

Using Sigsum Logs to Detect Malicious and Unintended Key-Usage

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
Outline

- 1. A weak link in firmware updates
- 2. How transparency logs can help
- 3. Meet the sigsum logging design

Disclamer

I'm not really a firmware hacker

UEFI firmware updates (1/2)




https://embeddedcomputing.com/technology/security/software-security/understanding-uefi-firmware-update-and-its-vital-role-in-keeping-computing-systems-secure

A problem of trust

4/22

UEFI firmware updates (2/2)

- Signed firmware updates
- Trust policy (public keys)
- Root of trust



The gist is that trusted keys sign firmware updates

The zoomed out problem

Signer perspective



"Have I been owned?"

Verifier perspective




"Am I being targeted?"

It's hard to know which signatures are out there

Can we make signing keys less juicy targets for attackers?

yes.

A bulletin board for signed firmware updates



A transparency log is really just a tamper-evident append-only list

List

[foo, bar, baz]

Append-only

Tamper-evident (1/2)

Tamper-evident (2/2)

[bar, baz, qux]

Cryptographically verifiable


Merkle tree

tree head
$$\longrightarrow$$
 .— g:=H(e + f) —. www.rgdd.se/r/tlog-0
e:=H(a + b) f:=H(c + d)
 $a:=H("foo")$ b:=H("bar") c:=H("baz") d:=H("qux")
list items: foo bar baz qux

Inclusion proof

Append-only proof

A complete overview



No signed firmware goes unnoticed

Details of course matter in practise



Sigsum is about nailing the details for a particular setting

www.sigsum.org


What is Sigsum?

- A transparency log design
- A transparency log API
- A FOSS software project




What you get from Sigsum

- Logging of signed checksums
- Centrally operated logs
- Distributed trust (m-of-n)
- Offline verification



Threat model: attacker runs everything but m witnesses you choose

I might have sigsum-logged these slides...



168c1008d0208bb6bcb73e34a15b98526ee50c1a1966141b23d342584ffaf5f7 https://gitlab.glasklarteknik.se/rgdd/osfc-22/-/blob/main/releases/

www.sigsum.org


What you don't get with Sigsum

- Real-time logging latency
- Cryptographic agility
- Complicated parsers
- Poisoned logs
- Spammed logs



Current status

- Pretty stable foundation
- V0 design and API documents
- Log aimed for self-hosting
- Prototype witness and monitor
- Debug tool for log interations



Ongoing work: bump version to v1, cut a log release, better tooling

Take away

- Firmware signing keys are juicy targets
- Transparency logs add detection and deterrence
- Sigsum's trade-offs are promising for firmware
 - Avoids non-essential complexity
 - Offline verification
 - Everything but m-of-n witnesses are broken



Thank you

- GitLab: https://www.sigsum.org/r/src
- Design document: https://www.sigsum.org/r/design
- API specification: https://www.sigsum.org/r/api
- Speaker: https://www.rgdd.se
- Slides: https://www.rgdd.se/r/osfc-22

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