurement results: out of 23,632
+15-minute intervals, only 18 contained less than 1,000 lookups.  
+Our conclusion together with the Tor Research Safety Board was that the
+resulting dataset should be safe to make public (further discussed later).
+
+\subsection{Data Collection} \label{tlwo:sec:torcache:collection}
+
+Two 100 Mbit/s exit relays were operated by volunteers on the premises of
+DFRI\footnote{More information about DFRI can be found at their website:
+\url{https://www.dfri.se}.}
+from May 2 until September 3, 2022.  One exit was configured in its exit policy
+with \emph{web} ports.\footnote{%
+	Reject all ports except 80 and 443.  (The exit can still do DNS for users.)
+} The other relay was configured with
+\emph{permissive} ports to also allow non-web traffic.\footnote{%
+	Allow all ports except 25, 119, 135--139, 445, 563, 1214, 4661--4666,
+	6346--6429, 6699, and 6881--6999.
+}  Otherwise the two exits were identical,
+running on the same VM with a dedicated \texttt{unbound} process that had
+caching disabled by setting the \texttt{rrset-cache-size} to zero (to avoid TTL
+biases). We collected the following counters every 15 minutes at both exits:
+
+\begin{description}
+	\item[timestamp] UNIX timestamp when the data was collected.
+	\item[lookups] Total number of observed domain lookups.
+	\item[hits\_5m] Number of cache hits with a TTL of 300 seconds.
+	\item[hits\_60m] Number of cache hits with a TTL of 3,600 seconds.
+	\item[hits\_pending] Number of cache hits with a pending resolve, i.e.,
+		an answer has been requested but is not yet available.
+	\item[hits\_same\_circuit] Number of streams that looked up a domain
+		that was previously looked up on the same circuit. 
+	\item[num\_cache\_entries] Number of entries in Tor's DNS cache.
+\end{description}
+
+A timestamp is needed to plot metrics as a function of time.  Timestamps are
+also crucial for the additional counters described in
+Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long:preload:collection}.  The number of lookups and different
+types of cache hits are needed to get a baseline of cache-hit ratios.  The
+number of entries in Tor's DNS cache (at the time of collection) is needed to
+get a baseline of memory usage. The necessary Tor changes to collect all metrics
+(including Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long:preload:collection}) were relatively modest:
+400 lines of code.
+
+\subsection{Metrics} \label{tlwo:sec:torcache:metrics}
+
+Regarding lookups per 15 minutes, the web exit processed a mean of 17,530 and
+median of 13,393 lookups (Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:metrics:lookweb}), and the permissive
+exit processed a mean of 41,100 and median of 26,940 lookups
+(Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:metrics:lookperm}). The permissive exit policy results in
+significantly more lookups. Around August 1, our exits experienced downtime,
+visible as dips in lookups in both figures (at times fewer than 1,000 lookups,
+as noted in Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:torcache:ethics}). Exit probability is weakly
+correlated with lookups: Pearson correlation 0.30 (web) and 0.16 (permissive).
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\subfloat[][web]{%
+		\includegraphics[width=.5\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/plot_lookups-web.pdf}
+		\label{tlwo:fig:metrics:lookweb}
+	}
+	\subfloat[][permissive]{%
+		\includegraphics[width=.5\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/plot_lookups-permissive.pdf}
+		\label{tlwo:fig:metrics:lookperm}
+	}
+	\caption{Lookups every 15 minutes and exit probability.}
+	\label{tlwo:fig:lookups}
+\end{figure}
+
+Figures~\ref{tlwo:fig:metrics:cacheweb} and~\ref{tlwo:fig:metrics:cacheperm} show the
+number of entries in Tor's DNS cache.  The web exit has a mean of 7,672 and
+median of 7,325 entries, and the permissive exit a mean of 12,130 and median of
+11,408 entries. Both appear relatively stable compared to the number of lookups
+(note log-scale y-axis in Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:lookups}).  Likely, this is
+because traffic on the Tor network is not uniformly distributed, but rather
+concentrated to relatively few destinations, e.g., as shown with website
+popularity~\cite{ManiWJJS18}.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\subfloat[][web]{%
+		\includegraphics[width=.5\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/plot_cache_entries-web.pdf}
+		\label{tlwo:fig:metrics:cacheweb}
+	}
+	\subfloat[][permissive]{%
+		\includegraphics[width=.5\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/plot_cache_entries-permissive.pdf}
+		\label{tlwo:fig:metrics:cacheperm}
+	}
+	\caption{Cache entries every 15 minutes.}
+	\label{tlwo:fig:cache}
+\end{figure}
+
+Central to a DNS cache is its \emph{cache-hit} ratio: how often lookups can be
+resolved using cached entries instead of asking DNS resolvers.
+Figures~\ref{tlwo:fig:metrics:hitsweb} and~\ref{tlwo:fig:metrics:hitsperm} show the
+cache-hit ratios for the two exits, with a mean cache-hit ratio of 0.80 (web)
+and 0.83 (permissive). We also show if the cache hits occurred due to a cache
+entry used earlier on the same circuit (``same'') or from another circuit
+(``shared''). Further, over all the cache hits, we show if the hits were because
+of DNS entries with a five-minute cached TTL (``5min''), a 60-minute cached TTL
+(``60min''), or pending entries in the DNS cache (``pending''). Same circuit
+hits are likely due to Tor Browser improving performance by creating multiple
+streams to the same destination. The cross-circuit cache-hit ratio is much
+smaller (``shared'') with a mean of 0.11 (web) and 0.17 (permissive). We return
+to these ratios in Section~\ref{tlwo:sec:long:evaluation} to compare with our
+defense.
+
+\begin{figure}[!t]
+	\centering
+	\subfloat[][web]{%
+	\includegraphics[width=.67\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/plot_cache_hits-web.pdf}
+	\label{tlwo:fig:metrics:hitsweb}
+	}\\
+	\subfloat[][permissive]{%
+	\includegraphics[width=.67\columnwidth]{src/tlwo/img/plot_cache_hits-permissive.pdf}
+	\label{tlwo:fig:metrics:hitsperm}
+	}
+	\caption{%
+		Cache-hit ratio every 15 minutes. The total ratio can be split
+		by same+shared hits or 60min+5min+pending hits.
+	}
+	\label{tlwo:fig:hits}
+\end{figure}
+
+During the four months of measurements, our exits experienced sporadic downtime
+(early August) and the Tor-network endured significant network DDoS
+activities~\cite{network-ddos}. This shows in our data, e.g., with the drop to
+close to zero lookups in Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:lookups}, huge spikes of cached entries
+in Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:cache}, and periods where the cache-hit ratio was almost
+one in Figure~\ref{tlwo:fig:hits}.
+
+To summarize, Tor's DNS cache has a cache-hit ratio over 80\% using a modestly
+sized DNS cache.  About 11--17\% of these hits are due to sharing the cache
+across circuits.  The number of lookups are weakly correlated to exit
+probability.
author	Rasmus Dahlberg <rasmus@rgdd.se>	2024-10-15 16:08:16 +0200
committer	Rasmus Dahlberg <rasmus@rgdd.se>	2024-10-15 16:08:16 +0200
commit	385cc92bc91e1a6c3724085c060e76bf40c13ed3 (patch)
tree	26d0a8f81f2caa472830fd40a51844bb202c1355 /summary