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+\begin{kaupaper}[
+    author={%
+      Tobias Pulls and \textbf{Rasmus Dahlberg}
+    },
+    title={%
+      Website Fingerprinting with Website Oracles
+    },
+    reference={%
+      PETS (2020)
+    },
+    summary={%
+      One of the properties Tor aims to provide against local network attackers
+      is unlinkability between end-users (sender anonymity set) and their
+      destinations on the Internet (receiver anonymity set).  A website
+      fingerprinting attack aims to break anonymity in this model by inferring
+      which website an identifiable end-user is visiting based only on the
+      traffic entering the Tor network.  We extend the attacker model for
+      website fingerprinting attacks by introducing the notion of \emph{website
+      oracles}.  A website oracle answers the following question: was website $w$
+      visited during time frame $t$?  In other words, the attacker can query the
+      receiver anonymity set for websites that were (not) visited.  Our
+      simulations show that augmenting past website fingerprinting attacks to
+      include website oracles significantly reduces false positives for all but
+      the most popular websites, e.g., to the order of $10^{-6}$ for
+      classifications around Alexa top-10k and much less for the long tail of
+      sites.  Further, some earlier website fingerprinting defenses are largely
+      ineffective in the (stronger) attacker model that includes website
+      oracles.  We discuss a dozen real-world website oracles ranging from
+      centralized access logs to widely accessible real-time bidding platforms
+      and DNS caches, arguing that they are inherent parts of the protocols used
+      to perform website visits.  Therefore, access to a website oracle should
+      be an assumed attacker capability when evaluating which website
+      fingerprinting defenses are effective.
+    },
+    participation={\vspace{-.25cm}
+      Tobias is the main author and conducted most of the work.  I mainly
+      contributed by coining the name \emph{website oracle}, evaluating
+      sources of real-world website oracles, and performing our non-simulated
+      network experiments.
+    },
+    label={
+      paper:cat
+    },
+]
+  \maketitle
+  \begin{abstract}
+    \input{src/cat/src/abstract}
+  \end{abstract}
+
+  \input{src/cat/src/intro}
+  \input{src/cat/src/background}
+  \input{src/cat/src/oracles}
+  \input{src/cat/src/sources}
+  \input{src/cat/src/sim}
+  \input{src/cat/src/wf}
+  \input{src/cat/src/discussion}
+  \input{src/cat/src/related}
+  \input{src/cat/src/conclusions}
+  \input{src/cat/src/ack}
+
+  \bibliographystyle{plain}
+  \bibliography{src/cat/src/ref-min}
+  
+  \begin{appendices}
+    \input{src/cat/src/bayes}
+    \input{src/cat/src/lessons}
+    \input{src/cat/src/othersources}
+  \end{appendices}
+
+\end{kaupaper}