From 385cc92bc91e1a6c3724085c060e76bf40c13ed3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rasmus Dahlberg <rasmus@rgdd.se>
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2024 16:08:16 +0200
Subject: Import PhD thesis

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+\begin{kaupaper}[
+    author={%
+      \textbf{Rasmus Dahlberg},
+      Tobias Pulls,
+      Tom Ritter, and
+      Paul Syverson
+    },
+    title={%
+      Privacy-Preserving \& Incrementally-Deployable Support for Certificate Transparency in Tor
+    },
+    reference={%
+      PETS (2021)
+    },
+    summary={%
+      One deployment challenge of Certificate Transparency is to ensure that
+      monitors and end-users are engaged in gossip-audit protocols.  This is
+      particularly difficult for end-users because such engagement can harm
+      privacy.  For example, verifying that a certificate is included by
+      fetching an inclusion proof from a log reveals which website was visited.
+      We propose a gradual roll-out of Certificate Transparency in Tor Browser
+      that preserves privacy \emph{due to} and \emph{how we use} the anonymity
+      network Tor.  The complete design holds log operators accountable for
+      certificates they promise to append by having Tor relays fetch inclusion
+      proofs against the same view agreed upon by directory authorities in Tor's
+      consensus.  Found issues (if any) are reported to trusted auditors.  The
+      incremental design side-steps much of the practical deployment effort by
+      replacing the audit-report pattern with cross-logging of certificates in
+      independent logs, thus assuming that at least one log is honest as opposed
+      to no log in the complete design.  All Tor Browser needs to do is verify
+      log signatures and then submit the encountered certificates to randomly
+      selected Tor relays.  Such submissions are probabilistic to balance
+      performance against the risk of eventual detection of log misbehavior.
+      Processing of the submitted certificates is also randomized to reduce
+      leakage of real-time browsing patterns, something Tor Browser cannot do on
+      its own due to criteria like disk avoidance and the threat model for
+      wanting Certificate Transparency in the first place.  We provide a
+      security sketch and estimate performance overhead based on Internet
+      measurements.
+    },
+    participation={\vspace{-.25cm}
+      I had the initial idea and was the main driver to move the work forward,
+      first in discussion with Tobias and then together with Tom and Paul.
+    },
+    label={
+      paper:ctor
+    },
+]
+  \maketitle
+  \begin{abstract}
+    \input{src/ctor/src/abstract}
+  \end{abstract}
+  
+  \input{src/ctor/src/introduction}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/background}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/adversary}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/design}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/analysis}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/cross-logging}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/performance}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/privacy}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/related}
+  \input{src/ctor/src/conclusion}
+
+  \input{src/ctor/src/acknowledgements}
+  
+  \bibliographystyle{plain}
+  \bibliography{src/ctor/src/ref}
+
+  \begin{appendices}
+    \input{src/ctor/src/appendix}
+  \end{appendices}
+\end{kaupaper}
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