


# On Certificate Transparency Verification and Unlinkability of Websites Visited by Tor users

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
# Outline




### 1. Introduction

- 2. Thesis overview
- 3. Contributions
- 4. Take away

## How is all of this related to you?




Web browsing



Possibly with Tor Browser

## Some preliminaries, Certificate Transparency what?




Why should we take log promises at face value?

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## **Research questions**


- 1. Can trust requirements in Certificate Transparency be reduced in practise?
- 2. How can authentication of websites be improved in the context of Tor Browser?
- 3. How do the protocols used during website visits affect unlinkability between Tor users and their destination websites?




RQ1: "less trust reqs in CT" RQ2: "CT+Tor" RQ3: "exploit protocols for deanonymization"

# Contributions

- 1. Reduced trust in third-party monitoring
- 2. Increased probability of split-view detection
- 3. Improved detectability of website hijacks targeting Tor Browser
- 4. An extension of the attacker model for website fingerprinting
- 5. Remotely-exploitable probing-attacks on Tor's DNS cache
- 6. A redesign of Tor's DNS cache to defend against all (timeless) timing attacks




### C1: Reduced trust in third-party monitoring



#### Secure in multi-instance setting, small performance overhead


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## C2: Increased probability of split-view detection



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# C3: Improved detectability of website hijacks targeting Tor Browser



## Solution (continued)

Attacker capabilities


- Vanilla Tor Browser threat model
- Plus zero-day on Tor Browser
- Plus operates enough logs

Security

- Break any of the four phases
- "Break" must go unnoticed

Gradual roll out, also use-cases relating to onion services

# C4: An extension of the attacker model for website fingerprinting




- Smaller destination anonymity set
- Eliminates most false positives for Alexa top-10k and beyond
- Gaining access to a website oracle?

Certificate Transaprency logs, Certificate Authorities, ...

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# C5: Remotely-exploitable probing-attacks on Tor's DNS cache




### Timing attack

#### Timeless timing attack


12M repetitions in the live Tor network, fully reliable attack prototype

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# C6: A redesign of Tor's DNS cache to defend against all (timeless) timing attacks



### Preloaded DNS cache



## Summary of research methods



Threat modelling, proof sketching



Real-world measurements



Network simulation



Prototyping and evaluation

## Take away

- Trust requirements can be reduced wrt. monitors and logs
- Certificate Transparency can work in Tor Browser's setting
- The website fingerprinting threat model could be stronger
- "On…"



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Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research

